In this article I explore the possibilities of experimentation as a non-foundational praxis for introducing novel ways of being into existence. Beginning with a discussion, following Bataille, of the excess of any thought, I argue that any action in the world is necessarily uncertain. Using the insights of Derridean deconstruction combined with Badiousian truth procedure I argue that experimentation offers a means for acting from this uncertain position. Experimentation takes advantage of the play and uncertainty of our understanding of (...) the world as a means of moving towards more progressive political positions. Normal 0 false false false EN-IE X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-fareast-language:EN-US;}. (shrink)

This E-Special Issue collects together 11 articles from the archives of Theory, Culture & Society. These articles all articulate and debate the contribution of what some have described as either ‘complex complexity’ or ‘general complexity’. In contrast to reductionist or restricted attempts to understand complexity, the articles collected here move away from the tendency to assume mastery of complexity by expounding a set of universal and simple laws. Rather, the position of general complexity is that we cannot grasp the complexity (...) of the world in its complexity, and therefore depend upon models which are always incomplete, provisional and contingent. Yet, these models make knowledge and action possible, and it is therefore the contribution of general complexity to provide the means through which we can ethically and pragmatically engage with complexity in the hope of realizing alternative, perhaps better, worlds. (shrink)

The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency -- the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; (...) some draw from historical sources while others focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action ; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action -oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. Contributors: Fred Adams, Jesús H. Aguilar, John Bishop, Andrei A. Buckareff, Randolph Clarke, Jennifer Hornsby, Alicia Juarrero, Alfred R. Mele, Michael S. Moore, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, David-Hillel Ruben, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Rowland Stout The hardcover edition does not include a dust jacket. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to develop a system of corporate ethics based on an understanding and interpretation of the ethical demand of human beings who are in relation with each other according to Emmanuel Levinas' teachings and the responsibility the human being has to and for herself and others whom she encounters based on Paul Ricoeur's teachings on human action, text and hermeneutics. While the philosophies to which we will be referring may not overtly (...) present a normative ethic, we shall convey them in such a way that is reasonably germane to the development of our system of corporate ethics that would, indeed, demonstrate why (and, perhaps, how in some instances) the human being must act in response to the demand of the other whom she encounters. -/- We must not abandon the discussion as it relates to the economy but rather include it in a broader and more comprehensive dialogue about working to promote, support and protect the human dignity of all people using the advancements of technology to improve the human condition. The broader discussion must include but not be limited to developing a working definition of corporate ethics. To engage in discussions about the economy as an indicator for human success, we must speak openly and honestly about all stakeholders that participate and are affected by the economy. Without forsaking other stakeholders, we find the corporation - the entity whose actions have the farthest reaching and, in some cases, longer lasting impact on the human condition - to be an appropriate point of departure for this endeavor. (shrink)

In _On Human Action and Practical Wisdom_, Yang Guorong offers a description of wisdom and action based on his “concrete metaphysics.” Yang attempts to go beyond the excessively linguistic, logical, and abstract focus found in the American analytic tradition.

In _On Human Action and Practical Wisdom_, Yang Guorong offers a description of wisdom and action based on his “concrete metaphysics.” Yang attempts to go beyond the excessively linguistic, logical, and abstract focus found in the American analytic tradition.

Approaches to the Study of Man In this chapter we shall distinguish two broad approaches to the study of human behaviour, the natural scientific, ...

An Essay on Human Action seeks to provide a comprehensive, detailed, enlightening, and (in its detail) original account of human action. This account presupposes a theory of events as abstract, proposition-like entities, a theory which is given in the first chapter of the book. The core-issues of action-theory are then treated: what acting in general is (a version of the traditional volitional theory is proposed and defended); how actions are to be individuated; how long actions (...) last; what acting intentionally is; what doing one thing by doing another is; what basic action is; and what omitting to do something is. Attention is also given to the concepts of causation, intention, volition, deciding, choosing, and trying. Finally, a libertarian account of free action is tentatively proposed and defended. (shrink)

The essays collected together in this volume, many of them written by leading scholars in the field, explore the commonsensical fact that our presence as..

