About this topic
Summary Rule-following’ is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem to be both guided and constrained by something general in performing particular actions. The current discussion takes off from Wittgenstein's work. On his use, a 'rule' is anything that can be followed such that: i) our having, grasp, or use of it can play a role in generating and explaining our action; and, ii) our actions can accord or discord with it, in some sense.  Wittgenstein’s examples of such rules are intentions, requests, and orders, and functions and properties used as principles for doing things (e. g. continuing a series, sorting). The topic is important since it has connections with representation, content and meaning. The ensuing discussion focuses on two separate questions. First, what does one's following a particular rule (rather than another one) consist in? This was the question that Kripke focused on in his important commentary under the guise of the question what does one's meaning something or having a determinate thought consist in (see also the section Kripkenstein on Meaning). Second, how does one move from the general rule to its application to a particular case? This question has been in the focus on recent work by Boghossian and Wright who argue that a puzzle is generated by the fact that rule-following must involve inference, whereas inference itself seems to involve rule-following.
Key works Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following can be found mainly in his Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Important commentaries which largely started the contemporary discussion are Wright 1980 and Kripke 1982. Further work includes McDowell 1984 which comments on both Wright's and Kripke's interpretations while defending his own, Pettit 1990 which defends the reality of rule-following and Ch. 1 of Brandom 1994 which provides a very clear statement of the basic issues. A lot of work from this period is collected in Miller & Wright 2002. Recent work includes Yamada 2010, Ginsborg 2011, Miller 2019. Boghossian's and Wright's new problem is presented in Wright 2007, Boghossian 2008, Boghossian 2012, Boghossian 2014, and critically discussed in Miller 2015.
Introductions Although there are no strictly introductory articles available as of yet, one can get a grip on the basic issues by reading Boghossian 1989, and Pettit 1990.
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286 found
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  1. Getting Rule-Following Straight.James Wong - unknown - Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 9.
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  2. Naturalism Without a Subject: Huw Price's Pragmatism.Brandon Beasley - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Huw Price has developed versions of naturalism and anti-representationalism to create a distinctive brand of pragmatism. ‘Subject naturalism’ focuses on what science says about human beings and the function of our linguistic practices, as opposed to orthodox contemporary naturalism’s privileging of the ontology of the natural sciences. Price’s anti-representationalism rejects the view that what makes utterances contentful is their representing reality. Together, they are to help us avoid metaphysical ‘placement problems’: how e.g. mind, meaning, and morality fit into the natural (...)
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  3. Explaining Away Kripke’s Wittgenstein.Derek Green - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations purports to show that words and thoughts have no content—that there is no intentionality. This paper refutes the paradox with a dilemma. Intentional states are posited in rational explanations, which use propositional attitudes to explain actions and thoughts. Depending on which of the two plausible views of rational explanation is right, either: the paradox is mistaken about the a priori requirements for content; or, a fatal flaw in content (...)
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  4. A New Problem for Rule Following.Mark Hogarth - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computation.
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  5. „Rule-Following In“.David Pears - forthcoming - Philosophical Investigations.
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  6. Linguistic Mistakes.Indrek Reiland - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Ever since the publication of Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, there’s been a raging debate in philosophy of language over whether meaning and thought are, in some sense, normative. Most participants in the normativity wars seem to agree that some uses of meaningful expressions are semantically correct while disagreeing over whether this entails anything normative. But what is it to say that a use of an expression is semantically correct? On the so-called orthodox construal, it is to say (...)
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  7. Blind Rule-Following and the Regress of Motivations.Zachary Mitchell Swindlehurst - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    Normativists about belief hold that belief formation is essentially rule- or norm-guided. On this view, certain norms are constitutive of or essential to belief in such a way that no mental state not guided by those norms counts as a belief, properly construed. In recent influential work, Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss develop novel arguments against normativism. According to their regress of motivations argument, not all belief formation can be rule- or norm-guided, on pain of a vicious infinite regress. I (...)
