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Michael Bergmann [54]Michael Abram Bergmann [1]
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Michael Bergmann
Purdue University
  1. Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
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  2. Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements.Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.
    Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement. I respond to the (...)
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  3. Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.
    * Editor’s Note: This paper won the Young Epistemologist Prize for the Rutgers Epistemology conference held in 2003.
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  4. Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument From Evil.Michael Bergmann - 2001 - Noûs 35 (2):278–296.
    Skeptical theists endorse the skeptical thesis (which is consistent with the rejection of theism) that we have no good reason for thinking the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. In his newest formulation of the evidential arguments from evil, William Rowe tries to avoid assuming the falsity of this skeptical thesis, presumably because it seems so plausible. I argue that his new argument fails to avoid doing this. Then I defend that skeptical thesis (...)
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  5. Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure.Michael Bergmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):336-353.
    The question I consider is this: -/- The Question: Can two people–who are, and realize they are, intellectually virtuous to about the same degree–both be rational in continuing knowingly to disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational too? -/- I distinguish two kinds of rationality–internal and external–and argue in section 1 that, whichever kind we have in (...)
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  6. Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil.Michael Bergmann - 2008 - In Thomas P. Flint & Michael C. Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press. pp. 374--99.
    The most interesting thing about sceptical theism is its sceptical component. When sceptical theists use that component in responding to arguments from evil, they think it is reasonable for their non-theistic interlocutors to accept it, even if they don't expect them to accept their theism. This article focuses on that sceptical component. The first section explains more precisely what the sceptical theist's scepticism amounts to and how it is used in response to various sorts of arguments from evil. The next (...)
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  7. Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition.Michael Bergmann - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):399-417.
    Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of internal here? And of which conditions of (...)
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  8.  21
    Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709-727.
    * Editor’s Note: This paper won the Young Epistemologist Prize for the Rutgers Epistemology conference held in 2003.
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  9. Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.
    It’s not implausible to think that whenever I have a justified noninferential belief that p, it is caused by a seeming that p. It’s also tempting to think that something contributes to the justification of my belief only if I hold my belief because of that thing. Thus, given that many of our noninferential beliefs are justified and that we hold them because of seemings, one might be inclined to hold a view like Phenomenal Conservatism, according to which seemings play (...)
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  10. In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy.Michael Rea & Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241.
    Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: ‘If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason’. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued that Michael Bergmann's way of developing the (...)
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  11.  70
    Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 154.
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  12. A Theistic Argument Against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity).Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:357-386.
    Predication is an indisputable part of our linguistic behavior. By contrast, the metaphysics of predication has been a matter of dispute ever since antiquity. According to Plato—or at least Platonism, the view that goes by Plato’s name in contemporary philosophy—the truths expressed by predications such as “Socrates is wise” are true because there is a subject of predication (e.g., Socrates), there is an abstract property or universal (e.g., wisdom), and the subject exemplifies the property.1 This view is supposed to be (...)
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  13. Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution.Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting (...)
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  14. (Serious) Actualism and (Serious) Presentism.Michael Bergmann - 1999 - Noûs 33 (1):118-132.
  15. Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?Michael Bergmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
    This paper is a response to Peter Klein's "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning". After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.
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  16. Externalism and Skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):159-194.
    Internalists and externalists in epistemology continue to disagree about how best to understand epistemic concepts such as justification or warrant or knowledge. But there has been some movement towards agreement. Two of the most prominent rationales for the internalist position have been subjected to severe criticism by externalists: the idea that justification should be understood deontologically and the thought that justification consists in having a reason in the form of another belief. It would not be accurate to say that all (...)
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  17. Religious Disagreement and Rational Demotion.Michael Bergmann - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 6:21-57.
    This paper defends the view that, in certain actual circumstances that aren’t uncommon for educated westerners, an awareness of the facts of religious disagreement doesn’t make theistic belief irrational. The first section makes some general remarks about when discovering disagreement (on any topic) makes it rational to give up your beliefs: it discusses the two main possible outcomes of disagreement (i.e., defeat of one’s disputed belief and demotion of one’s disputant), the main kinds of evidence that are relevant to demoting (...)
