About this topic
Summary Rule-following’ is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem to be both guided and "normatively" constrained by something general in performing particular actions. The current discussion takes off from Wittgenstein's work. On his use, a 'rule' is anything that can be followed such that: i) our having, grasp, or use of it can play a role in generating and explaining our action; and, ii) our actions can accord or discord with it, in some sense.  Wittgenstein’s examples of such rules are intentions, requests, and orders, and functions and properties used as principles for doing things (e. g. continuing a series, sorting). The topic is important since it has connections with representation, content and meaning. The ensuing discussion focuses on two separate questions. First, what does one's following a particular rule (rather than another one) consist in? This was the question that Kripke focused on in his important commentary under the guise of the question what does one's meaning something by a word consist in (see also the section Kripkenstein on Meaning). Second, how does one move from the general rule to its application to a particular case? This question has been in the focus on recent work by Boghossian and Wright who argue that a puzzle is generated by the fact that rule-following must involve inference, whereas inference itself seems to involve rule-following.
Key works Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following can be found mainly in his Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Important commentaries which largely started the contemporary discussion are Wright 1980 and Kripke 1982. Further work includes McDowell 1984 which comments on both Wright's and Kripke's interpretations while defending his own, Pettit 1990 which defends the reality of rule-following and Ch. 1 of Brandom 1994 which provides a very clear statement of the basic issues. A lot of work from this period is collected in Miller & Wright 2002. Recent work includes Yamada 2010, Ginsborg 2011, Miller 2019. Boghossian's and Wright's new problem is presented in Wright 2007, Boghossian 2008, Boghossian 2012, Boghossian 2014, and critically discussed in Miller 2015.
Introductions For an overview see Reiland 2024 and Miller & Sultanescu 2022
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  1. From Rule Following to Productive Thinking: Reading the Philosophical Investigations in the Light of Gestalt Psychology.Michael Campbell - forthcoming - Philosophia Scientiae:37-60.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein’s relation to Gestalt Psychology is typically understood through the lens of his engagement with Wolfgang Köhler’s work. Though valuable, this framing may obscure certain broader points of similarity between Wittgenstein’s methodological approach and the Gestalt school considered as a whole. In what follows I pursue this line of thought by comparing Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations with Max Wertheimer’s concept of productive thinking. I argue that Wertheimer’s emphasis on the shared and public aspects of Gestalt (...)
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  2. A New Problem for Rule Following.Mark Hogarth - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computation.
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  3. A Critical Review of the Mainstream Reading of Kripke’s Wittgenstein: On Misunderstanding Kripke’s Wittgenstein (In Persian).Ali Hossein Khani - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz.
    In this paper, I will argue against certain criticisms of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument and sceptical solution, made especially by Baker and Hacker, McGinn, and McDowell. I will show that their interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s view is misplaced. According to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument, there is no fact as to what someone means by her words. For Kripke, this conclusion, combined with Classical Realist view of meaning, leads to the Wittgensteinian paradox, according to which there is no such thing as (...)
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  4. Blackburn’s Wittgenstein: The Quasi-Realist.Ali Hossein Khani - forthcoming - In Ali Hossein Khani & Gary N. Kemp (eds.), Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers (Volume I). London: Routledge.
  5. Regulative Rules: A Distinctive Normative Kind.Reiland Indrek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    What are rules? In this paper I develop a view of regulative rules which takes them to be a distinctive normative kind occupying a middle ground between orders and normative truths. The paradigmatic cases of regulative rules that I’m interested in are social rules like rules of etiquette and legal rules like traffic rules. On the view I’ll propose, a rule is a general normative content that is in force due to human activity: enactment by an authority or acceptance by (...)
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  6. „Rule-Following in“.David Pears - forthcoming - Philosophical Investigations.
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  7. The Rule-Following Paradox and the Impossibility of Private Rule-Following.Jody Azzouni - 209 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
    Kripke’s version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox has been influential. My concern is with how it—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—have been perceived as undercutting the individualistic picture of mathematical practice: the view that individuals— Robinson Crusoes —can, entirely independently of a community, engage in cogent mathematics, and indeed have “private languages.” What has been denied is that phrases like “correctly counting” can be applied to such individuals because these normative notions can only be applied cogently in a context involving community standards. (...)
