Husserl: Ideas 1

This is my full original translation of Elsenhans' “Phaenomenologie, Psychologie, Erkenntnistheorie,” an early long review article on Husserl's Ideen I, published in German in Kant Studien XX (1915). A revised version of this translation (with Andrea Staiti and Evan Clarke) appears in The Sources of Husserl’s Ideas I, ed. Staiti and Clarke, De Gruyter (2018), 339-82. Please cite only from the published version of the translation.

La investigación propuesta tratará de contextualizar las insuficiencias teóricas de la fenomenología “clásica” antes de su despliegue genético. Ideen I aparecerá como la culminación de un periodo programático. La estructura de correlación, la naturaleza de la reducción trascendental, la necesidad de aunar la reducción fenomenológica y la reducción eidéti-ca, y la proliferación indiscriminada de metábasis de todo tipo, serán indicadores de la exigencia de una fenomenología “no-clásica”. La disociación entre Intencionalidad y Eidética nos mostrará la necesidad de una “ampliación” de (...) la fenomenología en forma de una arquitectónica de niveles, ya anunciada en los textos, pero más allá del lema programático: A los textos mismos.Our investigation will seek to contextualize the theoretical inadequacies of "classical" phenomenology before its genetic deployment took place. Edmund Husserl’s Ideen I will signify the culmination of a programmatic period. The correlation structure, the nature of transcendental reduction, the need to make phenomenological and eidetic reductions coalesce and the indiscriminate proliferation of all kinds of metabasis all are indicators of the need for a "non-classical" phenomenology. The dis-sociation between Intentionality and Eidetics will show the need for an "extension" of phenomenology into architectural levels−already announced in the texts−but beyond the pro-grammatic slogan: To the texts themselves. (shrink)

En el presente artículo analizo la lectura que hace Dorion Cairns, probablemente el más cercano de los seguidores de Husserl, del libro de Ideen y pondré de relieve las críticas que mi maestro le hizo a lo que Husserl había considerado una especie de manual de su filosofía fenomenológica. Lo que sigue es un resumen del seminario de 1964, dedicado a las Ideas. Siguiendo la estructura del libro, Cairns hace las siguientes observaciones: consideraciones sobre la comprensión adecuada del título del (...) libro, reflexiones de Cairns sobre la relación entre la fenomenología trascendental y la psicología empírica y la relación entre lo eidético y lo trascendental. En tercer lugar, abordaré lo que probablemente sea la mayor diferencia entre la fenomenología de Cairns y las Ideas de Husserl, esto es, la importancia de la “preconstitución”, un rico sustrato de los actos o acciones humanas, la cual desemboca en una critiqua de la noción de la intencionalidad presente en Ideas, como objetivadora. Cairns rechaza también la distinción hyle/ morphé y la sustituye por una más fundamental, la de sentir y sensa. También considera los aspectos fundamentales del tiempo. En cuanto a la tercera parte de Ideas, Cairns pone de relieve algunas dificultadaes a la hora de clasificar los actos. Otro aspecto de la lectura de Ideas es la insistencia en analizar los componentes subjetivos o irracionales en la teoría de la práxis, valores y conocimiento.In this paper I shall analyse Dorion Cairns´s, arguably Husserl´s closest follower, reading of the Ideen and I will emphasize criticisms that my teacher had of what Husserl considered a sort of manual for his phenomenological philosophy. What follows is a summary of the seminar from 1964, devoted to the Ideas. Following the structure of the book, Cairns points out the following remarks: concerns about the proper understanding of the very title of the work, Cairn´s consideration of the relation of transcendental phenomenology to empirical psychology and the relation of the eidetic and the transcendental. In the third place, probably the biggest difference between Cairn´s phenomenology and Husserl´s Ideas, that is, the importance of the “preconstitution”, a rich substratum of human act or actions. This emphasis amounts to the critique of intentionality in Ideen as objectivating. Cairns also rejects the hylē/morphē distinction and substitutes it by a more fundamental one of sensing and sensa. He also considers some fundamental aspects of time. As to the third part of the Ideas, Cairns points out some difficulties in classification of acts. Other aspect of Cairn’s reading of Ideen is the insistence on analysing the subjective or irrational components in the theory of praxis, values and knowledge. (shrink)

