Any adequate philosophy of technology needs to take a clear stance with regard to the limits of criticizability. While observing the canons of criticizability may appear to be simple, many philosophical approaches (whether towards technology or other topics) abandon comprehensive criticizability by adopting some forms of justificationist or essentialist epistemology. This paper aims to show that criticizability can only be upheld by subscribing to a non-justificationist epistemology and by acknowledging the propositions/standards dichotomy; failing to do so leads to undesirable epistemic (...) consequences. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the Philosophical relationship between humanities and technology. It will be explained that most disciplines in humanities are Janus-faced: they are part science/knowledge and part technology. The thesis of the paper is that the relationship between the technological aspect of humanities and other technologies is positive and synergetic, while the relationship between their scientific aspect and technologies is almost entirely critical and negative. The argument of the paper is not that (...) the scientific aspect of humanities has nothing positive to offer to the development of technologies, but rather to clarify the nature of this assistance. It is also hoped that the paper’s analysis could help to explain how the scientific aspect of humanities can partake in the process of rationalisation of the development of technology. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard, in his essay "The Present Age," takes a hostile stance towards the press. This is because he maintains that the press prepares the ground for the emergence of nihilism. Hubert Dreyfus extends this idea to other information technologies, especially the Internet. Since Kierkegaard-Dreyfus’ attitude towards various forms of information technology originates from philosophical anthropology and a particular conception of the meaning of life, assessing the viability of the attitude they hold requires further critical scrutiny. This paper aims to (...) show that, although, Kierkegaard’s and Dreyfus' insights are important in understanding the dangers of information technology their approach concerning the meaning of life and human identity is a one-sided analysis of the problem situation; In particular, their reliance on "Unconditional Commitment" could bring about new undesired consequences. This paper emphasizes that an appropriate stance towards information technology needs, among other things, a richer and more effective philosophical anthropology; one that by utilizing religious-moral wisdom in a sensible manner, provides an effective way to safely benefit from various types of technology without falling into the abyss of nihilism. The paper further argues that we also need to provide an institutional control of technology through piecemeal social engineering in a democratic process. (shrink)

In modern times many militant atheist thinkers and activists have tried to promote the idea that religions, as well as religious ways of life, are one of the main, if not the main source of evil in the social arena. Some other non-believer scholars, while taking a respectful approach towards religions and religious people, maintaining that it is more rational for people and communities to adopt a non-religious outlook on life and become members of the community of non-believers. In this (...) paper, I do not take issue with the militant non-believers. The reason is that their approach to religion is so ideologically driven that it leaves not much room for proper rational discussions; it only invites some polemical replies. My aim here is, instead, to enter into a dialogue with those non-believer scholars who view religion in a measured and rational way. My intention is to critically assess the claims of this latter group of scholars and explain why, contrary to what they suggest, certain interpretations of religion, and in particular, the Islamic faith, can provide them with better alternatives than their atheist outlooks. The arguments of this paper are mostly in reply to the views expressed by Professor Shearmur in his paper on critical rationalism and religion. (shrink)

Since the emergence of modernity, and in response to its myriad aspects and potentials, which are constantly unfolding, countless reactions have kept emerging in almost all quarters of the globe. A large variety of anti-modern reactions, the common core of which is perhaps the idea that modernity, in one way or another, is illegitimate, stand out among these responses. According to some of these anti-modern responses, modernity has usurped the characteristics and features of religion, which has been the soul as (...) well as the main shaping force of the pre-modern era and has reproduced it in a corrupted form. Two German-speaking philosophers, Karl Popper and Hans Blumenberg, are among the intellectuals who have defended modernity against the onslaught of anti-modern tendencies. In this paper, I briefly, though critically, compare and contrast the approaches as well as some of the arguments of these two thinkers in defence of modernity. (shrink)

