This book presents a thorough and systematic integration of Aristotle's analysis of friendship with the main lines of the rest of his work in Politics and Nicomachean Ethics.

A survey of recent literature would suggest that Aristotle has become a whipping boy for philosophers who would advocate equality between the sexes. What I hope to show is that we can actually advance the cause of sexual equality by treating him more judiciously. Aristotle does argue that men and women by nature have different psychologies, and even that men are psychologically superior to women. But contrary to what many today think he himself does not conclude from this proposition that (...) men and women ought to have roles entirely different within a city. Indeed, he leaves ample room in his theory for women to participate in political rule. We shall see by his own arguments that all women ought to have a vote in general assemblies, and that some women ought to hold high political office. (shrink)

Paul Schollmeier 1. “A new name for some old ways of thinking,” William James subtitled his most popular book. With typical diffidence, he did not hesitate to acknowledge that many earlier philosophers were cognizant of and practiced in the pragmatic method. He mentions by name not only Locke, Berkeley, and Hume but also Socrates, “who was adept at it,” and Aristotle, “who used it methodically” (1916, 50). Nor was he alone in his acknowledgement of his predecessors. Charles Sanders Peirce, who (...) invented the method, remarks that “the river of pragmatism” may be easily traced back to antiquity. Socrates, he tells us, “bathed in these waters,” and Aristotle “rejoices when he can find them.” He also mentions Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant, and Compte.. (shrink)

Arthur W. H. Adkins's writings have sparked debates among a wide range of scholars over the nature of ancient Greek ethics and its relevance to modern times. Demonstrating the breadth of his influence, the essays in this volume reveal how leading classicists, philosophers, legal theorists, and scholars of religion have incorporated Adkins's thought into their own diverse research. The timely subjects addressed by the contributors include the relation between literature and moral understanding, moral and nonmoral values, and the contemporary meaning (...) of ancient Greek ethics. The volume also includes an essay from the late Adkins himself illustrating his methodology in an analysis of the "Speech of Lysias" in Plato's _Phaedrus_. _The Greeks and Us_ will interest all those concerned with how ancient moral values do or do not differ from our own. Contributors include Arthur W. H. Adkins, Stephanie Nelson, Martha C. Nussbaum, Paul Schollmeier, James Boyd White, Bernard Williams, and Lee Yearley. Commentaries by Wendy Doniger, Charles M. Gray, David Grene, Robert B. Louden, Richard Posner, and Candace Vogler. (shrink)

Moral philosophers, beginning with Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, have recently broached the topic of moral luck in the philosophical literature. They limit their discussion however to considerations of how luck affects our ability to carry out actions or how it affects the consequences of our actions. I wish to suggest that luck is also an important factor in determining our actions as ends in themselves. What actions we may choose to perform for their own sake in a given situation (...) depends much more than we might care to think on causes beyond our control. Our happiness rests ultimately on our luckiness. (shrink)

Human Goodness presents an original, pragmatic moral theory that successfully revives and revitalizes the classical Greek concept of happiness. It also includes in-depth discussions of our freedoms, our obligations, and our virtues, as well as adroit comparisons with the moral theories of Kant and Hume. Paul Schollmeier explains that the Greeks define happiness as an activity that we may perform for its own sake. Obvious examples might include telling stories, making music, or dancing. He then demonstrates that we may use (...) the pragmatic method to discover and to define innumerable activities of this kind. Schollmeier's demonstration rests on the modest assumption that our happiness takes not one ideal form, but many empirical forms. (shrink)

Let us assume with the classical philosophers that we have a faculty of theoretical intuition, through which we intuit theoretical principles, and a faculty of practical intuition, through which we intuit practical principles. This modest assumption would allow us to distinguish conceptual intuitions from perceptual intuitions. l wish to ask how we could then know if our intuitions of practical principles are true or not. Could we justify or verify our theoretical and practical intuitions in the same way? One would (...) think not, for we assume that we have two different faculties for grasping principles of different kinds. We would thus ask what method or technique we could use to justify or to verify our practical principles. The identification of a method for this purpose would appear to be desirable, for surely we ought to have some guide for developing principles for social and political policies. All too often we find that discourse about policy abandons rationality in favor of appeals to emotion or threats of coercion. (shrink)

What I wish to do in this essay is to explain how ancient rhetoric and modern anthropology share a common methodology. I shall argue that a theory of rhetoric developed by Aristotle can provide paradigms to account for new approaches to anthropology developed fairly recently. Among rhetorical arguments Aristotle distinguishes enthymene and example, and he recognizes historical, mythological, and philosophical examples. But contemporary anthropologists distinguish historical, mythological, and philosophical arguments in anthropology. Aristotle's division of example can thus provide a unifying (...) perspective on the recent debate about anthropological method. (shrink)

The American philosopher John Dewey defines a public as those who are affected by indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that they deem it necessary to care systematically for these consequences. Unfortunately, his definition enables a public to cooperate merely for the control of the negative consequences of human action. Plato suggests that we might better define a public as those who deem it desirable to care for human action for the sake of itself as well as for (...) the sake of its consequences. This definition would especially empower a public to increase cooperation for attaining the goods of human happiness and virtue. (shrink)