A philosophical discussion of religion and its place in society. The book will examine the nature of faith and of the attacks upon it; considering both external and internal criticism - from non-believers and between believers. Having clarified the character of faith and considered its intellectual status, and its relation to scientific, moral, artistic and philosophical modes of thought; the book will then address a number of issues of contemporary public interest where religious faith is at issue, e.g. (...) class='Hi'>religious education and schooling. (shrink)

Contemporary Western culture is experiencing a heightened awareness of religious diversity. This article surveys a range of possible responses to such diversity, and distinguishes between responses that concern the salvation or moral transformation of persons (soteriological views) and those that concern the alethic or epistemic status of religious beliefs (doctrinal views). After providing a brief taxonomy of these positions and their possible relations to one another, the article focuses primarily on competing views about the truth and rationality of (...) religious beliefs (e.g., pluralism, exclusivism, and skepticism). Here a heavy emphasis is placed on arguments for and against the rationality and moral propriety of retaining one's religious beliefs in the face of disagreement. The article surveys some of the more prominent arguments from the literature on this topic and closes with suggestions for further research. (shrink)

In the recent past, attempts to revitalize historico-religious studies have challenged the charismatic appeal of some of the most celebrated scholars of the twentieth century. At the same time, the old and ideological frameworks that characterized the field have been critically analyzed and deconstructed. The disciplinary status quo, taken for granted for quite a long time, has been shaken to its foundation, paving the way for new approaches. However, the postmodern tenet of problematizing any authority has also become a (...) convenient shortcut to blur the distinction between scientific signal and nonepistemic noise. Despite this troublesome feature, some scholars have deployed postmodern and poststructuralist tools to study the genealogy, reception, implementation, and diffusion of cultural representations within the aforementioned academic discipline. The present article briefly reviews one of the most recent and remarkable examples of such scholarship, that is, The Scientification of Religion: An Historical Study of Discursive Change, 1800–2000. (shrink)

Religious pluralism model holds the belief that there is virtue in every religion, just as all religions are good and are of equal value. It does not consider religion’s particularity but is interested in the ideas that have not favoured any religion. The issue with this concept is not its assertion of the validity of all religions. It is rather with its denial of the finality of any religion as the way by which people could come to God. (...) Hence, it allows the existence of multiple religions in a given society and encourages religious tolerance. The beauty of pluralism is its flexibility which makes religious practicing a wilful act and religious conversion a choice and not a force, although it has the tendency to encourage syncretism. This research examines critically the implications of pluralism using historical approach on the development of Christian church. Data for the research were basically obtained from secondary sources. The findings reveal that although religious pluralism has its negative sides, it gives the much needed boost to development of church if its tenets are followed. Accordingly, the article recommends that Christian churches in pluralist societies such as Nigeria should imbibe the virtues of religious tolerance, and dialogue, if they want to remain alive and continue to be relevant.Contribution: Religious pluralism is a panacea to inordinate and incessant religious conflict, if given its proper place in Nigeria, will breed religious tolerance, peace and progress. This work would be of immense of benefit to government, missionaries and students across all strata of discipline. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Life‐Orienting Beliefs Belief in God Religious Belief and Its Counterfeits Alternative Stories Orienting Stories and Truth Fallibilism Notes.

This paper is concerned with the centrality of aspect seeing in Wittgenstein's philosophy, with some analogies between religious beliefs and aspect seeing, and with the implications of these analogies for the question of the justification of religious beliefs. If belief in God is neither a hypothesis nor a regular perceptual belief but rather a type of aspect seeing, then the kinds of proofs and justifications that are applicable to it would have to engage the non-believer in (...) a manner that would help her experience the dawning of a new aspect. This is why the standard philosophical proofs for theism, even when accepted as valid, are likely to be unsuccessful in bringing about faith. (shrink)

Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice engages several recent and important discussions in the mainstream epistemological literature surrounding 'pragmatic encroachment'. It has been argued that what is at stake for a person in regards to acting as if a proposition is true can raise the levels of epistemic support required to know that proposition. Do the high stakes involved in accepting or rejecting religious beliefs raise the standards for knowledge that 'God exists', 'Jesus rose from the dead' (...) and other propositions? Professor Rizzieri also examines whether or not knowledge and justification norms of belief and action undermine the pragmatic grounds for religious belief suggested by William James. Rizzieri argues that such norms favor an attitude of hope, as opposed to belief, under conditions of uncertainty. Finally, Rizzieri argues the connections between knowledge and rational action undermine radically externalist accounts of religious knowledge and proposes an alternative account of the justification of religious beliefs. (shrink)

A discussion of how making a decision about religious belief places this kind of belief in a category which distinguishes it from 'belief in other minds' or 'belief in an external world'. This has important consequences for a philosophical approach to religious belief.

