The 21st century is steeped in claims to interconnection, technological innovation, and new affective intensities amid challenges to the primacy and centrality of 'the human'. Flashpoint epistemology attends to the lived difficulties that arise in teaching, policymaking, curriculum and research among continuous practices of differentiation, and for which there is no pre-existing template for judgment, resolution or action. Flashpoint Epistemology Volume 1 examines contemporary collisions and reworkings of cultural-political issues in education through arts and humanities-based approaches. How and whether lines (...) are (re)drawn in educational practice - and via who-what - between justice, morality, religion, ethics, subjectivities, intersectionality, the sublime and the senses are a particular focus. The volume offers innovative relational approaches and new narrativization strategies, examining the aporia experienced when operating in educational domains of inevitable, recurring, difficult, fortuitous and/or unforeseen flashpoints. The chapters will engage researchers seeking new approaches to education's complexities, nested discourses, and ever-moving horizons of enactment. It will also benefit post/graduate students and teachers whose work intersects with sociological, philosophical and cultural studies and who are curious about claims to interconnection, the ethical quandaries embedded in practice, and the affordances and limits of technological innovation. (shrink)

Se verdade e política emergem, inicialmente, na obra de Hannah Arendt, como lados antagônicos em uma oposição aparentemente irresolúvel – oposição marcada, originariamente, pelo conflito entre a verdade do filósofo e as opiniões dos cidadãos –, em seu ensaio Verdade e política, publicado pela primeira vez em 1967, a autora parece colocar em novos termos a relação entre ambas, pensando-a, afinal, a partir de uma outra perspectiva. Considerando este contexto, o objetivo deste artigo é examinar a relação que Arendt (...) parece estabelecer entre a verdade, como o lugar da memória, e o mundo, buscando compreender, assim, a relevância e a possível “função” desempenhada pela verdade factual no que diz respeito à política. (shrink)

Philosophers ask just whose expression, if anyone’s, we hear in lyric poetry. Walton provides a novel possibility: it’s the reader who “uses” the poem (just as a speech giver uses a speech) who makes the language expressive. But worries arise once we consider poems in particular social or political settings, those which require a strong self-other distinction, or those with expressions that should not be disassociated from the subjects whose experience they draw from. One way to meet this challenge is (...) to consider the poem expressive of a plural subject, which frees us from looking for a particular individual whose voice we hear in the work, whether she be fictional or actual. Some lyrics give voice to a group whose experience is attended to in the work. This may be done through a posited fictional speaker, but the ontology of the speaker is shown to be less important. Attending to a group whose concerns are voiced allows us to explain how poems can manage to address our-worldly concerns even when lacking actual persons whose expressions we encounter in the poems. (shrink)

O presente trabalho objetiva discutir as possíveis contribuições da Hermenêutica Filosófica de Gadamer para a pesquisa em Psicologia. Nessa direção, parte da problematização do modo como o conhecimento é produzido na Psicologia, com realce para a insuficiência do horizonte técnico-científico para aproximar-se dos fenômenos humanos. Recorre à Hermenêutica Filosófica de Gadamer na busca do desvelamento de outras possibilidades para tal fazer. Para tanto, parte da compreensão da hermenêutica, não na função de método, mas compreendida como condição humana originária. Aborda inicialmente (...) o reconhecimento da influência de Heidegger para o desenvolvimento da Hermenêutica Filosófica de Gadamer e, em seguida, tece uma possível articulação entre o horizonte aberto por Gadamer e a pesquisa em Psicologia, enfocando as compreensões do filósofo acerca da compreensão, do jogo e do diálogo. Por fim, ressalta as contribuições abertas pela Hermenêutica Filosófica para descortinar “direcionamentos” inspiradores às pesquisas no contexto da Psicologia na busca de compreender os fenômenos existenciais. Tal caminho, na medida em que não busca conclusões teoréticas e explicativas, ao manter-se na direção da pergunta, realça a dimensão compreensiva e hermenêutica originária da existência como radicalmente singular e possibilita a tessitura de diálogos entre Psicologia e Hermenêutica Filosófica. (shrink)

The present volume brings Arendt's notes for these lectures together with other of her texts on the topic of judging and provides important clues to the likely direction of Arendt's thinking in this area.

