Le territoire de la philosophie serait divisé par une frontière infranchissable entre modèles analytique et continental. S'élevant contre cette idée reçue, cet essai met en lumière le socle commun de la philosophie des trente dernières années : pour sortir du „dispositif de la perspective» où le sujet était spectateur du monde, les philosophes contemporains ont conçu un sujet à ce point immergé dans le monde qu'il n'en est plus que le reflet ou l'effet. Cette solution a un nom (...) : le réalisme, unanimement revendiqué aujourd'hui, de l'actuelle phénoménologie aux disciples de Wittgenstein en passant par les nouvelles métaphysiques. Cette solution ne serait-elle pas devenue un simple lieu commun? Ce panorama critique de la philosophie contemporaine montre les écueils et l'impossibilité de ce réalisme partagé, dont il soumet les multiples expressions à une analyse serrée et limpide. Comment ensuite dépasser les apories du réalisme sans retomber dans le modèle du face-à-face entre l'homme et le monde? La réponse suppose une réflexion sur la possibilité même de la philosophie aujourd'hui. Au lieu commun réaliste de la philosophie contemporaine, l'auteur objecte le «lieu de l'universel». (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionAu xive siècle, Walter Burley s'est rendu célèbre par les polémiques qu'il a conduites contre la position théologique de Guillaume d'Ockham sur la quantité et sur ses conceptions réductionnistes en philosophie naturelle du mouvement et du lieu, au point de lui avoir consacré en 1335, presque trente ans après ses premiers commentaires aristotéliciens, une réécriture d'un certain nombre de passages de ses œuvres physiques et logiques. (...) Dans sa définition du lieu, Ockham refuse que le terme d'ultimum appartenant au corps contenant, ne soit pas le corps contenant lui-même. L'objet de cette étude est de comparer les études sur le lieu de Walter Burley avant et après 1320. Nous montrerons tout d'abord qu'avant 1320, Burley est marqué par la position averroïste sur le lieu et rejette la définition aristotélicienne des Catégories. Nous constaterons alors qu'après cette date, Burley consacre au lieu une étude beaucoup plus détaillée et développée qui doit prouver contre Ockham que le lieu n'est ni un corps ni une surface. Nous terminerons cette analyse en définissant le critère principal de distinction entre les deux époques d'écriture sur le lieu, l'intérêt accru de Burley pour les indivisibles et la structure du continu après 1320.La Reception Aristotelicienne et Averroïste du Lieu Chez BurleyAristote présente deux définitions contradictoires du lieu. Dans les Catégories, il cite le lieu dans la liste des quantités continues telles que la ligne, la surface, le corps et même le temps. Dans son livre iv de la Physique, le lieu est la limite du corps contenant. Dans le premier cas, le lieu est vu comme une capacité réceptive d'un corps et ses parties, dont la caractéristique est d'occuper un lieu. Dans le deuxième cas, Aristote nie que les parties du corps distinctes du corps, occuperaient un lieu par elles-mêmes. De plus, les parties d'un corps continu ne correspondent pas à la nature des parties qui pourraient être dans un lieu, c'est-à-dire des parties strictement séparées de ce qui fait leur contour. Dans la première définition du lieu comme espèce de la quantité, le lieu possède l'extension tridimensionnelle du corps logé. Cette interprétation est remise en cause dans la Physique. La définition aristotélicienne du lieu d'un corps est finalement basée sur quatre paramètres: le lieu n'est pas une partie du corps logé mais il a une capacité de contenance de ce corps, le lieu est aux justes dimensions du corps logé, le lieu est séparable du corps logé puisque ce dernier peut changer de lieu, le lieu propre se distingue du haut et du bas. Dans l'étude aristotélicienne sur la nature du lieu, sont envisagées quatre possibilités dont seule la dernière est véritablement retenue, puisqu'elle remplit les quatre conditions exposées plus haut dans sa définition: il s'agit de la surface du corps contenant. Aristote rejette les trois autres, le lieu comme forme, comme matière et comme extension ou espace séparé entre les surfaces du corps contenant.Burley adopte la solution médiévale la plus répandue sur les notions contradictoires du lieu selon Aristote: il se réfère à Averroès qui privilégie la définition du lieu de la Physique, comme contour ultime du corps contenant et exclut la solution des Catégories, quand elle est en conflit avec d'autres passages de l'œuvre aristotélicienne.La Conception Averroïste du Lieu Dans les Ecrits D'Avant 1320Une volonté de définir le lieu indépendamment des espèces de la quantitéLes deux premières versions de la Physique de Burley s'appuient sur la définition du lieu comme extrémité du corps contenant, capable de contenir et d'entourer le corps logé sans avoir ses dimensions propres ni être un corps. Deux manuscrits contiennent les questions 35 et 36 du livre iv sur le lieu. Dans la question 35, Burley soutient que le lieu n'est pas une quantité, car il est dans la catégorie de la passion et ne peut avoir une ou plusieurs dimensions. La question 36 reprend l'étude du lieu.. (shrink)

En jetant la sonde de l’interrogation philosophique au lieu de soi, Jean-Luc Marion nous donne une approche organique et originale à la pensée d’Augustin, en entrecroisant entre eux deux plans herméneutiques : sur le premier, l’on poursuit un itinéraire de rapprochement au cœur de la confessio augustinienne permettant de réduire le vaste univers sémantique d’Augustin à un noyau génétique unifiant; sur le second plan, le parcours philosophique de l’auteur se développe ultérieurement, tendant à désarticuler un bloc théorique d’ontologie et (...) métaphysique et atteignant ainsi par une voie phénoménologique une idée de philosophie finalement affranchie de la présupposition du caractère central de la question de l’étant et du fondement. En tout cas, même si l’on ne veut pas donner trop d’éclat à la critique anti-ontologique et antimétaphysique caractérisant l’approche à la pensée augustinienne proposée dans cet ouvrage, l’acquis spéculatif de celle-ci ne semble pas diminuer. Un parmi les mérites principaux de ce livre est d’avoir restitué à la confessio sa dignité théorique, en y apercevant un lieu phénoménologique originaire où la relation entre moi et Dieu se noue; une relation dont le caractère paradoxal, autrement insoutenable, est résolu par le primat du don et de l’amour. Ce sont tous ces traits originaux qui nous mènent à dire qu’Au lieu de soi n’est pas seulement un livre sur Augustin, car il est plus qu’un livre sur Augustin. (shrink)

Cet essai reconstruit les principales étapes de la confrontation de Ricœur avec la dialectique de Hegel, depuis ses premières notes manuscrites sur « Hegel et la négativité » jusqu’à l’essai de 1975, « Le lieu de la dialectique ». L’objectif que l’on vise est triple. Il s’agit tout d’abord de reconstruire dans sa genèse l’effort ricœurien de « régionalisation » de la dialectique hégélienne, dont les raisons ne peuvent pas être réduites à un refus générique des effets de totalisation (...) systématique de l’identification hégélienne entre négation et médiation. Le deuxième objectif est la mise en relève des raisons exogènes et endogènes qui sous-tendent l’élargissement et le déplacement que le lieu de la dialectique hégélienne subit, suite à la greffe ricœurienne de l’herméneutique sur la phénoménologie. Enfin, on vise à déterminer la place variable que la dialectique hégélienne occupe par rapport aux autres « dialectiques » qui nourrissent le style dialectique de la philosophie de Ricœur, de la « dialectique » du paradoxe de Kierkegaard et de la dialectique des cinq genres du Sophiste – telles qu’il les interprète – à la dialectique nabertienne entre acte et signes. (shrink)

La notion de lieu occupe dans le système cartésien une place stratégique : elle en manifeste la singularité tant dans le domaine de la physique que dans celui de la métaphysique. En physique, les difficultés sont nombreuses : comment Descartes parvient-il à édifier une philosophie naturelle qui produit, notamment, les lois du choc et celle de la chute des graves, dans un cadre conceptuel qui nie l'existence du vide ainsi que celle de lieux différents? Jusqu'à quel point peut-on (...) parler d'une mathématisation du réel pour un corps de doctrine aussi peu algébrique que possible? Le spectre du roman cartésien doit être chassé afin de saisir la science cartésienne dans sa nouveauté radicale. Mais dès lors que l'on s'interroge sur les motifs conceptuels qui empêchent Descartes d'élaborer une mathématisation du réel, dont la Géométrie semble lui donner les moyens et les Regulae la méthode, on est conduit à préciser la nature des procédures résolutoires de la pensée, leur portée et leurs limites et, ainsi, à entrer de plain-pied dans le champ de la mathématique, tout d'abord, puis dans celui de la métaphysique. Dire ce qu'est et ce que peut un corps s'énonce à partir du savoir de ce qu'est et de ce que peut l'esprit. En effet, Descartes attribue à l'esprit la force et la puissance, non seulement d'inventer et de produire du nouveau, mais également celle, très concrète, d'imprimer une nouvelle détermination aux mouvements des esprits animaux. On peut considérer que la force chez Descartes est indexée au spirituel plutôt qu'au corporel et qu'en dehors de la question singulière de l'Eucharistie, elle n'est efficace qu'à la condition de ne pas être localisée stricto sensu en termes de lieu : Dieu agit dans le monde pour autant qu'il n'en fait pas partie et la glande pinéale est le siège principal de l'âme, sedes et non pas locus. Cette lecture de l'œuvre cartésienne trouve ainsi dans la notion de lieu un thème d'étude particulièrement fécond, dans la mesure où elle est mobilisée à la fois dans la physique et les mathématiques cartésiennes, mais également dans la question de la localisation de Dieu dans le monde, dans celle du Christ sous les espèces consacrées, et dans celle de l'âme dans le corps. Ainsi d'un lieu à un autre, nous sommes conduits au cœur du système cartésien, par un mouvement d'approfondissement réciproque des perspectives. (shrink)

