Les prostituées n’échappent pas à la répression et à l’enfermement généralisés organisés par la Monarchie Absolue à la fin du XVIIe siècle. Des institutions nommées « Dames Blanches », « Bon Pasteur » ou « Pénitentes » apparaissent dans la plupart des capitales diocésaines. Afin de ramener ces femmes sur le chemin de la vertu, les autorités font rapidement appel à des religieuses pour diriger ces communautés. Le fonctionnement de deux de ces « couvents », ceux, ceux de Poitiers et (...) La Rochelle, au « siècle des Lumières » est ici étudié. (shrink)

Le devenir des religieuses, lors de la Révolution française, est encore mal connu. L’historiographie, lorsqu’elle les aborde, insiste sur leurs complaisances supposées à l’égard des prêtres réfractaires et les montre volontiers en victimes de la Terreur (exemple des Carmélites de Compiègne). Ces éclairages successifs masquent la majorité des ex-religieuses qui s’adaptent et consentent à la sécularisation. Dans le cas étudié (le diocèse de Poitiers) les religieuses qui souhaitent le rester, souvent au risque de leur vie, sont une minorité. Le regard (...) porté sur ces femmes, prises dans le tourbillon de la Révolution, demeure trop attaché à leur voile. Il convient de lever celui-ci pour analyser, de plus près, les bouleversements provoqués par l’événement révolutionnaire, dans les trajectoires collectives et individuelles de ces religieuses. (shrink)

Gwénael Murphy est spécialiste de l’histoire des religieuses et des couvents pendant la Révolution française. Ayant rencontré de nombreuses épouses maltraitées réfugiées dans des couvents dans les sources consultées, il a décidé de consacrer ses recherches à l’histoire des rapports conflictuels entre hommes et femmes dans le cadre conjugal. L’ouvrage publié est le résultat de dix-huit années de recherches. L’auteur place sa réflexion dans le temps long, en analysant des sources issues des xvi...

Is there a limit to the legitimate demands of morality? In particular, is there a limit to people's responsibility to promote the well-being of others, either directly or via social institutions? Utilitarianism admits no such limit, and is for that reason often said to be an unacceptably demanding moral and political view. In this original new study, Murphy argues that the charge of excessive demands amounts to little more than an affirmation of the status quo. The real problem with (...) utilitarianism is that it makes unfair demands on people who comply with it in our world of nonideal compliance. Murphy shows that this unfairness does not arise on a collective understanding of our responsibility for others' well being. Thus, according to Murphy, while there is no general problem to be raised about the extent of moral demands, there is a pressing need to acknowledge the collective nature of the demands of beneficence. (shrink)

In the last few decades, the emergence of mid-scale, intermediated marketing channels that fall between commodity and direct markets has attracted growing interest from scholars for their potential to preserve small and mid-sized farms while scaling up alternative agrifood sourcing. When such mid-scale supply chains are formed among multiple business partners with shared ethics or values related to the qualities of the food and the business relationships along the supply chain, they may be termed “values-based supply chains (VBSCs).” Most of (...) the research on VBSCs to date has relied primarily on a case study approach that investigates the performance of VBSCs from the perspective of VBSC founders or leaders. In contrast, this research seeks out the perspectives of farmers who participate in VBSCs. A nationwide farmer survey conducted in 2017 offers original insights on farmer motivations for participating in VBSCs and how they are being used by farmers relative to other marketing channels. We find that VBSCs serve farms of all sizes. Overall, smaller farms were more likely to market a higher percentage of overall sales through their VBSC and more likely to rank their VBSC as one of the top three marketing channels in their portfolio. But it was the larger farms that were more likely to perceive VBSC-specific benefits. Our findings confirm that while there is a limited volume of product that such regional supply chains can currently handle, farmers view VBSCs as a valuable marketing option that aligns with their own values and preserves their product’s identity. (shrink)