Regarding the selection of the legislative representatives, the elective system is the system that most democratic organizations have adopted. It has become so present nowadays that we take for granted the identification between elective system and representative democracy. But is this identification a correct one? I argue that it is not, since the meaning of 'representative democracy' has no reference to specific mode of selection of the representatives. And, since democracy and other methods of selection are compatible, it should adopted (...) the best one. The criteria of competence for the exercise of the political power ought to be the adopted method of selection, for it is the best one. I too argue that, in the context of division of labor into public and private labor, this is precisely what public representation aims: to leave to the experts the exercise of public labor. (shrink)

As Christian List (2021) has recently argued, the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems that operate autonomously in high-stakes contexts creates a need for “future-proofing” our regulatory frameworks, i.e., for reassessing them in the face of these developments. One core part of our regulatory frameworks that dominates our everyday moral interactions is blame. Therefore, “future-proofing” our extant regulatory frameworks in the face of the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems requires, among others things, that we ask whether it makes sense (...) to extend our blaming practices to these systems. In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising thesis that this question should be answered in the affirmative: contrary to what one might initially think, it can make a lot of sense to blame AI systems, since, as we furthermore argue, many of the important functions that are fulfilled by blaming humans can also be served by blaming AI systems. The paper concludes that this result gives us a good pro tanto reason to extend our blame practices to AI systems. (shrink)

I defend the normativity of meaning against recent objections by arguing for a new interpretation of the ‘ought’ relevant to meaning. Both critics and defenders of the normativity thesis have understood statements about how an expression ought to be used as either prescriptive or semantic. I propose an alternative view of the ‘ought’ as conveying the primitively normative attitudes speakers must adopt towards their uses if they are to use the expression with understanding.

The correspondence between Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers begins in 1926, when the twenty-year-old Arendt studied philosophy with Jaspers in Heidelberg. It is interrupted by Arendt's emigration and Jasper's 'inner emigration' and resumes in the fall of 1945. From then until Jaspers's death in 1969, the initial teacher-student relationship develops into a close friendship. Three countries figure prominently in the correspondence: Germany, Israel, and the United States. Among the topics are Fascism, the atom bomb and the threat of global (...) destruction, German guilt for the Holocaust, Jewishness, the State of Israel, American politics and American universities, the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem. Arendt and Jaspers discuss people both famous and obscure. They gossip, joke complain, and argue. They commiserate with each other over the illnesses and infirmities of old age. And they converse about the world's great philosophers: Spinoza, Kant, Marx, Max Weber, Heidegger. Here is a fascinating dialogue between a woman and a man, a Jew and a German, a questioner and a visionary, both uncompromising in their examination of our troubled century. (shrink)

In this book she describes the perplexing crises which modern society faces as a result of the loss of meaning of the traditional key words of politics: justice ...

Discusses the nature of thought and volition, examines past philosophical theories, and clarifies the relation between will and freedom.

Ana Mae Barbosa presenteia o leitor com uma palestra que descobriu nos arquivos de Arte-Educação da Miami University, dirigida a professores de Arte e Trabalhos Industriais. Um belo exemplo da visão de Dewey sobre a importância da Arte no desenvolvimento humano.

Although Hannah Arendt is considered one of the major contributors to social and political thought in the twentieth century, this is the first general anthology ...

Each of the books that Hannah Arendt published in her lifetime was unique, and to this day each continues to provoke fresh thought and interpretations. This was never more true than for Eichmann in Jerusalem, her account of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, where she first used the phrase “the banality of evil.” Her consternation over how a man who was neither a monster nor a demon could nevertheless be an agent of the most extreme evil evoked derision, outrage, (...) and misunderstanding. The firestorm of controversy prompted Arendt to readdress fundamental questions and concerns about the nature of evil and the making of moral choices. Responsibility and Judgment gathers together unpublished writings from the last decade of Arendt’s life, as she struggled to explicate the meaning of Eichmann in Jerusalem. At the heart of this book is a profound ethical investigation, “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy”; in it Arendt confronts the inadequacy of traditional moral “truths” as standards to judge what we are capable of doing, and she examines anew our ability to distinguish good from evil and right from wrong. We see how Arendt comes to understand that alongside the radical evil she had addressed in earlier analyses of totalitarianism, there exists a more pernicious evil, independent of political ideology, whose execution is limitless when the perpetrator feels no remorse and can forget his acts as soon as they are committed. Responsibility and Judgment is an essential work for understanding Arendt’s conception of morality; it is also an indispensable investigation into some of the most troubling and important issues of our time. (shrink)

