A cornerstone of the target article is that, in a predictive coding framework, attention can be modelled by weighting prediction error with a measure of precision. We argue that this is not a complete explanation, especially in the light of ERP (event-related potentials) data showing large evoked responses for frequently presented target stimuli, which thus are predicted.

Interval Temporal Logic is a finite-time linear temporal logic with applications in hardware verification, temporal logic programming and specification of multimedia documents. Due to the logic's non-elementary complexity, efficient ITL-based verification tools have been difficult to develop, even for propositional subsets. MONA is an efficient implementation of an automata-based decision procedure for the logic WS1S. Despite the non-elementary complexity of WS1S, MONA has been successfully applied in problems such as hardware synthesis, protocol verification and theorem proving. Here we consider a (...) rich propositional subset of ITL, PITL, whose expressive power is equivalent to that of WS1S, and in turn to that of regular languages. PITL not only includes operators such as chop, star and projection, but also past operators such as previous, chop in the past and since. We provide an interpretation of PITL formulas in WS1S, which led us to a direct translation from PITL formulas to MONA specifications. We present the tool PITL2MONA as an implementation of such translation. With PITL2MONA acting as a front-end, MONA is used as a decision procedure for PITL. To our knowledge, this is one of the few implementations of a decision procedure for PITL, the first one based on automata, and the only one which handles both projection and past operators. We have tested our implementation on a number of examples; we show in this paper the application of PITL and its MONA-based decision procedure in solutions to the dining-philosophers and a multimedia synchronisation problem, together with some experimental results on these and some other examples. (shrink)

A quintessential challenge for any perceptual system is the need to focus on task-relevant information without being blindsided by unexpected, yet important information. The human visual system incorporates several solutions to this challenge, one of which is a reflexive covert attention system that is rapidly responsive to both the physical salience and the task-relevance of new information. This paper presents a model that simulates behavioral and neural correlates of reflexive attention as the product of brief neural attractor states that are (...) formed across the visual hierarchy when attention is engaged. Such attractors emerge from an attentional gradient distributed over a population of topographically organized neurons and serve to focus processing at one or more locations in the visual field, while inhibiting the processing of lower priority information. The model moves towards a resolution of key debates about the nature of reflexive attention, such as whether it is parallel or serial, and whether suppression effects are distributed in a spatial surround, or selectively at the location of distractors. Most importantly, the model develops a framework for understanding the neural mechanisms of visual attention as a spatiotopic decision process within a hierarchy and links them to observable correlates such as accuracy, reaction time, and the N2pc and PD components of the EEG. This last contribution is the most crucial for repairing the disconnect that exists between our understanding of behavioral and neural correlates of attention. (shrink)

This essay explores the viability of theologies of nonviolent peacebuilding through reflection on constructive agents under duress. John Howard Yoder’s messianic theology was once a default model of peacebuilding in Christian ethics, but he mixes eschatologies, with problematic results. This essay extends insights from participant observation in Colombia to suggest that if we relate distinct accounts of messianic and gradual eschatologies without mixing them, we articulate a relationship between church and state that is fruitful for theological peacebuilding. This relationship (...) is best described as an interplay that allows for transformative displacement. (shrink)

The process of seeking the consent of a patient to a medical procedure is, arguably, one of the most important skills a doctor, or indeed any clinician, should learn. In fact, the very idea that doctors may institute diagnostic or treatment processes of any sort without a patient's consent is utterly counter-intuitive to the modern practice of medicine. It was not always thus, and even now it can be reliably assumed that consent is still not sought and gained appropriately in (...) every clinical encounter. To say that it should be sought and gained in this manner elevates the value of consent to a high level. It can be instructive to ask oneself why such a value might be held to be the case. The answer to this question lies in the philosophical underpinning of clinical consent, which sits within a notion of personal autonomy, and respect for autonomous decision making. (shrink)

World Athletics have introduced regulations preventing female athletes with certain differences in sex development from competing in the female category. We argue these regulations are not justified and should be removed. Firstly, we examine the reasoning and evidence underlying the position that these athletes have a substantial mean difference in performance from other female athletes such that it constitutes an advantage, and argue it is not sufficient. Secondly, if an advantage does exist, it needs to be demonstrated it is unfair. (...) We argue the advantage would not be unfair because to say otherwise relies on a presupposition about whether these athletes are female, which involves contradictory and inconsistent definitions of sex. Thirdly, we contend that even if it is established that there is an advantage and it is unfair, the response of requiring athletes to take testosterone-suppressing medication is not appropriate and is unfair. (shrink)

Motivational enhancement in sport – a form of ‘neuro-doping’ – can help athletes attain greater achievements in sport. A key question is whether or not that athlete deserves that achievement. We distinguish three concepts – praiseworthiness, prizeworthiness, and admiration – which are closely related. However, in sport, they can come apart. The most praiseworthy athlete may not be the most prizeworthy, and so on. Using a model of praiseworthiness as costly commitment to a valuable end, and situating prizeworthiness within the (...) boundaries of the sport, we argue that motivational enhancement in some cases can be compatible with desert. (shrink)

Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred (...) to an accidentally true belief; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism. (shrink)

