Tanabe Hajime

1. Introducción. 2. Modernización, tradicionalismo y sincretismo en el pensamiento japonés contemporáneo. 3. Liberalismo, conservatismo y primeras corrientes socialistas y feministas (1868-1912): La modernidad filosófica en el Japón Meiji. El debate en torno al término «filosofía». Imperialismo e ilustración. Contexto del liberal-conservatismo. Los reformistas de Meirokusha: liberalismo, gradualismo y evolucionismo social. Conservadurismo: reacción a los peligros de la occidentalización y a la pérdida de identidad. Los prematuros movimientos socialistas, anarquistas y feministas. 4. Subjetividad e ideología (1912-1945): Kitaro Nishida y la (...) pluralidad filosófica en el interior y más allá de la Escuela de Kioto. La significación de Nishida en el panorama filosófico japonés del siglo XX. La denominación de la «Escuela»: Tosaka y su descripción de la «filosofía de la escuela de Kioto». La experiencia pura nishidiana y el paradigma del «no-yo». El cuestionamiento nishidiano de los presupuestos de la epistemología en Estudio sobre el Bien. La filosofía nishidiana del no-yo, la iluminación y sus problemas éticos. La investigación crítica y el análisis del poder ideológico: Tosaka. 5. Pensar la postguerra: memoria y superación del ultranacionalismo. Superación del vacío a través del arrepentimiento: Tanabe. Superación del vacío a través de la comprensión del nihilismo: Nishitani. La autopsia filosófico-política del ultranacionalismo japonés: Maruyama. Movimientos y orientaciones posteriores a los años 1950. Panorama. Filosofía y denuncia del patriarcado y el nacionalismo: Ueno. Transcrítica y república mundial: Karatani. 6. Nota final. (shrink)

Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) in his later years explored the so-called "dialectical" interpretation of complex analysis, an important part of his philosophy of mathematics that has previously been criticized as lacking mathematical accuracy and philosophical importance. I interpret his elaboration on complex analysis as an attempt to develop Leibniz's theory of individual notion and to supplement Hegel's view of higher analysis with the development in mathematics such as the theory of analytic continuation and Riemann surface. This interpretation shows the previously underrated (...) philosophico-mathematical significance of Tanabe's argument. (shrink)

Nous nous proposons dans cette intervention de structurer synchroniquement trois moments philosophiques d’origines differentes : l’intuition agissante chez Kitarō Nishida, la dialectique de la mediation absolue chez Hajime Tanabe et la philosophie de l’individuation chez Gilbert Simondon, dans un contexte de reflexion philosophique sur la nature de la vie humaine. Les trois moments semblent susceptibles de se croiser, se critiquer et se completer dans un terrain transductif au sens ou l’entend Simondon. C’est ce nouveau terrain que nous entendons defricher afin (...) d’ouvrir une perspective ou un individu humain se transforme en agent responsable d’un transhumanisme a travers le processus de l’individuation dynamique et transindividuelle, laquelle nous preparerait a l’emergence du posthumain dans un futur proche. (shrink)

In Tanabe’s reading of time in the work of Heidegger and, through Shinran’s interpretation, of the seventh-century Chinese philosopher Shandao, one can see that both Heidegger’s and Zendō’s viewpoints do not go beyond the ethical standpoint of self-power. Tanabe distances himself from any view that strays from the eternal present as it is witnessed in the practice of metanoesis, in which one attempts to live the continuous practice, not as if one were dead, but by effectively being so, that is, (...) by practicing and witnessing the breaking through of the self, which in turn is the only thing that can foster the eternal present of naturalness. This is definitively Shinran’s viewpoint. (shrink)

This article provides the first English translation of Tanabe’s early essay, “The Limit of Logicism in Epistemology: A Critique of the Marburg and Freiburg Schools”. The key notion that the young Tanabe seeks to define in relation to his detailed analyses of contemporary Neo-Kantian epistemology is the notion of “pure experience” presented in Nishida’s philosophy. The general theory of epistemology shared among the thinkers from these two prominent schools of philosophy in early 20 th century Germany aimed to eliminate the (...) empirical residues in Kant’s theory of knowledge while opposing naïve empiricism and the uncritical methodology of positive science. Their “logicistic” approach, according to Tanabe, seems to contradict Nishida’s notion of pure experience, for it cannot allow any vestige of empiricism in its systematic framework, which is specifically designed to ground scientific knowledge. Yet given that the Neo-Kantian configuration of epistemology does not create the object of knowledge, it must face sensation or representational content as its limiting instance. Thus, to ground a Neo-Kantian theory of knowledge while taking account of this limit of logicism involves explaining their understanding of the unity of subject and object in human knowing. For this, Tanabe argues, recourse to Nishida’s notion of pure experience is indispensable. (shrink)

