Aristotle's Works in Ethics

This work presents the Nicomachean Ethics in a fresh English translation by Christopher Rowe that strives to be meticulously accurate yet also accessible. The translation is accompanied by Sarah Broadie's detailed line-by-line commentary, which brings out the subtlety of Aristotle's thought asit develops from moment to moment. In addition, a substantial introductory section features a thorough examination of the text's main themes and interpretative problems and also provides preambles to each of the ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics. An indispensable (...) resource for students approachingthe Nicomachean Ethics for the first time, this detailed treatment is ideal for courses in classical or ancient philosophy, the philosophy of Aristotle, and ethics. (shrink)

C. C. W. Taylor presents a clear and faithful new translation of one of the most famous and influential texts in the history of Western thought, accompanied by an analytical and critical commentary focusing on philosophical issues. In Books II to IV of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle gives his account of virtue of character, which is central to his ethical theory as a whole and a key topic in much modern ethical writing.

El artículo propone una serie de comentarios a propósito de la noción de Phrónesis, el carácter del estudio es introductorio y prevé esclarecer considerandos aristotélicos respecto a la noción, librándola de interpretaciones erróneas.

Happiness, then, is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world.'In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle's guiding question is: what is the best thing for a human being? His answer is happiness, but he means, not something we feel, but rather a specially good kind of life. Happiness is made up of activities in which we use the best human capacities, both ones that contribute to our flourishing as members of a community, and ones that allow us to engage (...) in god-like contemplation. Contemporary ethical writings on the role and importance of the moral virtues such as courage and justice have drawn inspiration from this work, which also contains important discussions on responsibility for actions, on the nature of practical reasoning, and on friendship and its role in the best life. This new edition retains David Ross's justly admired translation while updating certain key terms. It also includes a valuable introduction to this seminal work, and notes designed to elucidate Aristotle's arguments. (shrink)

Critical edition of the Arabic Nicomachean Ethics including an introduction on the influence of this major Aristotelian work on Arabic literature, as well as an annotated English translation, both by the late Douglas M. Dunlop.

Aristotle on Practical Wisdom is the first full-scale commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VI to be issued in a century, and the most illuminating ever. A meticulous translation with facing-page analysis enables readers to engage directly with Aristotle's account, while the lucid introduction locates it in the context of his—and later—ethical thought.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle examines the nature of happiness, which he defines as a specially good kind of life. He considers the nature of practical reasoning, friendship, and the role and importance of the moral virtues in the best life. This new edition features a revised translation and valuable new introduction and notes.

This volume, which is part of the Clarendon Aristotle Series, offers a clear and faithful new translation of Books II to IV of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, accompanied by an analytical commentary focusing on philosophical issues. In Books II to IV, Aristotle gives his account of virtue of character in general and of the principal virtues individually, topics of central interest both to his ethical theory and to modern ethical theorists. Consequently major themes of the commentary are connections on the one (...) hand with other relevant Aristotelian texts and on the other with modern writings, both text-related and thematic. -/- Since the main aim of the volume is to make Aristotle's thought as accessible as possible to readers who do not know Greek, considerable care is taken to elucidate both his technical vocabulary and significant features of his Greek idiom. C. C. W. Taylor also provides systematic comparisons with other translations into English and other languages, and frequent references to other commentaries, ancient, medieval, and modern. These features make the work useful to other scholars in the field as well as to students of philosophy, both undergraduate and graduate. -/- In view of the widespread contemporary interest in the topic of virtue, the volume should appeal to students of ethics (even those hitherto unacquainted with ancient thought) and to any reader who is concerned to see how fundamental questions of life and conduct were approached in a culture significantly different from our own. (shrink)

Michael Pakaluk presents the first systematic study in English of Books VIII and IX of Aristotle's masterpiece of moral philosophy, the Nicomachean Ethics; these books comprise one of the most famous of all discussions of friendship. Pakaluk accompanies his fresh and accurate translation with a philosophical commentary which unfolds lucidly the various arguments in the text, assuming no knowledge of Greek on the part of the reader.

ABSTRACT: This is a little piece directed at the newcomer to Aristotle, making some general remarks about reading Aristotle at the beginning and end, with sandwiched in between, a brief and much simplified discussion of some common misunderstandings of Aristotle's philosophy, concerning spontaneity, causal indeterminism, freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice, agent causation, logical determinism, teleological determinism, artistic creativity and freedom (eleutheria).

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Aristotle's celebrated work setting forth his system of moral philosophy is preceded by a survey of his life, writings, and understanding of ethics.

