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  1. Márgenes del carácter moral en Aristóteles: sueño y bestialidad.Javier Aoiz - 2022 - Ideas y Valores. Revista Colombiana de Filosofía 71 (180):35-57.
    Platón señala en República ix que en todos los seres humanos hay un trasfondo de deseos bestiales que se manifiestan especialmente en los sueños y el sabio logra mantener alejados. El artículo trata de reconstruir la respuesta de Aristóteles a estas tesis a través del estudio de tres tópicos de su filosofía: el concepto de felicidad, la categoría de bestialidad y la etiología de los sueños desarrollada en los tratados sobre los sueños incluidos en Parva Naturalia. -/- Plato points out (...)
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  2. Aristotle on the Purpose of Revenge.Krisanna M. Scheiter - 2010 - In Sheila C. Bibb & Daniel Escandell (eds.), Best Served Cold: Studies on Revenge. Brill. pp. 1-12.
    Aristotle defines anger as a desire for revenge aroused by an intentional and undeserved slight. His remarks on revenge are scattered throughout his corpus causing many commentators to overlook or oversimplify his account of revenge. Stocker and Hegeman, for example, claim that for Aristotle the purpose of revenge is to make the offender suffer and take pleasure in his suffering. David Konstan claims that the purpose of revenge is to restore one’s sense of honour and social status. Both these claims (...)
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  3. Honor, Worth, and Justified Revenge in Aristotle.Krisanna M. Scheiter - 2022 - In Paula Satne & Krisanna M. Scheiter (eds.), Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment. Cham: Springer. pp. 21-35.
    According to Aristotle there may be times when the virtuous person is justified in taking revenge. Many commentators claim that revenge, on Aristotle’s account, aims at restoring the honor and reputation of the avenger, but I will show that this cannot be why the virtuous person seeks revenge. I argue, instead, that the virtuous person seeks revenge when she is slighted in order to prove her worth. Aristotle claims that we slight those we think are neither good nor bad nor (...)
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  4. Why Aristotle’s Virtuous Agent Won’t Forgive: Aristotle on Sungnōmē, Praotēs_, and _Megalopsychia.Carissa Phillips-Garrett - 2022 - In Paula Satne & Krisanna M. Scheiter (eds.), Confict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment. Cham: Springer. pp. 189-205.
    For Aristotle, some wrongdoers do not deserve blame, and the virtuous judge should extend sungnōmē, a correct judgment about what is equitable, under the appropriate excusing circumstances. Aristotle’s virtuous judge, however, does not forgive; the wrongdoer is excused from blame in the first place, rather than being forgiven precisely because she is blameworthy. Additionally, the judge does not fail to blame because she wishes to be merciful or from natural feeling, but instead, because that is the equitable action to take (...)
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  5. Positive Psychology and Philosophy-as-Usual: An Unhappy Match?Josef Mattes - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (3):52.
    The present article critiques standard attempts to make philosophy appear relevant to the scientific study of well-being, drawing examples in particular from works that argue for fundamental differences between different forms of wellbeing, and claims concerning the supposedly inherent normativity of wellbeing research. Specifically, it is argued that philosophers in at least some relevant cases fail to apply what is often claimed to be among their core competences: conceptual rigor—not only in dealing with the psychological construct of flow, but also (...)
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  6. Aristotle on Happiness, Virtue, and Wisdom.Bryan Reece - forthcoming - Cambridge University Press.
    Aristotle thinks that happiness is an activity---it consists in doing something---rather than a feeling. It is the best activity of which humans are capable and is spread out over the course of a life. But what kind of activity is it? Some of his remarks indicate that it is a single best kind of activity, intellectual contemplation. Other evidence suggests that it is an overarching activity that has various virtuous activities, ethical and intellectual, as parts. At stake are questions about (...)
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  7. Silencing, Psychological Conflict, and the Distinction Between Virtue and Self-Control.Matthew C. Haug - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):93-114.