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  8. The Rule-Following Paradox and the Impossibility of Private Rule-Following.Jody Azzouni - unknown - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
    Kripke’s version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox has been influential. My concern is with how it—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—have been perceived as undercutting the individualistic picture of mathematical practice: the view that individuals— Robinson Crusoes —can, entirely independently of a community, engage in cogent mathematics, and indeed have “private languages.” What has been denied is that phrases like “correctly counting” can be applied to such individuals because these normative notions can only be applied cogently in a context involving community standards. (...)
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  9. The problem of rule-following in Michael Oakeshott.Juan Antonio González de Requena Farré - 2021 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 17:289-310.
    The role of rules in our normative practices constitutes a relevant philosophical problema, mainly associated with Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but to which Michael Oakeshott has also attempted to answer. Not surprisingly, some scholars have found parallels between their conceptions of human practices and rule-following. Through an exegesis of the notion and uses of the rule in Oakeshott's works, this article aims to clarify the link between rule-following and normative authorization. In this way, it will be possible to to decide the originality (...)
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  10. Podobieństwo rodzinne a paradoks reguły.Paweł Grad - 2021 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 30 (1):71-88.
    I argue in the paper that the conception of family resemblance discussed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations is a result of the application of Wittgenstein’s general argument against rule‑following to the pragmatics of all concepts. My argument runs as follows: First, (1) I criticize interpretations of family resemblance as a ‘local’ theory, applicable only to some concepts. Next, (2) I present and criticise a classic argument against the conception of family resemblance. In the following section, (3) I analyse attempts (...)
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  11. Two Pillars of Institutions: Constitutive Rules and Participation.Wolfgang Huemer - 2021 - In Leo Townsend, Preston Stovall & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Social Institution of Discursive Norms. Historical, Naturalistic, and Pragmatic Perspectives. Routledge.
    The creation of new institutions and the initiation of new forms of behaviour cannot be explained only on the basis of constitutive rules – they also require a broader commitment of individuals who participate in social practices and, thus, to become members of a community. In this paper, I argue that the received conception of constitutive rules shows a problematic intellectualistic bias that becomes particularly manifest in three assumptions: (i) constitutive rules have a logical form, (ii) constitutive rules have no (...)
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  12. Husserlian Phenomenology, Rule-Following, and Primitive Normativity.Jacob Rump - 2021 - In Chad Engelland (ed.), Language and Phenomenology. Routledge. pp. 74-91.
    The paper presents a phenomenological approach to recent debates in the philosophy of language about rule-following and the normativity of meaning, a debate that can be traced to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations but that was given new life with Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Taking a cue from Hannah Ginsborg’s recent work on “primitive normativity,” I use some of Husserl’s own comments about meaning and the status of rules to sketch a solution to Kripke’s rule-following paradox by (...)
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  13. Immanent Critique.Titus Stahl - 2021 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    When we criticize social institutions and practices, what kinds of reasons can we offer for such criticism? Political philosophers often assume that we must rely on universal moral principles that are not necessarily connected to the particular social practices of our communities. Traditionally,continental critical theory has rejected this claim through its endorsement of the method of immanent critique. Immanent critique is a critique of social practices that draws on norms already present within these practices to demand social change, rather than (...)
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  14. Meaning Scepticism and Primitive Normativity.Olivia Sultanescu - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (2):357-376.
    In this paper, I examine Hannah Ginsborg's attempt to address the challenge raised by Saul Kripke's meaning sceptic. I start by identifying the two constraints that the sceptic claims must be met by a satisfactory answer. Then I try to show that Ginsborg's proposal faces a dilemma. In the first instance, I argue that it is able to meet the second constraint, but not the first. I then amend the proposal in order to make room for the first constraint. I (...)
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  15. Complexes, Rule-Following, and Language Games: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Method and its Relevance to Semiotics.Sergio Torres-Martínez - 2021 - Semiotica 2021 (242):63-100.
