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  1. Intentional Mind-Wandering as Intentional Omission: The Surrealist Method.Santiago Arango-Muñoz & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - forthcoming - Synthese 199 (3-4):7727-7748.
    Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one’s own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission of control over thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavors.
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  2. What Is the Bearing of Thinking on Doing?Marshall Bierson & John Schwenkler - forthcoming - In Adrian Haddock & Rachael Wiseman (eds.), The Anscombean Mind. Routledge.
    What a person is doing often depends on that person’s thought about what they are doing, or about the wider circumstances of their action. For example, whether my killing is murder or manslaughter depends, in part, on whether I understand that what I am doing is killing you, and on whether I understand that my killing is unjustified. Similarly, if I know that the backpack I am taking is yours, then my taking it may be an act of theft; but (...)
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  3. Responsibility for Acts and Omissions.Randolph Clarke - forthcoming - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility.
    Accounts of moral responsibility commonly focus on responsibility for actions and their consequences. But we can be responsible as well for omitting to act or refraining from acting, and for consequences of these. And since omitting and refraining are not in every case performing an action, an account of responsibility for actions will not apply straightforwardly to these cases. This paper advances proposals concerning responsibility for omitting, refraining, and their consequences. Providing such an account is complicated by the fact that (...)
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  4. Negative Agency.Randolph Clarke - forthcoming - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Agency.
    A comprehensive theory of agency will encompass not just acting but also omitting to act and refraining from acting. Some theorists maintain that a causal theory can be applied to acting, omitting, and refraining in a perfectly uniform manner, for each omission or instance of refraining can be identified with some garden-variety action. Here it is argued that in plenty of cases this strategy fails. Sufficient conditions for omitting or refraining are offered that do not require there to be, in (...)
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  5. What Killed Your Plant? Profligate Omissions and Weak Centering.Johannes Himmelreich - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    This paper is on the problem of profligate omissions. The problem is that counterfactual definitions of causation identify as a cause anything that could have prevented an effect but that did not actually occur, which is a highly counterintuitive result. Many solutions of this problem appeal to normative, epistemic, pragmatic, or metaphysical considerations. These existing solutions are in some sense substantive. In contrast, this paper concentrates on the semantics of counterfactuals. I propose to replace Strong Centering with Weak Centering. This (...)
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  6. Two Problems for the Constitution View of Omissions: A Reply to Palmer.Jonathan D. Payton - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-9.
    Palmer defends the ‘Constitution View’ of omissions. According to this view, every omission is constituted by, though not identical to, some positive event. I argue that Palmer’s version of this view can’t do all the work he wants it to do. First, it can’t provide an answer to the ontological question to which he addresses himself: ‘What kind of thing is an omission?’ Second, it doesn’t give us the resources to determine which positive events serve as the ultimate constituters of (...)
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  7. Is Discontinuity in Palliative Care a Culpable Act of Omission?Ryndes True & Emanuel Linda - forthcoming - Hastings Center Report.
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  8. Environmental Racism: A Causal and Historical Account.Ariela Tubert - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy.
    This paper develops a philosophical account of environmental racism and explains why having such an account is worthwhile. After reviewing some data points and common uses of the term linking environmental racism to the distribution of environmental burdens by race, I argue that environmental racism should be understood as referring to an unequal distribution caused by a history of racism. Environmental racism is thus analyzed in terms of two conditions: first, that environmental burdens and benefits be distributed according to race, (...)
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  9. Semicompatibilism and Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: In Defence of Symmetrical Requirements.Taylor W. Cyr - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):349-363.
    Although convinced by Frankfurt-style cases that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, semicompatibilists have not wanted to accept a parallel claim about moral responsibility for omissions, and so they have accepted asymmetrical requirements on moral responsibility for actions and omissions. In previous work, I have presented a challenge to various attempts at defending this asymmetry. My view is that semicompatibilists should give up these defenses and instead adopt symmetrical requirements on moral responsibility for actions and omissions, (...)