    According to many virtue ethicists, one of Aristotle’s important achievements was drawing a clear, qualitative distinction between the character traits of temperance and self-control. In an influential series of papers, John McDowell has argued that a clear distinction between temperance and self-control can be maintained only if one claims that, for the virtuous individual, considerations in favor of actions that are contrary to virtue are “silenced.” Some virtue ethicists reject McDowell’s silencing view as offering an implausible or inappropriate picture of (...)
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  8. On the Practicality of Virtue Ethics.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-24.
    Using research in social psychology, philosophers such as Gilbert Harman and John Doris argue that human beings do not have – and cannot acquire – character traits such as virtues. Along with defenders of virtue ethics such as Julia Annas and Rachana Kamtekar, they assume that this constitutes a dangerous attack on virtue ethics. I argue that even if virtues and vices did not exist and everyone accepted that truth, (1) we would continue to make attributions of character traits in (...)
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  9. Νóμισμα - Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis von Geld und Wert bei Aristoteles.Sergiusz Kazmierski - 2012 - In Ivo De Gennaro (ed.), Value. Sources and Readings on a Key Concept of the Globalized World. Leiden, Niederlande: pp. 305-329.
    Aristoteles verwendet im Kontext seiner Bestimmung des Geldes in der Nikomachischen Ethik und Politik zwei Ausdrücke, die das ins Wort bringen, was im Deutschen Geld heißt: τὸ νόµισµα und τὰ χρήµατα. Beide Ausdrücke bezeichnen die selbe Sache, das Geld, aber nicht das selbe Geldphänomen. Der Singular auf der einen Seite und der Plural auf der anderen deuten an, worin das Problem der Phänomenalität dieses Phänomens liegt: Es ist die Doppeldeutigkeit dessen, was wir als Geld bezeichnen.
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  10. Dos meios e dos fins: o papel das virtudes na conquista da vida boa.Brunno Alves da Silva - 2020 - Revista Enunciação 5 (1):118-135.
  11. Virtue Habituation and the Skill of Emotion Regulation.Paul E. Carron - forthcoming - In Tom Angier & Lisa Raphals (eds.), Skill in Ancient Ethics: The Legacy of China, Greece and Rome. Bloomsbury Academic.
    In Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, Aristotle draws a now familiar analogy between aretai ('virtues') and technai ('skills'). The apparent basis of this comparison is that both virtue and skill are developed through practice and repetition, specifically by the learner performing the same kinds of actions as the expert: in other words, we become virtuous by performing virtuous actions. Aristotle’s claim that “like states arise from like activities” has led some philosophers to challenge the virtue-skill analogy. In particular, Aristotle’s skill analogy is (...)
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  12. When Aristotelian virtuous agents acquire the fine for themselves, what are they acquiring?Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (4):674-692.
    In the Nicomachean Ethics, one of Aristotle’s most frequent characterizations of the virtuous agent is that she acts for the sake of the fine (to kalon). In IX.8, this pursuit of the fine receives a more specific description; virtuous agents maximally assign the fine to themselves. In this paper, I answer the question of how we are to understand the fine as individually and maximally acquirable. I analyze Nicomachean Ethics IX.7, where Aristotle highlights virtuous activity (energeia) as central to the (...)
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  13. Another Dissimilarity between Moral Virtue and Skills: An Interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics II 4.Javier Echenique - 2018 - In Marcelo Boeri, Y. Kanayama & Jorge Mittelmann (eds.), Soul and Mind in Greek Thought. Psychologial Issues in Plato and Aristotle. Springer. pp. 199-215.
  14. Phainomenon and Logos in Aristotle's Ethics.J. Hatab Lawrence - 2013 - In Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 10-30.
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  15. Mediality and Rationality in Aristotle's Account of Excellence of Character.Mark Mccullagh - 1992 - Apeiron 25 (4):155-174.
    I offer a reading of Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean” that avoids two pitfalls: taking it as truistic, and taking it as involving the bizarre thesis that whenever one acts as reason directs, one’s action is mid-way between some extremes. The crucial point is that while Aristotle denies the existence of useful general ethical truths, he himself offers truths about the *likelihoods* with which rationality will require actions of certain types; and it is with such truths that the statistical idea (...)