    This paper forges links between early analytic philosophy and the posits of semiotics. I show that there are some striking and potentially quite important, but perhaps unrecognized, connections between three key concepts in Wittgenstein’s middle and later philosophy, namely, complex, rule-following, and language games. This reveals the existence of a conceptual continuity between Wittgenstein’s “early” and “later” philosophy that can be applied to the analysis of the iterability of representation in computer-generated images. Methodologically, this paper clarifies to at least some (...)
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  16. Meaning Under the Threat of Paradox on Two Fronts.Olga Ramirez Calle - 2020 - Analiza I Egzystencja 50:5-17.
    The paper defends the argument that the Resemblance Paradox (RP), or the problem of the ‘under-determination of meaning’, and the Rule-Following Paradox (RFP) are two sides of the same paradox threatening meaning from opposite extremes. After presenting the case, the paradox is reconsidered anew and the supposition that the threat is a pervasive one is challenged.
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  17. Two Epistemological Arguments Against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms.Andrea Guardo - 2020 - Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts 1 (1):13-25.
    Even though he is not very explicit about it, in “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language” Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses ‒ the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the metaphysics of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Normativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I (...)
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  18. Meaning Relativism and Subjective Idealism.Andrea Guardo - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4047-4064.
    The paper discusses an objection, put forward by - among others - John McDowell, to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s non-factualist and relativist view of semantic discourse. The objection goes roughly as follows: while it is usually possible to be a relativist about a given domain of discourse without being a relativist about anything else, relativism about semantic discourse entails global relativism, which in turn entails subjective idealism, which we can reasonably assume to be false. The paper’s first section sketches Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s ideas (...)
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  19. Rule-Following Practices in a Natural World.Wolfgang Huemer - 2020 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1 (1).
    I address the question of whether naturalism can provide adequate means for the scientific study of rules and rule-following behavior. As the term "naturalism" is used in many different ways in the contemporary debate, I will first spell out which version of naturalism I am targeting. Then I will recall a classical argument against naturalism in a version presented by Husserl. In the main part of the paper I will sketch a conception of rule-following behavior that is influenced by Sellars (...)
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  20. Patterns, Patterns, Patterns: Art and Meaning at the Crossroads Between Two Opposing Forces.Olga Ramirez Calle - 2020 - Theoria (2):220-244.
    This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abilities on whose behalf linguistic meaning is introduced from the proper institution of language. I call this capacity “private pattern recognition” (PPR) and argue that it plays an essential part not just in the instauration of linguistic meaning but also in other relevant cognitive phenomena such as artistic creation and understanding. Moreover, it is precisely the failure to separate both aspects that gives rise to important (...)
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  21. Constitutive Rules: Games, Language, and Assertion.Indrek Reiland - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):136-159.
    Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and speech (...)
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  22. Implicit Norms.Pietro Salis - 2020 - Phenomenology and Mind 17:56-68.
    Robert Brandom has developed an account of conceptual content as instituted by social practices. Such practices are understood as being implicitly normative. Brandom proposed the idea of implicit norms in order to meet some requirements imposed by Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following: escaping the regress of rules on the one hand, and avoiding mere regular behavior on the other. Anandi Hattiangadi has criticized this account as failing to meet such requirements. In what follows, I try to show how the correct understanding (...)
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  23. The Philosophical Investigations as a Christian Text: Christian Faith and Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following.Jairus Espiritu - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Life 9 (1):54-63.
    Wittgenstein has been considered one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century while being one of its most popular mystics. Considering the staunch secularization of philosophy during the Enlightenment, such combination is rarely seen in philosophers of more recent times. The farthest explication of the relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his mysticism has not went as far as making a Christian nature explicit. This can be read as analytic philosophy’s identification as an heir to the Enlightenment. There has been (...)
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  24. Yet Another Skeptical Solution.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):117-129.