An objection frequently brought against critical or satirical expressions, especially when these target religions, is that they are ‘offensive’. In this article, I indicate why the existence of diverse and conflicting beliefs gives people an incentive to formulate their complaints in the language of offence. But I also cast doubt on whether people, in saying they are offended really mean to present that as the foundation of their complaint and, if they do, whether their complaint should weigh with us. These (...) doubts do not apply to everything we might find offensive; in particular, they do not apply to simple cases of ‘sensory offence’; but they do apply to ‘belief-based offence’. Relying on offence also implies, inequitably, that different faiths should be differently protected depending on their susceptibility to offence; and the faithful themselves should worry about the flimsiness of claims based on ‘bare knowledge’ offence. I propose a principle of respect for beliefs as a differently grounded and more plausible reason for curbing our treatment of others’ beliefs. However, that principle has a limited compass and is hemmed in by the claims of free expression. It is also less suited to dictating the content of law than to influencing our conduct within the law. (shrink)

Recently, we have faced the outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 in the world, which has attracted the attention of all people. Stress has become a word familiar to all people. The stressors of life are relatively clear and some of them cannot be eliminated by humans. One of the stressors in the life of humans is the COVID-19 pandemic. Doctors believe that the virus is controllable but its prevalence is quicker and deadlier than other viruses. In addition, the virus (...) puts the elderly and those with underlying diseases at extreme risk. Therefore, more care is seriously required to protect members of society. However, this psychological imbalance caused by the virus is associated with stress and anxiety. Lack of proper management of this stress will be associated with emotional impacts, physiological impacts, cognitive impacts and behavioural impact.Contribution: Given the importance of this topic, this study aimed to evaluate the relationship between religious beliefs and coping with COVID-19-related stress amongst Muslim students in three cities of Russia – Ingushetia, Chechnya and the Republic of Dagestan – in 2020. Data were collected using questionnaires, the validity and reliability of which were previously confirmed. According to the results, religious beliefs had an impact on stress coping by p = 0.657. In other words, students’ ability to cope with stress improved by 0.657 units, with each unit of enhancement in their religious beliefs. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a fertile period of theorizing within mainstream epistemology which has had a dramatic impact on how epistemology is done. Investigations into contextualist and pragmatic dimensions of knowledge suggest radically new ways of meeting skeptical challenges and of understanding the relation between the epistemological and practical environment. New insights from social epistemology and formal epistemology about defeat, testimony, a priority, probability, and the nature of evidence all have a potentially revolutionary effect on how we understand our epistemological (...) place in the world. Religion is the place where such rethinking can potentially have its deepest impact and importance. Yet there has been surprisingly little infiltration of these new ideas into philosophy of religion and the epistemology of religious belief. -/- Knowledge, Belief, and God incorporates these myriad new developments in mainstream epistemology, and extends these developments to questions and arguments in religious epistemology. The investigations proposed in this volume offer substantial new life, breadth, and sophistication to issues in the philosophy of religion and analytic theology. They pose original questions and shed new light on long-standing issues in religious epistemology; and these developments will in turn generate contributions to epistemology itself, since religious belief provides a vital testing ground for recent epistemological ideas. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to consider the question ‘Why is belief in God not a delusion?’. In the first half of the paper, I distinguish two kinds of religious belief: institutional and personal religious belief. I then review how cognitive science accounts for cultural processes in the acquisition and transmission of institutional religious beliefs. In the second half of the paper, I present the clinical definition of delusion and underline the fact that (...) it exempts cultural beliefs from clinical diagnosis. Finally, I review cognitive models of the intuitive attribution of mental disorders and how they support cultural exemption. Through the comparison of the models of cultural acquisition of religious beliefs and of cultural exemption in the attribution of delusion I intend to make it clear that we can provide an answer to our motivating question: even though some institutional religious beliefs may seem as strange as the most florid delusions, humans can readily recognize that they are not the product of mental dysfunction due to the fact that their acquisition and transmission is embedded within a cultural context. (shrink)

