A central tenet of cognitive linguistics is that adults’ knowledge of language consists of a structured inventory of constructions, including various two-argument constructions such as the active, the passive and “fronting” constructions. But how do speakers choose which construction to use for a particular utterance, given constraints such as discourse/information structure and the semantic fit between verb and construction? The goal of the present study was to build a computational model of this phenomenon for two-argument constructions in Mandarin. First, we (...) conducted a grammaticality judgment study with 60 native speakers which demonstrated that, across 57 verbs, semantic affectedness – as determined by further 16 native speakers – predicted each verb’s relative acceptability in the bei-passive and ba-active constructions, but not the Notional Passive and SVO Active constructions. Second, in order to simulate acquisition of these competing constraints, we built a computational model that learns to map from corpus-derived input to an output representation corresponding to these four constructions. The model was able to predict judgments of the relative acceptability of the test verbs in the ba-active and bei-passive constructions obtained in Study 1, with model-human correlations in the region of r = 0.5 and r = 0.3, respectively. Surprisingly, these correlations increased when lexical verb identity was removed; perhaps because this information leads to over-fitting of the training set. These findings suggest the intriguing possibility that acquiring constructions involves forgetting as a mechanism for abstracting across certain fine-grained lexical details and idiosyncrasies. (shrink)

Unlike eggs and diatoms, most single cells in nature do not have structured shells to provide extensive protection. It is a challenge to artificially confer shell structures on living cells to improve their inherent properties and functions. We discuss four different types of cellular shellizations: man‐made hydrogels, sol‐gels, polyelectrolytes, and mineral shells. We also explore potential applications, such as cell storage, protection, delivery, and therapy. We suggest that shellization could provide another means to regulate and functionalize cells. Specifically, the integration (...) of living cells and non‐living functional shells may be developed as a novel strategy to create “super” or intelligent cells. Unlike biological approaches, this material‐based bio‐interface regulation is inexpensive, effective, and convenient, opening up a novel avenue for cell‐based technologies and practices. (shrink)

As the spirit of the times must understand the essence of the philosophy of real life. The relationship between philosophy and reality of life with people through philosophy, philosophy and social practice, truth and values, knowledge and belief, rationality and irrationality, philosophers and other issues out of a sense of mission. Practice of the masses, is the source of philosophical wisdom. Philosophy is the wisdom of human-specific, and its characteristics is that it's critical. Of existing things unreasonable and unfair negative (...) and critical factors, to arouse people's awareness, is a revolutionary philosophy, critical edge of the reflected glory. Philosophy can not stand still, should not stick to the simple knowledge of the territory, should break through the philosophy of scientism is the epistemological horizons, the value of the field, the field of faith, advance the field of non-rational, open up freedom of thought. Philosopher is the personification of wisdom, philosophy, and promote cultural development and all-round development is the glorious duty of the philosopher and mission. Philosophy as the essence of time spirit should understand the true-life inevitably. The relation between the philosophy and true-life can be outspreaded through such issues as philosophy and demos, philosophy and social practice, truth and value, knowledge and belief, rationality and non-rationality, vision of philosophers. People's practice is the headspring of philosophy wisdom. Philosophy is the particular wisdom of people with the characteristic of criticism. The revolution and criticism of philosophy is exhibited splendidly through the negating and criticizing the unreasonable and unfair thing, evoking the consciousness. Philosophy should not be complacent and conservative and keep in the pure knowledge field, but break through the boundary of intellective scientism to the field of value, belief and non-rationality, exploit the free of thinking. Philosophers is the personification of philosophy, with the duty and mission of promoting culture development and human development. (shrink)

本书选辑了作者自1982年以来公开发表的学术论文和学术评论50余篇。学术论文部分主要是围绕重大现实课题,探讨了马克思主义哲学历史观、真理观、价值观和文化研究的方法论等问题;学术评论部分主要针对社会上和 学术理论界存在的思想路线、思维方式、思想作风、学风、文风等方面的问题及其实质和根源,作了分析和评论。.