    The paper puts forward a new skeptical solution to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox, a solution which revolves around the idea that human communication does not require meaning facts - at least as defined by Kripke. After a brief discussion of the paradox, I explain why I think that Kripkenstein’s solution needs revision and argue that the main goal of a skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox should be that of showing that communication does not require meaning. After that, I offer (...)
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  25. Care, Social Practices and Normativity. Inner Struggle Versus Panglossian Rule-Following.Alexander Albert Jeuk - 2019 - Phenomenology and Mind 17:44-54.
    Contrary to the popular assumption that linguistically mediated social practices constitute the normativity of action (Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015; Rietveld, 2008a,b; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014), I argue that it is affective care for oneself and others that primarily constitutes this kind of normativity. I argue for my claim in two steps. First, using the method of cases I demonstrate that care accounts for the normativity of action, whereas social practices do not. Second, I show that a social practice account of (...)
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  26. Rule-Following, Meaning, and Primitive Normativity.Alexander Miller - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):735-760.
    This paper explores the prospects for using the notion of a primitive normative attitude in responding to the sceptical argument about meaning developed in chapter 2 of Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It takes as its stalking-horse the response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein developed in a recent series of important works by Hannah Ginsborg. The paper concludes that Ginsborg’s attempted solution fails for a number of reasons: it depends on an inadequate response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s ‘finitude’ objection to (...)
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  27. The Logical Structure of Human Behavior.Michael Starks (ed.) - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic (...)
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  28. Cientificismo Em Esteróides: Uma Revisão da ‘Liberdade Evolui’ (Freedom Evolves) Por Daniel Dennett (2003) (Revisão Revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delírios Utópicos Suicidas no Século XXI Filosofia, Natureza Humana e o Colapso da Civilization- Artigos e Comentários 2006-2019 5ª edição. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 95-111.
    ' ' As pessoas dizem repetidas vezes que a filosofia não progride realmente, que ainda estamos ocupados com os mesmos problemas filosóficos que os gregos. Mas as pessoas que dizem isso não entendem por que tem que ser assim. É porque a nossa língua permaneceu a mesma e continua a seduzir-nos a fazer as mesmas perguntas. Contanto que continue a ser um verbo ́para ser ́ que pareça como se ele funciona da mesma forma como ́para comer e beber ́, (...)
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  29. Semantic Knowledge, Semantic Guidance, and Kripke's Wittgenstein.Derek Green - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):186-206.
    Saul Kripke's influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule-following alleges that speakers cannot have any justification for using a word one way rather than another. If it is correct, there can be no such thing as meaning anything by a word. I argue that the paradox fails to undermine meaning. Kripke never adequately motivates its excessively strict standard for the justified use of words. The paradox lacks the resources to show that its standard is truly mandatory or that speakers do not (...)
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  30. Seguire una regola.Andrea Guardo - 2018 - Milano-Udine: Mimesis.
    Nelle "Ricerche filosofiche" e in altre opere Wittgenstein discute un argomento per la conclusione che non esiste qualcosa come il seguire una regola. Questa conclusione, a sua volta, sembrerebbe implicare che le parole del linguaggio non hanno un significato. E quest’ultima conclusione, infine, sembrerebbe implicare che la comunicazione è impossibile. Questa linea di pensiero è, ovviamente, paradossale: il comunicare è un fenomeno non solo possibile, ma assolutamente comune. La serie di argomenti in questione deve quindi, da qualche parte, nascondere un (...)
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  31. Wittgenstein on the Duration and Timing of Mental Phenomena: Episodes, Understanding and Rule-Following.Christopher Mole - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (6):1153-1175.
    Wittgenstein’s later works are full of questions about the timing and duration of mental phenomena. These questions are often awkward ones, and Wittgenstein seems to take their awkwardness to be philosophically revealing, but if we ask what it is that these questions reveal then different interpretations are possible. This paper suggests that there are at least six different ways in which the timing of mental phenomena can be awkward. By identifying these we can give sense to some of Wittgenstein’s more (...)