I present the first systematic account in the literature of a Husserlian response to Natorp’s critique of Husserl’s account of the pre-givenness of both the absolute stream of lived-experience and its essencesEssences to reflectionReflections. My response is presented within the broader context of what I argue is Heidegger’s misappropriation of Natorp’s critique of the phenomenological limits of reflectionReflections in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenologyTranscendental phenomenology and the misguided French attempt to address Heidegger’s critique by introducing the dialectical notion of “pre-reflectivePre-reflective” consciousness to (...) phenomenology. My Husserlian response shows that Husserl’s account of reflectionReflections in Ideas I is able to rebut Natorp’s critical claims that transcendental phenomenologyTranscendental phenomenology cannot access the streaming of the stream of lived-experience without “stilling” its flow and that a gap in Husserl’s account of the transformation of the natural phenomenonPhenomenon of reflectionReflections into transcendental reflectionReflections provides justification for Natorp’s criticism of the ambiguity of Husserl’s account in Ideas I of the givennessGivennesses of the essenceEssences of lived-experience investigated by transcendental phenomenologyTranscendental phenomenology. (shrink)

No nos interesan las facticidades [Faktizitäten] de la conciencia y de sus cursos [Abläufe], pero sí los problemas esenciales [Wesensprobleme], que aquí habría que formular. En el presente artículo me centraré en las siguientes cuestiones: que hay de nuevo en las Ideas de Husserl la necesidad de una epoché trascendental o una reducción para acceder a la correlación noesis-noema la estructura compleja de Erlebnis intencional y algunos aspectos de noesis y noema las leyes eidéticas identificadas por Husserl y, finalmente, algunas (...) observaciones sobre el papel del ego en la corriente de las vivencias What interests us are not the facticities [Faktizitäten] of consciousness and in-stances of it elapsing [Abläufe], but ra-ther the problems of its essence [Wesensprobleme], problems which would need to be formulated there. In this paper I shall focus on the following matters: what is new in Husserl’s Ideas the need for a transcendental epoché or reduction in order to access the noesi-noema correlation the complex structure of an intentional Erlebnis and some aspects of noesis and noema the eidetic laws Husserl identifies, and, finally, some remarks on the role of the ego in the stream of experiences. (shrink)

This paper deals with the Munich phenomenologist Johannes Daubert’s attitude towards Husserl’s turn to idealismIdealism as well as the problem of reality, taking Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith’s article AgainstIdealismIdealism: Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I as its point of departure. Indeed, the present work constitutes a supplement or addendum to Schuhmann and Smith’s text, relating the theses presented therein to Daubert’s investigations into the issue of questioning. Here we bring together two overarching motifs found in Daubert’s vast unpublished writings, (...) namely “the consciousness of realityConsciousness of reality [WirklichkeitsbewusstseinConsciousness of reality ]” and the problem of the question. According to Daubert, it is not the case that being is constituted on the level of transcendental consciousness, the latter he regarded as purely fictitious. Instead, being is found in opennessOpenness, which is in turn established by the direct, felt encounter of incarnate human beings with reality. (shrink)

It is said that transcendental phenomenology faces an unavoidable aporia, according to which it is perfectly justified to accept the claim that the transcendental ego constitutes the sense of all external being, including other subjects, as well as the claim that other subjects constitute the sense of all external objects, since they are a community of transcendental egos. The essence of the aporia is that it is impossible to accept both of these claims if one accepts the conceptual schema of (...) transcendental phenomenology. In the article, I present an interpretation of transcendental phenomenology which allows one to avoid such consequences. Firstly, the static theory of intersubjectivity presented in Ideas of Pure Phenomenology and Carthesian Meditations is reconstructed and analyzed. Attention is devoted to the issues of phenomenological reduction and constitution of sense. Afterwards, it is argued that one should distinguish two kinds of constitutive processes: one understood as an activity of the sole transcendental ego (self), and the second one as an activity of the community of transcendental egos. It is claimed that both processes are mutually connected. Moreover, it seems that the second kind of constitution is metaphysically prior then the former one. This claim will allow one to overcome solipsistic interpretations of transcendental phenomenology and to overcome the aporia presented. (shrink)

The paper develops the argument presented in my earlier article, Intentional Reference and Its Object in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism. It contains further considerations on the proper understanding of Husserl’s notion of noema. My aim is not only to present an interpretation of Husserl’s text, but primarily to understand what constitutes an intentional reference of an act of consciousness. I agree with some of Husserl’s claims in Ideas, Book I, that noema, sense and intentional object are basically the same. This standpoint (...) implies, however, a drastic reinterpretation of the notion of an object. I refer to Ingarden’s conception of a purely intentional object to show the difficulties connected with regarding noema as an object separate from consciousness but still existentially dependent on it. Analyzing Husserlian notion of a noematic core I emphasize the relevance of universals for Husserl’s theory of consciousness. (shrink)