This chapter corrects for Susan Sontag's undeserved neglect by contemporary ethical philosophers by bringing awareness to some of the unique metaethical insights born of her reflections on photographic representations of evil. I argue that Sontag's thought provides fertile ground for thinking about: (1) moral perception and its relation to moral knowledge; and (2) the epistemic and moral value of our emotional responses to the misery and suffering of others. I show that, contrary to standard moral perception theory (e.g. Blum 1994), (...) Sontag holds that we can have general moral perceptual knowledge. I then explore Sontag's idea that certain emotional responses, like sympathy and compassion, can sometimes be impertinent, in virtue of their having false or illusory content. I explain why this is so, and show the epistemic and motivational problems it poses for moral sentimentalism. (shrink)

The ideal introduction for students of semantics, Lexical Meaning fills the gap left by more general semantics textbooks, providing the teacher and the student with insights into word meaning beyond the traditional overviews of lexical relations. The book explores the relationship between word meanings and syntax and semantics more generally. It provides a balanced overview of the main theoretical approaches, along with a lucid explanation of their relative strengths and weaknesses. After covering the main topics in lexical meaning, such as (...) polysemy and sense relations, the textbook surveys the types of meanings represented by different word classes. It explains abstract concepts in clear language, using a wide range of examples, and includes linguistic puzzles in each chapter to encourage the student to practise using the concepts. 'Adopt-a-Word' exercises give students the chance to research a particular word, building a portfolio of specialist work on a single word. (shrink)

Cet article illustre de façon concrète et détournée les relations villes-campagnes. Les circuits courts alimentaires sont considérés comme vertueux (réduction des intermédiaires et des distances, « locavorisme »), mais qu’en est-il vraiment de leur durabilité, compte-tenu de leur complexité logistique? Pour le producteur, premier maillon de la chaîne, la commercialisation et le transport représentent travail et coûts supplémentaires. Les circuits courts ne sont pas moins énergivores : flux entre fermes et points de vente fragmentés en une multitude de petits volumes. (...) L’auteur propose plusieurs formes d’organisation pour pallier à ces inconvénients : mutualiser le transport entre producteurs partenaires et promouvoir une coopération logistique territoriale, consolider le transfert de flux en le déléguant à un prestataire extérieur. L’enjeu de la logistique et le rôle des intermédiaires non commerciaux sont clé. (shrink)

L’accueil dans les services de soin de personnes issues de la migration est un enjeu de santé mentale et éthique et relève d’une réflexion sur la prise en compte de leur vulnérabilité, a fortiori quand des enjeux de parentalité s’en mêlent. Cet article est un témoignage de l’équipe de pédopsychiatrie de Caen qui a adapté ses dispositifs de soins pour mieux accueillir ces publics spécifiques que sont les familles migrantes. Après un rappel sur les notions de migration, de culture et (...) de périnatalité en contexte migratoire, les deux dispositifs seront présentés et explicités au regard de leur fondation théorique qu’est la clinique transculturelle. (shrink)

Here we studied how participants steer to intercept uniformly moving targets in a virtual driving task. We tested the hypothesis that locomotor interception behavior cannot fully be explained by a strategy of nulling rate of change in pertinent agent-target relations such as the target-heading angle or target’s bearing angle. In line with a previously reported observation and model simulations, we found that, under specific combinations of initial target eccentricity and target motion direction, locomotor paths revealed reversals in movement direction. This (...) phenomenon is not compatible with unique reliance on first-order information in the case of uniformly moving targets. We also found that, as expected, such reversals in movement direction were not observed consistently over all trials of the same experimental condition: their presence depended on the timing of the first steering action effected by the participant, with only early steering actions leading to reversals in movement direction. These particular characteristics of the direction-reversal phenomenon demonstrated here for a locomotor interception-by-steering task correspond to those reported for lateral manual interception. Together, these findings suggest that control strategies operating in manual and locomotor interception may at least share certain characteristics. (shrink)