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  32. Inferential Transitions.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):532-547.
    ABSTRACTThis paper provides a naturalistic account of inference. We posit that the core of inference is constituted by bare inferential transitions, transitions between discursive mental representations guided by rules built into the architecture of cognitive systems. In further developing the concept of BITs, we provide an account of what Boghossian [2014] calls ‘taking’—that is, the appreciation of the rule that guides an inferential transition. We argue that BITs are sufficient for implicit taking, and then, to analyse explicit taking, we posit (...)
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  33. Sustaining Rules: A Model and Application.John Turri - 2017 - In Knowledge first: approaches in epistemology and mind.
    I introduce an account of when a rule normatively sustains a practice. My basic proposal is that a rule normatively sustains a practice when the value achieved by following the rule explains why agents continue following that rule, thus establishing and sustaining a pattern of activity. I apply this model to practices of belief management and identifies a substantive normative connection between knowledge and belief. More specifically, I proposes one special way that knowledge might set the normative standard for belief: (...)
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  34. The Sceptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self.Tony Cheng - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):3-14.
    In the present article, I attempt to relate Saul Kripke's “sceptical paradox” to some issues about the self; specifically, the relation between the self and its mental states and episodes. I start with a brief reconstruction of the paradox, and venture to argue that it relies crucially on a Cartesian model of the self: the sceptic regards the Wittgensteinian “infinite regress of interpretation” as the foundation of his challenge, and this is where he commits the crucial mistake. After the diagnosis, (...)
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  35. Enkratic Agency.David Horst - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery (...)
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  36. Good Legal Thought: What Wordsworth Can Teach Langdell About Forms, Frames, Choices, and Aims.Harold Anthony Lloyd - 2016 - Vermont Law Review 41 (1):1-22.
    Langdellian “science” and its “formalism” ignore ways form permits and even creates freedom of choice. For example, as Wordsworth notes, though the weaver is restricted by what his form of loom can weave, the weaver may nonetheless choose what and how he weaves. Furthermore, the loom creates weaving possibilities that do not exist without it. Such freedom alongside form is often lost on lawyers, judges, and teachers trained primarily in Langdellian redacted appellate cases where “facts” and other framed matters often (...)
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  37. McDowell and Hegel on Following a Rule.Louis Carré - 2015 - Hegel-Jahrbuch 2015 (1).
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  38. The Metaphysics of Meaning: Hopkins on Wittgenstein.Steven Gross - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (4):518-538.
    Jim Hopkins defends a ‘straight’ response to Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, a response he ascribes to Wittgenstein himself. According to this response, what makes it the case that A means that P is that it is possible for another to interpret A as meaning that P. Hopkins thus advances a form of interpretivist judgment-dependence about meaning. I argue that this response, as well as a variant, does not succeed.
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  39. Co to jest myślenie.Piotr Kozak - 2015 - Warszawa: Scholar.
    My main aim is to answer the question regarding the relationship between concepts and sensuous cognition on the basis of Kant’s critical philosophy. I argue that concepts are a part of the sensuous experience. The key question regarding the shape of this relation and the way concepts interconnect with sensibility are formulated in terms of the so-called rule-following problem that I try to resolve with reference to the function of the so-called power of judgment and Kant’s Third Critique. I argue (...)
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  40. Is (Determinate) Meaning a Naturalistic Phenomenon?Boghossian Paul - 2015 - In Gross Steven, Tebben Nicholas & Williams Michael (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism. OUP. pp. 331-358.
    This chapter revisits the question whether facts about intentional content can be understood in purely naturalistic terms. In a previous work, ‘The Rule-Following Considerations’, it was argued that Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein-inspired discussion of following a rule was, pace Kripke’s intention, best understood as showing that facts about intentional content resist naturalistic reduction. The message of this chapter is the same, although it differs from, and hopefully improves upon, the earlier work in several respects. First, it argues for a somewhat weaker (...)