There is considerable evidence that the hippocampal system contributes both to (1) the temporary maintenance of memories and to (2) the processing of a particular type of memory representation. The findings on amnesia suggest that these two distinguishing features of hippocampal memory processing are orthogonal. Together with anatomical and physiological data, the neuropsychological findings support a model of cortico-hippocampal interactions in which the temporal and representational properties of hippocampal memory processing are mediated separately. We propose that neocortical association areas maintain (...) shortterm memories for specific items and events prior to hippocampal processing as well as providing the final repositories of long-term memory. The parahippocampal region supports intermediate-term storage of individual items, and the hippocampal formation itself mediates an organization of memories according to relevant relationships among items. Hippocampal-cortical interactions produce (i) strong and persistent memories for events, including their constituent elements and the relationships among them, and (ii) a capacity to express memories flexibly across a wide range of circumstances. (shrink)

The concept of a reason is now central to many areas of contemporary philosophy. Key theses in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of the emotions, among others, have come to be framed in terms of reasons. And yet, despite their centrality, theorists seem to take inconsistent things for granted about how reasons work, what kinds of things can be reasons, what reasons favor, and more. Somehow reasons have come to be both indispensable and impenetrable. -/- (...) The Fundamentals of Reasons offers a comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of reasons. Focusing on the twin roles of reasons in explanation and deliberation, the book not only emphasizes what has made reasons central across philosophy but it also explores why philosophers have such incompatible pictures about what reasons are and how they work. Working from the inside out, Howard and Schroeder identify contentious assumptions about not only the internal structure of reasons but also their relationship to other important concepts, and then show how these contentious assumptions shape the many downstream applications of reasons in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, and beyond. -/- This mildly opinionated exploration of key questions about the significance and nature of reasons helps the reader to navigate this important part of the philosophical landscape and to get clearer about why reasons seem important and what their import, ultimately, is. (shrink)

Since 1962 Kuhn's concept of incommensurability has undergone a process of transformation. His current account of incommensurability has little in common with his original account of it. Originally, incommensurability was a relation of methodological, observational and conceptual disparity between paradigms. Later Kuhn restricted the notion to the semantical sphere and assimilated it to the indeterminacy of translation. Recently he has developed an account of it as localized translation failure between subsets of terms employed by theories.

Faith in God conflicts with reason—or so we’re told. We focus on two arguments for this conclusion. After evaluating three criticisms of them, we identify an assumption they share, namely that faith in God requires belief that God exists. Whether the assumption is true depends on what faith is. We sketch a theory of faith that allows for both faith in God without belief that God exists, and faith in God while in belief-cancelling doubt God’s existence. We then argue that (...) our theory, unlike the theory of Thomas Aquinas, makes sense of four central items of faith-data: (i) pístis in the Synoptics, (ii) ʾemunāh in the Hebrew scriptures, (iii) exemplars of faith in God, including Abraham, Jesus, and Mother Teresa, and (iv) the widespread experience of people of faith today. We close by assessing revisions of the two arguments we began with, revisions that align with our theory of faith, and find them dubious, at best. (shrink)

Das Eröffnungskapitel von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes hat wegen der Tragweite ihrer Behauptung, das Wahre der sinnlichen Gewißheit sei identisch mit dem nur in der Sprache zu erfassenden Allgemeinen, und wegen der äußersten Komprimiertheit der Argumentation, mit der Hegel seine These darzulegen beansprucht, eine Vielzahl verschiedener Interpretationen hervorgerufen. Abweichend von bisherigen Ansätzen betont Brady Bowman in seiner Studie die positive Funktion der sinnlichen Gewißheit des Absoluten als Ausgangspunkt von Hegels "Darstellung des erscheinenden Wissens". Indem er die Analyse der z.T. (...) stark rekonstruktionsbedürftigen Argumentation zu den philosophiehistorischen Referenzen und zum Gesamtzusammenhang der Phänomenologie des Geistes in Beziehung setzt, liefert er eine umfassende Interpretation des Textes. Dabei beleuchtet der Autor zugleich die Hintergründe in der antiken Philosophie, im klassischem Empirismus, in der Philosophie des Common Sense sowie im Umfeld der klassischen deutschen Philosophie; zugleich jedoch verfolgt er systematische Bezüge bis in die Sprachphilosophie der Gegenwart. (shrink)

The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. (...) The problem remains that deliberative judgement is required to determine the relevance and relative significance of a range of methodological norms. A role is sketched for cognitive virtues which may be exercised in the course of the deliberative judgement. (shrink)

This study presents a sociological profile of Peruvian female industrialists and some narratives of their struggle for personal independence and entrepreneurial success within the context of global restructuring and local deindustrialization. The study adopts the classical definition of woman's economic independence as a result of women's participation in the world of paid labor.

Published in 1982 by CUP (pb. 2009) it discusses the forms of materialism then current, including Davidson, early Rorty, but concentrating on Smart and Armstrong, and arguing that central state materialism fails to give a better 'occurrent' account of conscious states than does behaviourism/functionalism, as Armstrong claims. The book starts with a version of the 'knowledge argument' and ends with a chapter claiming that our conception of matter/the physical is more problematic than our conception of mind.

