Honor, Worth, and Justified Revenge in Aristotle

In Paula Satne & Krisanna M. Scheiter (eds.), Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment. Cham: Springer. pp. 21-35 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Aristotle there may be times when the virtuous person is justified in taking revenge. Many commentators claim that revenge, on Aristotle’s account, aims at restoring the honor and reputation of the avenger, but I will show that this cannot be why the virtuous person seeks revenge. I argue, instead, that the virtuous person seeks revenge when she is slighted in order to prove her worth. Aristotle claims that we slight those we think are neither good nor bad nor capable of producing good or bad things. Although the virtuous person will ignore most slights, Aristotle thinks there may be times when even a virtuous person will have to take revenge in order to prove her worth, not because she is insecure or requires honors, but because she cannot function to the best of her abilities within her society if those she interacts with fail to recognize her worth.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,139

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Apologist of Anger? Aristotle on an Emotion.Jan Opsomer - 2015 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 77 (4):701-717.
Rethinking Honor with Aristotle and Confucius.May Sim - 2012 - Review of Metaphysics 66 (2):263-280.
Anger, Feelings of Revenge, and Hate.Janne van Doorn - 2018 - Emotion Review 10 (4):321-322.
Francesco Piccolomini on honor.Guy Guldentops - 2019 - Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 22 (1):168-200.
Payback: The Nature and Morality of Revenge.Brian Bennett Allen - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Honor: a phenomenology.Robert L. Oprisko - 2012 - New York: Routledge.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-11-11

Downloads
25 (#581,490)

6 months
13 (#147,845)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Valuing Emotions.Michael Stocker & Elizabeth Hegeman - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Elizabeth Hegeman.
Aristotle on Desire.Giles Pearson - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.Jamie Dow - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 10 references / Add more references