The influence of Wittgenstein’s work in the study of deep disagreements has been dominated by On Certainty. Since the metaphor of ‘hinges’ plays a central role in the scholarship of On Certainty, a Wittgensteinian theory of deep disagreements is assumed to be based on hinge epistemology. This means that a disagreement would be deep because it concerns parties with conflicting hinges. When we shift our attention to a different part of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre, however, another picture of deep disagreements emerges. This (...) article proposes a new Wittgensteinian approach to disagreements through the analysis of the Lectures on Religious Belief. Some of the disagreements that Wittgenstein and his pupils discuss in these lectures are deep, but not because they are grounded in different hinges, but because they are disagreements about pictures.This article is an extension of a paper presented at the 41st International Wittgenstein Symposium. It was published in the proceedings of the symposium with the title: “Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Treatment of Disagreements in the so-called Lectures on Religious Belief” (Lavorerio, 2018b). I would like to thank the audience at that presentation for their comments, as well as Dejan Makovec, Martin Kusch and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on previous drafts of this paper. (shrink)

John Tillson’s book Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence addresses several themes: the ground and nature of ethical responsibility; the means and goals of ethical formative influence; the nature and ground of religious belief. In this article, I focus on the issue of justification for educational influence in general. Attention to this issue could avoid some intractable problems of specifically religious influence, most particularly the challenge of providing satisfactory criteria for what belongs to the category of (...) religion. Whilst there may be important reasons for examining specifically religious influence, I argue that religious influence is not fundamentally different from other forms of influence, and that the logic of the ethics of influence in general would encompass the logic of religious influence. If the educator is to justify certain forms of influence, then they should employ a kind of restraint: the educator should influence whilst simultaneously protect the influencee from that very influence. (shrink)

This study examines the relationships among intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations, locus of control and depression levels of 430 Turkish Muslim university students. The results show that some locus of control dimensions are related to participants’ religious orientations, but depression has no significant impact on intrinsic or extrinsic religiousness. Hierarchical Regression Analyses were conducted for predicting the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations of different gender. Belief in chance and belief in fate contribute to male and (...) female participants’ intrinsic religious orientations. Meaninglessness of effortfulness was crucial only for women's intrinsic religiosity. Higher belief in meaninglessness of effortfulness was related to lower intrinsic religiosity scores for women. Among the locus of control variables, only belief in fate contributed to extrinsic religious orientations in both men and women. Belief in an unjust world positively contributed only to male extrinsic religious orientations. Women had higher intrinsic religiosity scores. (shrink)

Religion is an important element of end-of-life care on the paediatric intensive care unit with religious belief providing support for many families and for some staff. However, religious claims used by families to challenge cessation of aggressive therapies considered futile and burdensome by a wide range of medical and lay people can cause considerable problems and be very difficult to resolve. While it is vital to support families in such difficult times, we are increasingly concerned that deeply (...) held belief in religion can lead to children being potentially subjected to burdensome care in expectation of ‘miraculous’ intervention. We reviewed cases involving end-of-life decisions over a 3-year period. In 186 of 203 cases in which withdrawal or limitation of invasive therapy was recommended, agreement was achieved. However, in the 17 remaining cases extended discussions with medical teams and local support mechanisms did not lead to resolution. Of these cases, 11 (65%) involved explicit religious claims that intensive care should not be stopped due to expectation of divine intervention and complete cure together with conviction that overly pessimistic medical predictions were wrong. The distribution of the religions included Protestant, Muslim, Jewish and Roman Catholic groups. Five of the 11 cases were resolved after meeting religious community leaders; one child had intensive care withdrawn following a High Court order, and in the remaining five, all Christian, no resolution was possible due to expressed expectations that a ‘miracle’ would happen. (shrink)

Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a (...) society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting one or both of those belief sources? Should evolutionary accounts of the origins of our moral beliefs and our religious beliefs undermine our confidence in their veracity? This volume places challenges to moral belief side-by-side with challenges to religious belief, sets evolution-based challenges alongside disagreement-based challenges, and includes philosophical perspectives together with theological and social science perspectives, with the aim of cultivating insights and lines of inquiry that are easily missed within a single discipline or when these topics are treated in isolation. The result is a collection of essays--representing both skeptical and non-skeptical positions about morality and religion--that move these discussions forward in new and illuminating directions. -/- Contributors: Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame; Michael Bergmann, Purdue University; Sarah Brosnan, Georgia State University; William FitzPatrick, University of Rochester; John Hare, Yale University; Timothy P. Jackson, Emory University; Patrick Kain, Purdue University; Jordan Kiper, University of Connecticut; Dustin Locke, Claremont McKenna College; Charles Mathewes, University of Virginia; Mark C. Murphy, Georgetown University; John Pittard, Yale Divinity School; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University; Richard Sosis, University of Connecticut; Sharon Street, New York University; Joshua Thurow, University of Texas at San Antonio; Ralph Wedgwood, University of Southern California. (shrink)

