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  1. The Physical Action Theory of Trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2015 - Methode 4 (6).
    Metaphysically speaking, just what is trying? There appear to be two options: to place it on the side of the mind or on the side of the world. Volitionists, who think that to try is to engage in a mental act, perhaps identical to willing and perhaps not, take the mind-side option. The second, or world-side option identifies trying to do something with one of the more basic actions by which one tries to do that thing. The trying is then (...)
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  2. Wie fängt (man) eine Handlung an?Geert Keil - 2014 - In Anne-Sophie Spann & Daniel Wehinger (eds.), Vermögen und Handung. Der dispositionale Realismus und unser Selbstverständnis als Handelnde. Mentis. pp. 135-157.
    Das Verb „anfangen“ lässt sich sowohl mit einem Akteur an Subjektstelle als auch subjektlos verwenden. Sogenannte subjektlose Sätze wie „Es fängt zu regnen an“ haben freilich ein grammatisches Subjekt, aber auf die Rückfrage „Wer oder was fängt zu regnen an?“ ist die einzig mögliche Antwort „Es“ unbefriedigend. Das grammatische Subjekt fungiert in solchen Sätzen lediglich als synkategorematischer Ausdruck. Menschliche Akteure können in gehaltvollerem Sinn etwas anfangen, zum Beispiel Streit, oder, wie es bei Kant heißt, „eine Reihe von Begebenheiten“. Mit dem (...)
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  3. Quand Vouloir, c'est Faire [How to Do Things with Wants].Olivier Massin - 2014 - In R. Clot-Goudard (Dir.), L'Explication de L'Action. Analyses Contemporaines, Recherches Sur la Philosophie Et le Langage N°30, Paris, Vrin 30.
    This paper defends the action-theory of the Will, according to which willing G is doing F (F≠G) in order to make G happen. In a nutshell, willing something is doing something else in order to bring about what we want. -/- I argue that only the action-theory can reconcile two essential features of the Will. (i) its EFFECTIVITY: willing is closer to acting than desiring. (ii) its FALLIBILITY: one might want something in vain. The action-theory of the will explains EFFECTIVITY (...)
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  4. Free will and probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.
    The chance objection to incompatibilist accounts of free action maintains that undetermined actions are not under the agent's control. Some attempts to circumvent this objection locate chance in events posterior to the action. Indeterministic-causation theories locate chance in events prior to the action. However, neither type of response gives an account of free action which avoids the chance objection. Chance must be located at the act of will if actions are to be both undetermined and under the agent's control. This (...)
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  5. Intentions, Intentional Actions and Practical Knowledge.Benedikt Kahmen - 2013 - In Markus Stepanians & Benedikt Kahmen (eds.), Critical Essays on "Causation and Responsibility". De Gruyter. pp. 253-270.
  6. Mental acts as natural kinds.Joëlle Proust - 2013 - In Till Vierkant, Julian Kieverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 262-282.
    This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have pre-specified goal contents. For example, one cannot prespecify the content of a judgment or of a deliberation. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental actions. Given these three constraints, mental and bodily actions appear (...)
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  7. Review of 'New Waves in Philosophy of Action' edited by Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff and Keith Frankish. [REVIEW]María G. Navarro - 2012 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 16 (51).
    New Waves in Philosophy, a book collection that stands out for giving a snapshot of research in all areas of philosophy is a successful editorial project addressed by Vincent F. Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard. New Waves in Philosophy of Action is one of its last titles, edited by Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff and Keith Frankish. -/- The book is aimed at the researchers of all fields and readers in general interested in this sub-discipline of philosophy very difficult to (...)
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  8. The exploration of moral life.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, philosopher. Oxford University Press.
    The most distinctive feature of Murdoch's philosophical project is her attempt to reclaim the exploration of moral life as a legitimate topic of philosophical investigation. In contrast to the predominant focus on action and decision, she argues that “what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons. We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being” (AD 293).1 I shall argue that to (...)
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  9. The conflicting aspects of Hugh McCann's theory of action.Damir Čičić - 2011 - Filozofia 66 (9):918.
  10. Human freedom and agency.Thomas Williams - 2011 - In Brian Davies & Eleonore Stump (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas. Oxford University Press. pp. 199-208.