The following issues are considered in the paper: The proper understanding of the ‘attempt to doubt’ recommended by Husserl in Ideas, Book I, as a point of departure on a way to the transcendental reduction. How intentional reference of an act of consciousness is possible and what it consists in, according to Husserl. A logical dependence between the characteristics of intentional reference and the standpoint of transcendental idealism in Husserl’s Ideas, Book I. How to understand Husserl’s claim that the intentional (...) object is equivalent to sense. I arrive at the conclusion that a fully consistent interpretation of Husserl’s declarations regarding the aforementioned issues does not seem to be possible; for one needs to modify Husserl’s standpoint in certain respects. These considerations will be carried on in an article titled ‘The Noema as Sense. The Problem of the Object of Consciousness in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism’, forthcoming in Diametros. (shrink)

This study is a commentary on Carl Stumpf's evaluation of Husserl's phenomenology as presented in the Logical Investigations and the first book of Ideas. I first examine Stumpf's reception of the version of phenomenology that Husserl presented in the Logical Investigations and I then look at §§ 85-86 of Ideas I, in which Husserl seeks to demarcate his "pure" phenomenology from that of Stumpf. In the third section, I analyze the criticism that Stumpf, in § 13 of his book Erkenntnislehre, (...) directs toward to the new version of phenomenology that Husserl develops in Ideas I, and in the fourth, I summarize the Spinozist interpretation of the noetico-noematical correlations that Stumpf proposes in his two studies on Spinoza. The last section addresses Husserl's self-criticism regarding the Cartesian aproach to the reduction in Ideas I and the parallelism that the late Husserl establishes between intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology. I try to show that the version of phenomenology that Husserl develops during the Freiburg period anticipates in many respects Stumpf's criticism and partly confirms the latter's diagnosis of the version of phenomenology advocated in Ideas I. (shrink)

Husserl's phenomenology provides theory for empirical science and other practices in the form of transcendental philosophy after Kant. This phenomenology is a reflection on mental objects in relation to mental processes, some of which are shared in culture: a theoretical framework that grounds and co-ordinates theory-production for empirical practice. The importance of the original work of Edmund Husserl for contemporary empirical psychology is that it provides the conceptual justification for the methods employed and the interpretative stances taken. Informed theoretically by (...) Husserl's phenomenology, empirical psychology is thus a discipline grounded and co-ordinated by essences. Essences are about the being of consciousness connected with other consciousness and mental senses, expressed as various forms of intentionality in connection with sense and meaning. The aim of this paper is to clarify some key features of Ideas I rather than to comment on the quality of the translation by Dahlstrom or the closeness of the readings of leading phenomenological psychologists to the original. (shrink)

Husserl's _Ideas_ is one of the most important works of twentieth-century philosophy, offering a detailed introduction to the phenomenological method, including the reduction, and outlining the overall scope of phenomenological philosophy. Husserl's explorations of the a priori structures of intentionality, consciousness, perceptual experience, evidence and rationality continue to challenge contemporary philosophy of mind. Dan Dahlstrom's accurate and faithful translation, written in pellucid prose and in a fluid, modern idiom, brings this classic work to life for a new generation. --Dermot Moran, (...) University College, Dublin. (shrink)

This essay has two parts. In the first one I try to show the crucial importance of Husserl’s phenomenology (Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen I) in Ortega’s thought at least till 1929. In this period it is not an exaggeration to say that Ortega understands his philosophy as a peculiar development of Husserl’s theory of intentionality. After this date, and influenced by the publication Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, he begins to consider Husserlian thought as the last and more refined form of (...) idealism. The antidote against it should be a philosophy of vital or historical reason, a form of non-idealistic phenomenology, which is close to the existential one. (shrink)

project of the Ideen II had two parts: (A) analyses of the constitution of the material, the animal, and the mental world, and (B) epistemological ( wissenschaftstheoretische) considerations. (A) Was published following the Landgrebe typescript of ...

...In what follows I lay out Husserl's theory of epistemic justification as he sketches it in Part IV of 'Ideas 1', especially in the section he appropriately titles the "Phenomenology of Reason," understood here to present a phenomenological analysis of how reason is given, namely, how reason manifests itself in conscious life. My claim is that Husserl's "phenomenology of reason," by clarifying the ways in which the "legitimizations of reason" take place can be ultimately understood as a theory of epistemic (...) justification. The theory of epistemic justification discused here is a phenomenological account of the process whereby the thinking subject comes to regards particular beliefs as true and can give reasons to support this claim. (shrink)