In his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Nicole Oresme raises a question that he is apparently the first to ask in these terms, in such a context: do all beings have the desire to persevere into being? Before him, this question is not found in any of the medieval commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics. But after him it became canonical until at least the 16th century, since it can be found in Pietro Pomponazzi’s works for example. The novelty here consists in questioning (...) the validity of Averroes’ thesis, in his own commentary on the Physics, according to which all beings have the desire to persist into being, using the Augustinian analysis of voluntary death and suicide. How can we explain that one can freely put an end to his days if he is naturally inclined by a desire for life and even for eternity? Oresme’s solution consists in justifying not only the possibility, but also the moral obligation to accept death under certain conditions. In most cases, we do not really want to die. The desperate man wishes to cancel his misfortune and the heroic man who sacrifices himself for his country wishes to immortalize himself in the memory of other men. From a moral point of view, Nicole Oresme justifies only one case of voluntary death: that of individual sacrifice for the common good. The aim of this paper is to analyze precisely this important turning point in the long history of the notion of conatus in the West by comparing this quaestio from the commentary on the Physics with the glosses that accompany the French translation of the Nicomachean Ethics realised by Oresme at the court of Charles V. (shrink)

근세 이후 자연과학과 사회과학의 눈부신 발달에 힘입어 쾌락을 생리학적으로 이해하거나 심리학적으로 이해하는 경향이 심화되어 왔다. 그 결과 쾌락의 인문학적 의미는 거의 망각되고 말았다. 본 논문의 목적은 아리스토텔레스의 『니코마코스 윤리학』을 중심으로 ‘쾌락’의 개념을 해명하면서 쾌락이라는 주제가 현대인에게 던지는 인문학적 의미를 성찰하는 것이다. 아리스토텔레스의 관점에서 보면, 무절제한 사람은 먹고 마시는 활동에 탐닉할 때 먹고 마시는 활동 그 자체를 즐기고 있는 것이 아니라 그러한 활동이 산출해 내는 유쾌한 느낌을 즐긴다. 예를 들어 알코올중독자나 섹스중독자는 음주 활동이나 섹스 활동 그 자체를 즐기는 것이 아니라 만취상태에서의 (...) 몽롱함이나 성적 관계를 통한 황홀함을 즐길 뿐이다. 다시 말해서 알코올중독자나 섹스중독자는 음주를 매개로하여 즐거운 대화를 나누거나 섹스를 통하여 사랑하는 사람과 인격적으로 교류하고 사회적 책임을 약속하는 것을 즐기지 않는다. 육체적 정신적 활동의 결과로서 주어지는 유쾌한 느낌이 아니라 활동 그 자체에 일종의 부산물로서 수반되는 유쾌한 느낌이 진정한 의미의 쾌락이며, 활동이 완전하게 수행될 수 있도록 하기 위하여 쾌락이 존재한다는 아리스토텔레스의 쾌락설은 철학적으로 매우 유명한 학설이다. 우리 모두 아리스토텔레스를 통해서 쾌락의 진정한 의미를 인문학적 차원에서 다시 한 번 되새겨 볼 필요가 있다. (shrink)

This chapter approaches the question of biopolitics in ancient political thought looking not at specific political techniques but at notions of the final aim of the political community. It argues that the “happiness” (eudaimonia, beatitudo) that constitutes the greatest human good in the tradition from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas is not a “biopolitical” ideal, but rather a metabiopolitical one, consisting in a contemplative activity situated above and beyond the biological and the political. It is only with Thomas Hobbes that civic (...) happiness becomes “biopolitically” identified with simple survival; for modernity, as Hannah Arendt puts it, mere being alive becomes the greatest human good, and happiness is understood as a subjective “quality of life.” In both models, the political realm is a means to an end. Arendt draws our attention to a neglected third alternative to both the classical/metabiopolitical and the modern/biopolitical ideals: “public happiness” consisting in political participation itself. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss in detail one of the first conclusions drawn by Aristotle in the ergonargument. The paper provides an in-depth approach to Nicomachean Ethics’ lines 1098a3-4, where one reads: “λείπεταιδὴπρακτικήτιςτοῦλόγονἔχοντος”. I divide the discussion into two parts. In the first part, I put under scrutiny how one should take the word “πρακτική” and argue that one should avoid taking this word as meaning “practical” in the passage. I will argue in favor of taking it as meaning “active”. (...) The exegetical inconvenience of taking “πρακτική” as meaning “practical” is the fact that it restricts the results achieved in the ergonargument by excluding the possibility of contemplation being considered a eudaimonlife. In the second part, I discuss the expression “λόγονἔχον” and provide some arguments to take it as preliminarily introducing the criterion of division of the virtues that will be spelled out in ENI.13 so that the λόγον-ἔχονpart of the soul here also makes reference to thevirtue of the non-rational part, i.e., virtue of character. I offer a deflationary view by showing that the moral psychology is developed in ENI.7 within the limits imposed by the ergonargument. (shrink)