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  16. Making a necessity of virtue: Aristotle and Kant on virtue.David O. Brink - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):428-434.
    Recent moral philosophy has seen a revival of interest in the concept of virtue, and with it a reassessment of the role of virtue in the work of Aristotle and Kant. This book brings that reassessment to a new level of sophistication. Nancy Sherman argues that Kant preserves a notion of virtue in his moral theory that bears recognizable traces of the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions, and that his complex anthropology of morals brings him into surprising alliance with Aristotle. She (...)
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  17. Das Ethos der Mesotes. By H. Schilling. Pp. iv + 103. (Heidelberger Abhandlungen zur Philosophic und ihrer Geschichte, 22.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1930. Paper, M. 6. [REVIEW]W. D. Ross - 1931 - The Classical Review 45 (2):88-88.
  18. Family Friendship in Aristotle’s Ethics.Elizabeth Belfiore - 2001 - Ancient Philosophy 21 (1):113-132.
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  19. What It Takes to be Great: Aristotle and Aquinas on Magnaminity.David A. Horner - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (4):415-444.
    The revival of virtue ethics is largely inspired by Aristotle, but few---especially Christians---follow him in seeing virtue supremely exemplified in the “magnanimous” man. However, Aristotle raises a matter of importance: the character traits and type of psychological stance exemplified in those who aspire to acts of extraordinary excellence. I explore the accounts of magnanimity found in both Aristotle and Aquinas, defending the intelligibility and acceptability of some central elements of a broadly Aristotelian conception of magnanimity. Aquinas, I argue, provides insight (...)
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  20. A Great Philosopher's Not So Great Account of Great Virtue: Aristotle's Treatment of Greatness of Soul'.Howard J. Curzer - 1990 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):517-537.
    Once again it is becoming fashionable to ask ‘What character traits are virtues?’ Naturally, it behooves us to try to recapture the insights of our predecessors, as well as forging ahead on our own. In this paper I shall examine one such insight.
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  21. Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean. [REVIEW]Paul Schollmeier - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (3):610-613.
    The ancient Greeks present a moral outlook which is not without considerable difficulty for contemporary philosophers. This difficulty has origins which may go back as far as the Renaissance, but we can surely trace its sources at least to Descartes. We tend to think that we had best use a moral theory to address problems of morality. What better way to determine how we ought to conduct ourselves than to define, once and for all, some basic principles of action! If (...)
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  22. Review of Howard J. Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues. [REVIEW]Marta Jimenez - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (04).
  23. Modern Greatness of Soul in Hume and Smith.Andrew J. Corsa - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    I contend that Adam Smith and David Hume offer re-interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of greatness of soul, focusing on the kind of magnanimity Aristotle attributes to Socrates. Someone with Socratic magnanimity is worthy of honor, responds moderately to fortune, and is virtuous—just and benevolent. Recent theorists err in claiming that magnanimity is less important to Hume’s account of human excellence than benevolence. In fact, benevolence is a necessary ingredient for the best sort of greatness. Smith’s “Letter to Strahan” attributes this (...)
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  24. In Philosophia, Quæmoralis Dicitur, Tractanda, Quæam Sit Præipue Aristotelicædisciplinævirtus? Dissertatio Latina Cancellari Præio Dignata Et in Theatro Oxoniensi Habita, Die Jun. Viimo. 1815.Charles Daubeny - 1815 - [Printed by S. Collingwood].
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  25. Aristotele e le virtù sociali: EN IV, 1126b 1-1128b 9.María Silvia Vaccarezza - 2012 - Acta Philosophica 21 (2):309 - 336.
    In EN II, 1108 9-1108 b10 e più estesamente in EN IV, 1126b 10-1128b 9 Aristotele analizza tre virtù (amichevolezza, sincerità e arguzia) che, coinvolgendo il linguaggio e il senso dell’umorismo, riguardano quell’aspetto fondamentale della natura umana che è la socialità, al punto che pare giustificato l’utilizzo dell’etichetta “virtù sociali” per riferirsi ad esse. Tali virtù, infatti, rappresentano le eccellenze nell’ambito dei rapporti sociali non connotati da affetto e amicizia, ma caratterizzati da un legame ben definito, sufficiente a giustificare l’emergere (...)