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  8. Rule-Following I: The Basic Issues.Indrek Reiland - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (1):e12900.
    ‘Rule-following’ is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem both guided and “normatively” constrained by something general in performing particular actions. Understanding the phenomenon is important because of its connection to meaning, representation, and content. This article gives an overview of the philosophical discussion of rule-following with emphasis on Kripke’s skeptical paradox and recent work on possible solutions. Part I of this two-part contribution is devoted to the basic issues from Wittgenstein to Kripke. Part II will be (...)
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  9. Functionalism and tacit knowledge of grammar.David Balcarras - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):18-48.
    In this article, I argue that if tacit knowledge of grammar is analyzable in functional‐computational terms, then it cannot ground linguistic meaning, structure, or sound. If to know or cognize a grammar is to be in a certain computational state playing a certain functional role, there can be no unique grammar cognized. Satisfying the functional conditions for cognizing a grammar G entails satisfying those for cognizing many grammars disagreeing with G about expressions' semantic, phonetic, and syntactic values. This threatens the (...)
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  10. Naturalism without a subject: Huw Price's pragmatism.Brandon Beasley - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10):1793-1820.
    Huw Price has developed versions of naturalism and anti-representationalism to create a distinctive brand of pragmatism. ‘Subject naturalism’ focuses on what science says about human beings and the function of our linguistic practices, as opposed to orthodox contemporary naturalism’s privileging of the ontology of the natural sciences. Price’s anti-representationalism rejects the view that what makes utterances contentful is their representing reality. Together, they are to help us avoid metaphysical ‘placement problems’: how e.g. mind, meaning, and morality fit into the natural (...)
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  11. Institutional Operability: Outward Rule-Following, Inward Role-Playing.Michele Bocchiola & Emanuela Ceva - 2023 - Analyse & Kritik 45 (2):325-347.
    Institutional operability refers to the normative conditions governing the exercise of power of office that makes an institution work. Because institutional action occurs by the interrelated actions of the officeholders, a focus on institutional operability requires the analysis and assessment of the officeholders’ conduct in their institutional capacity. This article distinguishes two perspectives on operability: ‘outward’ and ‘inward.’ The outward view emphasizes predefined instructions for efficient execution, focusing on rule-following to achieve institutional purposes. The inward perspective highlights role-playing and reflective (...)
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  12. Explaining Away Kripke’s Wittgenstein.Derek Green - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):991-1011.
    The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations purports to show that words and thoughts have no content—that there is no intentionality. This paper refutes the paradox with a dilemma. Intentional states are posited in rational explanations, which use propositional attitudes to explain actions and thoughts. Depending on which of the two plausible views of rational explanation is right, either: the paradox is mistaken about the a priori requirements for content; or, a fatal flaw in content (...)
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  13. A dilemma for dispositional answers to Kripkenstein’s challenge.Andrea Guardo - 2023 - Minds and Machines 33 (1):135-152.
    Kripkenstein’s challenge is usually described as being essentially about the use of a word in new kinds of cases ‒ the old kinds of cases being commonly considered as non-problematic. I show that this way of conceiving the challenge is neither true to Kripke’s intentions nor philosophically defensible: the Kripkean skeptic can question my answering “125” to the question “What is 68 plus 57?” even if that problem is one I have already encountered and answered. I then argue that once (...)
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  14. Linguistic Mistakes.Indrek Reiland - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2191-2206.
    Ever since the publication of Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, there’s been a raging debate in philosophy of language over whether meaning and thought are, in some sense, normative. Most participants in the normativity wars seem to agree that some uses of meaningful expressions are semantically correct while disagreeing over whether this entails anything normative. But what is it to say that a use of an expression is semantically correct? On the so-called orthodox construal, it is to say (...)
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  15. Review of James R. Shaw's Wittgenstein on Rules: Justification, Grammar, and Agreement[REVIEW]Olivia Sultanescu - 2023 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  16. Blind Rule-Following and the Regress of Motivations.Zachary Mitchell Swindlehurst - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):1170-1183.