Many scholars have argued that the Protestant Reformation generally departed from virtue ethics, and this claim is often accepted by Protestant ethicists. This essay argues against such discontinuity by demonstrating John Calvin’s reception of ethical concepts from Augustine and Aristotle. Calvin drew on Augustine’s concept of eudaimonia and many aspects of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , including concepts of choice, habit, virtue as a mean, and the specific virtues of justice and prudence. Calvin also evaluated the problem of pagan virtue in (...) light of traditional Augustinian texts discussed in the medieval period. He interpreted the Decalogue as teaching virtue, including the cardinal virtues of justice and temperance. Calvin was not the harbinger of an entirely new ethical paradigm, but rather a participant in the mainstream of Christian thinkers who maintained a dual interest in Aristotelian and Augustinian eudaimonist virtue ethics. (shrink)

RESUMO O escopo da pesquisa é a análise de 1142b 17-28 da “Ética Nicomaqueia”, trecho em que Aristóteles disserta sobre a correção, tendo em vista que a boa deliberação é uma espécie de correção. A passagem não é clara e sugere que: i) na boa deliberação, a moralidade restringe-se aos fins, cabendo aos meios apenas a característica de serem eficazes na obtenção dos fins; ou que ii) na boa deliberação, a moralidade recai sobre meios e sobre fins pois, com a (...) expressão “usar os meios corretos na obtenção do fim”, Aristóteles estaria incluindo o critério moral dos meios como condição necessária à boa deliberação. Opto por “i)” e defendo que a boa deliberação consiste tão somente em uma habilidade exitosa na obtenção de um fim bom, habilidade que leva em conta o que é melhor, mais fácil, mais eficaz, feita em tempo oportuno. ABSTRACT The scope of research is the analysis of “Nicomachean Ethics”, section 1142b 17-28, a passage in which Aristotle discusses the correction, since good deliberation is a kind of correction. The passage is not clear and suggests that: i) in good deliberation, morality is restricted to the ends, the means having only the characteristic of being effective in attaining the ends; or that ii) in good deliberation, morality pertains to means and ends since, in the expression "to use the right means in obtaining the end", Aristotle seems to include the moral criterion of means as a necessary condition for good deliberation. I opt for “i)” and argue that good deliberation consists only in a successful ability to attain a good end, a skill that takes into account what is better, easier, more effective, done in a timely manner. (shrink)

This page is a dedication to Aristotle on his 2400th Birth Anniversary by Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdiscipliary Studies (CPPIS) Pehowa (Kurukshetra) .

The Middle Included is a systematic exploration of the meanings of logos throughout Aristotle’s work. It claims that the basic meaning is “gathering,” a relation that holds its terms together without isolating them or collapsing one to the other. This meaning also applies to logos in the sense of human language. Aristotle describes how some animals are capable of understanding non-firsthand experience without being able to relay it, while others relay it without understanding. Aygün argues that what distinguishes human language, (...) for Aristotle, is its ability to both understand and relay firsthand and non-firsthand experiences. This ability is key to understanding the human condition: science, history, news media, propaganda, gossip, utopian fiction, and sophistry, as well as philosophy. Ömer Aygün finds Aristotle’s name for this peculiar but crucial human ability of “gathering” both experiences is logos, and this leads to a claim about the specificity of human rationality and language. (shrink)

O artigo tem por objetivo mostrar que, ao contrário do que muitos parecem ainda acreditar, a filosofia aristotélica reconhece a possibilidade de um conflito prático genuíno entre a busca do bem individual e a busca do bem da comunidade política por parte de um mesmo indivíduo. As conclusões alcançadas são puramente negativas. Este artigo terá cumprido o seu objetivo se contribuir para despertar no leitor o reconhecimento do problema e da necessidade de investigações ulteriores.