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  18. Reidian Externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    What distinguishes Reidian externalism from other versions of epistemic externalism about justification is its proper functionalism and its commonsensism, both of which are inspired by the 18th century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. Its proper functionalism is a particular analysis of justification; its commonsensism is a certain thesis about what we are noninferentially justified in believing.
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  19. A New Argument From Actualism to Serious Actualism.Michael Bergmann - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):356-359.
  20.  46
    Religious Disagreement and Epistemic Intuitions.Michael Bergmann - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81:19-43.
    Religious disagreement is, quite understandably, viewed as a problem for religious belief. In this paper, I consider why religious disagreement is a problem—why it is a potential defeater for religious belief—and I propose a way of dealing with this sort of potential defeater. I begin by focusing elsewhere—on arguments for radical skepticism. In section 1, I consider skeptical arguments proposed as potential defeaters for all of our perceptual and memory beliefs and explain what I think the rational response is to (...)
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  21. Rational Religious Belief Without Arguments.Michael Bergmann - 2012 - In Louis Pojman & Michael Rea (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology. Wadsworth. pp. 534-549.
     
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  22. What’s Not Wrong with Foundationalism.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
    One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism (...)
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  23.  91
    Divine Evil?: The Moral Character of the God of Abraham.Michael Bergmann, Michael J. Murray & Michael C. Rea (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Adherents of the Abrahamic religions have traditionally held that God is morally perfect and unconditionally deserving of devotion, obedience, love, and worship. The Jewish, Christian, and Islamic scriptures tell us that God is compassionate, merciful, and just. As is well-known, however, these same scriptures contain passages that portray God as wrathful, severely punitive, and jealous. Critics furthermore argue that the God of these scriptures commends bigotry, misogyny, and homophobia, condones slavery, and demands the adoption of unjust laws-for example, laws that (...)
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  24.  56
    Externalist Responses to Skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 504--32.
  25. Divine Responsibility Without Divine Freedom.Michael Bergmann & J. A. Cover - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (4):381-408.
    Adherents of traditional western Theism have espoused CONJUNCTION: God is essentially perfectly good and God is thankworthy for the good acts he performs . But suppose that (i) God’s essential perfect goodness prevents his good acts from being free, and that (ii) God is not thankworthy for an act that wasn’t freely performed.
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  26. Deontology and Defeat.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
    It is currently fashionable to hold that deontology induces internalism. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology. I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat---a requirement that many externalists impose on knowledge---guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that (...)
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  27.  93
    Externalist Justification Without Reliability.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):35–60.
  28. Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198-207.
    When one depends on a belief source in sustaining a belief that that very belief source is trustworthy, then that belief is an epistemically circular belief. A number of philosophers have objected to externalism in epistemology on the grounds that it commits one to thinking EC-beliefs can be justified, something they view as an unhappy consequence for externalism. In my 2004, I defend externalism against this sort of charge by explaining why this consequence needn’t be an unhappy one. In the (...)
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  29.  21
    Deontology and Defeat.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
    It is currently fashionable to hold that deontology induces internalism. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology. I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat-a requirement that many externalists impose on knowledge-guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that (...)
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  30. An Exchange on the Problem of Evil.Daniel Howard-Snyder, Michael Bergmann & William Rowe - 2001 - In William L. Rowe (ed.), God and the Problem of Evil. Blackwell. pp. 124--158.
     
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  31.  75
    Bonjour’s Dilemma.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):679-693.
    This paper is a contribution to a symposium on *Epistemic Justification* by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, although it focuses almost entirely on raising problems for BonJour's contribution to that co-authored book.
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  32. Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Free Will Defense.Michael Bergmann - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):462-478.
  33.  9
    Externalism and Skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):159.