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  10. Much Ado About Nothing: The Mental Representation of Omissive Relations.Sangeet Khemlani, Paul Bello, Gordon Briggs, Hillary Harner & Christina Wasylyshyn - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    When the absence of an event causes some outcome, it is an instance of omissive causation. For instance, not eating lunch may cause you to be hungry. Recent psychological proposals concur that the mind represents causal relations, including omissive causal relations, through mental simulation, but they disagree on the form of that simulation. One theory states that people represent omissive causes as force vectors; another states that omissions are representations of contrasting counterfactual simulations; a third argues that people think about (...)
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  11. Bystander Omissions and Accountability for Testimonial Injustice.J. Y. Lee - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):519-536.
    Literature on testimonial injustice and ways that perpetrators might combat it have flourished since Miranda Fricker’s ground-breaking work on testimonial injustice. Less attention has been given, however, to the role of bystanders. In this paper, I examine the accountability that bystanders may have for their omissions to redress testimonial injustice. I argue that bystander accountability applies in cases where it is opportune for bystanders to intervene, and if they are also sufficiently equipped and able to redress the testimonial injustice. Moreover, (...)
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  12. A Regulative Theory of Basic Intentional Omissions.Philippe A. Lusson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8399-8421.
    The folk picture of agency suggests that human beings have basic agency over some of their omissions. For example, someone may follow through on a decision never to support a political party without doing anything in order to make themselves omit. A number of features appear to signal their agency: the omission is not just called intentional, it is also seen as an achievement and explained in terms of the reasons for the decision. Some philosophers have tried to debunk the (...)
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  13. Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: The Asymmetry Thesis Rejected.David Palmer & Yuanyuan Liu - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1225-1237.
    There is an important contemporary debate in moral responsibility about whether the following asymmetry thesis is true: moral responsibility for actions does not require alternative possibilities but moral responsibility for omissions does. In this paper, we do two things. First, we consider and reject a recent argument against the asymmetry thesis, contending that the argument fails because it rests on a false view about the metaphysics of omissions. Second, we develop and defend a new argument against the asymmetry thesis, one (...)
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  14. Negative Actions: Events, Absences, and the Metaphysics of Agency.Jonathan D. Payton - 2021 - Cambridge University Press.
    Three claims are widely held and individually plausible, but jointly inconsistent: (1) Negative actions (intentional omissions, refrainments, etc.) are genuine actions; (2) All actions are events; (3) Some, and perhaps all, negative actions aren't events, but absences thereof (when I omit to raise my arm, no omission-event occurs; what happens is just that no arm-raising occurs). Drawing on resources from metaphysics and the philosophy of language, I argue that (3) is false. Negative actions are events, just as ordinary actions are. (...)
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  15. Lies of Omission and Commission, Providing and Withholding Treatment, Local and Global Autonomy – There Are Reasons for Clinical Ethicists to Attend to All of These Distinctions.Jonathan Pugh - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 21 (5):43-45.
    Meyers argues that clinical ethicists should sometimes be active participants in the deception of patients and families, whether that involves lies of omission or commission. I shall...
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  16. Habit, Omission and Responsibility.Christos Douskos - 2020 - Topoi 40 (3):695-705.
    Given the pervasiveness of habit in human life, the distinctive problems posed by habitual acts for accounts of moral responsibility deserve more attention than they have hitherto received. But whereas it is hard to find a systematic treatment habitual acts within current accounts of moral responsibility, proponents of such accounts have turned their attention to a topic which, I suggest, is a closely related one: unwitting omissions. Habitual acts and unwitting omissions raise similar issues for a theory of responsibility because (...)
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  17. Causation by Absence: Omission Impossible.Lawrence B. Lombard & Tiffany Hudson - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):625-641.
