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  1. Warum Humes Motivationsargument dem Non-Kognitivismus nicht helfen kann.Daniel Eggers - 2024 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 78 (3):361-384.
    In the modern metaethical debate, the term 'non-cognitivism' is often used to describe a claim in moral psychology: the claim that moral judgments are constituted by desire-like mental states rather than beliefs. An argument tradi- tionally employed in defences of non-cognitivism is the 'motivation argument' which can be traced back to David Hume. The motivation argument combines the idea that moral judgments are motivationally efficacious states of mind with the idea that beliefs are incapable of exerting motivational force. The aim (...)
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  2. Character and causation: Hume's philosophy of action.Constantine Sandis - 2018 - New York: Taylor & Francis.
    In the first ever book-length treatment of David Hume's philosophy of action, Constantine Sandis brings together seemingly disparate aspects of Hume's work to present an understanding of human action that is much richer than previously assumed. Sandis showcases Hume's interconnected views on action and its causes by situating them within a wider vision of our human understanding of personal identity, causation, freedom, historical explanation, and morality. In so doing, he also relates key aspects of the emerging picture to contemporary concerns (...)
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  3. Hume and the Unity of Reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2025 - In Scott Stapleford & Verena Wagner (eds.), Hume and contemporary epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Current debates about reasons and reasoning often draw comparisons between epistemic and practical reasons and reasoning and presuppose substantial unity between the practical and epistemic domains. This stance seems to conflict with a stark Humean contrast between the two domains: With respect to practical reasons and reasoning, Hume highlights the role of impressions, especially the passions, in motivating and rationalizing action, while apparently downplaying the potential relevance of beliefs, reason, or reasons. With respect to epistemic reasons and theoretical reasoning, he (...)
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  4. Hume on the Relationship between Emotion and Desire in Explaining Action.양선이 ) - 2018 - Modern Philosophy 11:33-53.
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  5. Hume, Motivation and Morality.John Bricke - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (1):1-24.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME, MOTIVATION AND MORALITY Hume remarks, in the Abstract, that his account of the passions in Book II of the Treatise has 'laid the foundation' (A 7 Ì1 for his theory of morals. Pall Ardal has shown how Hume's theory of certain indirect passions (pride, humility, love, hatred) underpins his theory of the evaluation of character. I propose to explore the links between Hume's account of motivation and his (...)
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  6. La credenza come fondamento dell'attività pratica in Locke e in Hume.Giuseppe Bianca - 1948 - Catania,: Edizioni B.
  7. Hume.Annette C. Baier - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 513–520.
    This chapter contains sections titled: References.
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  8. Hume on Liberty and Necessity.John Bricke - 2008 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 201–216.
    This chapter contains section titled: Necessity Liberty Agency and Responsibility References Further Reading.
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  9. Humeanism about Motivation.Michael Smith - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 153–158.
    This chapter contains sections titled: References Further reading.
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  10. (1 other version)Reason, Passion, and the Influencing Motives of the Will.Mikael M. Karlsson - 2006 - In Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 235–255.
    This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV V VI References Further reading.
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  11. (4 other versions)David Hume and the Concept of Volition: The Will as Wish.Thomas Keutner - 1987 - Hume Studies 13 (2):306-322.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:306 THE WILL AS WISH Hume's theory of action — that the will is the cause of voluntary action — is still one of the main accounts about the relationship of will and action in current discussion. In the following I will first show that Wittgenstein revived Hume's theory in his early philosophy. I will argue that wishing is taken as a model for willing in both Hume's and (...)
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  12. (1 other version)Constantine Sandis, Character and Causation: Hume’s Philosophy of Action (London-New York: Routledge, 2019). [REVIEW]Greco Lorenzo - 2021 - Rivista di Filosofia 112 (1):179-81.
  13. A Reconciliation between Liberty and Necessity : The connection of morality, responsibility, and liberty in Hume`s philosophy.Seong-Min Choe - 2019 - Modern Philosophy 13:49-73.
  14. Hume on the Relationship between Emotion and Desire in Explaining Action.Sunny Yang - 2018 - Modern Philosophy 11:33-53.
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  15. The Active Powers of the Human Mind.Ruth Boeker - 2023 - In Aaron Garrett & James A. Harris (eds.), Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Volume II: Method, Metaphysics, Mind, Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 255–292.