In modern times many militant atheist thinkers and activists have tried to promote the idea that religions, as well as religious ways of life, are one of the main, if not the main source of evil in the social arena. Some other non-believer scholars, while taking a respectful approach towards religions and religious people, maintaining that it is more rational for people and communities to adopt a non-religious outlook on life and become members of the community of (...) non-believers. In this paper, I do not take issue with the militant non-believers. The reason is that their approach to religion is so ideologically driven that it leaves not much room for proper rational discussions; it only invites some polemical replies. My aim here is, instead, to enter into a dialogue with those non-believer scholars who view religion in a measured and rational way. My intention is to critically assess the claims of this latter group of scholars and explain why, contrary to what they suggest, certain interpretations of religion, and in particular, the Islamic faith, can provide them with better alternatives than their atheist outlooks. The arguments of this paper are mostly in reply to the views expressed by Professor Shearmur in his paper on critical rationalism and religion. (shrink)

This article introduces the volume, "Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution," which contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists addressing the following three challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution: Can one reasonably maintain one’s moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non- (...) class='Hi'>religious belief source, such as a society’s moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting one or both of those belief sources? Should evolutionary accounts of the origins of our moral beliefs and our religious beliefs undermine our confidence in their veracity? By considering together both evolution-based and disagreement-based challenges to both moral and religious belief from a variety of perspectives and disciplines, this volume cultivates insights on developing these objections and responding to them—insights that would be missed with a more narrowly focused approach. After explaining the rationale for the volume, this introductory article summarizes the contents of each of the volume’s chapters and then makes some suggestions for future research on the volume topics. (shrink)

Can beliefs to the effect that god is manifesting himself in a certain way to the believer ("m-beliefs") be justified by its seeming to the believer that he experiences god doing that? the issue is discussed in the context of several concepts of justification. on a "normative" concept of justification the answer will depend on what one's intellectual obligations are vis-a-vis practices of belief formation. on a rigorous view of such obligations one is justified in forming a m-belief (...) on the basis of experience only if one has adequate reasons for taking that practice to be reliable. on a more permissive view of such obligations, one is justified only if one lacks adequate reasons for taking the practice to be unreliable. it is suggested that neither this practice nor, e.g., the practice of forming perceptual beliefs on the basis of sense perception passes the stronger test, but that they both pass the weaker test. (shrink)

I explore some of the reasons why, under specific circumstances, it may be rational to make-believe or imagine certain religious beliefs. Adopting a jargon familiar to certain contemporary philosophers, my main concern here is to assess what reasons can be given for adopting a fictionalist stance towards some religious beliefs. My understanding of fictionalism does not involve solely a propositional attitude but a broader stance, which may include certain acts of pretence. I also argue that a plausible reason (...) to be fictionalist about a specific set of religious beliefs and practices has to do with the value of some artistic creations; namely, those that require the adoption of a religious point of view for their understanding. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that belief in God couldn’t be rational unless it is held on the basis of arguments. But is that right? Could there be rational religious belief without arguments? For the past few decades, a prominent position within the philosophy of religion literature is that belief in God can be rational even if it isn’t based on any arguments. This position is often called ‘Reformed Epistemology’ to signify its roots in the writings of (...) John Calvin (1509-64), the great Protestant theologian and the main source of the Reformed tradition within Christendom. The central thesis of Reformed Epistemology is simply that religious belief, including belief in God, can be rational (sensible, reasonable, justified) even if it is not inferred from any other beliefs—even if it is not held on the basis of any argument at all. In what follows, I will explain this view in greater detail and then consider and respond to a number of objections to it. (shrink)

This study is an introduction to the problems of moral philosophy designed particularly for those interested in theology and religious studies. It offers an account of the nature and subject matter of moral reasoning and of the major types of moral theory in contemporary moral philosophy. The account aims to bring out the major issues in moral theory, to present a clear, non-technical articulation of the structure of moral knowledge, and to explore the relation between religious belief (...) and morality. (shrink)