    This paper considers Aquinas's accounts of the end of human action and the structure of human action, examines the debate between intellectualist and voluntarist interpretations of Aquinas, and corrects mistaken accounts of Aquinas's views on freedom, necessitation, and causation.
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  11. Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by E. J. Lowe. [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):820-823.
  12. Rational Action: Reasons, Causes, and Choices.David Redmond - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Missouri, St. Louis
    I argue that agents, by exercising their wills, cause action-results and that volitions or willings are uncaused basic actions. I motivate the existence of volitions by highlighting the important role they play in providing an answer to Wittgenstein's famous question, “What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?” That volitions do not have action-results is central to my argument. This has as a consequence that volitions are (...)
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  13. Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    If a person's head moves, she may or may not have moved her head, and, if she did move it, she may have actively performed the movement of her head or merely, by doing something else, caused a passive movement. And, if she performed the movement, she might have done so intentionally or not. This short array of contrasts (and others like them) has motivated questions about the nature, variety, and identity of action. Beyond the matter of her moving, when (...)
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  14. Volitional Necessity and Volitional Shift: A Key to Sobriety?John Talmadge - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (4):327-330.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Volitional Necessity and Volitional Shift:A Key to Sobriety?John Talmadge (bio)As a long-time amateur student of philosophy, I think my most effective contribution to this discussion of Dr. Rego's paper will be to discuss Harry Frankfurt's ideas from precisely the point of view of the beginner and the novice. After all, I had never experienced the pleasure of reading Frankfurt until reading Rego, so I can hardly be considered proficient (...)
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  15. Intention and Volition.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):175 - 193.
    The volitional theory of human action has formed a basis for a prominent account of voluntary behavior since at least Aquinas. But in the twentieth century the notions of will and volition lost much of their popularity in both philosophy and psychology. Gilbert Ryle’s devastating attack on the concept of will, and especially the doctrine of volition, has had lingering effects evident in the widespread hostility and skepticism towards the will and volition. Since the 1970s, however, the volitional theory has (...)
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  16. The Conative Mind: Volition and Action.Jing Zhu - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo (Canada)
    This work is an attempt to restore volition as a respectable topic for scientific studies. Volition, traditionally conceived as the act of will, has been largely neglected in contemporary science and philosophy. I first develop a volitional theory of action by elaborating a unifying conception of volition, where volitions are construed as special kinds of mental action by which an agent consciously and actively bridge the gaps between deliberation, decision and intentional action. Then I argue that the major skeptical arguments (...)
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  17. McCANN, HJ-The Works of Agency.J. Bishop - 2001 - Philosophical Books 42 (3):232-232.
  18. Agents and Their Actions.Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David & Leopold Stubenberg (eds.) - 2001 - Rodopi.
    IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally (...)
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  19. A Critique of Carl Ginet's Intrinsic Theory of Volition.Beverly K. Hinton - 2001 - Behavior and Philosophy 29:101 - 120.
    This essay presents an analysis in the area of the theory of human action. Philosophers and pschologists are interested in theories of action because action defines those behaviors that are under our control as opposed to behaviors that in some sense just happen. In its wider context, a theory of action has implications for legal reasoning or moral reasoning. Throughout the history of this topic, one of the leading theories of action has been the volitional theory. Volition, in its simplest (...)
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  20. The Works of Agency. [REVIEW]Carl Ginet - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):632-635.
    This book comprises eleven essays in the philosophy of action, six of which were previously published. The book has a fairly extensive index. The essays are arranged in four groups. The first group contains two essays on the individuation of action. The second contains four essays that argue for the view that what makes an event an action is, not how it is caused, but that it is, or begins with, a volition, “an intrinsically actional” mental event. The third contains (...)
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  21. Contemporary Action Theory.Ghita Holmström-Hintikka & R. Tuomela - 1997 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    Contemporary Action Theory, Volume I is concerned with topics in philosophical action theory such as reasons and causes of action, intentions, freedom of will and of action, omissions and norms in legal and ethical contexts, as well as activity, passivity and competence from medical points of view. Cognitive trying, freedom of the will and agent causation are challenges in the discussion on computers in action. The Volume consists of contributions by leading experts in the field written specifically for this volume. (...)
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  22. Subjects of Experience.E. J. Lowe - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...)
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  23. Springs of Action. [REVIEW]Hugh J. McCann - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):979-982.