When first published twenty years ago, The Logic of Medicine presented a new way of thinking about clinical medicine as a scholarly discipline as well as a profession. Since then, advances in research and technology have revolutionized both the practice and theory of medicine. In this new, extensively rewritten edition, Dr. Murphy includes changes to show how these different areas of scholarship may affect details of "the logic of medicine" without compromising its fundamental coherence. New to this edition are (...) discussions of the challenge of the flood of new empirical data, new ideas in genetics, molecular biology, homeostasis, pathogenesis, cancer, aging, and Alzheimer's disease. Murphy also comments on such new theoretical topics as dynamic systems, chaos, and fractals and their impact on the burgeoning fields of philosophy and practice of medicine. Written with medical students in mind, the book includes a glossary, many new examples, and problems for solutions with comments on each. An entirely new chapter deals with modeling. Clinicians and researchers will also find the principles thought-provoking and illuminating. (shrink)

Despite the growing autonomy of schools in the school systems of developed countries and the increase in the educational prerogatives of head teachers, the latter, particularly in France, have a relatively weak legitimacy to regulate and transform the teaching practices of teachers. Faced with this difficulty, they are regularly obliged to implement detour strategies in order to create the conditions for pedagogical change within the institution. In this article, we will show, through a qualitative study carried out in a French (...) secondary school, how the management team took advantage of the margin of maneuver left by the institution to experiment an innovative evaluation device without note. This experiment gave the school principal the opportunity to enroll, interest and temporarily stabilize a network of school actors (teachers and other staff) around local issues and mobilize them Transform teaching practices. The data collected were analyzed from the characteristics of the translation process theorized by Callon (1986). (shrink)

Emotional hardcore and other music genres featuring screamed vocals are puzzling for the appreciator. The typical fan attaches appreciative value to musical screams of emotional pain all the while acknowledging it would be inappropriate to hold similar attitudes towards their sonically similar everyday counterpart: actual human screaming. Call this the screamed vocals problem. To solve the problem, I argue we must attend to the anti-sublimating aims that get expressed in the emotional hardcore vocalist’s choice to scream the lyrics. Screamed vocals (...) help us see the value in rejecting (a) restrictive social norms of emotional expressiveness and (b) restrictive artistic norms about how one ought to express or represent pain in art, namely that if one is going to do so they must ensure the pain has been ‘beautified’. In developing this second point I argue that emotional hardcore is well-suited (though not individually so) for putting pressure on longstanding views in the history of aesthetics about the formal relationship between art and human pain. (shrink)

Plotinus' formulation of the problem of the individual should not be reduced to the question of whether or not one can accept Forms of Individuals. First, if Plotinus does indeed posit an intelligible foundation of individuality, there are no grounds to identify this foundation with a Form: it must rather be considered a logos. Second, we must, in addition to this intelligible "principle of distinction", allow for a sensible "principle of individuation": the living body. Finally, we have to distinguish a (...) third level: that of the hêmeis, the individual as a person, capable of freedom and consciousness. This latter's compatibility with the other two seems problematic, so that the real difficulty may lie in this tension, in Plotinus' thought, between an ontological and an ethical concept of the individual. (shrink)

Les Eléments de théologie de Proclus constituent un monument philosophique radicalement singulier tant par son architecture propre que par la façon dont la tradition l'a revisité. Ordonnant, sous une forme géométrique, les principes de la métaphysique néoplatonicienne, ils ont à la fois constitué celle-ci en système et opéré comme le principal relais de sa transmission aux pensées byzantine, arabe et occidentale. Ce sont ces effets d'héritage et d'adaptation que les textes ici réunis visent à évaluer. Du Liber de causis à (...) Hegel en passant par Thomas d'Aquin, Dietrich de Freiberg, Giordano Bruno, les Platoniciens de Cambridge et Leibniz, se reconstitue ainsi une a grande chaîne des "êtres", réarticulée par la chaîne des raisons, et à chaque fois revivifiée par celle de la transmission. (shrink)