Au lieu de soi marque un Haut Lieu du soi. Dans cette perspective, la hauteur du sujet s’acquiert par la verticalité (transcendance), et non pas uniquement par l’horizontalité (immanence). Interrogeant l’ambition d’une approche de saint Augustin du point de vue de saint Augustin lui-même, on montrera d’abord le mérite d’un tel renouvellement dans le cadre de la philosophie comme telle : la question de l’homme, le poids du soi, et le statut de l’éros. Une noble « disputatio (...) théologique et phénoménologique » cependant naîtra dans la confrontation avec d’autres ouvrages (en particulier Dieu, la chair et l’autre. D’Irénée à Duns Scot [PUF, « Épiméthée », 2008]) : doit-on nécessairement « dépasser » la métaphysique dans un tiers ordre, ou ne convient-il pas plutôt de la « transformer de l’intérieur » dans le geste que semble avoir accompli le Docteur d’Hippone lui-même? Il en va ici du statut de la philosophie dans son rapport à la métaphysique et à la théologie, mais aussi de la possibilité d’une « nouvelle pratique phénoménologique de la philosophie médiévale », pour aujourd’hui comme pour demain. (shrink)

Cet article propose une discussion sur les sources d'une histoire des savoirs à la recherche d'institutions, de communautés et plus largement des lieux où ces savoirs s'élaborent. Il montre que la nature scripturaire des sources d'un savoir possible sur les lieux de savoir du passé doit faire partie des objets de l'analyse, sous peine de reproduire des fictions sociales créées en leur temps pour servir des politiques diverses. Le cas étudié semble proposer ensemble à l'observation certains des objets favoris de (...) l'histoire intellectuelle du XVIIe siècle (académies, salons, École), et permet ainsi de questionner l'inégale solidité sociale de ces objets, en réinsérant l'activité d'écriture et de publication d'un auteur philosophe dans le tissu des multiples écritures sur la philosophie et ses lieux qui ont, à cette époque, fait d'elle autre chose qu'une discipline. (shrink)

"Que représentent l'« espace » et le « lieu » pour les philosophes? Quelle place occupent ces « notions » dans les différents systèmes de pensée? Sont-elles synonymes? Ont-elles des sens qui changent avec les découvertes scientifiques (en géométrie, en physique, en astronomie...)? Comment sont-elles, ou non, liées au concept de temps? Ont-elles à voir avec d'autres thèmes, comme le territoire, la ville et la campagne, le paysage? Pour la première fois, en langue française, un ouvrage rassemble les contributions (...) de philosophes confirmés, qui explorent la pensée d'auteurs majeurs de l'histoire intellectuelle occidentale en privilégiant l'espace et le lieu. Ce livre collectif complète Le Territoire des philosophes (La Découverte, 2009), qui se focalisait sur les penseurs du XXe siècle. Dix-neuf auteurs, de Platon à Nietzsche, sont ici questionnés quant à leur usage théorique de l'espace et du lieu, alors même qu'ils sont, pour la plupart, célèbres pour d'autres concepts et apports. Les contributeurs s'efforcent de situer la pensée de leur auteur dans son temps et dans la longue géohistoire des idées. La philosophie est ici entendue à la fois comme un « art de vivre » et une manière de comprendre le monde, deux dimensions inséparables dans la saisie et de l'espace et du lieu. Tout être humain est « spatio-temporalisé» et c'est seulement en ce sens qu'il habite la Terre et en fait sa demeure." Résumé commercial. (shrink)

This paper argues that a specifically environmental ethic is neither needed nor perhaps desirable for effecting the change in values for which many environmentalists have rightly called. Rather, familiar values such as beauty and excellence, and especially an outlook that regards those values as central aspects of a good life, may be all that is needed. The requisite ethic of appreciation is already embedded to some degree in a wide range of cultures, so no radical shift in values is called (...) for, nor convergence on a tendentious moral framework. But this outlook meets with skepticism from the dominant public ethos, as embodied for instance in mainstream economics. While this paper does not offer a full-blooded defense of an aesthetic grounding for environmental concern, it does suggest that the skepticism about such a grounding is considerably overblown. (shrink)

Husserl's phenomenology provides theory for empirical science and other practices in the form of transcendental philosophy after Kant. This phenomenology is a reflection on mental objects in relation to mental processes, some of which are shared in culture: a theoretical framework that grounds and co-ordinates theory-production for empirical practice. The importance of the original work of Edmund Husserl for contemporary empirical psychology is that it provides the conceptual justification for the methods employed and the interpretative stances taken. Informed theoretically by (...) Husserl's phenomenology, empirical psychology is thus a discipline grounded and co-ordinated by essences. Essences are about the being of consciousness connected with other consciousness and mental senses, expressed as various forms of intentionality in connection with sense and meaning. The aim of this paper is to clarify some key features of Ideas I rather than to comment on the quality of the translation by Dahlstrom or the closeness of the readings of leading phenomenological psychologists to the original. (shrink)

Nous nous proposons dans cette intervention de structurer synchroniquement trois moments philosophiques d’origines differentes : l’intuition agissante chez Kitarō Nishida, la dialectique de la mediation absolue chez Hajime Tanabe et la philosophie de l’individuation chez Gilbert Simondon, dans un contexte de reflexion philosophique sur la nature de la vie humaine. Les trois moments semblent susceptibles de se croiser, se critiquer et se completer dans un terrain transductif au sens ou l’entend Simondon. C’est ce nouveau terrain que nous entendons defricher (...) afin d’ouvrir une perspective ou un individu humain se transforme en agent responsable d’un transhumanisme a travers le processus de l’individuation dynamique et transindividuelle, laquelle nous preparerait a l’emergence du posthumain dans un futur proche. (shrink)

Panorama de la vision du lieu et de l'urbain de 20 philosophes importants du 20e siècle de Simmel, James ou Heidegger à Maldiney, Nancy en passant par Derrida, Foucault ou Deleuze.--[Memento].

This paper argues that a specifically environmental ethic is neither needed nor perhaps desirable for effecting the change in values for which many environmentalists have rightly called. Rather, familiar values such as beauty and excellence, and especially an outlook that regards those values as central aspects of a good life, may be all that is needed. The requisite ethic of appreciation is already embedded to some degree in a wide range of cultures, so no radical shift in values is called (...) for, nor convergence on a tendentious moral framework. But this outlook meets with skepticism from the dominant public ethos, as embodied for instance in mainstream economics. While this paper does not offer a full-blooded defense of an aesthetic grounding for environmental concern, it does suggest that the skepticism about such a grounding is considerably overblown. (shrink)

Pour la plupart des exégètes modernes, la pensée économique grecque se trouve exclusivement dans les traités « oikonomiques », et son objet se limite à l’économie domestique. Pourtant, cette pensée économique offre également une dimension politique, présente aussi bien dans ces traités spécialisés que dans des textes politiques consacrés à l’organisation de la cité. Cette dimension politique de la pensée économique antique consiste en particulier à s’interroger sur la proximité et la différence entre l’oikos et la polis, et entre le (...) domaine économique et le domaine politique. Après en avoir donné des exemples provenant de diverses traditions philosophiques antiques, je montrerai plus particulièrement que chez Xénophon et Platon, les rapports entre ces deux sphères se présentent sous deux formes principales : une similitude étroite ou une différence articulée. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Philosophy of George Engel and the Philosophy of MedicineJeffrey P. Spike (bio)KeywordsGeorge Engel, psychosocial medicine, medical education, medical humanities, interviewing skills, philosophy of medicine, scientific methodDoctor Brad Lewis has encouraged us to consider George Engel’s philosophy with his excellent essay on Engel and Pragmatism. As a philosopher teaching full time in a medical school, it is refreshing to have an opportunity to analyze the work of two (...) physicians at this level of reflection and abstraction. It is even more of a pleasure because I knew Dr. Engel personally while I was teaching at the University of Rochester School of Medicine. I will make some observations of the philosophy behind Dr. Engel’s work, both published and practical, that is, as reflected in his writing but also in his influence in the medical curriculum at the institution that he called home for some thirty years (as seems appropriate when considering someone’s bona fides as a pragmatist).Engel’s Philosophy and Medicine’s PhilosophyGeorge Engel’s primary philosophical concern was to fight the powerful belief (or perhaps delusion) that medicine was evolving into a pure physical science, an extension of biochemistry and cell biology, or as we would now call them, proteomics and genomics. There is little evidence that he espoused any one methodology for basic science, so much as he opposed any one methodology for medicine. So to say he was a pragmatist seems underdetermined by his words, if that is taken to mean he advocated for changing the methodological model for scientific research. Rather the question is whether his preferred medical methodology is best characterized as pragmatic, or by some other description. On that score I agree with Lewis wholeheartedly.Of course, it might be that the claim of pragmatism is not meant to suggest a change in method for basic science, but to advocate for retaining an appreciation for the whole range of approaches to knowledge, from experimental science to epidemiology, and from epidemiology to acculturation. By that definition of pragmatism, Engel was indeed a pragmatist. Interpreted this way, he wanted medicine to stop worshipping the scientific method and appreciate that there are many paths to knowledge besides through the wet lab.It might be said that there are different scientific methods for different sciences, and Engel wanted us to appreciate that the reductionist methods [End Page 315] appropriate to the sciences of the small are not necessarily methods that can be applied to all sizes of objects we study, or all levels of reality (like the psychological and social). This is the truth about the world, although I am not sure that this is what Engel meant. As Lewis notes, Engel’s writing does sometimes sound as if he worshipped at the alter of science, as if all subjects of importance can be studied scientifically. But if he believed that, he was not correct. It might be, if all the subjects of the university that Lewis mentions are important, that some will turn out to be able to be studied in academically rigorous methods that are not scientific in any of the usual meanings of the word. Consider philosophy itself, for example.To the degree that it may stretch the evidence to say that Engel would have advocated for a pragmatic scientific method, it is still the case that pragmatism as outlined by Lewis and Engel’s biopsychosocial model can both be used to help medicine understand itself and overcome the temptation to idolize science. Medicine is not a science, or at least it is not just a science; in fact, I would suggest that it never was a science, and it will never be a science. Medicine is about health and illness, and uses whatever science it can to promote health and to treat (ameliorate or cure) illness.None of this should necessarily lead us to idolize pragmatism either. If each subject has its own ideal methodology for study, then it may be that pragmatism is the preferred method for, say, clinical judgment, whereas the scientific method is the best for the ‘hard’ sciences, and logic for philosophy. Or perhaps pragmatism and inductive logic are competing models for clinical... (shrink)