    This essay traces the development of the philosophical debates concerning active powers and human agency in eighteenth-century Scotland. I examine how and why Scottish philosophers such as Francis Hutcheson, George Turnbull, David Hume, and Henry Home, Lord Kames, depart from John Locke’s and other traditional conceptions of the will and how Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart reinstate Locke’s distinction between volition and desire. Moreover, I examine what role desires, passions, and motives play in the writings of these and other Scottish (...)
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  16. Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action by Constantine Sandis. [REVIEW]Angela M. Coventry - 2019 - Ratio 3:32.
  17. La raison pratique existe-t-elle? Examen critique de Hume, Treatise II.iii.3.Daniel Schulthess - 2004 - In Ali Benmakhlouf & Jean-François Lavigne (eds.), Avenir de la raison, Devenir des rationalités - Actes du XXXIXe Congrès de l'ASPLF, Nice, 27 août-1er septembre 2002. Vrin. pp. p. 215-220..
    The article proposes an interpretation of the role of practical reason in Hume. The starting point is the distinction between strong practical reason and weak practical reason. The distinction concerns the assignment of values to states of affairs: strong practical reason is itself involved in this assignment of values, whereas weak practical reason only deliberates on the basis of given assignments. According to the author of the article Hume, showing how our choices are produced from a mechanics of passions, refutes (...)
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  18. Hume, Passion, and Action.Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    David Hume’s theory of action is well known for several provocative theses, including that passion and reason cannot be opposed over the direction of action. In Hume, Passion, and Action, the author defends an original interpretation of Hume’s views on passion, reason and motivation that is consistent with other theses in Hume’s philosophy, loyal to his texts, and historically situated. This book challenges the now orthodox interpretation of Hume on motivation, presenting an alternative that situates Hume closer to “Humeans” than (...)
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  19. Reid on Favors, Injuries, and the Natural Virtue of Justice.Lewis Powell & Gideon Yaffe - 2015 - In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 249-266.
    Reid argues that Hume’s claim that justice is an artificial virtue is inconsistent with the fact that gratitude is a natural sentiment. This chapter shows that Reid’s argument succeeds only given a philosophy of mind and action that Hume rejects. Among other things, Reid assumes that one can conceive of one of a pair of contradictories only if one can conceive of the other—a claim that Hume denies. So, in the case of justice, the disagreement between Hume and Reid is, (...)
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  20. (1 other version)Review of Francis Snare: Morals, Motivation, and Convention: Hume's Influential Doctrines[REVIEW]Henry R. West - 1992 - Ethics 103 (1):166-167.
  21. Hume on Passion, Reason, and the Reasonableness of Ends.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1994 - Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):1-11.
  22. (1 other version)Of Liberty and Necessity. [REVIEW]A. E. Pitson - 2006 - Hume Studies 32 (1):187-191.
    It is possible to distinguish a number of philosophical threads which run throughout Harris’s discussion of the philosophers with whom he is concerned. The following are perhaps the most significant.
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  23. Slaves of the Passions (review). [REVIEW]Melissa Barry - 2010 - Hume Studies 36 (2):225-228.
    In Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder provides a systematic, rigorously argued defense of a Humean theory of reasons for action, taking pains to respond to influential objections to the view. While inspired by Hume, Schroeder makes it clear that he aims to develop a Humean theory, not necessarily one that Hume himself embraced, and for this reason little is said about Hume in the book. One respect in which Schroeder takes himself to be departing from Hume is in developing (...)
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  24. Hume's Moral Sentiments As Motives.Rachel Cohon - 2010 - Hume Studies 36 (2):193-213.
    Do the moral sentiments move us to act, according to Hume? And if so, how? Hume famously deploys the claim that moral evaluations move us to act to show that they are not derived from reason alone. Presumably, moral evaluations move us because (as Hume sees it) they are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. So, it would seem that moral approval and disapproval are or produce motives to action. This raises three interconnected interpretive questions. First, on Hume's account, (...)
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  25. Hume, Reason and Morality. [REVIEW]Alessio Vaccari - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (1):193-195.
  26. Yet Another Look at Cognitive Reason and Moral Action in Hume’s Ethical System.Clarence Sholé Johnson - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Research 17:225-238.
    But for a very recent exception, Hume has generally been thought to deny that cognitive reason plays a distinctive role in morality. The cornerstone of this view has been his notorious remark that reason is and ought only to be the slave of passion and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey passion. But, this remark notwithstanding, Hume’s view about the significance of intention in moral processes suggests that he does assign to cognitive reason a (...)