The category of jus post bellum is a welcome addition to discussions of the justice of war. But, despite its handy Latin label, we will argue that it cannot be properly understood merely as a set of corollaries from jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Instead, an acceptable theory of justice in the postwar period will have to draw on a broader set of normative ideas than those that have been the focus of the just war tradition. In this (...) paper, we will argue that norms of political reconciliation provide some of the resources we need to address postwar justice. (shrink)

The first IVF baby was born in the 1970s. Less than 20 years later, we had cloning and GM food, and information and communication technologies had transformed everyday life. In 2000, the human genome was sequenced. More recently, there has been much discussion of the economic and social benefits of nanotechnology, and synthetic biology has also been generating controversy. This important volume is a timely contribution to increasing calls for regulation - or better regulation - of these and other new (...) technologies. Drawing on an international team of legal scholars, it reviews and develops the role of human rights in the regulation of new technologies. Three controversies at the intersection between human rights and new technology are given particular attention. First, how the expansive application of human rights could contribute to the creation of a brave new world of choice, where human dignity is fundamentally compromised; second, how new technologies, and our regulatory responses to them, could be a threat to human rights; and, third, how human rights could be used to create better regulation of these technologies. (shrink)

Les lectures plotinienne et proclusienne de Métaphysique Λ ne se résolvent pas dans ces résultats doctrinaux que sont la hiérarchisation de l’Intellect et de l’Un-Bien et l’harmonisation des causalités efficiente et finale. Pour les saisir tant dans leur différence que dans celle qui les oppose toutes deux aux lectures concordistes, il faut déplacer l’analyse du plan des doctrines à celui des concepts. Plus précisément, il faut demander comment Plotin et Proclus intègrent le concept qui, en Métaphysique Λ, condense la charge (...) polémique portée par Aristote contre Platon, à savoir le concept d’energeia. Ce dernier engage en effet une conception radicalement antiplatonicienne du principe premier, dont on montre qu’elle s’articule en quatre critiques fondamentales. On analyse dès lors les stratégies de lecture de Λ mises en oeuvre par Plotin et Proclus de façon à évaluer les angles de contreattaque qu’elles déterminent. Plutôt qu’à une harmonisation ou à une simple hiérarchisation, on a affaire, dans les deux cas quoique sous des modalités différentes, à une intégration dialectique qui en passe par la neutralisation de la charge polémique du concept d’energeia ainsi que par sa réélaboration, elle-même solidaire de modèles causaux distincts tant de celui de Platon que de celui d’Aristote. (shrink)

This book explores how some word meanings are paradigmatically related to each other, for example, as opposites or synonyms, and how they relate to the mental organization of our vocabularies. Traditional approaches claim that such relationships are part of our lexical knowledge (our "dictionary" of mentally stored words) but Lynne Murphy argues that lexical relationships actually constitute our "metalinguistic" knowledge. The book draws on a century of previous research, including word association experiments, child language, and the use of synonyms (...) and antonyms in text. (shrink)

This chapter sketches an account of psychiatric explanation with roots in contemporary philosophy of science and suggests that it is a natural fit with what it will call the strong interpretation of the medical model in psychiatry. The chapter starts by distinguishing between strong and minimal ways to understand the medical model before it moves on to talk about explanation. The basic idea of the chapter is that the logic of the medical model, together with recent developments in the sciences (...) of the brain, suggests that psychiatry should be seen as a kind of cognitive neuroscience. The second part of the chapter discusses some issues in applying mechanistic explanatory models to mental disorders. Recent philosophical work on explanation in the cognitive neurosciences has seen it as mechanistic explanation. A mechanistic explanation shows how components of a system interact to give rise to the phenomenon to be explained. (shrink)