Artificial intelligence technology has been widely applied in many fields. AI-assisted learning environments have been implemented in classrooms to facilitate the innovation of pedagogical models. However, college students' willingness to accept AI-assisted learning environments has been ignored. Exploring the factors that influence college students' willingness to use AI can promote AI technology application in higher education. Based on the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology and the theory of perceived risk, this study identified six factors that influence students' (...) willingness to use AI to analyze their relationships with WTA AI-assisted learning environments. A model including six hypotheses was constructed to test the factors affecting students' WTA. The results indicated that college students showed “weak rejection” of the construction of AI-assisted learning environments. Effort expectancy, performance expectancy, and social influence were all positively related to college students' WTA AI-assisted learning environments. Psychological risk significantly negatively influenced students' WTA. The findings of this study will be helpful for carrying out risk communication, which can promote the construction of AI-assisted learning environments. (shrink)

Emch, G.G., Liu, C.: The Logic of Thermostatistical Physics. Springer, Berlin/ Heidelberg (2002) 11. Frigg, R., Werndl, C.: Entropy – a guide for the perplexed. Forthcoming in: Beisbart, C., Hartmann, S. (eds.) Probabilities in Physics. Oxford  ...

Ben shu yi Ming ru Li Cai de jiang xue huo dong yu xue pai jian gou wei zhong xin, tan tao cong shi liu shi ji chu dao shi qi shi ji mo li xue qun ti zhong xin xing xue shuo he xue pai de chan sheng, chuan bo, kuo zhan yu chuan cheng de mo shi, bing zhuo zhong cong si xiang shi de jiao du jie shi zhe zhong mo shi chan sheng he yun xing de (...) si xiang gen yuan yu nei zai dong li. Quan shu zheng wen gong qi zhang, zhu yao nei rong fen wei shang xia liang bian, shang bian yi hong guan zong lun de fang shi, cong li xue jing dian "Da xue" de wen ben bian dong he quan shi jing zheng qie ru, tan tao zhong wan Ming li xue xue shuo he xue pai jian gou de li lun gen ju; xia bian yi Li Cai de "zhi xiu" xue shuo ji qi jiang xue huo dong zuo wei ge an yan jiu, tan tao li xue xue shuo he xue pai de chuan bo ji chuan cheng de she hui hua tu jing. (shrink)

Ben shu fen shang xia liang ge bu fen,Shang bian shi zhu zi yu lei wen xian yan jiu,Xia bian shi zhu zi yu lei ci hui yan jiu.Quan shu yi gong fen wei 9 zhang.Di yi zhang xu lun,Shou xian jie shao le zhu xi yu zhu zi yu lei,Qi ci jin xing le xue shu hui gu,Zong jie le jin 20 nian lai(jie zhi 2009 nian)Guo nei wai zhu zi yu lei yan jiu de sheng kuang he qu (...) de de zhu yao cheng jiu,Zui hou ti chu ben shu de yan jiu fang fa he yi yi.Di er zhang yan jiu tong xing ben zhu zi yu lei ji cheng shu zhi qian de ji ge zhong yao ban ben.Di san zhang wei zhong hua ben zhu zi yu lei yu song ke ben hui an xian sheng zhu wen gong yu lu de yi wen bi jiao.Di si zhang wei zhong hua ben zhu zi yu lei yu chao xian gu xie ben zhu zi yu lei yi wen bi jiao.Di wu zhang yan jiu zhu zi yu lei de wen xian xue jia zhi.Di liu zhang he di qi zhang ji zhong yan jiu zhu zi yu lei de fu yin ci.Di ba zhang tao lun zhu zi yu lei zhong de duo yin jie ci yu.Di jiu zhang zong jie chan shu zhu zi yu lei de yu ti te zheng,Yu yan te dian he yan jiu jia zhi. (shrink)