La philosophie de langue française commence avec Montaigne. Après le latin, le français devient une langue philosophique majeure, caractérisée par la clarté, l'économie des mots, l'élégance et la simplicité. Cet ouvrage présente en premier lieu les six grands livres, véritables événements, qui constituent les clefs pour comprendre la philosophie française, les Essais de Montaigne, le Discours de la méthode de Descartes, La Recherche de la vérité de Malebranche, Le Contrat social de Rousseau, L'Evolution créatrice de Bergson et (...) L'Etre et le Néant de Sartre. Il examine ensuite les grands courants philosophiques, en raison de leur rapport à la métaphysique. Les courants antimétaphysiques sont surtout ceux de la philosophie des Lumières. Les courants étrangers à la métaphysique sont les moralistes français, la tradition épistémologique et la phénoménologie. Les courants métaphysiques sont caractérisés d'abord par la tradition classique, puis le spiritualisme du XIXe siècle, le bergsonisme, la philosophie de l'esprit, la philosophie de l'existence et la philosophie de la vie. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophy and the Interpretation of Pop CultureStefán SnaevarrPhilosophy and the Interpretation of Pop Culture, edited by William Irwin and Jorge J. E. Gracia. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007, 297 pp., $29.85 paper.There has been quite a boom lately in the market for philosophical books on popular culture. The young American philosopher William Irwin has led the way by starting the fad of "... and philosophy" books; (...) the first one that Irwin edited was Seinfeld and Philosophy. So it is only fitting that he is one of the editors of this volume on philosophical interpretation of popular culture. In contrast to most of the earlier books of this kind, a sizable number of the contributors to this volume belong to the top brass of America's aestheticians: Noël Carrol, Ted Cohen, Carolyn Korsmeyer, and Richard Shusterman, to name but a few. The book is divided into two parts, "Philosophy and Popular Culture" and "Interpretation and Popular Art Forms." These titles are self-explanatory; it might be added that the aforementioned top brass dominates the first part.Irwin provides the book with a witty and well-written introduction, but he operates with a very wide definition of popular culture, classifying movies as such as items of pop culture. However, the medium surely is not the message. The fact that novels can be part of popular culture does not make Joyce's Ulysses a pop cultural object. Irwin's chapter, "Philosophy as/and/of popular culture," is rather two papers in one. One half addresses the concept of popular culture, containing an insightful critical evaluation of, among others, Noël Carroll's concept of mass art. The other half proposes that we can use popular culture to disseminate philosophical ideas to the general public. More so than in the introduction, Irwin is actually rather critical of popular culture in this chapter. He worries about its negative effect on culture in general—no cult of pop culture here. In addition, he rejects the notion of popular culture having the potential of becoming philosophy or its surrogate. He reminds us that Socrates used examples from everyday life and the popular culture of his day to make his philosophical points. In a similar fashion, the popular culture of today can be a stepping stone for philosophers to reach wider audiences. If you cannot beat them, join them! Popular culture could, for instance, be used to warn the public against its own evil aspects. This is an excellent idea, and I could not agree more; I myself often use examples from popular culture in my own lectures with good results. Irwin should expand on this idea and present it in a separate article.Richard Shusterman's chapter does not add much to his earlier writings. It is also somewhat like two articles in one; the first is a criticism of the denigration of pleasure and entertainment as aesthetic values, and the second half is an attempt to bridge the divide between intrinsic value and instrumental value. Both halves [End Page 111] contain some excellent arguments, but popular culture tends to be on the fringe in Shusterman's argument. The focus is on other more traditional, philosophical issues. Perhaps another venue would have been more suitable for this article.In contrast to Shusterman, Caroline Korsmeyer addresses the issues of popular culture in a fairly straightforward manner. Popular culture can be educational, even philosophically so. This claim does not mean that works of popular culture are works of philosophy in the ordinary sense of the word. However, we can "treat philosophy as a success term to refer to works demanding imaginative engagement that results in the recognition... of a philosophical position, such that what is done in philosophy proper that induces a possible conclusion is done in another genre by means appropriate to its appreciation" (31). Given this understanding of philosophy, we can understand works of popular culture as vehicles of philosophy. Korsmeyer maintains that the TV series Angel conveys some of Simone de Beauvoir's ideas from one of her books. Korsmeyer's chapter also contains a delightful discussion of "the probable impossible" and "the possible improbable" in fiction. But... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nishida and Western PhilosophyAmos YongNishida and Western Philosophy. By Robert Wilkinson. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2009. vii + 175 pp.Robert Wilkinson is a comparative philosopher who teaches at Open University in Edinburgh and has worked for years in the areas of comparative philosophy of mind and comparative aesthetics. This book should be read as part of a larger discussion of the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), which began (...) with Keiji Nishitani (Nishida Kitarō, trans. S. Yamamoto and J. W. Heisig, University of California Press, 1991) and continues with Robert E. Carter (The Nothingness Beyond God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro, Paragon House, 1997) and Robert J.Wargo (The Logic of Nothingness: A Study of Nishida Kitarō, University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005), among others. Going beyond his predecessors, however—even though it is unfortunate that Wilkinson does not interact much with them explicitly—Nishida and Western Philosophy prosecutes a clear even if perhaps controversial thesis: that in the end, Nishida’s philosophy of self-contradictory identity was, as a natural outgrowth of his Buddhist and Zen experience of satori (awakening), fundamentally incommensurable with the philosophy of identity that has characterized the major trajectory of the Western philosophical tradition.There are four chapters to the book (besides the introduction and then the summary and conclusions). The first focuses on Nishida’s starting point, the Zen Buddhist experience of enlightenment regarding the ultimate emptiness (mu), which albeit a difficult term to translate can be understood at least in part as referring to the nonduality, or even the interrelatedness, of all reality. Nishida’s work can be seen as a lifelong quest to formalize this experiential insight systematically in dialogue with the Western philosophical tradition. In a sense, this can be understood as a spirituality in search of a metaphysic, and given the emergence of Japan on the world stage at the beginning of the twentieth century, it is not surprising that up-and-coming Japanese philosophers like Nishida sought to legitimate their own insights in the Western idiom. But precisely for the same reason, however, Nishida rarely appealed to Asian sources, even within the Buddhist tradition, especially in his earlier work.Chapter 2 explicates Nishida’s early philosophy of pure experience, particularly as summarized in his Inquiry into the Good (1911; English translation: Yale University Press, 1990). The major dialogue partner at this point was William James and his notion of radical empiricism, which provided Nishida with Western conceptual resources to think through the primordial base from out of which conscious experience emerged. Thus did pure experience point to the nondual dimension of consciousness before the split between subject and object. Nishida never repudiated his Jamesian connection, although his ongoing work pushed him further and deeper into the metaphysical and ontological dimensions of consciousness that eventually left behind James’s more psychologically driven formulations.Next Wilkinson turns to Nishida’s second major book, Intuition and Reflection in [End Page 231] Self-Consciousness (1917; English translation: State University of New York Press, 1987), and focuses primarily on the Japanese philosopher’s interactions with the Neo-Kantian school of philosophy, Fichte, and Bergson. Each of these provided specific resources for this stage of Nishida’s philosophical project. The Neo-Kantians helped him to think about how the noumena-phenomena and fact-value distinctions contrasted with his own philosophical intuitions regarding their primordial unity in historicity. Fichte enabled the forging of a philosophy of action-consciousness, which promised to go beyond the subject-object distinction, even if in the end (for Nishida), the Fichtean ego remained “trapped” within the logic of identity rather than becoming “delivered” by or within the Zen logic of no-thingness. Bergson, meanwhile, was attractive precisely because of his dynamic (rather than static) philosophy of elan vital or conscious becoming even if Nishida was already discerning at this time that the Bergsonian elan both presumed an ontological togetherness that succumbed to the Western logic of identity on the one hand, and was not sufficiently attentive to the contrary of becoming—death, or the lapsing back into no-thingness—which was a prominent feature of historical reality on the other hand. Yet these Western interlocutors... (shrink)

Nous appelons «thèse des descriptions multiples» l'opinion qui veut qu'une seule et même action peut etre decrite de plusieurs façons différentes selon que Ton prend en considération ou non les différentes conséquences, plus ou moins lointaines, de cette action. Cette thèse joue chez certains penseurs un rôle essentiel dans la solution du problème de l'individuation des actions. Chez D. Davidson notamment, elle intervient de façon décisive dans la démonstration de sa fameuse thèse que toute action se réduit à des mouvements (...) corporels. Nous entendons montrer, premièrement, que la thèse des descriptions multiples, à supposer même qu'elle soit vraie, ne saurait remplir le rôle que lui assigne Davidson dans le contexte de l'individuation des actions; deuxièmement, que cette thèse est fondée en fait sur l'ignorance de certaines distinctions importantes concernant l'action et le langage de l'action. (shrink)