Although many modern philosophers of law describe custom as merely a minor source of law, formal law is actually only one source of the legal customs that govern us. Many laws grow out of custom, and one measure of a law's success is by its creation of an enduring legal custom. Yet custom and customary law have long been neglected topics in unsettled jurisprudential debate. Smaller concerns, such as whether customs can be legitimized by practice or by stipulation, stipulated by (...) an authority or by general consent, or dictated by law or vice versa, lead to broader questions of law and custom as alternative or mutually exclusive modes of social regulation, and whether rational reflection in general ought to replace sub-rational prejudice. Can legal rules function without customary usage, and does custom even matter in society? The Philosophy of Customary Law brings greater theoretical clarity to the often murky topic of custom by showing that custom must be analyzed into two more logically basic concepts: convention and habit. James Bernard Murphy explores the nature and significance of custom and customary law, and how conventions relate to habits in the four classic theories of Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, Jeremy Bentham, and James C. Carter. He establishes that customs are conventional habits and habitual conventions, and allows us to better grasp the many roles that custom plays in a legal system by offering a new foundation of understanding for these concepts. (shrink)

As part of a more general project which consists in identifying the process by which the modern ontology of power and action came to replace the Aristotelian ontology of in-potency and act, this article questions some fundamental features of Aquinas’ use and reworking of the Aristotelian concepts of dunamis and energeia. First, I ask, how Aquinas can characterise God as being pure act and omnipotent at the same time given that for Aristotle pure act radically excludes all potency. It appears (...) that the Thomistic act not only admits potency-as-power, but also signifies the full power of being so that we can detect in Aquinas the conjunction in the first being - of power with being itself Second, I show how the symmetrical reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of in-potency comes to be modified by means of the concept - inherited from Neo-Platonism - of epitedeiotes. Thus understood as receptive capacity, in-potency no longer signifies the principle within each substance of its own proper and immanent act but rather its dependence on the first act, the primary being. In the end, the concept of potency is redistributed by Aquinas between the Creator’s full power of being, and the creature’s mere capacity for being. (shrink)

Interroger la diversité des lectures antiques du Parménide pour dégager l’unité et la singularité du néoplatonisme, telle est l’ambition, pleinement tenue, du beau livre de Frédéric Fauquier. Celui-ci se donne comme une passionnante enquête méta-exégétique, qui ne se contente pas de retracer l’histoire des interprétations mais en dégage les stratégies et la visée. « Dès son origine, écrit F. Fauquier, le néoplatonisme est tradition, puisqu’il projette son origine dans l’œuvre de Platon » (p....

This chapter offers a general outline of Schopenhauer’s peculiarly named concept of the 'acquired character’ and explains its basic function in his ethical thought. For Schopenhauer, a person of acquired character is someone who knows the ways of acting (Handlungsweise) that are most expressive of their individuality and who allows that self-knowledge to structure their practical and emotional life. In keeping with certain elements of his psychological determinism, acquired character is not the acquisition of a ‘new’ character; rather, it is (...) the acquisition of self-knowledge of one’s essentially fixed empirical character. It is part of the argument of this chapter that by introducing the acquired character into his reflections on human action and agency Schopenhauer weaves a certain view of individual flourishing (eudaimonia) into his ethics. There are two central ingredients of Schopenhauer’s conception of eudaimonia, and both are linked to the acquired character. The first is self-knowledge; the second is a sense of personal autonomy that follows in the wake of the first. The chapter ends with a brief attempt to connect Schopenhauer’s concept of acquired character to contemporary debates in ethics concerning autonomy, practical identity, and what some call the ‘normative significance of self’. (shrink)

Some commentators argue that conception constitutes the onset of human personhood in a metaphysical sense. This threshold is usually invoked as the basis both for protecting zygotes and embryos from exposure to risks of death in clinical research and fertility medicine and for objecting to abortion, but it also has consequences for certain religious perspectives, including Catholicism whose doctrines directly engage questions of personhood and its meanings. Since more human zygotes and embryos are lost than survive to birth, conferral of (...) personhood on them would mean – for those believing in personal immortality – that these persons constitute the majority of people living immortally despite having had only the shortest of earthly lives. For those believing in resurrection, zygotes and embryos would also be restored to physical lives. These outcomes do not mean that conception cannot function as a metaphysical threshold of personhood, but this interpretation carries costs that others do not. For example, treating conception as a moral threshold of respect for human life in general, rather than as a metaphysical threshold of personhood, would obviate the prospect of the afterlife being populated in the main by persons who have never lived more than a few hours or days. (shrink)