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  27. Freedom and Moral Sentiment. [REVIEW]Nathan Brett - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (3):659-661.
    In this closely argued book, Paul Russell challenges the standard way of capturing what Hume has to say on the subject of freedom and responsibility. The argument is not, however, one that derives from a narrow interest in discovering what Hume said and demonstrating its divergence from the common view. Russell’s goal is ultimately to use Hume “to shed light on contemporary philosophical problems”. Hume had already discovered, for example, the lesson that Strawson articulated in his critique of compatibilism and (...)
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  28. Hume, Morality, and Skepticism.Simon Blackburn - 2016 - In Paul Russell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This paper defends Hume against contemporary attacks both on his theory of the explanation of action and on his “sentimentalist” account of the nature of morality. It argues that Hume is not committed to untoward claims either about causation or explanation and that his account of morality withstands the assaults made on it by rationalists and intuitionists.
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  29. Hume, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility.Tony Pitson - 2016 - In Paul Russell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter aims to relate Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity to central themes in his philosophy, including causation, the self, the distinction between virtue and vice, and naturalism as a response to skepticism. From this perspective, many points of contact with contemporary discussions of free will and moral responsibility emerge. Hume’s account of moral responsibility, with its implications for the conditions under which ascriptions of responsibility are withheld or qualified, is considered in detail. The notion of agent autonomy is (...)
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  30. Morals, Motivation, and Convention: Hume's Influential Doctrines.Francis Snare - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This 1991 book is about the continuing influence of Hume's ideas on moral and political philosophy. In part, it is a critical exegesis of Hume's most impressive and challenging doctrines in Book III of the Treatise of Human Nature on such topics as morals, motivation, justice, and social institutions. However, the main thrust of the argument is to throw into relief the importance of that discussion for contemporary philosophy. While the author subjects most contemporary defences of Humean doctrines to intense (...)
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  31. A New Worry for the Humean Internalist.Crystal Thorpe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):393-417.
    The Humean internalist finds Humean motivational theses and reasons internalism to be independently attractive. She therefore combines them, in the hope of creating a theory of reasons that is attractive for all of the reasons that each thesis is attractive. On this score, she succeeds. However, there is a drawback. Those who build a theory of reasons by combining Humean motivational theses and reasons internalism face a dilemma. If you combine these views, either you are committed to a theory of (...)
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  32. Trust, risk, and the social contract.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):21-25.
    The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume’s meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.
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  33. Hume on the Normativity of Practical Reasons.Cass Weller - 2013 - Hume Studies 39 (1):3-35.
    In this paper, I argue that Hume accepts two claims. The first is that it is not possible for a human agent, having adopted an end, to remain committed to it, have it in view, and be indifferent to what he or she acknowledges as the proper means of realizing it, where indifference is the absence of a favoring attitude.1 The second is that, other things being equal, an agent who fails through weak resolve to take the acknowledged means to (...)
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  34. Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction.Sophie Botros - 2005 - New York: Routledge.
    Covering an important theme in Humean studies, this book focuses on Hume's hugely influential attempt in book three of his _Treatise of Human Nature _to derive the conclusion that morality is a matter of feeling, not reason, from its link with action. Claiming that Hume's argument contains a fundamental contradiction that has gone unnoticed in modern debate, this fascinating volume contains a refreshing combination of historical-scholarly work and contemporary analysis that seeks to expose this contradiction and therefore provide a significant (...)
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  35. Teoria humeana de la motivació i sentimentalisme.Sergi Rosell - 2010 - Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciència 40:63-73.
    This paper deals with Hume’s main claims on human action and morality. Three connected issues are considered: the so-called Humean theory of motivation, the sentimentalist basis for moral judgment and the consequential motivational internalism. After diagnosing a possible incoherency in Hume’s overall account, due to his aim of overcoming sheer subjectivism and to the resulting Possible Sentiment Problem, I present an alternative picture of the kind of sentiment involved in moral judgment that surmounts this problem and undoes the incoherency.
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  36. How a Modern-day Hume Can Reject a Desire Categorically: A Perplexity and a Theoretically Modest Proposal.Regan Lance Reitsma - 2014 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2):48-66.
    We often treat our basic, unmotivated desires as reason-giving: you’re thirsty and take yourself to have a reason to walk to the drinking fountain; you care intrinsically about your young daughter and take yourself to have a reason to feed and clothe her. We think these desires generate normative practical reasons. But are there basic desires that don’t? It might seem so, for we sometimes find ourselves impelled to do some very strange, and some very awful, things. For example, would (...)