    In this paper, we argue that, omissions are not events or actions, but rather fact-like entities, and that, insofar as only events and actions can be causes, omissions cannot be causes. Nevertheless, since omissions can, and often do, play a role in the explanations of events, their place in such explanations must be found; and an attempt to find such a place is made.
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  18. Omissions and Their Effects.Martin Montminy - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):502-516.
    According to what I call the identity view, omissions are actual events. For example, the nominal ‘Ali's non-jogging’ denotes whatever Ali is doing at the time she is said not to be jogging. Some have objected that omissions cannot be events, since the two do not have the same causal relations. I show how advocates of the identity view can offer a pragmatic account of the data the objection relies on.
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  19. Vigilance and Control.Samuel Murray & Manuel Vargas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):825-843.
    We sometimes fail unwittingly to do things that we ought to do. And we are, from time to time, culpable for these unwitting omissions. We provide an outline of a theory of responsibility for unwitting omissions. We emphasize two distinctive ideas: (i) many unwitting omissions can be understood as failures of appropriate vigilance, and; (ii) the sort of self-control implicated in these failures of appropriate vigilance is valuable. We argue that the norms that govern vigilance and the value of self-control (...)
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  20. Omissions: The Constitution View Defended.David Palmer - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):739-756.
    Omissions are metaphysically puzzling: Are they something or are they nothing? This paper develops and defends the constitution view of omissions, according to which a correct analysis of a person’s omission has the form “S omitted to X by Y-ing,” where her Y-ing is what constitutes her not-X-ing. The paper explains why the constitution view should be preferred to other views of omissions and defends the view against objections.
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  21. Tekemättä jättämiset vastarintana.Kaisa Kärki - 2019 - In Outi Autti & Lehtola Veli-Pekka (eds.), Hiljainen Vastarinta. Tampere, Finland: pp. 27-54.
  22. Toimijuuden piilevästä puolesta.Kaisa Kärki - 2019 - Ajatus 76 (1):359-365.
    Tarkoitukselliset tekemättä jättämiset ovat osa toimijuutta siinä missä tarkoitukselliset teotkin. Tarkoitukselliset tekemättä jättämiset ovat kuitenkin piileviä toimijuuden ilmentymiä siinä mielessä, että on vaikea ulkopuolisen tarkkailijan näkökulmasta sanoa, jättääkö joku jotakin tekemättä tarkoituksella vai vahingossa. Teon filosofista lähestymistapaa tarvitaan siksi sen selvittämiseen, mitä tapahtuu, kun ihminen tarkoituksella jättää teon tekemättä. -/- Filosofinen työ pystyy erottelemaan tekemättä jättämisiä toisistaan, etsimään niiden välttämättömiä ja riittäviä ehtoja ja sijoittamaan ne osaksi toimijuutemme kokonaisuutta. Käsitteellinen työ auttaa tekemään piilevistä ilmiöistä todellisia antamalla niille nimen. Ontologinen työ (...)
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  23. Investigating the Other Side of Agency: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach to Intentional Omissions.Kaisa Kärki - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Jyväskylä
    This study develops conceptual means in philosophy of agency to better and more systematically address intentional omissions of agents, including those that are about resisting the action not done. I argue that even though philosophy of agency has largely concentrated on the actions of agents, when applying philosophy of action to the social sciences, a full-blown theoretical account of what agents do not do and a non-normative conceptual language of the phenomena in question is needed. Chapter 2 aims to find (...)
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  24. The Ethics of Omission.Gregory Schwartz - 2019 - Think 18 (51):117-121.
    In society, power and responsibility are often linked, supporting the idea that with great power comes great responsibility. I assert that this link between power and responsibility is a form of the Act–Omission Distinction, a principle in ethics that there is a morally relevant distinction between doing something and omitting to do something, e.g. a difference between killing someone and letting someone be killed. As such, using trolleys, elected spider-men, and real-life cases such as R v Stone & Dobinson, I (...)