It seems to have been taken for granted that we all know what a human action is. However in attempting to draw from what philosophers have said about actions the necessary clues as to their distinguishing features, one finds little to discourage the idea that there is no way of distinguishing one category of occurrences, human actions, from the complex of different sorts of things which happen. From this I am tempted to conclude that there is no (...) category of human action. But before drawing such a conclusion an ancient but terrible question must be faced: What sorts of things happen in the world ? This ancient question is faced but not answered. It is brought up because the failure to find a satisfactory answer to the question, Is human action a category? is a failure even to find a satisfactory assumption about what kind of reference the term ?human action? is supposed to have. (shrink)

In the economical changing and political disturbing times we are living a question concerns us all: Is this the society I want to live in? What are the opportunities I have to pursue in my socio-cultural environment? Which echoes the ancient Greek ethical questions: What is the best city to live in? What do I want to do with my live? In this book the author goes back to the primary reality of our lives: human action. From the (...) analysis of the anthropological elements of human action -culture, society, individual action- the book will help the reader to understand the construction of our economic reality and how to approach the perennial ethical question: How can I develop excellence in my life? (shrink)

This book is a philosophical analysis of ordinary concepts like human action and, consciousness, and how they get represented in our language. It examines the philosophical history of the issues that emerge and places the discussion across different paradigms. It brings into contemporary focus some problems like intentionality, relation between mind, body and structure of explanations.

This article explores the thought of Tomasso de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, on grace, justification and merit, situating his position vis-à-vis medieval, Reformation, and modern interlocutors. It examines a wide spectrum of Cajetan's works including his commentary on the Summa theologiae, the controversial work De fide et operibus contra Lutheranos, and his biblical commentaries on Matthew and Romans. It makes the argument that Cajetan preserves a Thomist perspective on grace and human action as they pertain to justification and salvation; (...) that is, Cajetan denies merit to any human action preceding justification but allows for restricted instances of merit for persons in a state of grace. The study examines potentially divergent positions in Cajetan's works and argues for overall consistency. In doing so, it presents Cajetan's thought on doctrinal issues which unfolded during the Reformation and persisted in the modern period. (shrink)

Although Thomas, Scotus, and Ockham are all broadly Aristotelian, their different Aristotelian accounts reflect underlying disagreements in these three areas. These trends may represent a shift from an earlier to a later medieval intellectual culture, but they also reflect views that continued to exist in different schools. Thomists continued to exist alongside Scotists through the end of the eighteenth century, and Ockham’s views had a more varied but continued influence through the modern period. The different views of Thomas, Scotus, and (...) Ockham are not only in themselves plausible attempts at understanding human action, but they formed the background to late medieval and early modern descriptions of human action. (shrink)

WITHIN the current discussion of political theory one of the most prominent voices remains that of Hannah Arendt. Her principal work, The Human Condition, attempts to revive a classical Aristotelian view of human action and politics. Recently we have been posthumously provided with her provocative reconstruction of Kant's political philosophy. Her concern with Kant is none other than to urge Kant as the basis for a revival of an appropriate political theory. Because I am largely sympathetic with (...) what Arendt would have an adequate political theory provide, I contest the appropriateness of Kant for such a purpose. I do not reject Kant out of hand, as for example Alasdair MacIntyre recently did in After Virtue. Nor do I accept, as will be apparent below, his rather standard criticisms of Kant. Yet Arendt gives us the wrong reasons to turn to Kant. (shrink)

Humans are capable of understanding an incredible variety of actions performed by other humans. Even though these range from primary biological actions, like eating and fleeing, to acts in parliament or in poetry, humans generally can make sense of each other’s actions. Understanding other people’s actions is called action understanding, and it can transcend differences in race, gender, culture, age, and social and historical circumstances. Action understanding is the cognitive ability to make sense of another person’s action (...) by integrating perceptual information about the behavior with knowledge about the immediate and sociocultural contexts of the action and with one’s own experience. Scholars are increasingly dissatisfied with monodisciplinary approaches to understanding human action. Such one-sidedness can rest upon various motives. For example, “hermeneutic interpretations” of action understanding tend to emphasize historical and cultural influences while overlooking that ultimately such influences depend upon individual cognitive processes. This has provoked criticism of the corresponding assumption that humans are born as a “blank slate” and that culture is solely responsible for all cognitive contents. However, such critique in turn easily slides into an overemphasis on the biology of human nature and a denial of sociocultural influences on cognition (Pinker, 2003). Fortunately, recent interdisciplinary endeavors have shown that an interdisciplinary approach is preferable when investigating complex functions like action understanding. The purpose of this chapter is to propose a “mechanism-based explanation” of action understanding that will provide a theoretical framework for integrating various and often conflicting disciplinary insights. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that despite undeniable fundamental differences between Descartes’ and Spinoza’s accounts of human action, there are some striking similarities between their views on right action, moral motivation, and virtue that are usually overlooked. I will argue, first, that both thinkers define virtue in terms of activity or freedom, mutatis mutandis, and thus in terms of actual power of acting. Second, I will claim that both Descartes and Spinoza hold a non-consequentialist approach to virtue, (...) by which human actions are evaluated as virtuous or good on the basis of their motivational forces rather than their consequences. I will show further that both philosophers identify virtue qua free action with the highest good, and thus with that which is to be sought for its own sake and not as a means to anything preferable to it. (shrink)