This new translation is an extremely welcome addition to the continuing Cambridge Edition of Kant’s works. English-speaking readers of the third Critique have long been hampered by the lack of an adequate translation of this important and difficult work. James Creed Meredith’s much-reprinted translation has charm and elegance, but it is often too loose to be useful for scholarly purposes. Moreover it does not include the first version of Kant’s introduction, the so-called “First Introduction,” which is now recognized as indispensable (...) for an understanding of the work. Werner Pluhar’s more recent translation, which does include the First Introduction, is highly accurate when it confines itself to rendering Kant’s German. However, it is often more of a reconstruction than a translation, containing so many interpretative interpolations that it is often difficult to separate out Kant’s original text from the translator’s contributions. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews have provided a translation that compares to or exceeds Pluhar’s in its literal approach to the German, but that confines all interpretative material to footnotes and endnotes, so that the text itself, with all its unclarities and ambiguities, lies open to view. In addition, Guyer, as editor of the volume, has provided a great deal of valuable supplementary material. This includes an introduction with an outline of the work and details of the history of its composition and publication, and a wealth of endnotes offering clarifications of the text, background information, and, most strikingly, many references to related passages in Kant’s voluminous writings, particularly in connection with Kant’s earlier writings related to aesthetics. The edition also records differences among the first three editions of the work, and—of particular interest—erasures from and additions to Kant’s manuscript of the First Introduction. Although the introduction and endnotes reflect interpretative views that are sometimes disputable, this supplementary material makes the present edition into a valuable resource even for those able to read the text in German. (shrink)

Debates about empathy's role in morality are notoriously complex. On the one hand, proponents of empathy argue that it plays a crucial role in the process of making moral judgments, moral motivation, moral development, and the cultivation of meaningful personal relationships. On the other hand, critics of empathy warn that it is especially susceptible to a number of morally troubling biases and motivational shortcomings. Yet there is little consensus about what empathy is or what it might be good for from (...) a moral point of view. As a result, critics and proponents of empathy alike often wind up talking past each other and debates about empathy's role in morality reach an impasse. This paper proposes a typology of empathy's affective, cognitive, and motivational dimensions and the different forms that empathy can take depending on the nature and degree of prominence of these. It argues that different forms of empathy are well equipped to handle some moral tasks as well as ill‐equipped to handle others. Its aim in doing so is to clarify an otherwise conceptually thorny set of debates and to amplify future research on empathy and its role in the moral life. (shrink)

A work of striking originality bursting with unexpected insights, _The Human Condition_ is in many respects more relevant now than when it first appeared in 1958. In her study of the state of modern humanity, Hannah Arendt considers humankind from the perspective of the actions of which it is capable. The problems Arendt identified then—diminishing human agency and political freedom, the paradox that as human powers increase through technological and humanistic inquiry, we are less equipped to control the consequences (...) of our actions—continue to confront us today. This new edition, published to coincide with the fortieth anniversary of its original publication, contains an improved and expanded index and a new introduction by noted Arendt scholar Margaret Canovan which incisively analyzes the book's argument and examines its present relevance. A classic in political and social theory, _The Human Condition_ is a work that has proved both timeless and perpetually timely. Hannah Arendt was one of the leading social theorists in the United States. Her _Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy_ and _Love and Saint Augustine_ are also published by the University of Chicago Press. (shrink)

Imagination comes with varying degrees of sensory accompaniment. Sometimes imagining is phenomenologically lean (cognitive imagining); at other times, imagining involves or requires sensory presentation such as mental imagery (sensory imagining). Philosophers debate whether contradictions can obtain in fiction and whether cognitive imagining is robust enough to explain our engagement with fiction. In this paper, I defend the Principle of Poetic License by arguing for the Permissive View of fictional truth: we can have fictions in which a contradiction is true, everything (...) is true, or nothing is true. I show that imagination-based worries about impossible, unlimited, and empty fictions can be shown to be about sensory imagination and that sensory imagination isn’t necessary for fictional truth. (shrink)

O artigo descreve sinteticamente as mudanças observadas nas funções e composição do Conse­lho de Estado durante a Monarquia Constitucional, procurando indagar a relevância política de uma instituição concebida desde o início para aconselhar o monarca. Não obstante a parcimó­nia das fontes coevas, e até alguns exemplos contraditórios, parece inquestionável que em vários momentos críticos as decisões políticas do monarca foram influenciadas pela opinião do­minante no Conselho de Estado. A finalizar, o artigo apresenta uma biografia colectiva dos 73 indivíduos que foram (...) nomeados conselheiros de Estado efectivos entre 1833 e 1910 – e que po­demos definir como o núcleo central da elite governante –, focando algumas características sociodemográficas (naturalidade, idade, educação, profissão, títulos nobiliárquicos) e tipos de experiência política. (shrink)