In this article, I present an interpretation of Aristotle’s thought regarding the normative value of friendship duties.The argument is divided in VII sections. In Section I, I provide brief summaries of the main arguments defended by me in a previous article about the normative consequences of virtue and utility friendships in Aristotle, the objectives that are to be defended in this article and of the conclusions that I take them to support. In section II, I offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s (...) thought regarding the normative value of friendship duties in cases where there is no practical conflict between friendship duties. In section III, I outline Aristotle’s theory about how we should deal with cases where there is such practical conflict. In the next sections, I analyze three other passages of the Aristotelian corpus where we have good reason to think that this kind of conflict appears, namely, NE, III 1, 1110a20-29 (IV), Pol., III 10, 1286b23-28 (V) and Pol., VII 9, 1330a9-25 (VI), in order to flesh out the outline presented in section III. In section VII I conclude with a summary of the argument. (shrink)

While Aristotle is often lauded, especially by virtue ethicists, for his focus on and insight into virtue, a central aspect of his conception of virtue—the doctrine of the mean—is often derided as false if not indeed absurd. The reason for this disparity in reaction to Aristotle is that the doctrine of the mean has been severely misinterpreted as stating that there are a variety of parameters in which one must achieve a mean. Such a doctrine is false, but it is (...) not Aristotle’s. In this paper, the author gives a more accurate account of the doctrine of the mean than has heretofore been given. According to this account, the doctrine simply states that virtue disposes one to feel one’s passions with an appropriate intensity. The author closes by considering Hursthouse’s famous criticisms of the doctrine of the mean, and he shows that they fail to be reasons for rejecting the doctrine. (shrink)

We hope to show that the overall protreptic plan of Aristotle's ethical writings is based on the plan he used in his published work Protrepticus (Exhortation to Philosophy), by highlighting those passages that primarily offer hortatory or protreptic motivation rather than dialectical argumentation and analysis, and by illustrating several ways that Aristotle adapts certain arguments and examples from his Protrepticus. In this essay we confine our attention to the books definitely attributable to the Nicomachean Ethics (thus excluding the common books).

What constitutes a true human-to-human relationship? What is its importance and value for human life? These are the questions I explore in this talk on Aristotle's philosophy of friendship, originally presented as part of Boston University's Core Curriculum lecture series.

In Nicomachean Ethics X.7, Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in contemplation alone. The question that I want to take up in this essay is whether the superiority of contemplative life fits with Aristotle’s argument for the self-sufficiency of the political life, according to which politics can lead us to happiness without being guided by philosophical knowledge of the highest sort. My basic argument is that, paradoxical as it may seem, Aristotle is led to acknowledge that contemplative life is superior (...) to political life by the same strand of argumentation which makes him plea for the self-sufficiency of the political life in the first place. In order to show how this argument unfolds, I take my point of departure from Aristotle’s analysis of phronēsis as stated in Nicomachean Ethics VI and bring it to bear on his discussion of the respective virtues of the contemplative and political ways of life in Politics VII. (shrink)

In this paper, I put under scrutiny the arguments put forward by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics (NE) VI.9. The paper has two main parts. In the first, I examine the NE VI.9’s first part where Aristotle develops the concept of good deliberation, offering its definition in 1142b27-28. In the second, I examine the connection between good deliberation and phronesis, and, then, I discuss the vexata quæstio about if the lines 1142b31-33 might be read as introducing the claim that phronesis provides (...) moral ends. (shrink)

Translated into Danish by Henrik Jøker Bjerre.

What is the origin and goal of man? In this lecture to a small audience I will pursue this question by comparing passages from Platonic Philebus with those from Aristotle's Nicomachian Ethics and comparing both together with a passage from the Letter to Menoikeus. It turns out that the Aristotelian idea of eudaimonia (happiness) is not so far removed from Epicurus, since eudaimonia also includes hedone, lust.

In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle defines happiness, or eudaimonia, in accordance with an argument he makes regarding the distinctive function of human beings. In this paper, I argue that, despite this argument, there are moments in the NE where Aristotle appeals to elements of happiness that don’t follow from the function argument itself. The place of these elements in Aristotle’s account of happiness should, therefore, be a matter of perplexity. For, how can Aristotle appeal to elements (...) of happiness not entailed by his argument for what happiness involves? I will examine two instances that exemplify the sort of appeal to outside elements that I have in mind. The first deals with Aristotle’s reference, in NE, I, 8, to certain goods—ancestry, children, beauty—goods unrelated to man’s function or his fulfillment of it, but nevertheless required for his happiness. The second instance involves pleasure. Aristotle makes various arguments, both in Books I and X of the NE, that tie pleasure to the activity of the soul, and the function argument in turn. However, none of these arguments succeeds in demonstrating that pleasure would necessarily follow from this activity. Taken together then, these two examples demonstrate the extent to which Aristotle’s definition of happiness is more inclusive than his function argument permits. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 62, Issue 1, pp 1 - 25 This paper aims to articulate Aristotle’s general account of vice, an account that applies to all special vices, regardless of their spheres of action and emotion, and whether they are states of excess or deficiency. Vice is ignorance in the decision : the paper explains what this means.