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  37. On Humean Explanation and Practical Normativity.Graham Hubbs - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):78-95.
    If Hume is correct that the descriptive and the normative are “entirely different” matters, then it would seem to follow that endorsing a given account of action-explanation does not restrict the account of practical normativity one may simultaneously endorse. In this essay, I challenge the antecedent of this conditional by targeting its consequent. Specifically, I argue that if one endorses a Humean account of action-explanation, which many find attractive, one is thereby committed to a Humean account of practical normativity, which (...)
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  38. Hume and the Metaphysics of Agency.Joshua M. Wood - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (1):87-112.
    I examine Hume’s ‘construal of the basic structure of human agency’ and his ‘analysis of human agency’ as they arise in his investigation of causal power. Hume’s construal holds both that volition is separable from action and that the causal mechanism of voluntary action is incomprehensible. Hume’s analysis argues, on the basis of these two claims, that we cannot draw the concept of causal power from human agency. Some commentators suggest that Hume’s construal of human agency is untenable, unduly skeptical, (...)
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  39. (1 other version)Critical Notice. [REVIEW]Terence Penelhum - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):81-94.
  40. Humean rationality.Michael Smith - 2004 - In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford handbook of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--92.
    Smith begins by noting the isomorphism between the rational transition to a psychological state from others and the derivation of a concluding proposition from premises in the deductive theoretical realm, and he argues that this isomorphism led Hume to think that the rationality of the psychological transition is to be explained by the deductive validity of the derivation. Generalizing, Smith argues, Hume concluded that the concept of a reason—that is, the concept of a consideration that justifies—must be prior to and (...)
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  41. Action, reason, and the passions.Constantine Sandis - 2012 - In Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume. Continuum. pp. 199--213.
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  42. Hume's Volitions.J. Bricke - 1984 - In V. Hope (ed.), Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment.
  43. David Hume and the Concept of Volition.John M. Connolly & Thomas Keutner - 1987 - Hume Studies 13 (2):275-275.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:275 DAVID HUME AND THE CONCEPT OF VOLITION Introduction The following two papers, though separately authored, belong together, not only because we, the authors, shared our views during the writing, but also because they are excerpts from a single story we are interested in telling. This is the story of a particular insight into the conceptual structure of human volition — the will. The insight is that volition — (...)
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  44. Hume and practical reason: A non-sceptical interpretation.Camillia Kong - 2013 - History of Political Thought 34 (1):89-113.
    It has become increasingly common to interpret Hume as a `sceptic' of practical reason. This means that Hume supposedly contests, not only the ability of reason to provide demonstrable truths, in the conventional rationalist sense, but also reason's ability to guide our practical action. Proponents of this reading include Jean Hampton, Elijah Millgram and Christine Korsgaard. If this `sceptical reading' of Hume is correct, he would lack the philosophical resources to justify his account of political justice. However, if examined further, (...)
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  45. Hume and Humeanism in Ethics.Rachel Cohon - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (2):99.
  46. Hume on the Reasonableness of Human Actions.P. Roy - 1979 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 6 (3):505-515.
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  47. David Hume e a Questão Básica de Critica da Razão Pratica.E. O. C. Chaves - 1977 - Rev. Latinoam. Fil. 2:215-41.
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  48. Because I Believe It’s the Right Thing to Do.Joshua May - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):791-808.
    Our beliefs about which actions we ought to perform clearly have an effect on what we do. But so-called “Humean” theories—holding that all motivation has its source in desire—insist on connecting such beliefs with an antecedent motive. Rationalists, on the other hand, allow normative beliefs a more independent role. I argue in favor of the rationalist view in two stages. First, I show that the Humean theory rules out some of the ways we ordinarily explain actions. This shifts the burden (...)
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  49. (1 other version)Hume on Practical Reason: Against the Normative Authority of Reason.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford University Press.
    In broad outlines, the first of these claims that beliefs and other cognitive states, on their own, can never motivate a new desire, intention, or action. Rather, on this view, what motivates us to desire, intend, or act is always the cooperation of some desire (or other conative state) with such cognitive states. Thus, on HTM, practical motivation is always the product of two fundamentally distinct categories of mental states operating in conjunction with one another.
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  50. Hume and Reid on the Nature of Action.R. F. Stalley - 1998 - Reid Studies 1 (2):33-48.
1 — 50 / 232