Les cartes donnent souvent l’impression que le monde est saturé et que la surface de notre fragile planète a renoncé à la dimension du mystère. Ce sentiment d’accomplissement est trompeur. Il est le propre de la modernité occidentale. Tout au long de son histoire, l’Occident n’a eu cesse d’affronter les espaces ouverts pour les transformer en lieux clos sans que ce verrouillage eût jamais été décisif. Tant mieux, car, à chaque fois qu’il rouvre sur un horizon nouveau, le monde suscite (...) l’éblouissement. Les Argonautes et Ulysse ont connu cette sidération, de même que Christophe Colomb à sa manière. L’art du lienzo aztèque, les lignes de chant des Aborigènes australiens et la cartographie extrême-orientale confirment que l’Occident ne détient pas le monopole de la vision géographique du monde. Et plutôt que de réserver les océans aux seules caravelles de Colomb, on lancera aussi dans l’aventure Abou Bakari II, empereur malinké, et Zheng He, amiral chinois. Ces tours et détours à travers espaces et lieux d’hier et d’aujourd’hui postulent l’existence d’un monde plausible qui sonnerait le glas des revendications hégémoniques de l’Occident. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"What Is Philosophy?"The Status of World Philosophy in the ProfessionRobert C. SolomonThe question "What is philosophy?" is both one of the most virtuously self-effacing and one of the most obnoxious that philosophers today tend to ask. It is virtuously self-effacing insofar as it questions, with some misgivings, its own behavior, the worth of the questions it asks, and the significance of the enterprise itself. It is obnoxious when (...) it refuses to question its own behavior but instead takes that same behavior as the exclusive standard to delegitimize any other activity that dares to call itself "philosophy." Thus, for most of this century, Anglo-American and most European philosophers have simply ignored the rich philosophical traditions of Africa, Asia, Latin and Native America, and the rest of the world. Some leading African American and African European philosophers have dismissed "ethnophilosophy" as "not philosophy," presumably to protect their own analytic credentials. Universities as far flung as Singapore, Sierra Leone, and New Delhi have prided themselves on their fidelity to Oxbridge philosophy. It seems that the globalization of free market economics goes with the globalization of one brief moment in philosophy, with similarly devastating effects on local cultures and the rich varieties of human experience.Philosophy might be thought of as made up of two components: critical thinking and passionate vision. But "critical thinking" does not necessarily imply the hermeneutics of suspicion, skepticism, or intellectual paranoia—all too often the trademarks of the bright young professional philosopher. One can be "critical," that is, reflective, while at the same time be committed, even devoted, to an idea or a way of thinking. The emphasis on passionate vision, however, is just as essential, and any philosophy that doesn't include both components just isn't worthy of the name. Without passionate vision, we get that utterly eviscerated focus on forms of argumentation—philosophia minimalia—devoid of "empirical" content (that is to say, content) and, as far as most people are concerned, devoid of any interest. Without critical reflection, we get gullibility and the worst of New Age philosophy, accepting of any kind of nonsense, just because it stirs the passions. But simply to assume that philosophy must be as rigorously self-questioning as modern European and Anglo-American philosophy is a subtle form of ethnic chauvinism. It eliminates from the realm of philosophy not only African ethnophilosophy and Latin and Native American and South Pacific mythology but a good deal of the philosophy of religion, the basis (for better or worse) of the development of Western philosophy over much of the past two thousand years. [End Page 100]I have just withdrawn from a recent dispute, in a respectable and supposedly eclectic philosophy journal, in which my worst fears in this regard were rather bluntly confirmed. I had made the point mentioned above—rather matter-of-factly, I thought—that if (analytic) philosophy dismisses or ignores modes of thinking that are not obviously self-critical and are presented poetically instead of by way of positions to be argued for, then a good deal of the world's philosophy, including a good deal of Western philosophy, would be left out of the arena. The journal's board reacted indignantly, to put it mildly, to the suggestion that anything should count as "philosophy" that was not sufficiently self-critical in just this sense. But what about the millennium or so of religious philosophy in the West? Does anyone believe that thinkers like Anselm, or Alvin Plantiga for that matter, are seriously skeptical of the truth of Christianity, as they go through their admittedly brilliant argumentative routines? For that matter, to what extent is the emphasis on logical form and argument subjected to scrutiny in contemporary analytic philosophy? (As one of the foremost practitioners of that art commented, "Metaphilosophy makes me sick.")Some of the hostility to world philosophy, to be sure, turns on the conflict between philosophy and religion, which may have its origins in ancient and medieval philosophy but emerges full-blown with the Enlightenment and its campaign against "superstition." But many people and a good many cultures do not distinguish between philosophy and religion. If we consider the word "philosophy... (shrink)

FORMEL/INFORMEL : Musique-Philosophie a pour noyau trois essais : Antonia Soulez montre le vaste champ conceptuel ouvert par Schönberg, qui le rapproche ainsi de la philosophie ; Horacio Vaggione s'interroge sur la composition musicale assistée par ordinateur en thématisant des problèmes spécifiquement musicaux, mais sur un ton ouvrant à la pensée en général ; Makis Solomos tente de définir les invariants de la pensée de Xenakis. A ces essais s'ajoutent deux articles historiques : une analyse musicale de l'op. (...) 16 de Schönberg par le jeune Adorno et un article du début des années 1980 de Dahlhaus. L'ensemble se clôt par une série d'entretiens entre les auteurs des trois essais. Le lien, l'unité qui traverse l'ensemble de ces écrits et de ces débats articule des réflexions croisées sur une des questions les plus importantes pour la musique : la relation entre le " formel " et l'" informel ". Simultanément, la juxtaposition de la musique et de la philosophie à laquelle ils donnent lieu, le passage d'un registre à l'autre, la redéfinition permanente des règles qui président à ces passages indiquent un enjeu supplémentaire : repenser l'esthétique musicale. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Philosophy of Modern Song by Bob DylanPeter CheyneThe Philosophy of Modern Song, Bob Dylan; 422 pp. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2022.Bob Dylan, like Dante's Virgil, takes us on an odyssey through sixty-six levels, not of the Underworld but of Songworld, in The Philosophy of Modern Song. With playful prose rhythms measured for pleasure and effect, these vistas are almost all seen through second-person portrayals. His (...) gorgeous write-up on Uncle Dave Macon's "Keep My Skillet Good and Greasy" (1924), for instance, conveys the "happy wanderer, the chicken thief," embodying the flagrant aristocracy of freedom: "You're the Dalai Lama, the Black Monk … The Thief of Baghdad … prowling and shoplifting … Multiracial, bisexual, celibate … freethinking … fucking and farting … Long John Silver … a pastry chef … hash slinger" (pp. 237–38). In Dylan's telling, this great song shimmies through a Whitmanesque catalogue of types united in aesthetic thrill.Invented characters inhabit this book, as they do Dylan's songs. Most prominent are the personae he extemporizes from others' songs in barnstorming flights of fancy. Upheld by writerly performance rather than argument, they act out his view that "it's what a song makes you feel about your own life that's important" (p. 9).The standout weird turn is the antihero he conjures from Webb Pierce's "There Stands the Glass" (1953). This is a country song about alcoholic consolation after a breakup, the toper hoping his love still thinks of him, in his misery. Simple, clichéd even, but Dylan invents a backstory hell of a Vietnam vet who "doesn't recall ever having a soul" and is "betrayed by politicians back home." Standard old-drunk fare, but then comes the nightmare of having "stuck a bayonet into babies' bellies and gouged out old men's eyes," "assassinated priests," and a concatenation of sins. "He rounds up the elderly, women and children, torches their huts" (p. 21). No bar-time happy hours for him; all those become "zero hour," "surrounded by the enemy" (p. 22). Dylan still protests the empire grotesque. Following each dark dive or wild fantasia is a straighter section that zooms out to more objective viewpoints, factoids, and historical analysis."You," ubiquitous and protean. "You," Dylan's projected center of subjective meaning. "You," his device, as he brings you along to reinvent a mood and mind frame, a world for each song. A thesis on mimesis, the second-person fantasies urge the reader to identify with the original first-person narrative, then fly it sky high. Dylan maintains that a successful song sings the listener into an alternative existence, a temporary self, through imagery and rhyme. This is just what Plato warned against, and what Dylan values: the art of making the listener mimetically become, for a few timeless minutes, what the writer and performer sing into being. In the ancient tussle between philosophers and poets, Dylan holds the agora through the harp. [End Page 254]Popular song as fiction is nothing unusual, but criticism as fiction? Is this critical license in extremis or is Dylan stressing the idea that music is always subjective? According to Dylan, songs earn their wings not just in the hearing but in how far and wide hearers can take them. While Dylan fabricates characters that weren't even dreamt of by the song performers, this book is also autobiographical throughout. The commentary relates as much of himself as the records he highlights. The book sustains a mood where the host impishly swaps masks all the while (as when he reveals, in a tiny chapter, that "Long Tall Sally" [1956] is about a one-story-tall woman from the Nephilim tribe in antediluvian Samaria). On Bobby Bare's "Detroit City" (1963), he writes, "Everybody assumes you're a bigwig, that things are cool and beautiful, but they're not." Here, many readers will flash back to young Zimmerman in Greenwich Village, desperate to pull off his move to the big city, "and the disgrace of failure is overwhelming" (p. 1). Through songs by selected others, Dylan recounts Dylan.Channeling small-hour talk radio, pulp Westerns, and hardboiled prose, the bourbon-scented mood evokes... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 261-263 [Access article in PDF] The Philosophy of Evil Dan J. Stein Keywords philosophy, evil, self-deception, psychopathy, narcissism, sadism Kubarych (2005) first draws on Peck (1983) to suggest a distinction between psychopaths who have no conscience and therefore no need for self-deception, and evil narcissists who use self-deception to keep the emotional consequences of their crimes out of awareness. He then draws (...) on Davidson (1985) to emphasize a parallel between self-deception (or weakness of the warrant) where an irrational belief conflicts with the evidence, and akrasia (or weakness of the will) where an irrational intention is in conflict with one's values.Although self-deception has long been de-scribed and debated (Fingarette 2000; McLaughlin and Rorty 1988; Mele 2001), a cognitive-affective neuroscience of self-deception has become possible only recently. Such an approach includes several strands. First, contemporary information processing constructs (e.g., schemas) have been used to reframe the early insights of writers like Freud and James, and to emphasize how inattention to painful truths provide a shield against anxiety (Goleman 1997). Second, the theoretical framework of evolutionary psychology has been used to emphasize the adaptive advantages of self-deception (Lockard and Delroy 1988). Third, functional brain imaging studies have noted increased activity in executive regions (e.g., prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices) during attempted deception but not during truthful responding, suggesting that the former requires active effort (Spence et al. 2004). The functional imaging of memory suppression suggests similar processes (Anderson et al. 2004). To date, however, there has been little functional imaging work on self-deception.Similarly, although evil has always been a key concern of philosophical thought, a cognitive-affective neuroscience of evil has emerged only in recent years (Stein 2000). Evil actions are not homogenous, and this area of research again comprises a number of different strands. First, there are actions where the primary aim is not necessarily to hurt, but where harm is in fact inflicted. (A contested, but perhaps useful example, is the battery-raising of animals for human consumption [Singer 2001]). Second, there are actions where the aim is to hurt, and where harm to the other may even be enjoyed. (During normal altruistic punishment, for example, reward circuitry is activated [de Quervain et al. 2004]). Third, there are actions characterized by impulsive aggression, and a relative absence of executive control. (There may be psychobiological distinctions between reactive aggression in response to frustration or threat, and instrumental aggression that is more goal directed [Blair 2004]).What are the implications of these two sets of cognitive-affective neuroscience literature for a philosophical consideration of evil and of narcissism? [End Page 261] It may be useful to differentiate healthy processes (e.g., having sufficient frontal cortical activity to be able to deceive others) from psychopathologic processes (e.g., not having the necessary frontal-amygdala circuitry required for empathic processing of emotions in social interaction). Similarly, it may be useful to differentiate between normal healthy narcissism (Taylor and Brown 1988) and pathologic malignant narcissism (Kernberg 1985), and between normal altruistic punishment (Hamilton 1963) and pathologic sadistic personality (Kaminer and Stein 2001). In addition, it is perhaps the case that some cognitive-affective processes that do not seem to involve psychopathology may nevertheless be seen as evil (e.g., arguably, the processes that allow a human to eat a battery-raised chicken), whereas some cognitive-affective processes that are clearly psychopathologic may not be viewed as evil (e.g., impulsive aggression in the context of a frontal lobe tumor may be viewed as excusable, as "mad" rather than "bad").Taken together with recent work on the cognitive-affective neuroscience of psychopathy, narcissism, and sadism, these considerations may lead to somewhat different approaches from those taken by Peck and Davidson. In his work on psychopathy, for example, Blair emphasizes a dysfunction in cognitive-affective processing resulting in abnormalities in the weighing up of social emotions (Blair 2004). This account is not inconsistent with a view that in psychopathy there is a disturbance in moral processing that is evil (contra Peck). Furthermore, this... (shrink)