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  41. Problem of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following.Michal Araszkiewicz, Pawel Banas, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki & Krzysztof Pleszka (eds.) - 2014 - Springer.
    This book focuses on the problems of rules, rule-following and normativity as discussed within the areas of analytic philosophy, linguistics, logic and legal theory. Divided into four parts, the volume covers topics in general analytic philosophy, analytic legal theory, legal interpretation and argumentation, logic as well as AI& Law area of research. It discusses, inter alia, “Kripkenstein’s” sceptical argument against rule-following and normativity of meaning, the role of neuroscience in explaining the phenomenon of normativity, conventionalism in philosophy of law, normativity (...)
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  42. Rule-Following and the Evolution of Basic Concepts.Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):829-839.
    This article concerns how rule-following behavior might evolve, how an old evolved rule might come to be appropriated to a new context, and how simple concepts might coevolve with rule-following behavior. In particular, we consider how the transitive inferential rule-following behavior exhibited by pinyon and scrub jays might evolve in the context of a variety of the Skyrms-Lewis signaling game, then how such a rule might come to be appropriated to carry out inferences regarding stimuli different from those involved in (...)
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  43. What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
    In some previous work, I tried to give a concept-based account of the nature of our entitlement to certain very basic inferences (see the papers in Part III of Boghossian 2008b). In this previous work, I took it for granted, along with many other philosophers, that we understood well enough what it is for a person to infer. In this paper, I turn to thinking about the nature of inference itself. This topic is of great interest in its own right (...)
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  44. Rule-Following Skepticism, Properly So Called.Jason Bridges - 2014 - In Andrea Kern & James Conant (eds.), Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell. De Gruyter. pp. 249-288.
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  45. Developing an Understanding of Social Norms and Games : Emotional Engagement, Nonverbal Agreement, and Conversation.Ingar Brinck - 2014 - Theory and Psychology 24 (6):737–754.
    The first part of the article examines some recent studies on the early development of social norms that examine young children’s understanding of codified rule games. It is argued that the constitutive rules than define the games cannot be identified with social norms and therefore the studies provide limited evidence about socio-normative development. The second part reviews data on children’s play in natural settings that show that children do not understand norms as codified or rules of obligation, and that the (...)
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  46. Normativity in Reasoning.John Broome - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):622-633.
    Reasoning is a process through which premise-attitudes give rise to a conclusion-attitude. When you reason actively you operate on the propositions that are the contents of your premise-attitudes, following a rule, to derive a new proposition that is the content of your conclusion-attitude. It may seem that, when you follow a rule, you must, at least implicitly, have the normative belief that you ought to comply with the rule, which guides you to comply. But I argue that to follow a (...)
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  47. Rules and Dispositions in Language Use.Florian Demont-Biaggi - 2014 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Human language is not arbitrary. But how is its use constrained? Are there rules or general human dispositions that govern it? Rules and Dispositions in Language Use explains how correct language use is indeed governed by both rules and general human dispositions. It does so by bringing together themes from Ludwig Wittgenstein and Noam Chomsky, which for many years have been thought to be incompatible. -/- Opening with a fresh discussion of Saul Kripke's work on rule-following and meaning, the question (...)
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  48. Semantic Dispositionalism and Non-Inferential Knowledge.Andrea Guardo - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):749-759.
    The paper discusses Saul Kripke's Normativity Argument against semantic dispositionalism: it criticizes the orthodox interpretation of the argument, defends an alternative reading and argues that, contrary to what Kripke himself seems to have been thinking, the real point of the Normativity Argument is not that meaning is normative. According to the orthodox interpretation, the argument can be summarized as follows: (1) it is constitutive of the concept of meaning that its instances imply an ought, but (2) it is not constitutive (...)
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  49. One Will To Rule Them All.Steve Neumann - 2014 - Philosophy Now 101:30-31.
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  50. Should You Look Before You Leap?Andrew Sepielli - 2014 - The Philosophers' Magazine 66:89-93.
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