Le premier volume des Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie pure et une philosophie phénoménologique est le traité fondamental de la phénoménologie de Husserl. Il s'y propose d'introduire le lecteur à la nouvelle attitude méthodique de la phénoménologie-la réduction transcendantale-pour révéler la subjectivité comme vie intentionnelle constituant en soi toute réalité objective sans exception: comme subjectivité transcendantale. La réduction apparaît ainsi liée d'emblée à une thèse métaphysique, l'idéalisme transcendantal, que Husserl revendiquera dans les Méditations cartésiennes comme l'«unique interprétation possible» du sens (...) du monde. Fonder la phénoménologie sur cet idéalisme de la subjectivité absolue implique un passage continu de l'attitude d'esprit naturelle à l'attitude transcendantale. Mais comment valider l'idéalisme transcendantal à partir de l'attitude naturelle sans la reconduire au cœur même de l'attitude phénoménologique? Et si, à l'inverse, la réduction se présuppose elle-même, que vaut l'idée d'un «accès» au transcendantal? Qu'est-ce alors que ce «transcendantal», auquel on prétend ainsi accéder? (shrink)

The present paper attempts to accomplish the following: (1) to clarify and critically discuss the phenomenology of “belief” as we find it in Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book (1913) (henceforward, Ideas I); (2) to clarify and critically discuss the manner in which the phenomenological method treats beliefs; (3) to clarify and critically discuss the manner of belief justification as described by the phenomenological method; and (4) to argue that, just as the (...) phenomenological method can be used to validate scientific hypotheses, it can likewise be practised in our everyday worldly comportment to justify our everyday, commonsense beliefs. The paper proceeds from the idea that the phenomenological method is not the static descriptive method some make it out to be, but, rather, a living method at the service of life. The author begins with some preliminary remarks about Husserl’s concerns with unfounded or presupposed beliefs and their necessary “suspension” as dictated by the phenomenological reduction and epoche (“the method”). He then engages the text of Ideas I, especially sections 101 to 106, where Husserl presents a phenomenological conception of the character of belief. The paper concludes by treating the nature of belief justification, or “rational positing”, and puts forward the view that the phenomenological method in everyday practice can aid us in the realization of responsible epistemic conduct and, ultimately, lead toward responsible conduct towards ourselves and, hence, authentic being. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 7, Edition 2 September 2007. (shrink)

Brainard’s systematic introduction to Husserl’s systematic introduction to phenomenology shows the underlying teleological directedness and sense of Husserlian thought as a striving toward absolute rationality. It is a structural analysis of and commentary on Ideas I, the 1913 work that introduces the transcendental aspects of the newly emerging phenomenology, including reduction, the pure ego, the noesis–noema correlation, eidetic intuition, and the static analysis of intentional acts. In a sense, Brainard has written three different books here.

Presenting the first step-by-step commentary on Husserl’s Ideas I, Marcus Brainard’s Belief and Its Neutralization provides an introduction not only to this central work, but also to the whole of transcendental phenomenology. Brainard offers a clear and lively account of each key element in Ideas I, along with a novel reading of Husserl, one which may well cause scholars to reconsider many long-standing views on his thought, especially on the role of belief, the effect and scope of the epoché, and (...) the significance of the universal neutrality modification. (shrink)

La teoría husserliana de la constitución es el método de la fenomenología como filosofía trascendental. Su problema específico es la constitución de objetividades en la conciencia. La reducción trascendental descubre la estructura noético-noemática de la conciencia, abriendo así el acceso a una esfera absoluta de reladones cidéticas. El análisis fenomenológico de la vivencia nos enfrenta con dos seres en sí: la conciencia y el ser de que se tiene conciencia. Lacuestión de la evidencia plantea el problema de la legitimidad racional (...) de toda correlación entre conciencia, verdad y ser. Lafenomenología tiene su fundamento en la «subjetividad trascendental absoluta».The husserlian theory of constitution is the method of phenomenology as transcendental philosophy. Its specific problem is the constitution ofobjectivities in consciousness.The transcendental reduction uncovers the noetic-noematic structure of consciousnes, opening up in tbat way the acreas to an absolute sphere of eidetic relationships. Tbe phenomenological analysis of experiential process confronts us withtwo beings: the consciousnessand the being aware of one’s consciousness. As regards evidence one thinks about the problem of rational legitimacy of every correlation between consciousness, truth and heing. Phenomenology has its foundations in the «absolute transcendental subjectivity». (shrink)