The market changes sweeping the U.S. health care industry have a distinctive impact on communities that rely on religiously affiliated health care providers. When a sectarian sponsor subsumes multiple providers, its assertion of religious beliefs can preclude the provision of certain health care services to the entire community. In addition, the sectarian provider's refusal to offer certain services may violate state certificates of need, licensing, Medicaid managed care, or even professional liability law. This situation challenges both the provider and (...) the state: the provider seeks adherence to religious law, and the state seeks compliance with its law and citizens access to health care.I propose that the state attempt to ameliorate tensions between civil and religious laws through negotiated accomodation. This concept encourages the sectarian institution to reassess its mission in the current market and to identify alternative avenues of health care delivery that will preserve patients' access to care without excessively diluting religious identity or beliefs. (shrink)

The market changes sweeping the U.S. health care industry have a distinctive impact on communities that rely on religiously affiliated health care providers. When a sectarian sponsor subsumes multiple providers, its assertion of religious beliefs can preclude the provision of certain health care services to the entire community. In addition, the sectarian provider's refusal to offer certain services may violate state certificates of need, licensing, Medicaid managed care, or even professional liability law. This situation challenges both the provider and (...) the state: the provider seeks adherence to religious law, and the state seeks compliance with its law and citizens access to health care.I propose that the state attempt to ameliorate tensions between civil and religious laws through negotiated accomodation. This concept encourages the sectarian institution to reassess its mission in the current market and to identify alternative avenues of health care delivery that will preserve patients' access to care without excessively diluting religious identity or beliefs. (shrink)

Beliefs seem to be more significantly constrained by some norms than others e.g. one should only believe what they have sufficient evidence for, a belief that p is correct iff p is true etc. I call these norms, doxastic norms. Constitutivism is the view that doxastic norms are a constitutive feature of belief. I argue that this view is mistaken. In making this case, I come to defend views about the semantics of doxastic norms, the nature of (...) class='Hi'>belief, and the value of truth. Doxastic norms are naturally stated in deontic terms. In the first chapter, I consider how we should best understand these statements, given that we likely don't control our beliefs in the same way that we do our actions. In the second chapter, I consider whether the account of religious belief given by either Ludwig Wittgenstein or Søren Kierkegaard provide a counterexample to constitutivism. In the third chapter, I argue that constitutivism can't account for certain intuitions about our reasons for belief. In the fourth chapter, I defend a descriptive account of belief in terms of the appearance of truth. In the fifth chapter, I show how my view can better account for the data which is thought by some to support constitutivism. In the final chapter, I describe how our reasons for belief might arise from our goals. (shrink)

Described as a gem in Islam, intellect can lead all individual and social behaviours towards balance, appeal and godliness. Given the utmost importance of protecting intellect in this divine religion, everything from eating and drinking to reading, listening and entertainment is thus considered haram [ viz. remains prohibited] if it makes threats to the health of mind and soul. In general, narcotics and substance abuse in all forms can have crushing and all-encompassing effects, that is, inflict heavy blows on the (...) body, soul, mind, willpower and religion in a person and consequently destroy life in the family and society. The continuation of life as well as the stability and survival of this holy institution accordingly depends on many factors, including addiction tendency (AT) and sexual dysfunction (SD). It is also obvious that the balance and optimal use of sexual instinct on the accepted path of religion will be the key to the family health and strength. Altogether, the role of AT and SD on intention to divorce (ITD) in Indonesian Muslim couples ( n = 450) was investigated in 2022 in this study, wherein one partner had previously attended addiction treatment centres over the last 6 months. The study results ultimately demonstrated that AT could induce SD and consequently raise ITD among Muslim couples. Contribution: The study results confirmed the harmful impacts of AT on SD among Muslim couples, which could increase their ITD. In view of this, it was suggested to promote religious teachings in the family to benefit from their positive effects. (shrink)

This is a re-Examination of hume's intentions in the final part of the "dialogues". It is here, If anywhere, That we find the resolution of the conflict between his naturalistic acceptance that belief has non-Rational causes, And his wish to expose religious belief as irrational. The paper amends its author's previous view that hume is shown to have accepted, At least verbally, That such a theism is a result of cleanthes' arguments, But to have maintained his secularism (...) by showing it to be religiously vacuous, And hence a socially benign influence. The argument relies on hume's use of the thought and language of the fideist tradition, And on questioning how far we can identify hume with philo as the "dialogues" conclude. (shrink)

In recent philosophical analysis of religious experience and discussion on the relation of beliefs and experiences, Ninian Smart is said to be, amongst such other philosophers as Katz and Hick, a maximal constructivist. Distinguishing theistic and non-theistic contexts of experiences, Smart suggests a two poles theory of religious experience, and draws attention to different levels of interpretation. He holds that cultural-religious contexts, including religious beliefs, influence religious experience, but it is not led to fully determine (...) experience. Accordingly, he takes a position between essentialism and maximal constructivism. This position could call minimal constructivism. (shrink)