Le mot «milieu» est précieux pour souligner que les installations humaines – l’architecture, la ville – tiennent compte de leur environnement, naturel ou bâti. Avant de configurer «un monde», l’art humain configure un lieu et même l’élit et le transfigure en le métamorphosant, faisant de milieux donnés des «lieux» habitables voire mémorables aux multiples formes de délimitations, d’échanges et de devenir. La notion de milieu habité est mise en perspective et pensée en termes de limites, passages, liens et métamorphoses.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.3 (2003) 108-112 [Access article in PDF] Themes in the Philosophy of Music, by Stephen Davies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 283 pp., hardcover. Over the last few decades, there has been a remarkable output of several books and articles on the philosophy of music. Stephen Davies is one of the leading contributors to this growing literature in the Philosophy of Music. (...) This important and thought-provoking volume collects fifteen of Davies's essays on various philosophical issues pertaining to music such as ontology, performance, expression, and appreciation. With the exception of two, all of the essays have been published before. There is not enough space here to do justice to all fifteen essays, and thus I focus on those that strike me as most important and where I disagree with Davies.First a word about the book's relevance to aesthetic education and itspotential for use in aesthetic education. Davies's book strikes me as having immense potential for aesthetic education. I can easily see the various essays as being of great value in educating performers, composers, musicologists, and music lovers about various aspects of performance and appreciation especially. Here is a brief list of questions pertinent to aesthetic education that Davies's work raises and addresses: Why is performance on authentic instruments important? What is involved in understanding musical works? Is technical training necessary to appreciate musical works fully? To what degree can the performer create her own interpretation of a work, and how much does the score constrain her?Now on to the essays themselves. The first part of Davies's volume concerns ontology, and the first essay "John Cage's 4'33": Is it Music?" addresses this very famous musical work. Davies argues that 4'33" is not music but rather a theatrical piece about music because it does not exclude anysounds as being ambient noise, as Davies thinks musical works should do. Davies does not deny, however, that this work is an artwork. He thinks instead that the work is not organized sound, as all music must be, for it does not exclude any sonic events during performance as ambient; even sounds made by the performer of this work, claims Davies, are mistakes and not ambient. Thus neither Cage nor the performer organize (select, appropriate) sounds. Davies also suggests that while Cage wants us to have an aesthetic interest in the sonic properties of 4'33," he failed in his intention for we hear the work instead in musico-historical terms.Contrary to Davies's view, one mustwonder if 4'33" just is a theatrical piece about music, not a musical work as such. Unlike theater and theatrical works which are meant to be both seen and heard, Cage's work is only meant to be heard. Davies's view would seem to neglect this important auditory aspect in claiming that the work is just theater not music. Besides, why must all musical works exclude some soundsas ambient, and why might Cage's [End Page 108] work not be an exception to this? Why couldn't 4'33" be a limiting case of music, at one extreme of a range of musical works? As for Davies's claim that any sounds made by the performer who is supposed to be silent are mistakes not ambient noise, one must wonder if Cage intended instead that sounds made by the performer (such as musical tones or coughs) be bracketed by listeners as not part of the work while sounds made by the audience are part of the work, thus undermining the audience-performer distinction. Moreover, against Davies's claim that Cage intended us to have an aesthetic interest in sonic properties, I submit that Cage was Zen-influenced and not committed to such dualisticaesthetic concepts (such as beautiful vs. ugly) or any concepts for that matter, whether musico-historical or not. Instead, Cage intended us to simplylisten, with an open mind and openears, without adhering rigidly to concepts or hearing 4'33" in musico-historical terms, difficult as that may be. Finally, there... (shrink)

Monique Demarle-Casadebaig Le questionnement de la philosophie s’est traduit par des lieux communs de problèmes et d’arguments dont l’intelligence ne dépend pas de leur expression dans une langue particulière. On veut faire reconnaître par cet article un tel locus communis philosophiae dans l’argument de Gongsun Long de 公孫龍, d’après lequel « cheval blanc n’est pas cheval ». Gongsun Long, déjà assimilé à un « disputeur » en Chine, a été exilé du champ de la philosophie en Europe en (...) tant que « sophiste ». On montre pourtant que son argument concerne un problème analogue à celui qui a conduit Aristote à faire la distinction entre prédication essentielle et accidentelle ou celui qui a conduit Husserl à parler de ce que vise l’« intuition catégoriale ». Mais la leçon proprement chinoise de son propos tient peut-être alors en son indifférence au choix entre le primat de l’être sur la conscience, selon Aristote, ou de la conscience sur l’être, selon Husserl. (shrink)