An increase in the number of older people with dementia is currently a trend around the world. In low and middle countries, effective public health services are not yet well‐developed, and family care‐givers may be overwhelmed by the requirements of care. This paper has two purposes: to share findings from an ethnographic study about family dementia care practices in Brazil and to draw attention to the significance of the materiality of care practices in the family context. The study was conducted (...) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. We describe the care trajectory of one family and, analysing data using the insights of Actor Network Theory, show the significance of objects in a networked relation of care. In particular, we show how incontinence products such as adult diapers assume different positions in the network, acting as either mediator or intermediary of care in relation to other elements of the network composed of family members and their living situation, the person with dementia herself, the doctor, and Brazilian health policies. Although the diaper is often seen as an ordinary object for care providers, its participation in a care network shapes relations, activating conflict, financial constraint, and disciplining the body of the person with dementia. (shrink)

O estudo da iconografia do livro impresso em Portugal entre os séculos XV e XVIII não prescinde do levantamento, tão extenso quanto possível, de marcas de água e contramarcas identificadoras do papel em que as obras foram estampadas. Este levantamento sistemático é tanto mais indispensável quanto são raros e avulsos os estudos portugueses neste campo da investigação histórica. O conjunto de marcas a reunir, algumas centenas de unidades, permitirá uma visão cronológica e panorâmica dos motivos iconográficos das filigranas utilizadas na (...) produção do papel das obras impressas no nosso país, revelando a sua origem e contribuindo para a investigação no âmbito histórico, artístico e económico. (shrink)

A partir de retratos de mulheres indígenas datados da primeira metade do século XX, conservados no acervo do Museu da Imagem e do Som de Manaus, este estudo, por meio da poética do livro de artista Existências Líquidas, apresenta um olhar subjetivo acerca das representações de povos originários. A obra partiu do desejo de entrelaçar afetos às imagens das retratadas memorando hábitos do cotidiano da minha família afro-indígena, como as receitas de chás, que aprendi com minha avó materna Norma Teixeira. (...) As fotos das retratadas, agrego fragmentos de vegetais que coletei durante caminhadas em Manaus e os associei à resistência do matagal no âmbito urbano como um ato de resistir da população indígena frente as políticas racistas, que desconsideram os modos de vida desses povos. (shrink)

A Idade Média foi cenário de manifestações variadas do conhecimento produzidas por letrados judeus, especialmente no campo da filosofia. O intervalo temporal predominante, os séculos XI, XII, XIII e XIV, coincide com a consolidação de uma tradição filosófica aristotélica sobre a base da língua e da cultura árabe. Uma tal riqueza em termos de produção do saber é, também, atestada por reconhecidos estudiosos de língua, cultura, religião, filosofia e história judaicas. Há um importante processo de encontro e desencontro, interação e (...) sobreposição entre as culturas árabe, judaica e cristã na Idade Média – seu estudo ilumina nossa compreensão de indivíduos e de suas obras, para além de si mesmos. (shrink)

Este artigo se propõe a refletir sobre um leque de conceitos inerentes à alegria por meio de figuras que encarnam a estética da sobra, neste caso, o bobo e o palhaço. Dos gregos até o final do século 19, a filosofia permaneceu a pensar o que é sério. Em 1677, com a publicação de Ética, Baruch Spinoza pensou os afetos, um deles, a alegria, ainda que a tenha pensado com a retidão de um geômetra. A escrita spinoziana é o sério (...) que pensa a alegria. Somente na segunda metade do século 19, Friedrich Nietzsche alegra a escrita filosófica. Em um mundo onde crianças cada vez mais ignoram o sentido do bobo e do palhaço para a vida, refletir sobre a alegria neste artigo é tentar devolver a essa palavra sua profunda originalidade, sentido ausente em dias hodiernos. (shrink)

