Mind and Language (forthcoming)

Authors
Hannah Ginsborg
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
Kripke’s thesis that meaning is normative is typically interpreted, following Boghossian, as the thesis that meaningful expressions allow of true or warranted use. I argue for an alternative interpretation centered on Wittgenstein’s conception of the normativity involved in “knowing how to go on” in one’s use of an expression. Meaning is normative for Kripke because it justifies claims, not to be saying something true, but to be going on as one ought from prevous uses of the expression. I argue that this represents a distortion of Wittgenstein’s conception of the normativity of meaning, and that Wittgenstein’s conception is preferable
Keywords normativity of meaning  rule-following  Kripkenstein  Paul Boghossian
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12342
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References found in this work BETA

Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.John McDowell - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):325-364.

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