    Normativists about belief hold that belief formation is essentially rule- or norm-guided. On this view, certain norms are constitutive of or essential to belief in such a way that no mental state not guided by those norms counts as a belief, properly construed. In recent influential work, Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss develop novel arguments against normativism. According to their regress of motivations argument, not all belief formation can be rule- or norm-guided, on pain of a vicious infinite regress. I (...)
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  17. On Some Objections to the Normativity of Meaning.Mindaugas Gilaitis - 2022 - In Stalmaszczyk Piotr & Hinton Martin (eds.), Philosophical Approaches to Language and Communication Vol 2. Peter Lang. pp. 269-289.
    The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to contribute to the debate about the normativity of meaning not by means of providing and defending new arguments, but by analysing and reflecting on some of the presuppositions and seemingly irresolvable dialectical points of disagreement. Second, it seeks to achieve the first aim by critically engaging with some of the objections raised against semantic normativity by anti-normativists like Kathrin Glüer, Anandi Hattiangadi and Åsa Wikforss as well as discussing some (...)
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  18. Yet another victim of Kripkenstein’s monster: dispositions, meaning, and privilege.Andrea Guardo - 2022 - Ergo 8 (55):857-882.
    In metasemantics, semantic dispositionalism is the view that what makes it the case that, given the value of the relevant parameters, a certain linguistic expression refers to what it does are the speakers’ dispositions. In the literature, there is something like a consensus that the fate of dispositionalism hinges on the status of three arguments, first put forward by Saul Kripke ‒ or at least usually ascribed to him. This paper discusses a different, and strangely neglected, anti-dispositionalist argument, which develops (...)
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  19. Fictional Narrative and the Other’s Perspective.Wolfgang Huemer - 2022 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 65 (22):161-179.
    Anti-cognitivism is best understood as a challenge to explain how works of fictional narrative can add to our worldly knowledge. One way to respond to this challenge is to argue that works of fictional narrative add to our knowledge by inviting us to explore, in the imagination, the perspectives or points of view of others. In the present paper, I distinguish two readings of this thesis that reflect two very different conceptions of “perspective”: a first understanding focuses on what the (...)
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  20. Kripke’s Wittgenstein.Ali Hossein Khani - 2022 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP).
    Saul Kripke, in his celebrated book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), offers a novel reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s main remarks in his later works, especially in Philosophical Investigations (1953) and, to some extent, in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956). Kripke presents Wittgenstein as proposing a skeptical argument against a certain conception of meaning and linguistic understanding, as well as a skeptical solution to such a problem. Many philosophers have called this interpretation of Wittgenstein Kripke’s Wittgenstein or (...)
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  21. Rule-following.Erik Kimbrough & Bart Wilson - 2022 - In Chris Melenovsky (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Routledge.
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  22. Certainties and Rule-Following.Andreas Krebs - 2022 - Wittgenstein-Studien 13 (1):23-30.
    This paper argues that Wittgenstein does not assimilate certainties to either linguistic norms or empirical propositions but assigns them to a liminal space between rule and experience. This liminal space is also brought into play in remarks written at the same time as those compiled in On Certainty, but attributed to different bodies of text. The paper maintains that certainties express the agreement and constancy in judgements without which – as Wittgenstein contends in his Philosophical Investigations – rule-following would not (...)
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  23. Semantic dispositionalism and the rule‐following paradox.Elek Lane - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):685-695.
    In virtue of what does a sign have meaning? This is the question raised by Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. Semantic dispositionalism is a (type of) theory that purports to answer this question. The present paper argues that semantic dispositionalism faces a heretofore unnoticed problem, one that ultimately comes down to its reliance on unanalyzed notions of repeated types of signs. In the context of responding to the rule-following paradox—and offering a putative solution to it—this amounts to simply assuming a solution to (...)
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  24. Rules as constitutive practices defined by correlated equilibria.Ásgeir Berg Matthíasson - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65.
    In this paper, I present a game-theoretic solution to the rule-following paradox in terms of what I will call basic constitutive practices. The structure of such a practice P constitutes what it is to take part in P by defining the correctness conditions of our most basic concepts as those actions that lie on the correlated equilibrium of P itself. Accordingly, an agent S meant addition by his use of the term ‘+’ because S is taking part in a basic (...)