Ben shu yi dao de chuan cheng wei shi jiao,cong yan hui zhi le yu xian, zi gong zhi zhi yu yan, zi lu zhi zhi yu zheng, zi xia zhi xue yu ren si ge fang mian, lun shu zhu xi dui kong zi men ren yan xing de quan shi,cong er jie shi zhu xi dui "Lun yu" zhe yi jing dian suo fan ying de sheng huo shi jie de li jie ji qi he si kao fang (...) shi......shi dui chuan tong zhu xi yan jiu nai zhi song ming li xue yan jiu de yi ge zhong yao bu chong. (shrink)

本书面对21世纪的各种新的挑战,哲学家和科学家,社会科学家和自然科学家应该怎样携手,通力合作,高质量地发展我国的科学和教育等诸多问题作了论述。.

Claims concerning processes, claims of the form “xisφing”, have been the subject of renewed interest in recent years in the philosophy of action. However, this interest has frequently limited itself to noting certain formal features such claims have, and has not extended to a discussion of when they are true. This article argues that a claim of the form “xisφing” is true when what is happening withxis such that, if it is not interrupted, a φing will occur. It then applies (...) itself more directly to the case of action, arguing that when “xisφing” describesx's intentional action, it is true iffxis acting from a method she knows to be sufficient to φ, in the sense that if she is not interrupted in carrying out this method, she will φ. I use this criterion to argue that the carbon‐copier example Donald Davidson gives in “Intending” fails to refute Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that an agent who is φing intentionally knows that she is, because the agent in Davidson's example is not intentionally making the copies. (shrink)

Ben shu jie shao le gong zi zhen, wei yuan, yan fu, kang you wei, tan si tong, liang qi chao, chen tian hua, zhang bing lin deng wan qing si xiang jia de zhe xue si xiang.

Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the (...) following views: pleasure, rather than achievement or the satisfaction of desire, is what makes life go well; death is generally bad for its victim, in virtue of depriving the victim of more of a good life; death is bad for its victim at times after death, in particular at all those times at which the victim would have been living well; death is worse the earlier it occurs, and hence it is worse to die as an infant than as an adult; death is usually bad for animals and fetuses, in just the same way it is bad for adult humans; things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more good life is possible. (shrink)

The surface grammar of reports such as ‘I have a pain in my leg’ suggests that pains are objects which are spatially located in parts of the body. We show that the parallel construction is not available in Mandarin. Further, four philosophically important grammatical features of such reports cannot be reproduced. This suggests that arguments and puzzles surrounding such reports may be tracking artefacts of English, rather than philosophically significant features of the world.

本书从教师职业素质和专业发展的角度出发,参考借鉴了网络上颇为流行的《做教师的22条军规》的部分条款,分成运筹职业:三尺讲台与你一生有约;决胜课堂:让你的教学充满激情与诗意;倾情心田:让爱做主,剑指未来 :让你的教师生涯洒满阳光四个部分。.

本书主要对东西文化和中西印哲学作了相当广泛的讨论,涵摄科学哲学、文化哲学、人生哲学、宗教哲学、历史哲学、比较哲学等方面的内容,表现出超越式的融合趋向。.

Philosophers of logic are particularly interested in understanding the aims, epistemology, and methodology of logic. This raises the question of how the philosophy of logic should go about these enquires. According to the practice-based approach, the most reliable method we have to investigate the methodology and epistemology of a research field is by considering in detail the activities of its practitioners. This holds just as true for logic as it does for the recognised empirical and abstract sciences. If we wish (...) to systematically understand the aims and epistemology of logic, we are best placed achieving this by looking at what logicians do, rather than reflecting upon the nature of logic itself. In this entry, we outline the motivations for a practice-based approach towards the philosophy of logic and highlight its advantages over more “top-down” approaches, which attempt to infer conclusions about the nature of logic and its methodology on the basis of traditional assumptions about knowledge, metaphysics, or logic itself. We end by addressing several prominent concerns raised against the practice-based approach. (shrink)