In lieu of a programmatic argument about the general relations of history of science and philosophy of science, this essay offers a particular topic in the history of philosophy of science that should be of interest to both historians and philosophers of science. It argues that questions typical of contemporary history of science could illuminate the recent history of philosophy of science and analytic philosophy. It also suggests that the history of scientific philosophy is a particularly fruitful arena for (...) historians of science interested in issues of marginal science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Why Philosophy Matters for the Study of Religion—and Vice Versa by Thomas A. LewisAndrew ForsythWhy Philosophy Matters for the Study of Religion—and Vice Versa Thomas A. Lewis OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2015. 177 PP. $34.95Thomas Lewis's emphasis in Why Philosophy Matters for the Study of Religion—and Vice Versa is chiefly the "Vice Versa" of his book's title. Philosophy of religion (untenably tied to Christianity and Judaism, he (...) claims, and unduly limited to well-worn questions of theism's rationality and the like) must learn from the field of religious studies, and most particularly from its pluralism and twenty-first-century attention to the historical and cultural construction of the category of "religion." Philosophers of religion fail today if they treat as self-evident the building blocks of their discipline.In a series of essays, Lewis diagnoses the malaise, ably sketches "promising signs" of a different paradigm, and prods the discipline to "belong more clearly in religious studies" (vii). More specifically, he treats normativity in religious studies; the place of history (and the history of "religion") in philosophy of religion; the centrality of comparison in religious ethics and philosophy of religion; and the proper—self-conscious—use of categories in the study of religion. Taken one by one, Lewis's essays are elegant and thought-provoking. "On the Role of Normativity in Religious Studies," for example, merits inclusion in any Theories and Methods syllabus, teasing out, as it does, problematic presuppositions that only theology makes normative claims, and that "faith" is juxtaposed with "reason."Taken as a whole, however, Lewis's book will trouble Christian ethicists committed to conversation with religious studies. To begin, philosophy of religion most often "matters," in Lewis's telling, when it clarifies current trajectories of scholarship in religious studies. As a result, the organizing disciplinary presuppositions of religious studies go mostly unchallenged. Second, in Lewis's telling, religious studies becomes a surprisingly narrow enterprise. While the whole sweep of "religious thought, people, movements, practices, materials, etc." (7) is the apparent purview of religious studies, the golden thread running through Lewis's various essay interventions is scholarship on "religion" as a constructed, nonnatural category. This has been a generative pursuit for two decades, but scholarly concern for "religion" risks becoming tediously in-house, despite Lewis's fine articulation of the negative public policy ramifications of simplistic alternatives. No doubt Lewis uses the category of "religion" as just one example of potential work in religious studies, but the example's ubiquity in [End Page 209] the book flows from Lewis's vision of the field: religious studies shares the same kinds of evidence as those used throughout the humanities and social sciences, and excludes work reliant on unassailable authorities (scriptures, traditions) or private forms of justification (experience). Neither tracking a particular natural phenomenon, then, nor employing its own particular methods, discourse on the use of the category of "religion" becomes ever more central.Finally, the relationship between what might be called Lewis's "broader" and "narrower" visions of philosophy of religion is left somewhat unclear. Lewis's broader position is inclusive of positions he does not hold but that are not excluded by his understanding of the boundaries of the field. His narrower position is a take on Hegel, its details outlined in the concluding essay. Hegel's thought, Lewis tells us, offers the greatest potential for "simultaneously acknowledging the historical situatedness of our own viewpoint, exposing the hidden operation of power, and providing a rational justification for our normative commitments" (159–60). While Lewis's impulse throughout Why Philosophy Matters is for wider, broader work in philosophy of religion, his narrower Hegelian vision of the field, it turns out, has no place for "extra-conceptual grounding, whether in empiricist or transcendent accounts" (156). Are only Hegelian and pragmatist accounts sufficient? Philosophers must make a case for what they think is true, of course, but there is still some irony that a work that helpfully seeks to expand philosophy of religion beyond the "parochial" (23, 28) ends by excluding so much.Andrew ForsythYale UniversityCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophies versus Philosophy:In Defense of a Flexible DefinitionRein RaudIt is strange that no one has taken up Carine Defoort's clearly formulated and timely argument about the intercultural tensions in interpreting what philosophy is, although the issue deserves at least a roundtable, if not an international conference.1 I doubt that this is because there is a general consensus that the matter is now settled, and I would therefore like (...) to develop the argument a bit further and offer a few additional factors to consider. It is also obvious that the problem is not limited to the subject of Chinese philosophy alone: all traditions of thought from all over the world, but most notably the Indian, Islamic, and Japanese heritages, are affected by the positions we adopt. As in most debates about the commensurability of cultural traditions, we can find differences when we look for them, and similarities if these are what we would like to see, so the "conflict of sensitivities"2 is also a matter of attitudes. My own position is that regardless of what we prefer to call the practice of deeper thought (and 'philosophy' is a very good name), it would be extremely useful for all of its participants, whatever their origin and upbringing, to find a common denominator for them to be able to exchange ideas and mutually enrich each other on its basis. In what follows I shall try to sketch a perspective from which this could, in my opinion, be theoretically grounded.Four PositionsDefoort has identified four possible points of view on the problem of whether classical Chinese thought could or should be called 'philosophy,' which could be summarized as follows.1. Chinese classical thought is not philosophy, because it does not satisfy the conditions of philosophy as it is generally and traditionally understood in the West.2. Chinese classical thought is philosophy, because it reveals the necessary characteristics if analyzed with the help of an appropriate (Western-type) observation language.3. Chinese classical thought can be called philosophy, but only if we redefine philosophy in order to accommodate some of its nontypical or clearly deviant features.4. Chinese classical thought should not be called philosophy, because philosophy is a culturally closed Western phenomenon with a limited scope and incapable of understanding fundamentally different modes of thought. [End Page 618]If we dismiss the birthright variety of the first position, we could label it essentialist, and its weakest point is certainly that Western philosophy has not remained unchanged during the course of history. It is highly doubtful that Socrates, Diogenes, scholastics, Nietzsche, and Gareth Evans could all be members of the same set if the same strict criteria were applied to all periods and all cultural settings in the same way, and, as Defoort herself stresses,3 the fact that seventeenth-century Jesuits (the basis of whose original worldview, we should think, was much farther from the Chinese than ours) had no problem in calling Chinese thought philosophy should show us that the paradigm shift of the thing called 'philosophy' has occurred in the West and is, so to speak, our problem and not theirs.Now, it is also possible that in some circles even some prominent names in the Western tradition do not qualify as real philosophers, in the sense in which Hegel was treated by Bertrand Russell4 and Heidegger was dismissed by Alfred Ayer5 in their respective histories of philosophy (while they nevertheless felt compelled to include chapters or passages on them). A definition of philosophy that puts forward such criteria that a considerable number of thinkers would have to remain outside its borders should be labeled sectarian-and it can still be met, even if ever less often, in some analytical schools of philosophy. It is my conviction, however, that in our globalizing world any definition that would leave non-European philosophy outside the borders of 'philosophy proper' should be considered sectarian in nature. The main problem that I have with Defoort's family model6 is precisely that in it the head of the family, who makes the decisions as to who can be adopted and who cannot, is always Western, and the... (shrink)