This paper discusses von Wright's theory of causation from Explanation and Understanding and Causality and Determinism in contemporary context. I argue that there are two important common points that von Wright's view shares with the version of manipulability currently supported by Woodward: the analysis of causal relations in a system modelled on controlled experiments, and the explanation of manipulability through counterfactuals - with focus on the counterfactual account of unmanipulable causes. These points also mark von Wright's departure from previous (...) class='Hi'>action-based theories of causation. Owing to these two features, I argue that, upon classifying different versions of manipulability theories, von Wright's view should be placed closer to the interventionist approach than to the agency theory, where it currently stands. Furthermore, given its relevance in contemporary context, which this paper aims to establish, I claim that von Wright's theory can be employed to solve present problems connected to manipulability approaches to causation. (shrink)

This Book is an important study of Barth's theology of human action, arguing that Barth's work cannot be properly understood unless his interest in human agency is fully appreciated. Throughout, Professor John Webster demonstrates the contemporary vitality of the style and content of Barth's theology. Many of the studies introduce posthumous texts by Barth which have so far received little attention (such as his lectures on Calvin and his ethics lectures), but which substantially revise the received views (...) of Barth's thinking about ethics and human action. Developing from the author's earlier study of Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation (CUP, 1995), this book argues forcefully for Barth's work as a whole to be understood as moral theology. (shrink)

If we are to develop efficient, reliable and secure means for sharing information across healthcare systems and organizations, then a careful analysis of human actions will be needed. To address this need, the HL7 organization has proposed its Reference Information Model (RIM), which is designed to provide a comprehensive representation of the entire domain of healthcare centered around the phenomenon of human action. Taking the Basic Formal Ontology as our starting point, we examine the RIM from an (...) ontological point of view, describing how it fails to provide a representation of the healthcare domain which would enjoy the sort of clarity, coherence, rigor and completeness that is claimed on its behalf. (shrink)

John R. Silber; XI—Human Action and the Language of Volitions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 June 1964, Pages 199–220, https://.

This volume brings together this new knowledge in a single, concise source, covering most if not all of the basic questions regarding human action: What are the ...

The religious legitimacy of medical practice was an issue of serious contention amongst medieval Jewish scholars. For Nahmanides, altering the patient's fate through manipulation of natural causality amounts to circumventing divine judgment. For Maimonides, however, human accomplishment is part of God's providential design; this view generally prevails in contemporary Jewish bioethics. But the doctrine of deligitimizing human intervention continues, even while unacknowledged, to underlie certain contemporary positions. These include arguments within Jewish bioethics about end-of-life decisions, which are therefore (...) imbued with inconsistencies. It is suggested that, given the overall endorsement of modern medicine, the Nahmanidean approach must be explicitly confronted. Keywords: euthanasia, Jewish bioethics, Nahmanides, naturalism, nature, Maimonides, providence CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Various theories of moral cognition posit that moral intuitions can be understood as the output of a computational process performed over structured mental representations of human action. We propose that action plan diagrams—“act trees”—can be a useful tool for theorists to succinctly and clearly present their hypotheses about the information contained in these representations. We then develop a methodology for using a series of linguistic probes to test the theories embodied in the act trees. In Study 1, (...) we validate the method by testing a specific hypothesis (diagrammed by act trees) about how subjects are representing two classic moral dilemmas and finding that the data support the hypothesis. In Studies 2–4, we explore possible explanations for discrete and surprising findings that our hypothesis did not predict. In Study 5, we apply the method to a less well‐studied case and show how new experiments generated by our method can be used to settle debates about how actions are mentally represented. In Study 6, we argue that our method captures the mental representation of human action better than an alternative approach. A brief conclusion suggests that act trees can be profitably used in various fields interested in complex representations of human action, including law, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, computer science, robotics, and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Aristotle's theory of human action is an impressive achievement that has served philosophy well for more than two thousand years. In every philosophical era it is explored anew--and with great profit. As a contribution to contemporary efforts in this regard, the present dissertation aims to lay out, lucidly and in detail, the various components of Aristotle's action theory. ;Since actions, according to Aristotle, constitute a sub-class of "the voluntary", the dissertation begins by examining Aristotle's account of voluntary (...) activities. It discusses the chief characteristics shared by all such activities, and compares the Nicomachean and Eudemian accounts. ;Perception is examined next, because percepts and their lingering traces , according to Aristotle, are the triggers of desire. And desire provides the impetus for animal behavior and human action. Aristotle's analysis assumes a rich array of desire-types, including appetites, passions, emotions, and wishes, all of which are analyzed in the dissertation. ;The keys to adult human action--distinguishing it from animal and child behavior--are deliberation, "choice" and the so-called "practical syllogism". The dissertation examines these in some detail and produces a model of the practical syllogism. ;Once the practical syllogism has been examined, the dissertation considers the question of whether Aristotle's theory of action provides a successful resolution of the so-called "problem of free will". It is argued that Aristotle--despite common misconceptions to the contrary--was aware of the problem and had a promising philosophical basis for its solution. (shrink)