Compiled by scholars at the court of Liu An, king of Huainan, in the second century B.C.E, _The Huainanzi_ is a tightly organized, sophisticated articulation of Western Han philosophy and statecraft. Outlining "all that a modern monarch needs to know," the text emphasizes rigorous self-cultivation and mental discipline, brilliantly synthesizing for readers past and present the full spectrum of early Chinese thought. _The Huainanzi_ locates the key to successful rule in a balance of broad knowledge, diligent application, and the penetrating (...) wisdom of a sage. It is a unique and creative synthesis of Daoist classics, such as the _Laozi_ and the _Zhuangzi_; works associated with the Confucian tradition, such as the _Changes_, the _Odes_, and the _Documents_; and a wide range of other foundational philosophical and literary texts from the _Mozi_ to the _Hanfeizi_. The product of twelve years of scholarship, this remarkable translation preserves _The Huainanzi_'s special rhetorical features, such as parallel prose and verse, and showcases a compositional technique that conveys the work's powerful philosophical appeal. This path-breaking volume will have a transformative impact on the field of early Chinese intellectual history and will be of great interest to scholars and students alike. (shrink)

I argue that extant accounts of harm all fail to account for important desiderata, and that we should therefore jettison the concept when doing moral philosophy.

This is a collection of papers by Prof. Liu Shuhsien, Chinese University of Hong Kong, on his recent research in contemporary Chinese Philosophy. The first volume Personagestudies the following five figures who exerted a great influence on contemporary Chinese philosophy: Hu Shi (westernisation), Mao Zedong (Marxism), Feng Youlan, Xiong Shili and Mou Songsan (New Confucianism).

In dem allgemeinen Denkmodus des antiken Platonismus (Platon und Plotin) und Kants wird das Sein der sinnlichen, in der Zeit existierenden Dinge apriorisch von dem als „zeitlos“ verstandenen Denken bestimmt und erfasst. Mit der Untersuchung der Grundgedanken Platons, Plotins und Kants kommt das Buch zur Konklusion, dass die apriorische Bestimmung und Erfassung des Seins in diesem Denkmodus erst durch diejenige Zeit möglich ist, die von der Autorin als „ontologische Zeit“ bestimmt wird. Die Art und Weise, wie die ontologische Zeit zu (...) diesem Zweck dient, wird in diesem Buch erforscht. Während für den antiken Platonismus die Zeit, indem sie das Intelligible auf das Sinnliche überträgt, als das bestimmende Prinzip des Seins der sinnlichen Dinge gilt, ist der Fall bei Kant aber komplizierter, da hier die verschiedenen Aspekte des Seins unterschiedlich begründet werden müssen: die ontologische Zeit fungiert mit ihrer strukturellen Affinität zu den Kategorien als das Prinzip des Was-Seins der sinnlichen Gegenstände, während der Raum das Prinzip des Dass-Seins derselben ist, sofern die Äußerlichkeit der Raum-Zeit-Anschauungsformen in Beziehung auf den Verstand mit dem Argumentationsversuch der Autorin beseitigt wird. (shrink)

刘如瑛(1924~ ),江苏铜山人,扬州大学师范学院中文系古代文学教授,硕士研究生指导教师.