In this revised edition, two distinguished philosophers have extended and strengthened the most authoritative text available on the philosophy of law and jurisprudence. While retaining their comprehensive coverage of classical and modern theory, Murphy and Coleman have added new discussions of the Critical Legal Studies movement and feminist jurisprudence, and they have strengthened their treatment of natural law theory, criminalization, and the law of torts. The chapter on law and economics remains the best short introduction to that difficult, controversial, (...) and influential topic.Students will appreciate the careful organization and clear presentation of complicated issues as well as the emphasis on the relevance of both law and legal theory to contemporary society. (shrink)

On propose ici une lecture de la Métaphysique inspirée de Ε, 2, 1026a33-b2, prenant la dunamis et l’energeia comme principal sens de l’être. Le couple conceptuel de l’en-puissance et de l’acte fournit ainsi à la fois le principe d’une réponse possible à la question disputée de la « science recherchée », et le fondement d’une ontologie singulière, que l’on caractérise comme une ontologie axiologique. On commence par analyser la signification de ces notions telle qu’elle se déploie en Métaphysique Δ et (...) Θ : au terme de cette analyse, l’acte apparaît comme nommant l’identité réelle, ou réalisée, de l’être et du bien, et l’en-puissance, cette identité comme à réaliser. On montre ensuite, en suivant Ζ et Η, comment le couple de la dunamis et de l’energeia, et non celui de la matière et de la forme, est au principe de la substance sensi­ble, puis, à partir de Λ (en particulier Λ, 5, 1071a3-6), comment la dunamis et l’energeia valent, par-delà les substances sensibles, comme les principes communs à toutes les substances, sous la modalité spécifique de l’analogie. Le couple de l’en-puissance et de l’acte assure ainsi à la fois la généralité du dis­cours ousiologique, et le primat réel du principe théologique (qu’Aristote désigne toujours comme acte, et jamais comme forme). On montre enfin com­ment dunamis et energeia fondent non seulement une ousiologie unitaire, mais aussi une ontologie générale, en ce qu’elles s’appliquent, sous certaines conditions, aux êtres mathématiques. On s’interroge, pour finir, sur la signi­fication de l’inversion, par Plotin, de la dunamis aristotélicienne, et de la désignation du Premier Principe non plus comme acte pur, mais comme « puissance de tout (δύναμις πάντων) ». En ce geste plotinien, on reconnaît l’origine d’un mouvement d’identification du divin non plus au bien, comme le faisait Aristote à travers la notion d’acte pur, mais à la puissance - à une puissance qui, ultimement, pourra être pensée comme excédentaire au bien. Comme la théologie de l’acte pur, cette ontologie axiologique de l’en-puissance et de l’acte est victime d’un oubli dont, en conclusion, est brièvement esquis­sée l’histoire. (shrink)

This book delivers a definitive contribution to the understanding of Habermas's oeuvre as it applies to education. The authors examine Habermas's contribution to pedagogy, learning and classroom interaction; the relation between education, civil society and the state; forms of democracy, reason and critical thinking; and performativity, audit cultures and accountability.