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  25. Rule-Following and Intentionality.Alexander Miller & Olivia Sultanescu - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  26. Limits or Limitations? On a Bifurcation in Reading Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations §§185–201.Jens Pier - 2022 - In Jakub Mácha & Herbert Hrachovec (eds.), Platonism: Contributions to the 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg a. W.: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    In Philosophical Investigations §§185–201, Wittgenstein addresses an oscillation in our thinking about the nature of rules. He seems to introduce a problem—how do we follow rules?—, and a “paradox” in which it is rooted, in order to find a solution to them; only to then call the whole puzzle a “misunderstanding” after all. My contention is that this apparent friction can best be understood and resolved when we view it in light of Wittgenstein’s engagement with limits and limitations, and how (...)
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  27. Rule‐Following and Objective Spirit.Thomas J. Spiegel - 2022 - Philosophical Investigations 46 (1):76-98.
    This paper deals with Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox, focussing on the infinite rule-regress as featured in Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. I argue that one of the most salient and popular proposed solutions (championed by John McDowell), which argues that rule-following is grounded in “custom,” “practice” or “form of life, remains unsatisfactory because part of this proposal is the rejection of further “theory” (commonly attributed to Wittgenstein) which seemingly makes it impossible to substantiate the claim of how customs, practices (...)
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  28. Meaning, Rationality, and Guidance.Olivia Sultanescu - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):227-247.
    In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke articulates a form of scepticism about meaning. Even though there is considerable disagreement among critics about the reasoning in which the sceptic engages, there is little doubt that he seeks to offer constraints for an adequate account of the facts that constitute the meaningfulness of expressions. Many of the sceptic's remarks concern the nature of the guidance involved in a speaker's meaningful uses of expressions. I propose that we understand those remarks (...)
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  29. The problem of rule-following in Michael Oakeshott.Juan Antonio González de Requena Farré - 2021 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 17:289-310.
    The role of rules in our normative practices constitutes a relevant philosophical problema, mainly associated with Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but to which Michael Oakeshott has also attempted to answer. Not surprisingly, some scholars have found parallels between their conceptions of human practices and rule-following. Through an exegesis of the notion and uses of the rule in Oakeshott's works, this article aims to clarify the link between rule-following and normative authorization. In this way, it will be possible to to decide the originality (...)
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  30. Podobieństwo rodzinne a paradoks reguły.Paweł Grad - 2021 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 30 (1):71-88.
    I argue in the paper that the conception of family resemblance discussed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations is a result of the application of Wittgenstein’s general argument against rule‑following to the pragmatics of all concepts. My argument runs as follows: First, (1) I criticize interpretations of family resemblance as a ‘local’ theory, applicable only to some concepts. Next, (2) I present and criticise a classic argument against the conception of family resemblance. In the following section, (3) I analyse attempts (...)
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  31. Two Pillars of Institutions: Constitutive Rules and Participation.Wolfgang Huemer - 2021 - In Leo Townsend, Preston Stovall & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Social Institution of Discursive Norms. Historical, Naturalistic, and Pragmatic Perspectives. Routledge.
    The creation of new institutions and the initiation of new forms of behaviour cannot be explained only on the basis of constitutive rules – they also require a broader commitment of individuals who participate in social practices and, thus, to become members of a community. In this paper, I argue that the received conception of constitutive rules shows a problematic intellectualistic bias that becomes particularly manifest in three assumptions: (i) constitutive rules have a logical form, (ii) constitutive rules have no (...)
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  32. Concepts, Normativity, and Self-Knowledge. On Ginsborg's Conception of Primitive Normativity.David Lauer - 2021 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Perception. London, New York: Routledge. pp. 117-138.
    In a series of intriguing and far-reaching papers, Hannah Ginsborg introduced the notion of “primitive normativity” as the cornerstone of a novel account of the normativity of concepts, thought, and meaning. Her account is supposed to steer a middle course between what she regards as the two horns of a dilemma first laid out by Saul Kripke in his seminal reading of Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following. I propose to investigate Ginsborg’s conception. I begin by establishing the conceptual relations between the (...)