A common deflationary tendency has emerged recently in both philosophical accounts and comparative animal studies concerned with how subjects understand the actions of others. The suggestion emerging from both arenas is that the default mechanism for understanding action involves only a sensitivity to the observable, behavioural (non-mental) features of a situation. This kind of ‘smart behaviour reading’ thus suggests that, typically, predicting or explaining the behaviour of conspecifics does not require seeing the other through the lens of mental state (...) attribution. This paper aims to explore and assess this deflationary move. In §1 I clarify what might be involved in a smart behaviour reading account via looking at some concrete examples. Then in §2 I critically assess the deflationary move, arguing that, at least in the human case, it would in fact be a mistake to assume that our default method of action understanding proceeds without appeal to mental state attribution. Finally in §3 I consider briefly how the positive view proposed here relates to discussions about standard two-system models of cognition. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 214 Seiten: 219-229.

CHAPTER ONE Introduction Twenty-five years ago it was pretty widely held among Anglo- American philosophers that it was sheer confusion to suppose that an ...

This book reconstructs in detail the older Stoic theory of the psychology of action, discussing it in relation to Aristotelian, Epicurean, Platonic, and some of the more influential modern theories. Important Greek terms are transliterated and explained; no knowledge of Greek is required.

Human actions have been one of the most discussed topics in the science of kalām since the first centuries of Hijra. Many scholars from different schools of kalām have tried to solve this problem. Efforts to solve the problem have brought different views. In this framework, three main views emerged Jabrī, Qadarī/Muʿtazilī and Salafī/Sunnī. The views of Islamic philosophers were added to these and this number was increased to four. Nevertheless, Sunnī scholars, who agree on the basic propositions, disagreed (...) on the nature of kasb. While there are differences of opinion between Ashʿarī and Māturīdī schools, there are also those who put forward different views among scholars belonging to the same school. Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) and Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), Sadr al- Shrīʿa (d. 747/1346) and Ibn al-Humām (d. 861/1457) are the most obvious examples of this. These views on human actions have been mentioned in their works by scholars of kalām. One of these scholars is Gelenbevî Ismāʿil (d. 1205/1791). In this article, the views on human actions will be examined in the context of Gelenbevî’s work named Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al ʿAqāʾid al ʿAḍudiyya. Gelenbevî makes concise or detailed explanations about the views mentioned in his work with the exception of Ibn al-Humām. In addition, he also mentions the views of al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111). While Gelenbevî mentions these views and the discussions that took place around them, He makes use of his works Ījī’s (d. 756/1355) named Mawāqif, Taftāzānī’s (d. 792/1390) Sharḥ al Maqāṣ̣ıd and Jurjānī’s (d. 816/1413) Sharḥ al - Mawāqif. Gelenbevî states that Ashʿari’s view is middle jabr (jabr al muṭavaṣṣıṭ) and even he is accused of being pure jabr (jabr al- maḫẓ). Based on the concept of partial will (al-irādah al-juzʾiyyah), he says that the views of Bāqillānī and Māturīdī school are the same and states that this view is more successful than Ashʿari’s in explaining human responsibility. This thought indicates that he is closer to the Māturīdī view of human actions than to Ashʿarī. He points out that Isfarāyīnī’s views are open to criticism in some respects. He implicitly states that he does not agree with the idea that Juwayni agrees with the Islamic philosophers. Rather than Muʿtazila’s views, it focuses on whether their views and the views of Islamic philosophers are the same. (shrink)

This paper seeks to unveil and investigate the close bond existing between the critical project developed by Axel Honneth and Hans Joas in Social Action and Human Nature (1980) and John Dewey’s naturalistic humanism and social criticism. I will contend that these authors develop an original and compelling approach to the critique of the social world, which relies on a naturalistic redefinition of human beings with intersubjective premises. By reconsidering human beings in their continuity and discontinuity (...) with nature, they attempt to identify the specific quality of human action with respect to animal behavior and to employ this category as a criterion for the critique of the social world. On the other hand, the paper will underline how Dewey significantly contributes to the outlining of a contemporary critical project with naturalistic premises. Indeed, his naturalistic humanism provides a systematic metaphysics of human experience to ground social criticism, wherein the underdeveloped elements of Social Action and Human Nature’s analysis of human action are better explained and justified from a theoretical point of view. (shrink)

This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of (...) the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally. (shrink)