  24. Review of On Action, by Carl Ginet.Richard Malpas - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):134.
  25. Review of On Action, by Carl Ginet. [REVIEW]Alfred Mele - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):488-491.
  26. Recent Work on Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):199 - 217.
    Central to the philosophy of action is a concern to understand intentional action. Two pertinent questions may be distinguished. What is it to do something intentionally? How is intentional behavior to be explained? Although, ideally, a review of recent work in the philosophy of action would attend equally to both questions, space does not permit my doing justice to both here. I shall focus on the definitional or conceptual issue and examine work on the explanatory issue only insofar as it (...)
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  27. Carl Ginet, On Action Reviewed by.Karl Pfeifer - 1992 - Philosophy in Review 12 (3):196-199.
  28. Carl Ginet, On Action. [REVIEW]Karl Pfeifer - 1992 - Philosophy in Review 12:196-199.
  29. Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action.Myles Brand - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (1):115.
  30. The Inner Event Conception of Action.Emilio Mahdad Kosrovani - 1989 - Dissertation, University of Washington
    Author considers versions of the theory that actions are inner events, either mental or physical in nature, and finds them ill-motivated, sketchy, incomplete, and inadequate.
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  31. Volition and Action.Douglas Odegard - 1988 - American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (2):141 - 151.
  32. Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action.Alan Donagan - 1987 - New York: Routledge.
    This book, first published in 1987, investigates what distinguishes the part of human behaviour that is action from the part that is not. The distinction was clearly drawn by Socrates, and developed by Aristotle and the medievals, but key elements of their work became obscured in modern philosophy, and were not fully recovered when, under Wittgenstein’s influence, the theory of action was revived in analytical philosophy. This study aims to recover those elements, and to analyse them in terms of a (...)
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  33. Actions. [REVIEW]Peter Cataldo - 1985 - New Scholasticism 59 (2):244-245.
  34. Actions.Carl Ginet - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):120.
  35. Hornsby, Jennifer actions. [REVIEW]Jane Heal - 1982 - Philosophy 57:133.
  36. Actions. [REVIEW]James S. Morgan - 1982 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 29:345-348.
  37. Actions.Alfred Louch - 1981 - International Studies in Philosophy 13 (2):93-95.
  38. Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 1980 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    This book presents an events-based view of human action somewhat different from that of what is known as "standard story". A thesis about trying-to-do-something is distinguished from various volitionist theses. It is argued then that given a correct conception of action's antecedents, actions will be identified not with bodily movements but with causes of such movements.
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  39. Theory of Action.Charles Marks & Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (4):634.
  40. Why actions might be willings.Eugene Schlossberger & Ron Talmage - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (2):199 - 203.
  41. theory of action.Lawrence Howard Davis - 1979 - Prentice-Hall.
  42. Volitions and Actions.Michael Martin - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):187 - 190.
    In a recent paper Lawrence Davis has argued that the difference between an arm raising and someone raising his arm is that in the latter case a volition causes the arm to rise. In this paper I will show that Davis's theory is faulty and that certain obvious ways of repairing his theory do not work.Davis proposes the following as an account of Sam's raising his arm: Sam raises his arm if he willed to raise his arm and this caused (...)
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  43. Action Theory.Leon Pearl - 1977 - International Studies in Philosophy 9:111-112.
  44. Volition and basic action.Hugh McCann - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):451-473.
    The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that the bodily actions of men typicaly involve a mental action of voliton or willing, and that such mental acts are, in at least one important sense, the basic actions we perform when we do things like raise an arm, move a finger, or flex a muscle.
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  45. Trying.Brian O'Shaughnessy - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):365-386.
  46. XI—Human Action and the Language of Volitions.John R. Silber - 1964 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64 (1):199-220.
    John R. Silber; XI—Human Action and the Language of Volitions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 June 1964, Pages 199–220, https://.
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  47. Action.Winston H. F. Barnes - 1941 - Mind 50 (199):243-257.
  48. Trying without fail.Ben Holguín & Harvey Lederman - manuscript
    An action is agentially perfect if and only if, if a person tries to perform it, they succeed, and, if a person performs it, they try to. We argue that trying itself is agentially perfect: if a person tries to try to do something, they try to do it; and, if a person tries to do something, they try to try to do it. We show how this claim sheds new light on the logical structure of intentional action, on the (...)
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