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Jessica Moss [24]Jessica Dawn Moss [3]
  1. Aristotle on the apparent good: perception, phantasia, thought, and desire.Jessica Dawn Moss - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Pt. I. The apparent good. Evaluative cognition -- Perceiving the good -- Phantasia and the apparent good -- pt. II. The apparent good and non-rational motivation. Passions and the apparent good -- Akrasia and the apparent good -- pt. III. The apparent good and rational motivation. Phantasia and deliberation -- Happiness, virtue, and the apparent good -- Practical induction -- Conclusion : Aristotle's practical empiricism.
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  2. The Birth of Belief.Jessica Moss & Whitney Schwab - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1):1-32.
    did plato and aristotle have anything to say about belief? The answer to this question might seem blindingly obvious: of course they did. Plato distinguishes belief from knowledge in the Meno, Republic, and Theaetetus, and Aristotle does so in the Posterior Analytics. Plato distinguishes belief from perception in the Theaetetus, and Aristotle does so in the De anima. They talk about the distinction between true and false beliefs, and the ways in which belief can mislead and the ways in which (...)
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  3. Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of Logos.Jessica Moss - 2014 - Phronesis 59 (3):181-230.
    Something Aristotle calls ‘right logos’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘logos’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially the Laws—in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelian phronēsis, like his and Plato’s technē and epistēmē, is a matter of grasping explanatory accounts: in this case, (...)
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  4. ‘Virtue Makes the Goal Right.Jessica Moss - 2011 - Phronesis 56 (3):204-261.
    Aristotle repeatedly claims that character-virtue “makes the goal right“, while Phronesis is responsible for working out how to achieve the goal. Many argue that these claims are misleading: it must be intellect that tells us what ends to pursue. I argue that Aristotle means just what he seems to say: despite putative textual evidence to the contrary, virtue is (a) a wholly non-intellectual state, and (b) responsible for literally supplying the contents of our goals. Furthermore, there are no good textual (...)
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  6. Appearances and Calculations: Plato's Division of the Soul.Jessica Moss - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34:35-68.
  7. Pleasure and Illusion in Plato.Jessica Moss - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):503 - 535.
    Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but (...)
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  8. Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul.Jessica Moss - 2005 - In David Sedley (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Xxix: Winter 2005. Oxford University Press. pp. 137-170.
  9. Knowledge-that is knowledge-of.Jessica Moss - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    If there is any consensus about knowledge in contemporary epistemology, it is that there is one primary kind: knowledge-that. I put forth a view, one I find in the works of Aristotle, on which knowledge-of – construed in a fairly demanding sense, as being well-acquainted with things – is the primary, fundamental kind of knowledge. As to knowledge-that, it is not distinct from knowledge-of, let alone more fundamental, but instead a species of it. To know that such-and-such, just like to (...)
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  10. Akrasia and perceptual illusion.Jessica Moss - 2009 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (2):119-156.
    de Anima III.10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia (“imagination”) on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle's discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis , I use this parallel to illuminate the difficult discussion (...)
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  11. The Doctor and the Pastry Chef.Jessica Moss - 2007 - Ancient Philosophy 27 (2):229-249.
  12. Pictures and Passions in the Timaeus and Philebus.Jessica Moss - 2012 - In Rachel Barney, Tad Brennan & Charles Brittain (eds.), Plato and the Divided Self. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 259-280.
  13. Hedonism and the Divided Soul in Plato’s Protagoras.Jessica Moss - 2014 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96 (3).
  14. Soul-Leading: The Unity of the Phaedrus, Again.Jessica Moss - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43:1-23.
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    Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion.Jessica Moss - 2009 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (2):119-156.
    de Anima III.10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia (“imagination”) on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle’s discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis, I use this parallel to illuminate the difficult discussion of (...)
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    Thought and Imagination: Aristotle’s Dual Process Psychology of Action.Jessica Moss - 2021 - In Caleb M. Cohoe (ed.), Aristotle's on the Soul: A Critical Guide. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 247-264.
    Aristotle's De Anima discusses the psychological causes of what he calls locomotion – i.e, roughly, purpose-driven behavior. One cause is desire. The other is cognition, which falls into two kinds: thought (nous) and imagination (phantasia). Aristotle’s discussion is dense and confusing, but I argue that we can extract from it an account that is coherent, compelling, and that in many ways closely anticipates modern psychological theories, in particular Dual Processing theory. Animals and humans are driven to pursue objects that attract (...)
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  17. Soul-leading: The unity of the phaedrus, again.Jessica Moss - 2012 - In Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 43--1.
  18. Plato's Appearance‐Assent Account of Belief.Jessica Moss - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):213-238.
    Stoics and Sceptics distinguish belief (doxa) from a representationally and functionally similar but sub-doxastic state: passive yielding to appearance. Belief requires active assent to appearances, that is, affirmation of the appearances as true. I trace the roots of this view to Plato's accounts of doxa in the Republic and Theaetetus. In the Republic, eikasia and pistis (imaging and conviction) are distinguished by their objects, appearances versus ordinary objects; in the Theaetetus, perception and doxa are distinguished by their objects, proper perceptibles (...)
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  19. Knowledge-that is knowledge-of.Jessica Moss - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    If there is any consensus about knowledge in contemporary epistemology, it is that there is one primary kind: knowledge-that. I put forth a view, one I find in the works of Aristotle, on which knowledge-of – construed in a fairly demanding sense, as being well-acquainted with things – is the primary, fundamental kind of knowledge. As to knowledge-that, it is not distinct from knowledge-of, let alone more fundamental, but instead a species of it. To know that such-and-such, just like to (...)
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  20.  94
    Aristotle's Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View that Everyone Always Desires Things under the Guise of the Good.Jessica Moss - 2010 - In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 65.
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    Commentary on Larsen.Jessica Moss - 2017 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 32 (1):100-110.
    How does Plato draw the line between perceiving and reasoning? According to Peter Larsen, he gives perception only the power to perceive isolated proper perceptibles, and treats all other cognitive operations as reasoning. I show problems for this interpretation. I argue that in the Republic, non-rational cognition—perception, either on its own, or perhaps augmented by other non-rational powers Plato does not specify, along the lines of Aristotle’s φαντασία —can generate complex cognitions. Reason’s job is not to integrate the raw data (...)
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  22. Plato's Doxa.Jessica Moss - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):193-217.
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    Aristote sur la sagesse pratique.Jessica Moss, Maxence Gévaudanet & David Lefebvre - 2021 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 138 (3):27-47.
    L’article porte sur le rapport entre la phronèsis (prudence ou sagesse pratique) et la vertu éthique dans la conception aristotélicienne de l’action et du bonheur. La question principale est la suivante : faut-il penser, selon une conception « humienne », que, chez Aristote, les buts sont fixés par notre désir, tandis que la raison servirait de simple instrument pour déterminer les moyens de les atteindre? La thèse défendue est que la vertu de caractère donne bien le contenu des fins, mais (...)
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  24. Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul.Jessica Moss - 2005 - In David Sedley (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Xxix: Winter 2005. Oxford University Press.
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  25.  69
    Review of Devin Stauffer, The Unity of Plato's Gorgias: Rhetoric, Justice, and the Philosophic Life[REVIEW]Jessica Moss - 2006 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (11).