Louise Weiss (1893 – 1983) percorre, em múltiplas viagens, o Ocidente europeu, a América, as longínquas paragens do Oriente, o continente africano. A sua obra, em particular as Mémoires d’une Européenne, revela-se um testemunho eloquente de sua força anímica e do olhar atento e crítico das décadas vividas no século XX. É no espaço e no tempo das suas múltiplas viagens que Weiss diagnostica e espelha a relação de Alteridade Ocidente / Oriente, entre a Europa e o Outro. A vida (...) e a acção militante no curso de sua longa vida centrou-se em três pólos nucleares: combate pela paz, combate pelo voto feminino e combate pela construção da Europa.É nesta luta incessante que Louise Weiss – a Europeia cumpria o lema que a norteava – partic­ipar na aventura do seu século. (shrink)

Procurou-se, e esse foi o objetivo essencial, que este volume fosse marcado pelo discurso questionador e crítico de historiadores, de filósofos, de especialistas da ciência política, das ideias, do direito, da economia, da educação, da comunicação, da informação, das ciências, das artes. Surgiram assim interpretações, quadros, configurações e reconfigurações, ângulos de análise diversificados que fomentarão, por certo, uma reflexão viva dos leitores. É fundamental — continua a sê-lo — repensar e questionar campos temáticos à luz das análises teóricas e concetuais, (...) mas também dos processos, das dinâmicas, das relações, das potencialidades explicativas da nossa contemporaneidade. É assim que se entende este livro, com muitas contribuições, que vêm propiciar e enriquecer a reflexão sobre Outros Combates pela História. Combates pela História é, como se sabe, o título de um livro famoso de Lucien Febvre dos anos cinquenta. Através de uma recomposição, de novo se deu importância a todas as modalidades da História, mantendo, todavia, o sentido do rigor que era algo perseguido nos «combates pela História». Quer-se, pois, analisar o sentido da História, nas suas várias áreas. Contudo, ao propor-se este tema, não se desejou que os autores apresentassem tanto as suas investigações nas suas áreas próprias — embora elas estivessem subentendidas e devessem ser expressas —, mas que refletissem sobre o seu sentido no âmbito da História entendida como Ciência Social e Humana. Para tal, desejou-se que discutissem o objeto e o método da História das diversas áreas, equacionando os seus vários problemas. Foi isso que também sucedeu — estamos disso convencidos. Mas será o leitor, melhor do que ninguém, a ajuizá-lo. (shrink)

Critics of empathy—the capacity to share the mental lives of others—have charged that empathy is intrinsically biased. It occurs between no more than two people, and its key function is arguably to coordinate and align feelings, thoughts, and responses between those who are often already in close personal relationships. Because of this, critics claim that empathy is morally unnecessary at best and morally harmful at worst. This paper argues, however, that it is precisely because of its ability to connect people (...) by coordinating and aligning their feelings, thoughts, and responses, that empathy is especially well suited to perform one particular moral task that has been largely overlooked in moral philosophical discussions. That is, helping people, including those who are antagonistically opposed on matters of moral, social, and political importance—what I call antagonistic moral opponents—find common ground: a set of shared beliefs, attitudes, values, or experiences that lays the requisite ground for even minimally positive relationships. Doing so can contribute to a number of morally, practically, and epistemically important outcomes, including resolving fraught disagreements, mitigating antagonism, promoting cooperation, learning from differences, and even forging positive relationships of various sorts. Contra critics, I therefore maintain that empathy is important for at least one area of the moral life. (shrink)

Anorectics typically maintain that they perceive their bodies as ‘fat’ and yet also state that they are aware of being ‘too thin.’ In this study, I use phenomenological insights from the work of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre to explore this apparent contradiction. I suggest that the anorectic experiences a pathological corporealization of the body, and show how this bodily experience may be described as ‘feeling fat’ due to cultural influences. In addition, I explore how this anomalous bodily experience may lead to (...) partial feelings of disassociation from visual perceptions of the body, allowing the anorectic to recognize the emaciation of a reflected image of herself without it impacting upon her subjective experience of the body as ‘fat.’. (shrink)

The Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB) holds that when a couple plans to have a child, they have significant moral reason to select, of the possible children they could have, the child who is most likely to experience the greatest wellbeing – that is, the most advantaged child, the child with the best chance at the best life.1 PB captures the common sense intuitions of many about reproductive decisions. PB does not posit an absolute moral obligation – it does not (...) dictate what people must do. Instead it holds that there is a significant moral reason to select the best child, but one that must be weighed against other reasons.Recent research suggests that it may become possible to derive gametes (eggs and sperm) from human stem cells in vitro, a process which we will term in vitro gametogenesis (IVG). The ability to create large numbers of eggs or sperm through IVG greatly increases our capacity to select the best child possible. (shrink)