The later Wittgenstein presents all kinds of knowledge in the form of language games based on forms of life. One of the implications of his later views is that certain language games and forms of life are incommensurable. Since each person can know the world only through his/her own form of life and language game, those who subscribe to entirely different language games cannot have a proper understanding of the forms of life of others. They are not able to critique (...) and evaluate their knowledge of reality unless they abandon their own customary forms of life and internalize other forms of life that they want to know about, that is, to become a member of a society based on those different forms of life. In contrast, Popper emphasizes the objective nature of knowledge by considering external reality as a major criterion of objectivity. Popper maintains that the growth of human knowledge takes place through a never-ending process of critical evaluation of previous knowledge claims and a continuous supply of new conjectures for capturing reality and their critical appraisal incessantly. In this article, following a brief description of the philosophical approaches of Wittgenstein and Popper (Sections 1 and 2), and a brief explanation of the anti-relativist attitude of critical rationalism (Section 3), we turn to a critical assessment of Wittgenstein's relativist approach through the prism of Critical Rationalism (Section 4). The last chapter of the article (Section 5) is dedicated to a brief recap of the topics discussed in the earlier sections. (shrink)

"Certainty" occupies an important place in Wittgenstein’s epistemology: it does not belong to the category of knowledge but constitutes its foundation. In his view, knowledge boils down to language games, and language games are based on indubitable certainties. According to Wittgenstein, scepticism is meaningless, and if there is no certainty, then even doubt would be meaningless. Wittgesntein maintains that [relative] doubt and knowledge are epistemic categories, whereas absolute doubt and certainty are non-epistemic categories. Epistemic categories are meaningful and when expressed (...) by means of statements could be either true or false. In contrast, non-epistemic categories are meaningless and when expressed by means of statements the properties of truth and falsehood do not apply to them. The aim of the present paper is two fold: 1- Providing an explanation of the status of certainty in comparison to categories such as doubt and knowledge in Wittgenstein’s thought; 2- Providing a critical assessment of Wittgenstein's approach to certainty through the prism of critical rationalism. The main arguments of the paper are as follows: 1. Although Wittgenstein considers certainty to be meaningless and therefore not on a par with epistemological categories, he regards it as an objective concept that functions as the foundation upon which all human knowledge is based; 2. Wittgenstein's efforts to show the objectivity of certainty have not been entirely successful, partly due to his reliance on a defective notion of ‘objectivity’ and partly as a result of the prominence he assigns to the category of ‘meaning’ at the expense of the category of ‘truth’. (shrink)

In the present article, working from within the framework of critical rationalism and focusing mostly on the views developed by some Iranian writers, I argue that the programmes of producing ‘Islamic Science’ and ‘Islamisation of Science/Knowledge’ are doomed to failure. I develop my arguments in three parts. I start by explaining that the advocates of the programmes of producing cIS or IoK subscribe to mistaken images of science that are shaped by either a positivist or outmoded culturalist/interpretivist theories of science. (...) I shall then focus on the similarities and differences of ‘science’ and ‘technology’, arguing that despite close interconnection between the two it is of utmost importance, for analytical purposes, to keep these two socially constructed entities apart. Drawing on the above distinction, I argue that while creating ‘Islamic’ or ‘indigenous’ sciences is impossible, constructing ‘Islamic’ or ‘indigenous’ technologies is, in principle, feasible. Lastly, I turn to some of the... (shrink)

Für Ali Paya verspricht die Zivilgesellschaft im Kontext muslimischer Gesellschaften an sich schon die Aussicht auf Distanzierung und Relativierung fundamentalistischer religiöser Standpunkte. Der Beitrag, der durch eine solche inner-islamische Wende weltweit geleistet werden könnte, liegt auf der Hand: muslimische Zivilgesellschaften könnten, wenn sie entstehen, genau in jenem Gespräch mit anderen Gesellschaften, auch säkularen, in der Lage sein, den Boden für eine volle und konstruktive Partizipation in der Gestaltung einer wünschenswerten künftigen globalen Zivilgesellschaft zu bereiten.