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  26. Le Ragioni Del Contingente: La Saggezza Pratica Tra Aristotele E Tommaso D'Aquino.Maria Silvia Vaccarezza - 2012 - Orthotes.
    Questo lavoro è diviso in due parti: una monografica in cui viene indagata l’autentica posizione aristotelica in merito allo statuto della phronesis e della conoscenza morale, e l'altra in cui si offre una nuova traduzione del VI libro ...
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  27. Mencius' Jun-zi, Aristotle's megalopsuchos, & moral demands to help the global poor.Sean Walsh - 2013 - Comparative Philosophy 4 (1):103-129.
    Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE Normal 0 false false false EN-US ZH-TW X-NONE It is commonly believed that impartial utilitarian moral theories have significant demands that we help the global poor, and that the partial virtue ethics of Mencius and Aristotle do not. This ethical partiality found in these virtue ethicists has been criticized, and some have suggested that the partialistic virtue ethics of Mencius and Aristotle are parochial (i.e., overly narrow in their scope of concern). I (...)
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  28. Affective conflict and virtue: Hume's answer to Aristotle.Kate Abramson - 2013 - In Jon Miller (ed.), The Reception of Aristotle's Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
  29. Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle.A. W. Price - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    A.W. Price explores the views of Plato and Aristotle on how virtue of character and practical reasoning enable agents to achieve eudaimonia--the state of living or acting well. He provides a full philosophical analysis and argues that the perennial question of action within human life is central to the reflections of these ancient philosophers.
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  30. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Books Ii--Iv: Translated with an Introduction and Commentary.C. C. W. Taylor (ed.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume, which is part of the Clarendon Aristotle Series, offers a clear and faithful new translation of Books II to IV of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, accompanied by an analytical commentary focusing on philosophical issues. In Books II to IV, Aristotle gives his account of virtue of character in general and of the principal virtues individually, topics of central interest both to his ethical theory and to modern ethical theorists. Consequently major themes of the commentary are connections on the one (...)
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  31. Mεγαλοπρέπεια and Mεγαλοψυχία in Aristotle.J. Cook Wilson - 1902 - The Classical Review 16 (04):203-.
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  32. Functionalism and the Moral Virtues in Aristotle’s Ethics.Michael J. White - 1979 - International Studies in Philosophy 11:49-57.
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  33. ‘Virtue Makes the Goal Right.Jessica Moss - 2011 - Phronesis 56 (3):204-261.
    Aristotle repeatedly claims that character-virtue “makes the goal right“, while Phronesis is responsible for working out how to achieve the goal. Many argue that these claims are misleading: it must be intellect that tells us what ends to pursue. I argue that Aristotle means just what he seems to say: despite putative textual evidence to the contrary, virtue is (a) a wholly non-intellectual state, and (b) responsible for literally supplying the contents of our goals. Furthermore, there are no good textual (...)
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  34. Moral Knowledge and the Acquisition of Virtue in Aristotle's "Nicomachean" and "Eudemian Ethics".Alex John London - 2001 - Review of Metaphysics 54 (3):553 - 583.
    IN BOTH THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS AND THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Aristotle says that the aim of ethical inquiry is a practical one; we want to know what virtue is so that we may become good ourselves and thereby do well and be happy. By classifying ethical inquiry as a practical endeavor, Aristotle is rejecting a view that he attributes to Socrates according to which ethics is a kind of theoretical science. In theoretical sciences, such as geometry or astronomy, the knowledge of (...)
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  35. Does Aristotle Have a Consistent Account of Vice?Thomas C. Brickhouse - 2003 - Review of Metaphysics 57 (1):3 - 23.
    HOW ARE WE TO UNDERSTAND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VICE in Aristotle’s ethics? As many commentators have noted, it is by no means obvious that Aristotle’s scattered remarks about vice really add up to a coherent account. In several places Aristotle clearly assigns the leading role in the explanation of vicious action to reason. We see this, for example, in the unequivocal claim that acts expressing intemperance are “in accordance with choice”. This is important, in part because it provides a basis (...)