China has achieved economic prominence but damaged the natural environment. Can religions excite pro-environmental actions? Chinese religion encompasses Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, native Taoism, and indigenous folk beliefs (GuanDi and Mazu). We theorize that believers demonstrate more sustainable HOPE (Help Ourselves Protect the Environment) than non-believers. Religions with standardized and formal liturgy show more pro-environmental HOPE than those without it. We challenge the myth that the believers of Christianity and Islam display more sustainable HOPE than other faith. The 2013 Chinese General (...) Social Survey (involving 10,017 randomly selected participants across 28 provinces) revealed that 11.10% of them have faith. Believers display higher levels of HOPE than atheists, demonstrating the __religion__ effect. Among believers, native Taoism and Buddhism exhibit more ecological HOPE than other religions, supporting the __dogma__ effect in the Chinese culture. Religions with formalized liturgy demonstrate more pro-environmental HOPE than generalized folk beliefs—GuanDi and Mazu, validating the __liturgy__ effect. Females, married, and people with good income, education, health, and country-domicile—the haves—exhibit robust ecological HOPE. The rich get richer and greener. However, those who are older, males, urban residents, and the Han majority do not. We empirically demonstrate the Matthew Effect in Religious Social Responsibility: Religious faith facilitates believers’ pro-environmental behaviors—HOPE and ethical behaviors in China. (shrink)

Critics of John Rawls' conception of a reasonable pluralism have raised the question of whether it is justified to demand that religious individuals should 'bracket' their essential, identity-constituting convictions when they enter a political discourse. I will argue that the criterion for religious beliefs of being justified as grounds for political decisions should be their ability of being 'translatable' in secular reasons for the very same decisions. This translation would demand 'epistemic abstinence' from religious believers only on (...) the basis of a rigid distinction between the spheres of private opinions and public reasons. To give a more adequate account of the relation between religious beliefs and political reasons in a pluralistic society it seems to be helpful to make use of Niklas Luhmann's functionalistic theory of religion. Key Words: democracy and religious beliefs • philosophy of religion • pluralism • political liberalism • political theory. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam and Cora Diamond both wrote on Wittgenstein’s Three Lectures on Religious Belief. They did it quite differently; my ultimate aim in this article is to explore this difference. Putnam’s view of religion is largely a view of ethical life; I look thus into his writings on ethics and his proposals to face the relativist menace therein. Still, in his incursions into philosophy of religion, describing religious experience through authors such as Rosenzweig, Buber, or Levinas, Putnam (...) deals with what Diamond calls, after Wittgenstein, “the gulfs between us.” Such gulfs, and the threat of relativism they bring, need to be accounted for. With that purpose in mind I complement Putnam’s reading of the Three Lectures with Diamond’s own reading. (shrink)

It is no exaggeration to say that there has been an explosion of activity in the field of philosophical enquiry that is known as natural theology. Having been smothered in the early part of the twentieth century due to the dominance of the anti-metaphysical doctrine of logical positivism, natural theology began to make a comeback in the late 1950s as logical positivism collapsed and analytic philosophers took a newfound interest in metaphysical topics such as possibility and necessity, causation, time, the (...) mind-body problem, and God. This chapter begins by considering how we might characterise natural theology as a field of enquiry. It then proceeds to survey the landscape of contemporary natural theology, which has spawned a large and at times highly technical body of literature. Finally, consideration is given to two epistemological issues confronting the theist who wishes to appeal to natural theology, which could be termed the problem of the gap(s) and the problem of accessibility. (shrink)

In the United States, lay-adults with a range of educational backgrounds often conceptualize species change within a non-Darwinian adaptationist framework, or reject such ideas altogether, opting instead for creationist accounts in which species are viewed as immutable. In this study, such findings were investigated further by examining the relationship between religious belief, scientific expertise, and ecological reasoning in 132 college-educated adults from 6 religious backgrounds in a Midwestern city. Fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist religious beliefs were differentially related (...) to concepts of evolution, adaptation, and extinction. Biological expertise and creationism were significantly and differentially related to the endorsement of the Darwinian concept of common descent. Yet, creationists were more likely to reject macroevolutionary than microevolutionary concepts. Overall, the greater the taxonomic distance between species, the less likely were participants to agree that species-pairs had common ancestors. It is argued that lay adults from contemporary industrialized societies adopt a view of evolution in which species adapt to novel environments, but remain the same "kind" despite changes. Therefore, extinction is considered unlikely and the relations between micro- and macroevolution misconstrued. Lay-adults' species concepts appear to be an amalgam of a common-sense understanding of species and of evolutionary ideas, modified but not transformed by religious and scientific beliefs. Finally, it is argued that the development of scientific expertise does not involve the radical transformation of ingrained worldviews. Rather, scientists select specializations that are compatible with their existing philosophies, then consciously apply the constructs of their disciplines in order to transcend their common-sense folk beliefs. (shrink)