Some healthcare systems are said to be grounded in solidarity because healthcare is funded as a form of mutual support. This article argues that health care systems that are grounded in solidarity have the right to penalise some users who are responsible for their poor health. This derives from the fact that solidary systems involve both rights and obligations and, in some cases, those who avoidably incur health burdens violate obligations of solidarity. Penalties warranted include direct patient contribution to costs, (...) and lower priority treatment, but not typically full exclusion from the healthcare system. We also note two important restrictions on this argument. First, failures of solidary obligations can only be assumed under conditions that are conducive to sufficiently autonomous choice, which occur when patients are given ‘Golden Opportunities’ to improve their health. Second, because poor health does not occur in a social vacuum, an insistence on solidarity as part of healthcare is legitimate only if all members of society are held to similar standards of solidarity. We cannot insist upon, and penalise failures of, solidarity only for those who are unwell, and who cannot afford to evade the terms of public health. (shrink)

The philosophical study of well-being concerns what makes lives good for their subjects. It is now standard among philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of well-being: - lifetime well-being, i.e., how good a person's life was for him or her considered as a whole, and - temporal well-being, i.e., how well off someone was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time or over a period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, (...) a day, month, year, or chapter of a life. Many theories have been offered of each of these kinds of well-being. A common view is that lifetime well-being is in some way constructed out of temporal well-being. This book argues that much of this literature is premised on a mistake. Lifetime well-being cannot be constructed out of temporal well-being, because there is no such thing as temporal well-being. The only genuine kind of well-being is lifetime well-being. The Passing of Temporal Well-Being will prove essential reading for professional philosophers, especially in moral and political philosophy. It will also be of interest to welfare economists and policy-makers who appeal to well-being. (shrink)

I argue that we can visually perceive others as seeing agents. I start by characterizing perceptual processes as those that are causally controlled by proximal stimuli. I then distinguish between various forms of visual perspective-taking, before presenting evidence that most of them come in perceptual varieties. In doing so, I clarify and defend the view that some forms of visual perspective-taking are “automatic”—a view that has been marshalled in support of dual-process accounts of mindreading.

According to hedonism about well-being, lives can go well or poorly for us just in virtue of our ability to feel pleasure and pain. Hedonism has had many advocates historically, but has relatively few nowadays. This is mainly due to three highly influential objections to it: The Philosophy of Swine, The Experience Machine, and The Resonance Constraint. In this paper, I attempt to revive hedonism. I begin by giving a precise new definition of it. I then argue that the right (...) motivation for it is the ‘experience requirement’ (i.e., that something can benefit or harm a being only if it affects the phenomenology of her experiences in some way). Next, I argue that hedonists should accept a felt-quality theory of pleasure, rather than an attitude-based theory. Finally, I offer new responses to the three objections. Central to my responses are (i) a distinction between experiencing a pleasure (i.e., having some pleasurable phenomenology) and being aware of that pleasure, and (ii) an emphasis on diversity in one’s pleasures. (shrink)

This paper defends the view, put roughly, that to think that p is to guess that p is the answer to the question at hand, and that to think that p rationally is for one’s guess to that question to be in a certain sense non-arbitrary. Some theses that will be argued for along the way include: that thinking is question-sensitive and, correspondingly, that ‘thinks’ is context-sensitive; that it can be rational to think that p while having arbitrarily low credence (...) that p; that, nonetheless, rational thinking is closed under entailment; that thinking does not supervene on credence; and that in many cases what one thinks on certain matters is, in a very literal sense, a choice. Finally, since there are strong reasons to believe that thinking just is believing, there are strong reasons to think that all this goes for belief as well. (shrink)

Strategies to increase influenza vaccination rates have typically targeted healthcare professionals and individuals in various high-risk groups such as the elderly. We argue that they should focus on increasing vaccination rates in children. Because children suffer higher influenza incidence rates than any other demographic group, and are major drivers of seasonal influenza epidemics, we argue that influenza vaccination strategies that serve to increase uptake rates in children are likely to be more effective in reducing influenza-related morbidity and mortality than those (...) targeting HCPs or the elderly. This is true even though influenza-related morbidity and mortality amongst children are low, except in the very young. Further, we argue that there are no decisive reasons to suppose that children-focused strategies are less ethically acceptable than elderly or HCP-focused strategies. (shrink)

Several critics of realist theories of political legitimacy have alleged that it possesses a problematic bias towards the status quo. This bias is thought to be reflected in the way in which these...