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  36. The Unity of the Moral Virtues in Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics".Elizabeth Telfer - 1990 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90:35 - 48.
    Elizabeth Telfer; III*—The Unity of the Moral Virtues in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 90, Issue 1, 1 June 19.
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  37. Aristotle's Crowning Virtue.Neil Cooper - 1989 - Apeiron 22 (3):191 - 205.
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  38. The Practical Import of Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean.J. E. Tiles - 1992 - Apeiron 25 (4):1 - 14.
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  39. Contemplation, the Noble, and the Mean: The Standard of Moral Virtue in Aristotle's Ethics.Thomas Tuozzo - 1992 - Apeiron 25 (4):129 - 154.
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  40. Aristotle's 'Nameless' Virtues.Paula Gottlieb - 1994 - Apeiron 27 (1):1 - 15.
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  41. Aristotle on Habituation.Nathan Bowditch - 2008 - Ethical Perspectives 15 (3):309-342.
    This paper explores Aristotle ’s discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics of the relation between the rational and nonrational parts of the soul to make sense of his claim that “we cannot be fully good without prudence [practical wisdom], or prudent without virtue of character.” The significance of this interpretive project for an understanding of the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole cannot be understated. While Aristotle ’s conception of human excellence clearly incorporates both cognitive and conative capacities – which he calls (...)
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  42. Aristotle on Dividing the Soul and Uniting the Virtues.Paula Gottlieb - 1994 - Phronesis 39 (3):275-290.
  43. What is “the mean relative to us” in Aristotle's Ethics?”.Lesley Brown - 1997 - Phronesis 42 (1):77-93.
  44. How to Distinguish Aristotle's Virtues.Marguerite Deslauriers - 2002 - Phronesis 47 (2):101-126.
    This paper considers the distinctions Aristotle draws (1) between the intellectual virtue of "phronêsis" and the moral virtues and (2) among the moral virtues, in light of his commitment to the reciprocity of the virtues. I argue that Aristotle takes the intellectual virtues to be numerically distinct hexeis from the moral virtues. By contrast, I argue, he treats the moral virtues as numerically one hexis, although he allows that they are many hexeis 'in being'. The paper has three parts. In (...)
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  45. Aristotelian Piety.Sarah Broadie - 2003 - Phronesis 48 (1):54-70.
    Aristotle seems to omit discussing the virtue piety. Such an omission should surprise us. Piety is not covertly dealt with under the more general heading of justice, nor under that of philia. But piety does make a veiled appearance at NE X.8, 1179a22-32. Many interpreters have refused to take this passage seriously, but this is shown to be a mistake.
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  46. The price of virtue.Anne Margaret Baxley - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4):403–423.
    Aristotle famously held that there is a crucial difference between the person who merely acts rightly and the person who is wholehearted in what she does. He captures this contrast by insisting on a distinction between continence and full virtue. One way of accounting for the important difference here is to suppose that, for the genuinely virtuous person, the requirements of virtue "silence" competing reasons for action. I argue that the silencing interpretation is not compelling. As Aristotle rightly saw, virtue (...)
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  47. Man as a Moral Agent in Aristotle.Mårten Ringbom - 2002 - Societas Philosophica Fennica.
  48. Aristotle’s Internalism in the Nicomachean Ethics.Caj Strandberg - 2000 - Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (1):71-87.
  49. Book review: Lorraine Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the philosophy of friendship. [REVIEW]Markus Woerner - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):461-463.
Aristotle: Friendship
  1. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics on the Sameness of Friendship and Justice.Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim - forthcoming - Apeiron.
    In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that friendship and justice are the same, apparently flouting the not uncommon contrast between friendship and justice. I start by assessing Aristotle’s principle of equality: friends of equal standing engage in exact reciprocity in goods and friends of unequal standing engage in proportional reciprocity. In a number of ways that have gone unnoticed, the equalization principle is a requirement for understanding the sameness of friendship and justice. Just relations and friendship share the same domain, (...)
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