Ethics is being asked to respond to the globalization of the economy, and among the various responses one can see the emergence of inter-religious approaches including lay groups. This article examines certain of these concrete attempts to integrate ethics, spirituality and economics, and problematizes some of the theoretical underpinnings of these activities, specifically the question of beliefs.In January, 1998, two inter-religious and interdisciplinary organizations — Avicenne and the World Conference on Religion and Peace — participated for the first (...) time in the European Commission's conference on the future of Europe's economic and social order. It was recognized at this meeting that inter-religious dialogue constituted a paradigmatic example for the construction of a European society that must integrate different cultures. But paradigmatic does not mean it actually exists, for the inter-religious dynamic is still hesitating between globalization and integrationism. Nevertheless, religious plurality is apparent in the economy. The IMF recently hosted representatives of different religions, surpassing the framework of Christianity. In France, the University of Paris IX has planned a series of lectures on “Morality, Spirituality and Business Life”. Before looking at the theoretical questions connected with the emergence of a planetary, inter-religious ethics, let us come back to the question of the Christian religions and the social and economic order. I will restrict myself to mentioning some problematic points in order to defend the necessity of an inter-religious, interdisciplinary approach.Among the positions adopted by the churches at the January, 1998 conference, three points bear some examination: the dignity of labour and the community as specifically Christian values, and Europe constructed on the base of Christian values. (shrink)

This paper considers some of the ways in which ‘postmodernism’ is construed, before turning to several important representative examples of religious postmodern thought. It highlights some common features possessed by prominent examples of religious postmodern thought within Judaism and Christianity. Much postmodern religious thought is characterised by the separation of religious belief from religious experience, and is marked by the tendency to emphasise the latter at the expense of the former. This paper argues that, (...) despite this tendency, the work of certain key postmodern religious thinkersparticularly those associated with open-traditionalism and radical orthodoxy—does not conform to this characterisation and needs to be understood in a broader cultural and theological context. (shrink)

An account of the relation between belief and practice is inseparable from a general theory of religion and religious discourse. Rejection of the one time popular, but now more or less defunct, nonrealist position of people such as D. Z. Phillips, Don Cupitt, and indeed Wittgenstein leaves contemporary theo rists in anthropology and the "history of religions" with basically the vastly different "literalist" and "symbolist" analyses of religion from which to choose. This article critically appraises John Skorupksi's influential (...) defense of intellectualism. I argue that his dismissal of symbolist approaches is more theoretically radical than he recog nizes. It rejects outright some of the very foundations and staples of contempo rary anthropology in, for example, Durkheim. His argument for the rejection of the symbolist approach is examined. Skorupski's defense of intellectualism is set in the context of a problematically naive understanding of the nature and function of religion. (shrink)

Women’s participation in physical activities has been discouraged for a variety of reasons, especially in Muslim countries. This study aims to highlight Pakistani women’s religious beliefs about sports. It focuses on whether their religion contradicts their participation in sporting activities, and it does so by using an adapted version of the Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire in the theoretical context of feminism in sports. The snowball sampling method was used to select women from the Sindh province (...) of Pakistan, who completed a questionnaire incorporating the SCSRFQ that was specially designed for the current study. The results were unexpected, revealing that religious beliefs have no negative impact on Pakistani women’s participation in sports. Few participants believe that religion is an obstacle to their participation in sports. The results of the study challenge the traditional view by most of the previous studies that Islam is against women’s sports. It also challenges cultural limitations, such as some unwritten rules in Pakistani culture according to which women cannot participate in sports. These efforts should lead to enhanced female sports participation in the Pakistani context. (shrink)