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  25. Material Contribution, Responsibility, and Liability.Christian Barry - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (6):637-650.
    In her inventive and tightly argued book Defensive Killing, Helen Frowe defends the view that bystanders—those who do not pose threats to others—cannot be liable to being harmed in self-defence or in defence of others. On her account, harming bystanders always infringes their rights against being harmed, since they have not acted in any way to forfeit them. According to Frowe, harming bystanders can be justified only when it constitutes a lesser evil. In this brief essay, I make the case (...)
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  26. I’M Just Sitting Around Doing Nothing: On Exercising Intentional Agency in Omitting to Act.Andrei Buckareff - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4617-4635.
    In some recent work on omissions, it has been argued that the causal theory of action cannot account for how agency is exercised in intentionally omitting to act in the same way it explains how agency is exercised in intentional action. Thus, causalism appears to provide us with an incomplete picture of intentional agency. I argue that causalists should distinguish causalism as a general theory of intentional agency from causalism as a theory of intentional action. Specifically, I argue that, while (...)
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  27. Not Doings as Resistance.Kaisa Kärki - 2018 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (4):364-384.
    What does it mean to intentionally not perform an action? Is it possible to not perform an action out of resistant intention? Is there sufficient language for talking about this kind of behavior in the social sciences? In this article, a nonnormative vocabulary of not doings including resistant intentional omissions is developed. Unlike concepts that describe official, overt, and public resistance, James Scott’s everyday resistance and Albert Hirschman’s exit have made it possible to talk about the resistant inactions of agents (...)
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  28. Reference Fiction, and Omission.Samuel Murray - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):235-257.
    In this paper, I argue that sentences that contain ‘omission’ tokens that appear to function as singular terms are meaningful while maintaining the view that omissions are nothing at all or mere absences. I take omissions to be fictional entities and claim that the way in which sentences about fictional characters are true parallels the way in which sentences about omissions are true. I develop a pragmatic account of fictional reference and argue that my fictionalist account of omissions implies a (...)
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  29. How to Identify Negative Actions with Positive Events.Jonathan D. Payton - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):87-101.
    It is often assumed that, while ordinary actions are events, ‘negative actions’ are absences of events. I claim that a negative action is an ordinary, ‘positive’ event that plays a certain role. I argue that my approach can answer standard objections to the identity of negative actions and positive events.
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  30. Omissions as Events and Actions.Kenneth Silver - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1):33-48.
    We take ourselves to be able to omit to perform certain actions and to be at times responsible for these omissions. Moreover, omissions seem to have effects and to be manifestations of our agency. So, it is natural to think that omissions must be events. However, very few people writing on this topic have been willing to argue that omissions are events. Such a view is taken to face three significant challenges: (i) omissions are thought to be somehow problematically negative, (...)
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  31. Causal Relevance, Permissible Omissions, and Famine Relief.Chad Vance - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):25-47.
    Failures are sometimes, but not always, causally relevant to events. For instance, the failure of the sprinkler was causally relevant to the house fire. However, the failure of the dam upstream to break (thus inundating the house with water) was not. Similarly, failures to prevent harms are sometimes, but not always, morally wrong. For instance, failing to save a nearby drowning child is morally wrong. Yet, you are also in some sense “allowing” someone on another continent to drown right now, (...)
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  32. Omissions and Expectations: A New Approach to the Things We Failed to Do.Pascale Willemsen - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1587-1614.
    Imagine you and your friend Pierre agreed on meeting each other at a café, but he does not show up. What is the difference between a friend’s not showing up meeting? and any other person not coming? In some sense, all people who did not come show the same kind of behaviour, but most people would be willing to say that the absence of a friend who you expected to see is different in kind. In this paper, I will spell (...)
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  33. Omissions, prolifération et proportionnalité : Donald Trump a-t-il causé la mort des plantes ?Kate Blais - 2017 - Ithaque 21:25-46.