La teoría huaserliana de la constitución es el método de la fenomenología como filosoffa trascendental. Su problema especifico es la constitución de objetividades en la conciencia. La reducción trascendental descubre la estructura noético-noemática de la conciencia, abriendo así el acceso a una esfera absoluta de relaciones eidéticas. El análisis fenomenológico de la vivencia nos enfrenta con dos seres en sí: la conciencia y el ser de que se tiene conciencia. La cuestión de la evidencia plantea el problema de la legitimidad (...) racional de toda correlación entre conciencia, verdad y ser. La fenomenología tiene su fundamento en la “subjetividad trascendental absoluta”.The husserlian theory of constitution is die method of phenomenology as trascendental philosophy. Ita specific problem is this constitution of objectivities in consciousness. The trascendental reduction unconvers this noetic-noematic structure ofconsciousnes, opening up iii that way the access tu an absoluta sphere of eidetic relationships. The phenomenological analysis of experiential process confronts us with two beings; dic consciousness and dic being aware of one’s consciousness. As regards evidence one thinks about dic problem of rational legitimacy of every correlation between consciousness, truth and being. Phenomenology has its foundations in this “absolute transcendental subjectivity.”. (shrink)

To seek to elucidate Husserl's phenomenology by contrasting it with that of the Munich phenomenologist Johannes Daubert is to betray an intention to explain something well-known by reference to something that is wholly obscure. Thus most philosophers are somehow aware of Edmund Husserl. But Johannes Daubert?

The first volume of Husserl's Ideen was published in 1913. Until then Husserl was known as the author of Logical Investigations, which had been published in 1900-1901 and which had generated a philosophical movement after its own image: one marked by anti-psychologism, by a detailed analysis of the phenomena of consciousness, by an interest in logic, by a kind of common-sense realism. The developments in Goettingen and Munich were examples of the influence of Husserl's early work. But the appearance of (...) Ideen I in 1913 opened a new dimension in Husserl's thought, one that--as we now know from his posthumous works--had been germinating in the intervening years. To many the new dimension seemed, and still seems, disappointingly idealistic. The new book was an introduction to phenomenology, but it seemed to talk about the world and everything in it as only the achievement of consciousness. Husserl seemed to have become practically a Fichtean idealist. In fact what was at issue in Ideen I was a deeper appreciation of the nature of philosophical reflection and analysis. It was an appreciation that being is essentially intelligible and intendable, and that we give only a partial analysis of an object if we fail to speak, ultimately, about the object's being intelligible and intendable, about its being for consciousness. However in this book Husserl made his case in an apparently obscure way. The terminology, the prose, and the argument are difficult and technical from the start. We do not find the gradual introduction of concepts and problems that can be found in the Investigations. Everything is rigorous from the beginning. (shrink)

In his Preface to Ideas, Husserl gives a concise overview of his phenomenology and addresses two serious objections to his phenomenological program. My Introduction to his Preface provides the background to the writing of the piece and suggests it does not do enough to counter the charges of psychologism and idealism.

the Logische Untersuchungen,l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood (...) or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks. (shrink)

As philosophers speak, they think that there are things whicht they can see and speak about as philosophers. But what are these things? And what is the general character of the philosopher's statements? How can we find out whether they are true? If, as is widely agreed, the philosopher does not rely on empirical research, in which direction ought we to look for the evidence to support philosophical statements? Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological reduction, we propose to show, can best be understood as (...) an attempt to indicate the nature and direction of the specifically philosophical concern. The reduction, as he understood it, determines the domain of philosophical research, the character of philosophical statements, and the direction in which we can look for evidence to support such statements. In this paper we shall concentrate on the Ideas, the work which Husserl published in 1913 as a general introduction to phenomenology. (shrink)

Mit den "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie" von 1913, von ihm selbst nur als eine "Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie" angezeigt, zog Edmund Husserl die Konsequenz aus seinen Logischen Untersuchungen (PhB 601), die ihn 1900/01 berühmt gemacht hatten: Ausgehend von der dort entwickelten Phänomenologie der intentionalen Erlebnisse sieht er jetzt in der Aufdeckung der Leistungen des "reinen Bewußtseins", dem die uns bekannte natürliche Welt nur als "Bewußtseinskorrelat" gegeben ist, den eigentlichen Gegenstand philosophischer Erkenntnis und in den (...) von ihm eingeführten methodologischen Begriffen der "Reduk tion" und der "Epoché" den Weg, sich über die Beschaffenheit dieses "reinen Bewußtseins", aus dem alle Erkenntnis entspringt, Klarheit zu verschaffen. Die Ausgabe bietet Husserls Schrift text- und seitengleich nach Band III/1 der Husserliana, herausgegeben von Karl Schuhmann; beigegeben sind Husserls Nachwort zu den Ideen von 1930 aus Band V der Husserliana, herausgegeben von Marly Biemel, sowie ein umfangreiches Namen- und Sachregister von Elisabeth Ströker. (shrink)