The view that religious experience is a valid ground of basic religious beliefs inevitably raises the problem of the apparently incompatible belief-systems arising from different forms of religious experience. David Basinger's and William Alston's responses to the problem present the Christian belief-system as the sole exception to the general rule that religious experience gives rise to false beliefs. A more convincing response presents it as an exemplification of the general rule that religious experience (...) gives rise (subject to possible defeaters) to true beliefs. This requires a two-level' conception. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to defend the legitimacy of different religious systems by showing that they arise naturally as a consequence of the fact that we are linguistic beings. I will show that we do not need to presume that such belief systems all have something in common, and that even if they did we would most probably be unaware of it. I shall argue, however, that this lack of a common core does not mean that (...) understanding between different belief systems is impossible, and that, in fact, a dialogue between them is possible without one system being reduced to another. I will defend these ideas through the use of some principles expounded in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, especially the world-picture concept. (shrink)

Neo-Confucian influence in early modern Japan was highly intellectual, indicating that Confucian ideals did not change the nature of Japanese norms of social lives. For early modern Japanese intellectuals, the conflict and contradiction between reality and ideals had always been a source of debate and inspiration. Within the theme of Neo-Confucian rites, the contradiction was highlighted owing to the fact that it included a guideline for authentic ancestral worship and religious policy. Once introduced within the Japanese circumstances of the (...) day, Confucian understanding on spirits and proper rites lead Japanese scholars to define what was legitimate worship in the format of state religion: it was necessary to authorize traditional Japanese worship toward domestic shrines. Within thepractical process of policy making, it must be noted that a keen interest toward local beliefs had emerged through the discussion. Arai Hakuseki (1657‐1725) reflects such political interest within his work ‘Kishinron’. In order to understand the impact of Japanese interpretation of Neo-Confucian ideals, it is essential to focus on the interrelationship between religious policy and interest toward local beliefs. (shrink)

What is the status of belief in God? Must a rational case be made or can such belief be properly basic? Is it possible to reconcile the concept of a good God with evil and suffering? In light of great differences among religions, can only one religion be true? The most comprehensive work of its kind, Reason and Religious Belief, now in its fourth edition, explores these and other perennial questions in the philosophy of religion. Drawing (...) from the best in both classical and contemporary discussions, the authors examine religious experience, faith and reason, the divine attributes, arguments for and against the existence of God, divine action (in various forms of theism), Reformed epistemology, religious language, religious diversity, religion and science, and much more. Retaining the engaging style and thorough coverage of previous editions, the fifth edition features revised treatments of omnipotence, miracles, and providence and updated suggestions for further reading. A sophisticated yet accessible introduction, Reason and Religious Belief, Third Edition, is ideally suited for use with the authors' companion anthology, Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, Fifth Edition (OUP, 2015). (shrink)

The aim of this study was to evaluate the structure and measurement invariance of the religious identity, religious practice, and religious beliefs across cultures in six world regions (Asia, non-Western Europe, North America, Oceania, South America, and Western Europe) and across Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic regions (WEIRD) and non-WEIRD world regions. Confirmatory factory analysis examined whether the hypothesized measurement model fits the data; several multi-group confirmatory factor analyses were performed to examine measurement invariance through a (...) progressive analytic strategy involving three invariance conditions of configural, metric, and scalar invariance. The results generally supported the adequate fit to the data of the three correlated factors model (religious identity-RII, religious practice-RPI, and religious beliefs—RBI); it was found to be full metric invariance for WEIRD regions (RII), North America (RII and RBI), Western Europe (RII) and Non-Western Europe (RII), and South America (RII and RBI). Finally, for RII, it was found to be full configural invariance in almost all regions, except North America and Oceania; for RPI, it was found to be full configural only in North America and Non-WEIRD regions; and for RBI, it was found to be full configural only in North America, Asia, and South America, being that women scored significantly higher than men in all three indices all over the world; finally, it was found to be configural, but not metric or scalar invariance across WEIRD and non-WEIRD world regions. (shrink)

Introductions to epistemology routinely define knowledge as a kind of belief which meets certain criteria. In the first two sections of this article, I discuss this account and its application to religious epistemology by the influential movement known as Reformed Epistemology. In the last section, I argue that the controversial consequences drawn from this account by Reformed Epistemology offer one of the best illustrations of the untenability of a conception of knowledge as a kind of belief. I (...) conclude by sketching an alternative account of cognition which also provides a different framework for religious epistemology. (shrink)

It has recently been suggested by Brassington that, when students in classes in medical ethics announce that some view that they wish to express is related to their religious convictions, the teacher is obliged to question them explicitly about the suggested link. Here, a different conclusion is reached. The view is upheld that, although the stratagem recommended by Brassington is permissible and might sometimes be desirable, it is not obligatory nor is it, in general, likely to be optimal.

Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR) argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR theories argue for (...) the naturalness of religious belief in at least three ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases. I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more flexibility. (shrink)