Can dialogue make real impact on the state of affairs in the real world, or is it a pastime of the polite societies or a lullaby useful for sending gullible grown-ups into “sleep”? In the present paper, following a two-tier analysis of the notion of dialogue, as “shared exploration towards greater understanding, connection, or possibility,” and as a product of our “collective intentionality,” I shall develop a bifurcated argument. Against the cynic pundits, who preach that realpolitik and not dialogue is (...) the name of the game in our daily interactions with each other, I shall argue that in an increasingly pluralistic world, dialogue is a powerful and indispensable means for making desirable changes. Similarly, against the over-enthusiastic optimists who believe that dialogue provides us with a magical wand, I shall argue that dialogue is as good as we can make it: dialogue cannot work miracles in a vacuum of collective will. The upshot of my argument is that firstly, dialogue is an indicator of the rationality and maturity of the social actors: the more rational the social actors the more ubiquitous and effective the dialogue and vice versa. And secondly, although, dialogue itself may lead to frustration or even violence, it is the absence of dialogue that poses the greatest danger for the future of mankind. (shrink)

Introduction -- What and how can we learn from the Quran: a critical rationalist perspective -- A critical rationalist approach to religion -- A critical assessment of the programmes of producing "Islamic science" and "Islamisation of science/knowledge" -- Faqih as engineer: a critical assessment of fiqh's epistemological status -- A critical assessment of the method of interpretation of the Quran by the Quran, in the light of Allameh Tabatabaei's Tafsir al-mizan -- The disenchantment of reason: an anti-rational trend in modern (...) Shiʻi thought- the Tafkikis -- Islamic philosophy: past, present, and future -- Doctrinal certainty: a major contributory factor to "secular" and "religious" violence in the political sphere -- Islam, Christianity, and Judaism: can they ever live peacefully together? -- The shape of the coming global civil society: suggestions for a possible Islamic perspective. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically assess the present state of Islamic philosophy in its main home, namely, Iran. However, since such a study requires some knowledge of the past developments of philosophical thought among Muslims, the paper briefly, though critically, deals with the emergence and subsequent phases of change in the views of Muslim philosophers from ninth century onward. In this historical survey I also touch upon the role played by other Muslim scholars such as theologians, mystics (...) and jurists, in shaping Islamic philosophy. The last section of the paper, deals, not in great details, with one or two possible scenarios for the future of Islamic philosophy. (shrink)

The present paper is an attempt to explore the impact of Karl Popper's ideas on the views of a number of intellectual groups in post-revolutionary Iran. Throughout the text, we have tried to make use of original sources and our own personal experiences. The upshot of the arguments of the paper is that the Viennese philosopher has made a long-lasting impression on the intellectual scene of present-day Iran in that even those socio-political groups which are not in favour of his (...) ideas, especially his model of critical rationalism, have felt the urgent need to make themselves familiar with them. Moreover, many of Popper's ideas have directly or indirectly influenced the thinking of the decision-makers in Iran since 1978. (shrink)

In this study, we shall assess the claim concerning the negative effect of sin and positive effect of grace on proper function of reason and cognitive faculties through the lens of the Calvinist tradition and the Reformed Epistemology. Although the noetic effect of sin has already been discussed probably by tracing the role of the non-epistemic factors in acquiring knowledge in general, approaching the issue by focusing on ‘scientific knowledge’ is novel and, to the best of my knowledge, has not (...) been attempted before. This study will be developed by means of an evaluation of Stephen Moroney’s project. Through a critical survey of the views of a number of prominent Christian theologian, he tries to develop a model for the cognitive influence of sin. In our review of his work from the canons of Critical Rationalism, we shall try to show that Moroney's conclusions are inconsistent with his explanation of the effect of sin on the natural sciences. Our main arguments are as follows: what Moroney describes as scientific knowledge from a Christian point of view is more a technological awareness rather than scientific knowledge proper. Furthermore, it is the scientist who is affected by sin and not his scientific claim. (shrink)