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  33. Husserlian Phenomenology, Rule-following, and Primitive Normativity.Jacob Rump - 2021 - In Chad Engelland (ed.), Language and Phenomenology. Routledge. pp. 74-91.
    The paper presents a phenomenological approach to recent debates in the philosophy of language about rule-following and the normativity of meaning, a debate that can be traced to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations but that was given new life with Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Taking a cue from Hannah Ginsborg’s recent work on “primitive normativity,” I use some of Husserl’s own comments about meaning and the status of rules to sketch a solution to Kripke’s rule-following paradox by (...)
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  34. Immanent Critique.Titus Stahl - 2021 - Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Edited by John-Baptiste Oduor.
    When we criticize social institutions and practices, what kinds of reasons can we offer for such criticism? Political philosophers often assume that we must rely on universal moral principles that are not necessarily connected to the particular social practices of our communities. Traditionally,continental critical theory has rejected this claim through its endorsement of the method of immanent critique. Immanent critique is a critique of social practices that draws on norms already present within these practices to demand social change, rather than (...)
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  35. Meaning Scepticism and Primitive Normativity.Olivia Sultanescu - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (2):357-376.
    This paper examines Hannah Ginsborg's attempt to address the challenge raised by Saul Kripke's meaning sceptic. I start by identifying the two constraints that the sceptic claims must be met by a satisfactory answer. Then I try to show that Ginsborg's proposal faces a dilemma. In the first instance, I argue that it is able to meet the second constraint, but not the first. I then amend the proposal in order to make room for the first constraint. I go on (...)
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  36. Complexes, rule-following, and language games: Wittgenstein’s philosophical method and its relevance to semiotics.Sergio Torres-Martínez - 2021 - Semiotica 2021 (242):63-100.
    This paper forges links between early analytic philosophy and the posits of semiotics. I show that there are some striking and potentially quite important, but perhaps unrecognized, connections between three key concepts in Wittgenstein’s middle and later philosophy, namely, complex, rule-following, and language games. This reveals the existence of a conceptual continuity between Wittgenstein’s “early” and “later” philosophy that can be applied to the analysis of the iterability of representation in computer-generated images. Methodologically, this paper clarifies to at least some (...)
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  37. Meaning under the Threat of Paradox on Two Fronts.Olga Ramirez Calle - 2020 - Analiza I Egzystencja 50:5-17.
    The paper defends the argument that the Resemblance Paradox (RP), or the problem of the ‘under-determination of meaning’, and the Rule-Following Paradox (RFP) are two sides of the same paradox threatening meaning from opposite extremes. After presenting the case, the paradox is reconsidered anew and the supposition that the threat is a pervasive one is challenged.
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  38. Meaning relativism and subjective idealism.Andrea Guardo - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4047-4064.
    The paper discusses an objection, put forward by - among others - John McDowell, to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s non-factualist and relativist view of semantic discourse. The objection goes roughly as follows: while it is usually possible to be a relativist about a given domain of discourse without being a relativist about anything else, relativism about semantic discourse entails global relativism, which in turn entails subjective idealism, which we can reasonably assume to be false. The paper’s first section sketches Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s ideas (...)
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  39. Two epistemological arguments against two semantic dispositionalisms.Andrea Guardo - 2020 - Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts 1 (1):13-25.
    Even though he is not very explicit about it, in “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language” Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses ‒ the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the philosophy of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Normativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I (...)
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  40. Rule-following practices in a natural world.Wolfgang Huemer - 2020 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1 (1):161-181.
    I address the question of whether naturalism can provide adequate means for the scientific study of rules and rule-following behavior. As the term "naturalism" is used in many different ways in the contemporary debate, I will first spell out which version of naturalism I am targeting. Then I will recall a classical argument against naturalism in a version presented by Husserl. In the main part of the paper I will sketch a conception of rule-following behavior that is influenced by Sellars (...)
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  41. Social Cooperation as Institutional Rule-Following.C. M. Melenovsky - 2020 - Public Affairs Quarterly 34 (1):26-49.
    The idea that society is a cooperative venture has been used by contractualists, contractarians, and deliberative democrats to justify the burdens of society to each member. In such a cooperative venture, those who benefit from society owe a contribution and those who contribute are owed benefits. Even though this idea is quite intuitive, there are deep disagreements about what makes society cooperative. Some focus on acts of production, others on fair interaction, and still others on the intention to contribute to (...)