La philosophie de Bolzano est a la source d'une tradition de pensee dont l'importance et l'originalite n'ont pas encore ete appreciees a leur juste mesure. En 1997, 160 ans apres la publication de son chef d'oeuvre, la Wissenschaftslehre, a eu lieu, a Cerisy-la-Salle, un colloque destine a examiner l'interet historique actuel de cette tradition qui s'etend jusqu'a Musil et a la seconde guerre mondiale. Ce volume est destine a offrir une vision panoramique, enrichie de plusieurs etudes de detail, (...) des idees et des oeuvres qui, de Bolzano a Musil, ont renouvele le champ intellectuel et philosophique europeen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-ProsperityMichiko YusaPolitical Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity. By Christopher S. Goto-Jones. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. Pp. 192. Hardcover $105.00.If it is the case that scholars who engage the Kyoto School philosophy in any serious manner may risk their reputation by "being tarred with the brush of fascism" (p. 4), then Christopher Goto-Jones (...) is certainly courageous to set out to redress the predicament that Nishida Kitarō 's thought (Nishida tetsugaku) is apparently in. Indeed, Goto-Jones' effort is to be highly commended. He contends that Nishida tetsugaku "ought to have been liberated from the oppression of the ultra-nationalist orthodoxy of wartime Japan" by "the allied victory," but instead it has been "oppressed under the new weight of post-war historiography" (p. 2). The author hopes to help change the present-day academic environment that still condemns Nishida tetsugaku or Kyoto School philosophy for complicity with the agenda of fascists and ultranationalists, a formidable force in Japan from the mid-1930s through the end of the Pacific War.Believing that Nishida tetsugaku qua political philosophy should gain its rightful place in the academic discourse, Goto-Jones embarks on this task. The way to liberate Nishida tetsugaku, he suggests, is to avoid the approach taken by apologists whose arguments, ultimately "unconvincing," were "not finally rooted in Nishida's philosophy but in his diaries and correspondence" (p. 4). He hopes to bring out the "cultural and political pluralism" that is at the heart of Nishida's political philosophy and to demonstrate that the contribution of Nishida's thought is to "relativize the political conceptualizations of Western philosophy" (p. 5). The strategy is to "re-politicize" Nishida tetsugaku and allow his (political) texts to speak for themselves. Goto-Jones contends that Nishida's political philosophy, properly understood, is neither ultranationalism nor liberalism, but "may be termed radical liberalism" (p. 137 n. 11).In chapter 2, the author proposes to situate Nishida's political thought "in the context of some of its earlier formulations," just as "[m]uch of Western political philosophy partakes in conversations initiated by the Greeks" (p. 28). He therefore begins with the seventeen-article constitution of Prince Shōtoku as the Ur-official text, and then turns his attention to the Japanese Buddhist and Confucian traditions. En route, Goto-Jones tries to connect such ideas as the honji suijaku theory with Nishida's dialectics, or the Tendai meditation practice of ichinen sanzen with the ideology of hakkō ichiu. Whether this approach clarifies Nishida's thought or adds further complications is left to the judgment of the reader. [End Page 361]Contrary to the view that Nishida underwent a "turn" in the early 1930s, Goto- Jones attempts to prove in chapters 3 and 4 that Nishida's political philosophy remained consistent throughout his life. To demonstrate this point, he examines the several theories of good discussed by Nishida in part 3 of Zen no kenkyū (An inquiry into the good), written ca. 1906, and the 1937 lecture "Rekishiteki shintai" (Historical body). The author's evidence to sustain his argument seems to rest on Nishida's personal protest against the intervention of the state in the affairs of education, as well as his lament that his thought was never properly understood.Because the scope of the book extends to Nishida's one-time students (such as Tosaka Jun, Miki Kiyoshi, Kōsaka Masaaki, Kōyama Iwao, and Nishitani Keiji as well as Harada Kumao and Kido Kōichi)1 and his colleagues (such as Tanabe Hajime and Watsuji Tetsurō ), to undertake this project Goto-Jones took on the weighty task of studying biographical information about Nishida and his colleagues as well as their vastly varying political approaches. The author's project is far more serious than a mere debate on the semantics of, for instance, the word "liberal," which, when applied to Nishida-and I tend to agree with him here-is "inappropriate and ahistor-ical" (p. 7), or the term "universal(ism)," which seems to have become another term of contention by sheer chance.The fact that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 443-445 [Access article in PDF] Martin Schönfeld. The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xv + 348. Cloth, $55.00. Kant's precritical philosophy has often been judged as lacking continuity, originality, and, indeed, philosophical relevance. Martin Schönfeld's impressive new study disputes this assessment, claiming instead that "the philosophy of the young Kant (...) reveals a greater unity and a more interesting coherence than previously assumed" (245). The author further argues that Kant's precritical thought is philosophically interesting in its own right. Schönfeld is to be commended for his successful refutation of the standard caricature and for deftly defending his reading of this formative period in Kant's thought. Recent years have seen a number of similar attempts to rehabilitate Kant's precritical thought, but Schönfeld's study will no doubt become the standard against which future scholarship is measured. [End Page 443]Schönfeld locates the unity of Kant's precritical philosophy in his purported "grand synthesis of the Newtonian model of nature with three assumptions of metaphysics: the purposive development of nature, the possibility of a morally relevant freedom, and the existence of God" (209). Schönfeld divides Kant's precritical philosophy into three periods comprising (1) Kant's initial failure during the 1740s to formulate a non-Newtonian philosophy of nature, (2) his conversion to Newtonianism in the 1750s (and the constructive philosophizing of this period), and (3) the period of intense self-criticism in the 1760s leading to the collapse of the precritical project. The originality of Schönfeld's typology is evident since many scholars claim that Kant was a Newtonian ab initio. In addition, Schönfeld claims that the precritical project ends with the "Dreams of a Spirit-Seer" (1766), a departure from the orthodox extension of the project to the "Inaugural Dissertation" (1770).Such readings are driven by the author's generally trenchant analyses of Kant's attempt to construct a unified philosophy of nature. In this regard, Schönfeld's analysis of Kant's attempt to reconcile physical processes and purposiveness in the "Universal Natural History" (1755) is particularly insightful; and Kant's attempts to account for the compatibility of determinism and human freedom in the "New Elucidation" (1755) and to formulate a theory of active matter in the "Physical Monadology" (1766) receive readings of a similarly high caliber. In addition, Schönfeld's extensive bibliography and his many references to thinkers now long-forgotten—yet indispensable for understanding Kant's early thought (e.g., Georg Bilfinger, a Wolffian thinker and source for Kant's lifelong strategy of seeking a via media between opposing positions)—are invaluable research tools.Also deserving mention is Schönfeld's examination of the "Dreams" essay. Once thought to be a mere critique of Swedenborg's mysticism, this work actually marks the beginning of Kant's doubts regarding the very possibility of speculative metaphysics. The precritical philosophy is largely concerned with the nature of real interaction between substances—contra occasionalist and pre-established harmony theories—and with Kant's interpretation of physical influx that grounds the same. Yet Kant realizes in the "Dreams" that his own account of a commercium of substances (as well as his claims regarding the soul) seems to lead quite naturally to the notion of a divine influx governing the interaction of disembodied spirits (regarding which Swedenborg purported to have first-hand experience). This realization, Schönfeld argues, motivates the collapse of the precritical project and Kant's recognition that an examination of mental capabilities must precede any speculation regarding nonsensible objects. It is to Schönfeld's credit that he takes this text, which is usually either ignored or ridiculed, seriously and presents a comprehensive and cogent reading of the same.Though generally successful in defending his reading of the precritical Kant, some of Schönfeld's positions are rather suspect. Indeed, Schönfeld claims that "in the 1740s, Kant either rejected Newtonian ideas out of hand, or he... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 413-414 [Access article in PDF] Katerina Ierodiakonou, editor. Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp. vii + 309. Cloth, $55.00.Talking about, let alone writing on "Byzantine Philosophy" within the English-speaking philosophical community could cause embarrassment. It is only recently that this field has gained a few notable entries in philosophical works of (...) reference like the Routledge Encyclopedia or the Oxford Dictionary—but still it cannot make its way into the histories of medieval philosophy, not to mention the general histories of philosophy. Byzantine Philosophy aims at providing good reasons for changing that tendency and seeks to "persuade [us] that Byzantine Philosophy is worth investigating" (13).The book contains eleven articles, plus Ierodiakonou's introduction and Linos Benakis's review of the current research, read in part at a Conference held in Thessaloniki, Greece in 1997, but it is more than a mere collection of conference papers. Written both by well-established and younger scholars from diverse disciplines, the volume focuses on the explicit or implicit dialogue of Byzantine thinkers with ancient Greek philosophy, one of the two ingredients of Byzantine Philosophy (the other being patristic thought).Ierodiakonou in her introduction prefers to make a few—but penetrating—remarks on the nature of Byzantine Philosophy and its proper study. Her arguments are presented in a non-conclusive form and they are intended to serve as guidelines to further research. While a longer discussion of the issues involved would be welcome by the less-specialized reader, her choice seems reasonable as long as one thinks—rightly in my opinion—that it is premature to embark on general methodological suggestions about how to investigate Byzantine Philosophy, or believes that scrutinizing the texts themselves is a more promising approach at this relatively early stage of research (as perhaps always).With one exception, each article deals at length with a special issue spanning from metaphysics to political philosophy and concentrates on individual thinkers from the patristic era to the Renaissance; the absence of philosophical theology is surprising. Expectedly the presence of Aristotle can be traced in logic: in an eleventh-century humble handbook (thoroughly analyzed by Jonathan Barnes); in Psellos's Paraphrase on Aristotle's De Interpretationeand in the anti-logical movement in the fourteenth century (Ierodiakonou); as well as in John of Damascus's discussion of will (Michael Frede). On the Christian-neoplatonic tradition are founded a nominalistic position of Basil of Caesarea concerning the semantics of proper names (Paul Kalligas); a sixth-century treatise On Political Science (Dominic O'Meara); Psellos's conception of philosophy (John Duffy); and the peculiar case of Chaldaean Oracles and their commentators (Polymnia Athanassiadi). The last article on the Renaissance controversy between Plethon and Scholarios over the primacy of Plato or Aristotle (George Karamanolis) brings the volume appropriately to an end.That Platonism and Aristotelianism nearly monopolize the contributors' concerns is justified but this must not give the simplified impression that Byzantine Philosophy can be exclusively explained against this background. Other Greek philosophical traditions, such as Stoicism, are mentioned as well, and the fourteenth-century interest in skepticism is densely discussed (Börje Bydén on Metochites). The first essay is an informative outline of the Greek-Latin Philosophical Interaction (Sten Ebbesen), whose inclusion in the volume makes a similar survey of ancient Greek-Byzantine philosophical interaction more warranted.The contributors do not confine themselves to resolving specific problems of a Quellenforschung, by identifying parallel texts or recurring arguments in order to establish the obvious dependence of Byzantine thought on Greek Philosophy. In fact, as many articles show, it is the very analysis of patristic and Byzantine texts that makes us return to their ancient sources and also makes clear how this revisiting can deepen our understanding of the texts and the philosophical problems they are trying to present or to solve. When doing philosophy, Byzantine thinkers have ancient Greek concepts in their minds, and quite often have ancient texts in their hands. Now it is up to us to evaluate... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 153-155 [Access article in PDF] Dieter Sturma. Philosophie der Person. Die Selbstverhältnisse von Subjektivität und Moralität. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997. Pp. 376. DM 68.00. According to Sturma, it was John Locke who first developed the concept of a person, molding it into an "elaborated theory of personal identity" (27). His approach was continued first by Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, (...) and Hegel, and then in the 20th Century—via Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Sartre—by Anglo-American philosophers such as Strawson, Rawls, Frankfurt, Nagel, Parfit, and Taylor. While these authors provide the main orientation for Sturma, Kant seems to assume a leading position. The aim of the book is to trace out a non-reductionist philosophy of the person. Sturma believes that personhood consists in the fully developed subjectivity together with the moral components included in it" and he intends to uncover the "consequences for practical self-relation arising from it" (38). These relations are, first of all, relations to oneself.The book consists of eleven chapters. The last one is a kind of summary. The other ten can be subdivided into three parts. The first part serves as introduction and propedeutic. In it, Sturma first presents "Subjects and Problems of the Philosophy of the Person" (chapter I), then gives a compendium of "The History of the Philosophy of the Person" (chapter II), and finally presents a "Critique of Reductionism"(chapter III). The last part is the largest. Its main thesis is "that persons are at least in principle subjects who are due freedom, accountability, and self-determination, and who [... ] can initiate reflective and practical self-relations within the social space" (59). After claiming that in practice "every reductionism conceals a kind of determinism" (60), Sturma gives a sketch of his critical approach. Dealing with different forms of determinism, physicalism, logical empiricism, with Wittgenstein's position between reductionism and non-reductionism, and with Thomas Nagel's critique of reductionism, Sturma arrives at a discussion of the difference between (mental) experience (Erlebnis) and events (Ereignis). As a proponent of a "moderate naturalism" (95), he tries in the style of Davidson to take up a middle position, which neither denies events in space and time nor eliminates the personal standpoint of experience.The next two chapters, "Self-Consciousness"(chapter IV) and "Consciousness and [End Page 153] Personal Identity"(chapter V) form the second, more theoretical, part of the book. According to Sturma, Descartes deserves credit for revealing the irreducibility of self-consciousness. This irreducibility is revealed by the fact "that persons become aware of their existence in a way which differs from all other states of consciousness" (103). After discussing mainly analytical objections—above all Wittgenstein's 'private-language' argument and Ayers' critique of the Cogito argument—he summarizes the position of the Heidelberg school (Henrich, et al.). His effort is directed primarily at showing that reflexivity and self-reference are essential to self-consciousness. He tries to develop a concept of self-consciousness that is capable of tying together self-acquaintance and reflection. He believes that only in this way can "the project for a philosophy of the person that is critical of reductionism be transferred to a constructive concept of self-determination"(107). In self-consciousness a person always behaves in relation "to her concrete existence and her concrete behavior in ontological and social space." This explains why the immediate self-relation of self-consciousness is "always an alteration and its subject at once the altering instance and the altered person" (144f). This is followed in the fifth chapter by an examination of the relation between person and identity, where Sturma_starting with the Locke-Leibniz controversy_shows that a person refers to her identity as a given as well as something that needs to be produced (cf.187).The next chapter, "Personal Identity and Practical Self-relations" (chapter VI) is the beginning of the third part of the book, which is essentially practical. In this and the following chapters—"Contexts of Practical Self-relations: The Unconscious and... (shrink)