On cherche ici à lever le reproche d’incohérence souvent adressé à la doctrine plotinienne de l’Intellect en montrant comment l’attribution à celui-ci de déterminations apparemment contradictoires obéit à une logique rigoureuse. Appliqué au rapport de l’Intellect naissant à l’Un-Bien, le modèle aristotélicien de l’empreinte et du noûs pathêtikos est refusé pour l’Intellect achevé. La notion d’energeia se trouve ainsi, contre Aristote, dissociée de celle de bien, pour dire la structure fondamentale du deuxième principe. Mais celle de dunamis intervient aussi, en (...) écho au Sophiste de Platon, pour dire sa structuration en genres premiers. Enfin, le processus de spécification peut être pensé à la lumière du rapport de l’en-puissance et de l’acte. C’est finalement en la notion de vie que se résout la tension entre ce double héritage platonicien et aristotélicien.« L’empreinte du bien dans le multiple » : structure et constitution de l’intellect plotinienPlotinus’s theory of Intellect is frequently said to be incoherent. The paper aims to answer this criticism by showing how the attribution, to the second principle, of apparently conflicting determinations actually obeys a rigorous logic. Although it does apply to the inchoate Intellect and to its relation to the One-Good, the Aristotelian model of the noûs pathêtikos must be rejected so far as the thinking Intellect is considered. The Aristotelian concept of energeia, is therefore dissociated from the good in order to express the fundamental structure of the second principle. But, as in Plato’s Sophist, the notion of dunamis is also mobilised to describe its structuration into first genera. Finally, the potentiality/actuality analysis applies to the process of specification. The notion of Life ultimately appears as that into which this double heritage can be reconciled. (shrink)

Les études ici réunies visent à explorer la résurgence, dans la philosophie et la théologie contemporaines, du motif de l'impuissance de Dieu. La question n'est plus seulement celle, comme dans la pensée médiévale, de la limitation de la toute-puissance divine, mais bien de son complet abandon. Elle est étroitement liée à l'interrogation sur ce que peut être une théologie d'après la Shoah, et elle préside aussi, chez des penseurs comme Hans Jonas, Gianni Vattimo, ou Giorgio Agamben, au redéploiement des problèmes (...) du mal et de la création, des concepts théologiques de kénose et d'incarnation, ou encore des catégories aristotéliciennes de la puissance. The contributions assembled here explore the resurgence in contemporary philosophy and theology of the notion of a powerless God. What is at stake here is no longer the medieval question of limitations of divine omnipotence, but its radical abandonment. This is closely linked to the question of a new post-Shoah theology. Among thinkers such as Hans Jonas, Gianni Vattimo, or Giorgio Agamben, it presides over a re-examination of the problems of evil and creation, of the theological concepts of kenosis and incarnation or even the Aristotelian categories of potency. (shrink)

Les études ici réunies visent à explorer la résurgence, dans la philosophie et la théologie contemporaines, du motif de l’impuissance de Dieu. La question n’est plus seulement celle, comme dans la pensée médiévale, de la limitation de la toute‑puissance divine, mais bien de son complet abandon. Elle est étroitement liée à l’interrogation sur ce que peut être une théologie d’après la Shoah, et elle préside aussi, chez des penseurs comme Hans Jonas, Gianni Vattimo, ou Giorgio Agamben, au redéploiement des problèmes (...) du mal et de la création, des concepts théologiques de kénose et d’incarnation, ou encore des catégories aristotéliciennes de la puissance.The contributions assembled here explore the resurgence in contemporary philosophy and theology of the notion of a powerless God. What is at stake here is no longer the medieval question of limitations of divine omnipotence, but its radical abandonment. This is closely linked to the question of a new post‑Shoah theology. Among thinkers such as Hans Jonas, Gianni Vattimo, or Giorgio Agamben, it presides over a re‑examination of the problems of evil and creation, of the theological concepts of kenosis and incarnation or even the Aristotelian categories of potency. (shrink)

This chapter examines the theme of “philosophy as a way of life” that has had so many effects that it has sometimes been able to hide the fact that for Pierre Hadot, philosophy is also a theoretical arrangement and a way of thinking. It is therefore worth emphasizing what, in Pierre Hadot's suggestions, resists this kind of interpretation, and this may also provide the means for inquiring about what he understands when he talks about the “reciprocal causality” of philosophy and (...) philosophical discourse, or again, when he says that they are “both inseparable and incommensurable.” The chapter analyzes the meaning of anti‐philosophy projected by various philosophers and explores whether defining philosophy as a way of life means being an antiphilosopher? Hadot's approach seems to be best described not as anti‐philosophical, but, on the contrary, as archphilosophical. (shrink)