For philosophy to criticize the concept of reality requires self-criticism. Throughout history many thinkers that have systematized a critique of both reality and philosophy. In this article we will analyze the Kantian and Hegelian systems by showing the failure in their respective critique to exercise sufficient self-criticism, resulting in unfinished critiques. Going a step further, Tanabe’s proposal was to plunge philosophy into a kind of «absolute disruption» that would drive thought beyond itself by means of an absolute critique in which (...) being and nothingness are seen to interpenetrate each other, thus opening up the possibility of positing absolute nothingness as «a foundation that is not a foundation.». (shrink)

In this collection of seven essays on the「種の論理」"logic of species," Tanabe Hajime 田辺元, a major figure in the Kyoto School, confronts the philosophy of his mentor, Nishida Kitarō, head-on as he sets forth his own systematic logic and lays the groundwork for his later work. This is the third volume of "Classics of Philosophy in Japan," a series of books dedicated to the dissemination of important philosophical texts at an affordable price.

A new reprint of Tanabe Hajime's masterwork Zangedō toshite no tetsugaku 懺悔道としての哲学, cross-referenced to the pagination of the original 1963 text from The Complete Works of Tanabe Hajime (田辺元全集) and to translations in English, Korean, Spanish, and Italian. This is the first in a new series dedicated to the dissemination of important Japanese philosophical texts and entitled "Classics of Philosophy in Japan.

This essay deals with the problem of religious transformation in Tanabe Hajime. In his Philosophy as Metanoetics, Tanabe examines this transformation through the relationship between vows of the Buddhas as described in the writings of the Pure Land Buddhist thinker Shinran. For Tanabe, each vow expresses a moment of the religious transformation. Furthermore,he argues against all possibility of immediacy in human existence and sets out to demonstrate that the meaning of existence is mediated by the transformation of self-power into Other-power, (...) wherein the drive to affirm the self is transformed into a radical return to the world in which the self becomes a medium for the salvation of others. This is where Tanabe locates the deepest power of nothingness: in negating every effort of the self to ground itself and to make human being an upāya, a skillful means to a greater end. This is possible, in turn, because being itself, in all its manifestations, is upāya. (shrink)

Much Ado About Nothingness brings together 14 essays on Nishida Kitaro and Tanabe Hajime by one of the leading scholars of twentieth-century Japanese philosophy. With Nishida’s “logic of place” and Tanabe’s “logic of the specific” providing a continuity to the whole, the author writes from a conviction that “the overriding challenge for those doing philosophy in the key of the Kyoto School, with their sights set squarely on self-awareness like Nishida and Tanabe before them, is to turn its attention to (...) the wider world….”. (shrink)

This article introduces the first English translation of one of Tanabe’s early essays on metaphysics. It questions the relation of the universal to the particular in context of logic, phenomenology, Neo-Kantian epistemology, and classical metaphysics. Tanabe provides his reflections on the nature of the concept of universality and its constitutive relation to phenomenal particulars through critical analyses of the issue as it is discussed across various schools of philosophy including: British Empiricism, the Marburg School, the Austrian School, the Kyoto School, (...) and Platonism. In this essay, Tanabe reveals his ability to think metaphysically the ground for the possibility of reasoning and dares to voice his own thought beyond references to the most prominent thinkers of his time from distinct intellectual traditions in both the east and the west. This essay, therefore, demonstrates that his strong tendency to move beyond the received epistemology and phenomenology of the European intellectual tradition to metaphysics was already present in the early days of his academic life and thereby marks a more general contribution of the Kyoto School of Philosophy to distinct European schools of thought in the early twentieth century. (shrink)

This paper presents the first English translation of one of Tanabe’s early essays on Kant. Tanabe marks the occasion of the first translation of the Critique of Practical Reason into Japanese by providing his reflections on Kant’s theory of freedom in this essay. This creative essay by Tanabe represents the hallmark Kyoto School interpretation of Kant. Tanabe weaves his account of Kant with elements from other philosophers in an attempt to think systematically about the nature of freedom. He agrees with (...) Kant that morality itself “rises and falls” with the idea of freedom; however, Tanabe also tries to rescue some of the pitfalls he sees in Kant’s theory by reconstructing Kant’s account. In this brief, but rich essay, Tanabe unfolds one of the more creative aspects of his philosophy through Kant. (shrink)

The Japanese philosopher, Tanabe Hajime is taken up as an example of a thinker who, like the conference question, straddles intellectual histories East and West. Of all the Kyoto School philosophers, it was he who took history most seriously. He not only criticized Kantian, Hegelian, and Marxist notions of teleology and the modern scientific myth of "progress" on their own ground, but went on to counter these views of history with a logic of emptiness grounded in Buddhist philosophy. The essay (...) concludes with an attempt to uncover the tacit assumption that allows Tanabe to make his arguments. (shrink)