Il est question de l'analogie et de la comparaison selon la démarche dialectique platonicienne, ainsi que des topoi empruntés aux textes anciens: la chasse, le labyrinthe, le vase, la statue intérieure que l'on doit polir, le Soleil pour désigner de manière visible le Bien, ou la caverne pour rappeler la parabole de laconnaissance, mais aussi pour évoquer le lieu de transit de l'âme. Les principaux textes utilisés sont extraits des Discours théologiques de Grégoire de Nazianze. Un passage du Traité (...) sur le Saint Esprit (149 B-C) de Basile de Césarée, cité à la fin, illustre dans un contexte un peu différent le même procédé que celui utilisé par Grégoire. Dans tous ces passages il est question de travailler le langage sous le double aspect ontologique et sémantique, afin de trouver les modalités discursives les plus appropriées à la définition de la substance divine, à la nature de l'unité divine et à la détermination du caractère spécifique des hypostases. La théologie chrétienne se sert donc des moyens de la philosophie et emprunte des figures à la rhétorique, mais se défend de toute confusion avec ces disciplines. Invente-t-elle alors un genre nouveau, le «discours théologique», sur le modèle fourni par les Cappadociens? Encore faut-il savoir si le discours pouvait être perçu au IVᵉ siècle comme un genre approprié à la théologie, ou seulement comme un contrepoint à l'exégèse et au traité: un contrepoint par lequel les Pères ne rechignent pas à faire concurrence aux Sophistes pour les besoins politiques, et subsidiairement polémiques, de l'institution nouvellement créée. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy's Role in Psychopathology Back to Jaspers and an Appeal to Grow PracticalThe author reports no conflicts of interest.In "Philosophy's role in theorizing psychopathology," Gibson presents a defense of the continued relevance of philosophy to psychopathology, and a non-exhaustive framework for the role of philosophy in this domain (Gibson, 2024). I find it hard to disagree that psychopathology is soaked in philosophy from its origins, and that to (...) try and dry it out would be both unwise and impossible.In this commentary, I go back to Karl Jaspers' account of the role of philosophy in his General Psychopathology. In doing so, I do not find that Gibson adds anything new, but instead gives us a well-illustrated reminder that philosophy "is operative within every living science" (Jaspers, 1997, p. 770).Situated Psychopathological TheorizingGibson addresses a broad 'we' who might be engaged with psychopathological theorizing. This seems to encompass three main settings, from which examples are drawn.1. Everyday and regulative social practices (ordinary and legal setting).2. Empirically driven disciplines which work with psychopathological constructs (academic setting).3. Psychiatry and psychotherapy (clinical setting).In my view, it is a mistake not to map the terrain where psychopathological theorizing is situated. In each setting psychopathological theorizing has its own set of aims and constraints. In the ordinary setting, the aim might be to know whether to blame a loved one for their action. In the legal setting it might be to decide whether treatment or punishment is appropriate. In the clinical setting, the aim is usually a therapeutic assessment, and moral stance taking is often best kept at bay. In the academic setting, we might want to ensure our concepts are reliable and valid, opening them up to investigation using objective scientific methods. [End Page 13]Beyond what can be said in the most general terms, the role of philosophy will look different in these different situations.Understanding Is Not (Just) a Philosophical ToolUnderstanding is a mode of knowing that is concerned with the particular, rather than the general, and accessed inter-relationally, relying on tacit knowledge and empathetic imagination. Gibson introduces the concept as an elementary form of social intuition, used in ordinary life to make sense of social relations and other people's behaviors and reactions. I agree with Gibson, drawing on Strawson, that Understanding is a mode of knowledge that involves the subject of enquiry as a participant (Strawson, 1982). There is a moral imperative to take this stance, which drives us to value the expansion of what we are able to understand of other people's mental states. This at least partly motivates the agenda when we theorize about psychopathology.At times throughout his argument, Gibson seems to be arguing for the role of Understanding in psychopathological theorizing, in place of his explicit aim of arguing for the role of philosophy. However it is not at all clear that this replacement can be made. Accepting the picture drawn, Understanding is not any more the expertise or domain of the philosopher than the author, police officer, or sociologist. We are surely not meant to take Understanding as a uniquely philosophical tool, but rather a mode of knowing available to all social agents, integral to social reasoning in ordinary life and in the human studies.What philosophy can distinctively do is point to and defend the existence of forms of intersubjective and tacit knowledge within human studies such as psychopathology. For Jaspers, Understanding can be a scientific tool, albeit one that reminds us that knowledge in psychopathology is not all of one kind. One role for philosophy therefore is to help us to "distinguish the different modes of knowing," so that we might "order knowledge into a comprehensive whole" (Jaspers, 1997, p. 769). This is akin to the 'synthetic' role that Gibson proposes.Philosophy and ScienceJaspers defines scientific knowledge broadly as knowledge with "general validity, convincing insights (which can be proved), clarity of method, and the possibility for a meaningful discussion" (Jaspers, 1997, p. 768).We do not get such a definition from Gibson, but in the sections of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Natural Philosophy: On Retrieving a Lost Disciplinary Imaginary by Alister E. McGRATHJack ZupkoMcGRATH, Alister E. Natural Philosophy: On Retrieving a Lost Disciplinary Imaginary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. viii + 248 pp. Cloth, $39.95This book attempts to retrieve and reimagine the tradition of natural philosophy as an antidote for what the author sees as the fragmented, instrumentalized, and ethically disengaged understanding of the natural world most of (...) us have today. The idea is not to reinstate the older vision of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, with its final causes and animated spheres, or even the early modern culmination of natural philosophy in Newton’s universe of mathematically fixed natural laws; rather, the author hopes to engender a newer and deeper understanding of nature that is at once scientific, ethical, and poetic, which he explains in terms of the conceptual framework of Popper’s “Three Worlds”: objective, subjective, and theoretical. What is recovered thereby is said to be a “lost conceptual space” wherein human beings learn both about and from nature, modes of knowing rendered obsolete by disciplinary specialization in the sciences as well as our commitment to objective methods that leave no room for ethical or spiritual approaches to understanding the natural world and our place in it.The author covers quite a bit of ground on the historical side, from the ancient Greeks through the Middle Ages, moving on to the idea of natural philosophy as it was gradually transformed during the early modern period by Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Bacon, Boyle, and Newton—a picture finally eclipsed by the objective, empirical concept of natural science familiar to us today. Curiously, the book says very little about the Platonic tradition of natural philosophy that grew up around the Timaeus. Because it was available in Latin (or the first half of it, anyway, in a Latin translation by the Roman Neoplatonist Calcidius, who also wrote an influential commentary on the work), the Timaeus was, for almost a millennium, the authoritative text in natural philosophy in the West, at least until Aristotle’s nonlogical and scientific writings were recovered in the twelfth century. The Timaeus was the subject of many commentaries and philosophical discussions, from Calcidius in the fourth century to Bernardus Silvestris, William of Conches, and Alan of Lille in the twelfth. It fell out of favor among philosophers with the rise of Aristotle’s Physics and Aristotelian natural philosophy, though it continued to shape the popular imagination of nature in other genres, such as art and literature—recall, for example, the well-known image of “God the Geometer” (c. 1230), measuring the cosmos with a compass. If the author’s project is about “retrieving” natural philosophy “as a lost disciplinary imaginary” (the book’s subtitle), then surely the Platonic vision of the universe deserves equal billing with the Aristotelian. [End Page 158]That said, there is much to like in the project sketched here. The author’s diagnosis of the epistemic malaise of modern-day science sounds right to anyone familiar with the history of philosophy and natural science. So, even though we can now correctly describe the velocity constant of earth’s gravity as 9.8 m/s2, among other scientific achievements, we take ourselves to be wearing a different hat when we wax poetic at the beauty of the sky and the stars. Early-and pre-modern authors were more adept at bringing together science and poetry, but that might be because their epistemic position was radically different from our own. Calcidius, for example, finds it easy to draw moral and aesthetic conclusions from the motions of the cosmos because he really believed heavenly bodies are, like us, animated by souls. Even a materialist like Lucretius accepts that the gods exist; his (still) very radical thesis is that they don’t care about us. (And why should they? The Pythagorean theorem is much more beautiful and edifying to consider than the troubles of ignorant and weak-willed mortals.) Enlightened moderns that we are, we no longer believe the heavens are populated by super-intelligent beings; yet we continue to marvel at Van Gogh’s Starry Night and feel it is wrong to cause gratuitous... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist Philosophy and New Testament TheologyYagi SeiichiPrologueBy way of Buddhist-Christian dialogue we Christians can become aware of the latent motifs in our own tradition. The dialogue gives us opportunities to rethink the Christian tradition, not to interpret it from Buddhist viewpoint but, based on these actualized motifs, to find a more adequate interpretation of its own. In this way Buddhist-Christian dialogue is relevant also for the construction of (...) New Testament theology.On the Philosophy of Nishida, Hisamatsu, and NishitaniThe central problems of Nishida Kitaro’s philosophy were (1) keiken (immediate experience) in his early period, (2) jikaku (seeing oneself in oneself) in his middle period, and (3) basho (topos) in his last years. 1 It should be noted that these terms together cover the essential fields of Buddhist cognition.Nishida began his book Studies of the Good 2 with statements concerning immediate experience. After the publication of the book, he felt compelled to consider the nature of the subject of philosophical cognition at the scene of immediate experience, for the subject in this case is not reason in the sense of Western philosophy. Thus in his middle period, jikaku became the main theme of his reflection. Jikaku means that the self sees itself in itself, and Nishida named the deepest, ultimate self, the self that embraces and sees all levels of cognition in “the field of transcendental predicate.” Then in his last years, Nishida grasped it anew as the topos, in which the individuals work on one another. The structure of the topos was defined as the “unity of the contradictory,” for in the topos the absolute and the relative define each other.His student, Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, made jikaku his central theme, whereas the thinking of Nishitani Keiji, another eminent student of Nishida, was centered mainly on topos. Nishida’s understanding of jikaku reminds us somewhat of the Hegelian Geist, for it concerns primarily the subject of cognition. Hisamatsu, however, spoke simply of ‘kaku’ (awakening) of the Formless Self. It means that the ego is awakened to the Formless Self. At the same time it is the awakening of the Formless Self to [End Page 165] Itself. We should note that kaku is not simply self-cognition but rather the actualization of the Self. As is well known, Hisamatsu rejected theism. God or Buddha as ‘other’ or ‘over against’ is at best a secondary human construction and not primary reality. So, if we call God the absolute Other, God must be at the same time the ultimate Self: God as the absolute Other, in Hisamatsu’s view, must be at the same time God who acts as the ultimate subject of humanity. 3 On the other hand, Nishitani preferred the terms common to Mahayana-Buddhism in general: ku (nothingness), engi (dependent orinination), and jijimuge (infinite-fold mutual penetration of the individuals). In his book What Is Religion, 4 Nishitani tried to rethink such Christian themes as personality, time, and history from the standpoint of ku. Remarkably, he stated that the topos of ku is the field of power: “As far as all beings penetrate one another in their being, they are not what they are. On the other hand they are as such what they are. This relation of mutual penetration itself is the power which gathers and binds all beings into one, the power which makes the world the world. The field of ku is the field of power.” 5 As is well known, from the viewpoint of jijimuge, the infinite-fold mutual penetration of the individuals, there is nothing transcendent. Therefore Nishitani, when he speaks of this aspect of reality, does not refer to the paradoxical unity of the absolute and the relative. The field of ku is simply the field of power in which mutual penetration of the individuals is realized.If we combine three keywords of these three philosophers, namely Nishida’s “immediate experience,” Hisamatsu’s “awakening to the Self,” and Nishitani’s “field of ku as the field of power,” they seem to me more genuinely Buddhist than Nishida’s terms: keiken, jikaku, and basho. Whereas Nishida—who as a pioneer attempted to construct a philosophical system from... (shrink)