D’une vie de philosophe, on n’attend ni un récit anecdotique, ni, bien sûr, un exposé théorique, mais un témoignage, toujours singulier et inanticipable, sur la façon dont des idées, une vérité, peuvent pénétrer et modifier une existence, ou inversement, et au risque de toutes les réductions biographiques, sur l’itinéraire existentiel qui a pu présider à la découverte ou à l’adoption de ces idées, de cette vérité. Cela vaut plus encore, lorsque la proposition théorique fondamentale de ce phil...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Autonomy, Experience, and TherapyDominic Murphy (bio)The contemporary philosophical idea of autonomy has a psychological implication, to wit, that there exists a comprehensive set of ideal competences, realized in our mind/brain, that enable a person to be self-governing. Autonomy is normally accorded individuals who enjoy a certain kind of psychological functioning and, perhaps, a certain sort of psychological history (Christman 1991). We think that autonomous individuals critically evaluate their (...) life and actions, endorse them as self-determined rather than imposed from without, and guide their own lives in accordance with the plans and values they have worked out for themselves. Such self-government has to depend on some psychological structures, but philosophers have tended to theorize about what these structures might be at a considerable distance from what the behavioral sciences can tell us. Anderson and Lux's paper is a welcome contribution to the growing literature that tries to connect issues in ethics with empirical considerations. This sort of methodological, as opposed to merely metaphysical, naturalism, is only just coming into vogue in ethics, even in moral psychology.1 Anderson and Lux are, as far as I am aware, the first people to reflect seriously on what we can learn about autonomy from clinical experience. Theirs is a very suggestive and fruitful paper that looks at real-life cases of loss of autonomy and tries to reach conclusions about what the deficits in performance tell us about the psychological preconditions of autonomy. Their paper also opens the way for an investigation into the precise neurologic and computational underpinnings of these capacities, which is essential if we are to get a serious moral psychology underway.I find little to quarrel with in the story that Anderson and Lux tell, but I will try to modify it slightly to bring out what I think is the important psychological point they make and explore some ramifications. I begin by claiming that they have scored a decisive point in favor of an external conception of autonomy. Second, I suggest that what Anderson and Lux have really put their finger on is less a requirement of accurate self-assessment than a requirement of sensitivity to feedback from the environment. I conclude by raising some of these issues about the relations between autonomy and assessments of psychological function when the deficit responsible is less amenable to clear cut neurologic identification.The External Perspective on AutonomyOne way of taking the paper (although this goes beyond anything that Anderson and Lux suggest) is that there is a smooth naturalistic picture of the cognitive basis of autonomy. When people have a normally functioning neurocomputational setup in their heads, we should assume that they are autonomous, and vice versa. However, autonomy cannot simply be identifiable with a mind that is working as some scientific theory says it should, because a mind that is [End Page 303] in that sense working correctly could, nonetheless, be directed by forces other than the agent. Servile or deluded individuals might endorse their lives even if those lives are the product of indoctrination, self-deception, or internalized oppression (Mackinnon 1997; Mele 1995). Normal mechanisms of belief fixation, for example, may not foster one's autonomy if the only context in which they are exercised is one in which many possible ways of life are simply unavailable for consideration, having been excluded from consideration by the dominant forces around one. We might, then, think of full autonomy as depending on relational rather than intrinsic properties. Perhaps autonomy requires a subject to have both normal psychological capacities and the right sort of environment in which to exercise them. I do not follow-up on this suggestion, but I mention it because it introduces two dimensions, within the subject and around the subject, where the externalist perspective on autonomy can get a grip. I discuss the former, but I do not mean to suggest that the latter is not important. A full account must deal with both. But even the psychological structures that foster autonomy cannot be identified with a mind working according to some scientific theory, as we shall see.Many writers on autonomy argue that we must recognize appropriate, objective constraints... (shrink)