When the fate of the Japanese people has been decided at the end of the war, the Japanese intellectuals cannot feign a naïve stance of innocence that would have mitigated pursed lips, silent pens and empty sheets of paper. And when some of them did take this recourse, or worse, tried to revise their earlier positions with regard to the Japanese’ involvement in the World War by tampering on their published works, Hajime Tanabe took the road less traveled and confronted (...) the issue of flawed scientific philosophical position head-on; his is a genuine attempt at self-criticism that would put to question every inveterate beliefs one has held at the expense of an openness to a reality that is neither pre-given nor statically perfect. This paper, then, will be a reflection on Tanabe’s suggestion on what we should or could do if rationality has become pathological, if thinking can no longer contain the irrational, and if at the demise of philosophy, nothing remains but the haunting gossamer of injustice’s debris crying for recognition, demanding for an apology. (shrink)

Introduction -- Nishida -- Nishitani -- Tanabe -- The Danish parallel -- Conclusion.

Monolitna kulturološka označenja kao što je Zapad ili Istok postala su sumnjiva i puki izraz parokijalizma u eri globalizacijskih procesa. Otuda, trebalo bi biti očito da svjetska filozofija nije nešto što se može ograničavati isključivo na jednu tradiciju koja započinje sa Talesom. Ona mora biti dostatno široka da obuhvati svaki čin filozofiranja, svaki oblik traganja za mudrošću, budući da ne moramo svi biti Zapadnjaci da bismo filozofirali. -/- Kako bi dali svoj doprinos prevladavanju općenite kulture ksenofobije na pragu 21. stoljeća (...) u Bosni i Hercegovini i Balkanu općenito, dvojica su priređivača Novih granica japanske filozofije, Nevad Kahteran i James W. Heisig, uključili čitav serijal tekstova (11 eseja o japanskoj filozofskoj tradiciji), potcrtavajući ovaj nesrazmjer u pogledu unošenja azijskih prinosa te napose modela dalekoistočnjakog mišljenja u našim filozofskim seminarima, potičući druge da rade na produbljivanju ovakovrsnih susretanja i transkulturalnom dijalogu. Zapravo, ovim sveskom se sumiraju rezultati prethodna četiri sveska Nanzan Instituta (Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 1, 2, 3 i 4) te japanski prinosi pluralizmu i interkulturalnim studijama postaju dostupni u našem jeziku. (shrink)

The historical origins of the Kyoto School of Philosophy of modern Japan, represented by Kitaro Nishida and Hajime Tanabe, may be derived from both the ancient Chinese idea of Change and the ancient Indian Upanishadic idea of the mutual identity of Brahman and Atman. The ancient Chinese idea of Change signifies change as well as non-change, and even their dialectical unification. Both origins are structured by the self-identity of the opposed in logic, and these historical prototypes have been developed into (...) the various forms of Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist philosophy. The notion of Nothingness or Emptiness rather than Being has been set up as the fundamental principle. The principle of Nothingness as ultimate reality has been connected with the logic of self-identity of theopposed, and this is evident in Nishida’s concept of the self-identity in absolute contradistinction that is equivalent to the Place of Absolute Nothingness. Even though Nishida’s idea of Place is directly and explicitly influenced by the ancient Greek idea of Topos, it has indirectly and implicitly been affected by the traditional agricultural society as well, in which the land is regarded as the self-identical substratum despite the cyclic time of the four-seasons change. The ancient Chinese idea of Change also reflects the agricultural society in which the cyclic time plays an important role on the basis of the unchanging self-identical land as the underlying substratum. Nishida succeeds in establishing the new logical expression of Eastern traditional thought, deeply hidden in consciousness, in relation toWestern philosophy. The uniqueness of Nishida’s idea of Place may have its main source in the traditional agricultural background, and in this sense his way of thinking may be rural in character. On the other hand, Tanabe, though following Nishida at first, turns to making criticism of the mentor with the establishment of the triadic logic of species as the dialectic, which is characterized by the perpetual self-negating conversion in action. In contrast to Nishida, Tanabe represents the urban type of thinking, which is in pursuit of transforming in life. While Nishida’s idea of Absolute Nothingness has an affinity with the ancient Chinese philosopher Laotzu’s idea of Nothingness from and into which every entity comes and goes, Tanabe’s concept of Absolute Nothingness as the principle ofconversion is more closed to the Buddhist idea of sunyata, i.e., Emptiness, which is devoid of any substance in itself. As regards evil, the difference between them is obvious in that for Nishida evil and time or history disappear into the ultimate horizon or place of Nothingness with the tendency toward a kind of monism of goodness, whereas for Tanabe evil copes with goodness and retains its own status throughout, never being reduced to the opposed. Even if so, both of them, however, fail to construct a philosophy of history from the epochal or durational viewpoint, compared to Heidegger and Jaspers. (shrink)