This article presents a model for regulating cognitive enhancement devices. Recently, it has become very easy for individuals to purchase devices which directly modulate brain function. For example, transcranial direct current stimulators are increasingly being produced and marketed online as devices for cognitive enhancement. Despite posing risks in a similar way to medical devices, devices that do not make any therapeutic claims do not have to meet anything more than basic product safety standards. We present the case for extending existing (...) medical device legislation to cover CEDs. Medical devices and CEDs operate by the same or similar mechanisms and pose the same or similar risks. This fact coupled with the arbitrariness of the line between treatment and enhancement count in favour of regulating these devices in the same way. In arguing for this regulatory model, the paper highlights potential challenges to its implementation, and suggests solutions. (shrink)

Hannah Ginsborg presents fourteen essays which establish Kant's Critique of Judgment as a central contribution to the understanding of human cognition. The papers bring out the significance of Kant's philosophical notion of judgment, and use it to address interpretive issues in Kant's aesthetics, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of biology.

In this article, I aim to do two things: first, introduce Juche, the official philosophy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea”), and second, defend Juche against Alzo David-West’s allegation that it is a nonsensical philosophy. I organize David-West’s complaints into two major strands—that Juche’s axiom is too vague to be of philosophical use and that Juche makes too stark a distinction between human vs. everything else—and offer responses to both strands. My goal isn’t to defend the regime, (...) but to present its ideology in the most charitable way so its merits and demerits can be seen more clearly in future engagements. (shrink)

In a powerful and original contribution to the history of ideas, Hannah Dawson explores the intense preoccupation with language in early-modern philosophy, and presents a groundbreaking analysis of John Locke's critique of words. By examining a broad sweep of pedagogical and philosophical material from antiquity to the late seventeenth century, Dr Dawson explains why language caused anxiety in writers such as Montaigne, Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Gassendi, Nicole, Pufendorf, Boyle, Malebranche and Locke. Locke, Language and Early-Modern Philosophy demonstrates that new (...) developments in philosophy, in conjunction with weaknesses in linguistic theory, resulted in serious concerns about the capacity of words to refer to the world, the stability of meaning, and the duplicitous power of words themselves. Dr Dawson shows that language so fixated all manner of early-modern authors because it was seen as an obstacle to both knowledge and society. She thereby uncovers a novel story about the problem of language in philosophy, and in the process reshapes our understanding of early-modern epistemology, morality and politics. (shrink)

Kripke’s thesis that meaning is normative is typically interpreted, following Boghossian, as the thesis that meaningful expressions allow of true or warranted use. I argue for an alternative interpretation centered on Wittgenstein’s conception of the normativity involved in “knowing how to go on” in one’s use of an expression. Meaning is normative for Kripke because it justifies claims, not to be saying something true, but to be going on as one ought from prevous uses of the expression. I argue that (...) this represents a distortion of Wittgenstein’s conception of the normativity of meaning, and that Wittgenstein’s conception is preferable. (shrink)

In a 2020 article in Analysis, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of standing to blame fails. To object to this account, Lippert-Rasmussen considers the contrary of hypocrisy: hypercrisy. In this article, I show that if hypercrisy is a problem for the moral equality account, it is also a problem for Lippert-Rasmussen’s own account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame. I then reflect on the hypocrite’s and hypercrite’s standing to self-blame, which reveals that the (...) challenge hypercrisy poses for accounts of standing is different from the challenge Lippert-Rasmussen articulates. (shrink)

I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience. I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the (...) primitive character of perceptual experience relative to thought and judgment. (shrink)

In a famous passage from the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein describes a pupil who has been learning to write out various sequences of numbers in response to orders such as “+1” and “+2”. He has shown himself competent for numbers up to 1000, but when we have him continue the “+2” sequence beyond 1000, he writes the numerals 1004, 1008, 1012. As Wittgenstein describes the case: We say to him, “Look what you’re doing!” — He doesn’t understand us. We say “You (...) should have added two; look how you began the series!” — He answers: “Yes! Isn’t it right? I thought that’s how I should [sollen] do it. — Or suppose he were to say, pointing to the series, “But I went on in the same way!”1The passage continues:— It would now be no use to us to say “But don’t you see…?” — and repeat for him the old explanations and examples. — In such a case, we might perhaps say: this person naturally understands our order, once given our explanations, as we would understand the order “Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000, and so on.”. (shrink)