    Dans cet article, j’examine la solution que propose Phil Dowe (2010) pour régler le problème de la prolifération causale, qui surgit lorsque la causalité par absence est analysée à la lumière de la dépendance contrefactuelle : si nous acceptons une omission comme cause, nous sommes forcés d’admettre que toutes les omissions du même type le sont également. Dowe prétend pouvoir éviter la prolifération des causes en utilisant le principe de proportionnalité, qui emploie la relation déterminable déterminé, tel qu’on le retrouve (...)
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  34. Ignorance, Revision, and Common Sense.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition. Oxford, UK: pp. 233-51.
    Sometimes someone does something morally wrong in clear-eyed awareness that what she is doing is wrong. More commonly, a wrongdoer fails to see that her conduct is wrong. Call the latter behavior unwitting wrongful conduct. It is generally agreed that an agent can be blameworthy for such conduct, but there is considerable disagreement about how one’s blameworthiness in such cases is to be explained, or what conditions must be satisfied for the agent to be blameworthy for her conduct. Many theorists (...)
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  35. Blameworthiness and Unwitting Omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - In Dana Kay Nelkin and Samuel C. Rickless (ed.), The Ethics and Law of Omissions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 63-83.
    This paper argues that agents can be directly blameworthy for unwitting omissions. The view developed focuses on the capacities and abilities of agents.
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  36. Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: A New Challenge to the Asymmetry Thesis.Taylor Cyr - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3153-3161.
    This paper presents a new challenge to the thesis that moral responsibility for an omission requires the ability to do the omitted action, whereas moral responsibility for an action does not require the ability to do otherwise than that action. Call this the asymmetry thesis. The challenge arises from the possibility of cases in which an omission is identical to an action. In certain of such cases, the asymmetry thesis leads to a contradiction. The challenge is then extended to recent (...)
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  37. Cause by Omission and Norm: Not Watering Plants.Paul Henne, Ángel Pinillos & Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):270-283.
    People generally accept that there is causation by omission—that the omission of some events cause some related events. But this acceptance elicits the selection problem, or the difficulty of explaining the selection of a particular omissive cause or class of causes from the causal conditions. Some theorists contend that dependence theories of causation cannot resolve this problem. In this paper, we argue that the appeal to norms adequately resolves the selection problem for dependence theories, and we provide novel experimental evidence (...)
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  38. The Forgetting of the Penetrable Body: Simone de Beauvoir, Silence, Omission in Jacques Derrida.Norman Roland Madarasz - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):835.
    Jacques Derrida é conhecido por suas tentativas a incluir a perspectiva da mulher no seu trabalho filosófico. Seus esforços receberam o elogio de filósofas, apesar do fato de sua filosofia permanecer marcada pela omissão de qualquer menção ao trabalho de Simone de Beauvoir. O assunto deste artigo não será a mulher, como na conferência de 1972 Esporas, mas o falogocentrismo. Ou seja, a economia, dinâmica e os limites deste conceito enquanto crítica da história, isto é, a história da mentira, termo (...)
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  39. Moral Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions: A New Tracing View.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2017 - In The Ethics and Law of Omissions. New York, NY, USA: pp. 106-129.
    Unwitting omissions pose a challenge for theories of moral responsibility. For commonsense morality holds many unwitting omitters morally responsible for their omissions (and for the consequences thereof), even though they appear to lack both awareness and control. For example, some people who leave dogs trapped in their cars outside on a hot day (see Sher 2009), or who forget to pick something up from the store as they promised (see Clarke 2014) seem to be blameworthy for their omissions. And yet, (...)
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  40. Omissive Implicature.Eric Swanson - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (2):117-137.
    In some contexts, not saying S generates a conversational implicature: that the speaker didn’t have sufficient reason, all things considered, to say S. I call this an omissive implicature. Standard ways of thinking about conversational implicature make the importance and even the existence of omissive implicatures somewhat surprising. But I argue that there is no principled reason to deny that there are such implicatures, and that they help explain a range of important phenomena. This paper focuses on the roles omissive (...)