    Internalists and externalists in epistemology continue to disagree about how best to understand epistemic concepts such as justification or warrant or knowledge. But there has been some movement towards agreement. Two of the most prominent rationales for the internalist position have been subjected to severe criticism by externalists: the idea that justification should be understood deontologically and the thought that justification consists in having a reason in the form of another belief. It would not be accurate to say that all (...)
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  34.  7
    What’s NOT Wrong with Foundationalism.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161-165.
    One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially-i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism fail.
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  35.  48
    Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Overview and Future Directions.Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain - 2014 - In Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution.
  36.  40
    Bonjour’s Dilemma. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):679 - 693.
  37.  72
    Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism.Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Ordinarily, people take themselves to know a lot. I know where I was born, I know that I have two hands, I know that two plus two equals four, and I also think I know a lot of other stuff too. However, the project of trying to provide a philosophically satisfying account of knowledge, one that holds up against skeptical challenges, has proven surprisingly difficult. Either one aims for an account of justification (and knowledge) that is epistemologically demanding, in an (...)
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  38.  56
    Might-Counterfactuals, Transworld Untrustworthiness and Plantinga’s Free Will Defence.Michael Bergmann - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):336-351.
    Plantinga’s Free Will Defense employs the following proposition as a premise:◊TD. Possibly, every essence is transworld depraved.I argue that he fails to establish his intended conclusion because the denial of ◊TD is epistemically possible. I then consider an improved version of the FWD which relies on◊TU. Possibly, every essence is transworld untrustworthy. I argue that the denial of ◊TU is also epistemically possible and, therefore, that the improved FWD fares no better than the original at establishing the compatibility of God (...)
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  39. Reply to Rowe.Daniel Howard-Snyder & Michael Bergmann - 2003 - In Michael Peterson (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell.
    Preprinted in God and the Problem of Evil (Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. In this article, we reply to Bill Rowe's "Evil is Evidence Against Theistic Belief" in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell 2003).
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  40. Grounds for Belief in God Aside, Does Evil Make Atheism More Reasonable Than Theism?Daniel Howard-Snyder & Michael Bergmann - 2003 - In Michael Peterson & Raymond Van Arrogan (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell. pp. 140--55.
    Preprinted in God and the Problem of Evil(Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. Many people deny that evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. After all, they say, the grounds for belief in God are much better than the evidence for atheism, including the evidence provided by evil. We will not join their ranks on this occasion. Rather, we wish to consider the proposition that, setting aside grounds for belief in God and relying only on (...)
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  41. The God of Eth and the God of Earth.Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower - 2007 - Think 5 (14):33-38.
    Stephen Law has recently argued (Think 9), using a dialogue set on the fictional planet Eth, that traditional belief in God is . Bergmann and Brower argue that theists on Earth should not be convinced.
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  42. Agent Causation and Responsibility: A Reply to Flint.Michael Bergmann - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):229-235.
  43.  46
    Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 2001 - International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):484-486.
  44.  42
    God and Inscrutable Evil: In Defense of Theism and Atheism. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (4):562-569.
  45.  13
    Nathan Ballantyne, Knowing Our Limits.Michael Bergmann - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (2):242-248.
    This is a review of Nathan Ballantyne's book *Knowing our Limits*.
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  46.  51
    Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection.Michael Bergmann - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. pp. 123.
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  47. Temporal Parts Unmotivated Michael С Rea.Darren Belousek Balashov, Michael Bergmann & J. B. Hud Hudson - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):225-260.
     
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  48. A Theistic Argument Against Platonism.Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower - 2006 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 2. Oxford University Press.
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  49.  66
    Reason and Faith: Themes From Swinburne.Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    The past fifty years have been an enormously fruitful period in the field of philosophy of religion, and few have done more to advance its development during this time than Richard Swinburne. His pioneering work has systematically developed a comprehensive set of positions within this field, and made major contributions to fields such as metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. This volume presents a collection of ten new essays in philosophy of religion that develop and critically engage themes from Swinburne's (...)
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  50.  26
    Evil and the Evidence for God: The Challenge of John Hick’s Theodicy. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):436-441.
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