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  42. Social Cooperation as Institutional Rule-Following.Chris Melenovsky - 2020 - Public Affairs Quarterly 1 (34):26-49.
    The idea that society is a cooperative venture has been used by contractualists, contractarians, and deliberative democrats to justify the burdens of society to each member. In such a coop- erative venture, those who benefit from society owe a contribution and those that contribute are owed benefits. Even though this idea is quite intuitive, there are deep disagreements about what makes society cooperative. Some focus on acts of production, others on fair interaction, and still others on the intention to contribute (...)
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  43. On Complete Information Dispositionalism.Mons Nyquist - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1915-1938.
    In a trio of recent articles, Johnson and Nado defend a form of metasemantic dispositionalism, arguing for a novel approach to the “error”-problem, based on speakers’ dispositional states under what they call a state of “full information”. In this article, I argue that their brand of dispositionalism fails to solve the “error”-problem, because of what I think of as counterexamples to it. In the final sections, I propose a way to amend the theory to shield it from some of the (...)
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  44. Patterns, Patterns, Patterns: Art and Meaning at the Crossroads between Two Opposing Forces.Olga Ramirez Calle - 2020 - Theoria (2):220-244.
    This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abilities on whose behalf linguistic meaning is introduced from the proper institution of language. I call this capacity “private pattern recognition” (PPR) and argue that it plays an essential part not just in the instauration of linguistic meaning but also in other relevant cognitive phenomena such as artistic creation and understanding. Moreover, it is precisely the failure to separate both aspects that gives rise to important (...)
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  45. Implicit norms.Pietro Salis - 2020 - Phenomenology and Mind 17:56-68.
    Robert Brandom has developed an account of conceptual content as instituted by social practices. Such practices are understood as being implicitly normative. Brandom proposed the idea of implicit norms in order to meet some requirements imposed by Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following: escaping the regress of rules on the one hand, and avoiding mere regular behavior on the other. Anandi Hattiangadi has criticized this account as failing to meet such requirements. In what follows, I try to show how the correct understanding (...)
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  46. The Philosophical Investigations as a Christian Text: Christian Faith and Wittgenstein’s Rule-following.Jairus Espiritu - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Life 9 (1):54-63.
    Wittgenstein has been considered one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century while being one of its most popular mystics. Considering the staunch secularization of philosophy during the Enlightenment, such combination is rarely seen in philosophers of more recent times. The farthest explication of the relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his mysticism has not went as far as making a Christian nature explicit. This can be read as analytic philosophy’s identification as an heir to the Enlightenment. There has been (...)
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  47. Yet another skeptical solution.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):117-129.
    The paper puts forward a new skeptical solution to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox, a solution which revolves around the idea that human communication does not require meaning facts - at least as defined by Kripke. After a brief discussion of the paradox, I explain why I think that Kripkenstein’s solution needs revision and argue that the main goal of a skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox should be that of showing that communication does not require meaning. After that, I offer (...)
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  48. Care, Social Practices and Normativity. Inner Struggle versus Panglossian Rule-Following.Alexander Albert Jeuk - 2019 - Phenomenology and Mind 17:44-54.
    Contrary to the popular assumption that linguistically mediated social practices constitute the normativity of action (Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015; Rietveld, 2008a,b; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014), I argue that it is affective care for oneself and others that primarily constitutes this kind of normativity. I argue for my claim in two steps. First, using the method of cases I demonstrate that care accounts for the normativity of action, whereas social practices do not. Second, I show that a social practice account of (...)
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  49. Rule-Following, Meaning, and Primitive Normativity.Alexander Miller - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):735-760.
    This paper explores the prospects for using the notion of a primitive normative attitude in responding to the sceptical argument about meaning developed in chapter 2 of Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It takes as its stalking-horse the response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein developed in a recent series of important works by Hannah Ginsborg. The paper concludes that Ginsborg’s attempted solution fails for a number of reasons: it depends on an inadequate response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s ‘finitude’ objection to (...)
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  50. The Logical Structure of Human Behavior.Michael Starks (ed.) - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic (...)
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