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  41. Ellipsis in English Literature: Signs of Omission.Miguel Tamen - 2017 - Common Knowledge 23 (3):547-547.
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  42. Omission Impossible.Sara Bernstein - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2575-2589.
    This paper gives a framework for understanding causal counterpossibles, counterfactuals imbued with causal content whose antecedents appeal to metaphysically impossible worlds. Such statements are generated by omissive causal claims that appeal to metaphysically impossible events, such as “If the mathematician had not failed to prove that 2+2=5, the math textbooks would not have remained intact.” After providing an account of impossible omissions, the paper argues for three claims: (i) impossible omissions play a causal role in the actual world, (ii) causal (...)
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  43. Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom.Nathan Hanna - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):251-73.
    The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm says that an event is overall harmful for someone if and only if it makes her worse off than she otherwise would have been. I defend this account from two common objections.
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  44. The Logical Form of Negative Action Sentences.Jonathan D. Payton - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):855-876.
    It is typically assumed that actions are events, but there is a growing consensus that negative actions, like omissions and refrainments, are not events, but absences thereof. If so, then we must either deny the obvious, that we can exercise our agency by omitting and refrainment, or give up on event-based theories of agency. I trace the consensus to the assumption that negative action sentences are negative-existentials, and argue that this is false. The best analysis of negative action sentences treats (...)
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  45. Is There Really an Omission Effect?Pascale Willemsen & Kevin Reuter - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1142-1159.
    The omission effect, first described by Spranca and colleagues, has since been extensively studied and repeatedly confirmed. All else being equal, most people judge it to be morally worse to actively bring about a negative event than to passively allow that event to happen. In this paper, we provide new experimental data that challenges previous studies of the omission effect both methodologically and philosophically. We argue that previous studies have failed to control for the equivalence of rules that are violated (...)
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  46. The Metaphysics of Omissions.Sara Bernstein - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (3):208-218.
    Omissions – any events, actions, or things that do not occur – are central to numerous debates in causation and ethics. This article surveys views on what omissions are, whether they are causally efficacious, and how they ground moral responsibility.
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  47. Negligent Action and Unwitting Omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2015 - In Alfred Mele (ed.), Surrounding Free Will. New York, NY, USA: pp. 298-317.
    Negligence and omission are closely related: commonly, in cases of negligent action, the agent has failed to turn her attention to some pertinent fact. But that omission is itself typically unwitting. A sufficient condition for blameworthiness for an unwitting omission is offered, as is an account of blameworthiness for negligent action. It is argued that one can be blameworthy for wrongdoing done from ignorance even if one is not blameworthy for that ignorance.
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  48. Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal Judgments.Randolph Clarke, Joshua Shepherd, John Stigall, Robyn Repko Waller & Chris Zarpentine - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):279-293.
    Many philosophical theories of causation are egalitarian, rejecting a distinction between causes and mere causal conditions. We sought to determine the extent to which people's causal judgments discriminate, selecting as causes counternormal events—those that violate norms of some kind—while rejecting non-violators. We found significant selectivity of this sort. Moreover, priming that encouraged more egalitarian judgments had little effect on subjects. We also found that omissions are as likely as actions to be judged as causes, and that counternormative selectivity appears to (...)
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  49. Acting to Let Someone Die.Andrew McGee - 2015 - Bioethics 29 (2):74-81.
    This paper examines the recent prominent view in medical ethics that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is an act of killing. I trace this view to the rejection of the traditional claim that withdrawing LST is an omission rather than an act. Although that traditional claim is not as problematic as this recent prominent view suggests, my main claim is that even if we accepted that withdrawing LST should be classified as an act rather than as an omission, it could still be (...)
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  50. Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2015 - Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences 2 (2):243.
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