Hajime Tanabe, the Kyoto- School philosopher of modern Japan, attempts to interpret Aristotle's ontology as being involved in the logic of self-identical being without self-negative conversion in action from his own dialectical perspective. For Tanabe, the eternal essence or Form is to be mediated by the dynamic character of matter, i.e., the temporality pertinent to the changing movement. For Aristotle, however, the essence or pure activity as the principle of being is devoid of such a dynamic mediation, but is rather (...) regarded as the past being, i.e., what it should be originally and eternally. In other words, for Aristotle, evil and matter are the lacks of goodness and the eternal Form that are identical with the essence of the individual substance. Evil is to be self-negatively mediated to goodness in free action through conversion in Tanabe's perspective. Movement pertaining to matter is not simply an incompletion of pure activity, but is rather self-negatively converted into the activity as the transcendent principle of the dialectical unification of time and eternity, matter and Form, evil and Goodness. The individual existence has freedom to unify the self-contradistinctive opposed moments, i.e., subjective action and objective being in a way of mutually negating conversion. The difference between Tanabe and Aristotle lies in that for Tanabe practice is relevant to the future, whereas for Aristotle contemplation is concerned with eternity as invariable and imperishable being since the past. While Aristotle's logic is confined to the self-identity of being in contemplation, Tanabe's logic is structured by the triadic elements of individuality, species as the relative universal, and genus as the absolute universal in terms of the negative conversion in action. (shrink)

Can contradictions be meaningful? How can one assert 'P soku not-P' or 'P and yet not-P' without sacrificing intelligibility? Expanding on previous attempts, mainly by Dilworth and Heisig, to demystify the soku connective, a formal system is presented here for the logic of soku. Through a formal distinction between internal and external negation, grammatical features of the soku connective are shown to be logically irrelevant, and the principle of non-contradiction is preserved. Disparities with traditional logic are noted, with a focus (...) on negation rather than 'soku'. The formal examination of the logic of soku is intended to present the logic in a way acceptable to more analytically minded philosophers and thereby enhance East-West and Japanese-Anglo-American interaction and criticism. (shrink)

This dissertation examines philosophical and literary configurations of "violence" in discourses of human freedom and imperial subjugation in Germany and Japan. The concept of "violence" marks the ethical limit of normative claims. Without a definition in itself, "violence" serves the critical function of disclosing norms orienting social and political life. Each of the authors studied in this dissertation turned toward a conception of human freedom founded in the confrontation of social norms disclosed by rhetorical violence. Chapter one examines the rhetoric (...) of Immanuel Kant's Zum ewigen Frieden in the historical context of its writing. Kant engages in a performative argument for publicity in his critique of Prussian imperialism and the censorship of revolutionary views. Through rhetorical gestures such as the title of his essay as an invocation of death and the clausula salvatoria as a hedge against his critics, Kant encodes the political upheavals of the historical exterior in the rhetorical movement of his essay. He argues for peace by performing violence in language. Whereas Kant's essay has been conventionally read apart from its historical context, Heinrich von Kleist's Die Herrmannsschlacht has been interpreted strictly in terms of the historical moment of its writing. Chapter two argues instead for a rhetorical reading of Kleist's play in which language emerges as both the central theme of the text and an agent of anti-imperial violence. Kleist concretizes metaphors of the body such that they perform the politics of absolute opposition. Freedom for Kleist means opposition to the other. Chapter three turns to an alternative conception of human freedom grounded in opposition. In his Phanomenologie des Geistes, Hegel produces a performative narrative of the development of subjectivity in relations of violence. As an "unhappy consciousness," the subject no longer opposes an external other but itself as an internal "enemy." The freedom that it attains is constituted in self-subjection. Chapter four examines the appropriation of Kant and Hegel by the Japanese wartime philosophers Miki Kiyoshi and Tanabe Hajime. Both defend the project of Japanese imperialism by arguing for a form of freedom in which the subject negates its attachment to the imperial state. This negation inverts into a performance of subjectivity as the movement of self-subjection. (shrink)

In this collection on the Kyoto School of Philosophy, the author offers the reader Tanabe's religious philosophy, but also, and for the first time, his ...

Translated text is chapt. 7, pt. 2 of Kirisutokyō no benshō.

A milestone in Japan's post-war philosophical thought and a dramatic turning point in Tanabe's own philosophy, "Philosophy as Metanoetics" calls for nothing less than a complete and radical rethinking of the philosophical task itself. It is a powerful, original work, showing vast erudition in all areas of both Eastern and Western thought.