In this chapter I defend a methodological view about how we should conduct substantive ethical inquiries in the fields of normative and practical ethics. I maintain that the direct plausibility and implausibility of general ethical principles – once fully clarified and understood – should be foundational in our substantive ethical reasoning. I argue that, in order to expose our ethical intuitions about particular cases to maximal critical scrutiny, we must determine whether they can be justified by directly plausible principles. To (...) expose apparently plausible principles to maximal critical scrutiny, we must determine whether their direct plausibility can survive careful clarification of what they are really saying. This means that intuitions about cases are useful only in (a) suggesting principles that must stand on their own two feet, and (b) illustrating or otherwise helping us clarify what a principle is really saying. We should not reject principles that seem most directly plausible after we have fully clarified their content simply because they conflict with our intuitions about cases, because to do so is to side with uncritical prejudices over the teachings of critical scrutiny. (shrink)

Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the pool rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity” – it’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normatively” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning “authoritative (...) normativity”: (1) that motivation for it originates in a parochial conception of “normative flavours”; (2) that arguments against alternative ways of explaining e.g., morality’s importance are overblown; and (3) that there are strong reasons against theorizing in terms of “authoritative normativity”. The overarching aim is not to show that “authoritative normativity” is incoherent or entirely unmotivated. Rather, it is to discuss some of “authoritative normativity’s” deeper commitments to correct the impression that is it largely benign or that it is entailed by familiar and popular “metanormative” positions. Authoritative normativity, it seems to us, is a solution in search of a problem. (shrink)

Howard J. Curzer presents a fresh new reading of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, which brings each of the virtues alive. He argues that justice and friendship are symbiotic in Aristotle's view; reveals how virtue ethics is not only about being good, but about becoming good; and describes Aristotle's ultimate quest to determine happiness.

Questions the research, assumptions, and intention behind Danish statistician Bj²rn Lomborg's attacks on peer-reviewed scientific theories of global warming.

In Paradigms and Barriers Howard Margolis offers an innovative interpretation of Thomas S. Kuhn's landmark idea of "paradigm shifts," applying insights from cognitive psychology to the history and philosophy of science. Building upon the arguments in his acclaimed Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition, Margolis suggests that the breaking down of particular habits of mind—of critical "barriers"—is key to understanding the processes through which one model or concept is supplanted by another. Margolis focuses on those revolutionary paradigm shifts— such as the (...) switch from a Ptolemaic to a Copernican worldview—where challenges to entrenched habits of mind are marked by incomprehension or indifference to a new paradigm. Margolis argues that the critical problem for a revolutionary shift in thinking lies in the robustness of the habits of mind that reject the new ideas, relative to the habits of mind that accept the new ideas. Margolis applies his theory to famous cases in the history of science, offering detailed explanations for the transition from Ptolemaic to cosmological astronomy, the emergence of probability, the overthrow of phlogiston, and the emergence of the central role of experiment in the seventeenth century. He in turn uses these historical examples to address larger issues, especially the nature of belief formation and contemporary debates about the nature of science and the evolution of scientific ideas. Howard Margolis is a professor in the Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies and in the College at the University of Chicago. He is the author of Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality and Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition, both published by the University of Chicago Press. (shrink)

A philosophical exploration of the origin and limits of the modern world.

For many people the existence of God is by no means a sufficiently clear feature of reality. This problem, the fact of divine hiddenness, has been a source of existential concern and has sometimes been taken as a rationale for support of atheism or agnosticism. In this collection of essays, a distinguished group of philosophers of religion explore the question of divine hiddenness in considerable detail. The issue is approached from several perspectives including Jewish, Christian, atheist and agnostic. There is (...) coverage of the historical treatment of divine hiddenness as found in the work of Maimonides, St. John of the Cross, Jonathan Edwards, Kierkegaard, and various Biblical writers. A substantial introduction clarifies the main problems of and leading solutions to divine hiddenness. Primarily directed at philosophers of religion, theologians, and scholars of religious studies, this collection could also serve as a textbook for upper-level courses in philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In this major reinterpretation, Howard Caygill argues that all of Benjamin's work is characterized by its focus on a concept of experience derived from Kant but applied by Benjamin to objects as diverse as urban experience, visual art, literature and philosophy. The book analyzes the development of Benjamin's concept of experience in his early writings showing that it emerges from an engagement with visual experience, and in particular the experience of colour. By representing Benjamin as primarily a thinker of (...) the visual field, Caygill is able to bring forward previously neglected texts on inscription and the visual field and to cast many of his more familiar texts, for instance the Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction in a new light. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta desarrollar una deducción del concepto de sumo bien kantiano: esto es, intenta demostrar, de acuerdo con la interpretación de Dieter Henrich acerca de la deducción, que el sumo bien es un fin a la vez que un deber. Apelo a los rasgos de la razón práctica que constituyen la legitimidad de los hechos, la premisa que cualquier deducción debe tener. De acuerdo con Kant, el sumo bien consiste en la felicidad, la virtud y sus relaciones de proporcionalidad (...) y causalidad, tal que la felicidad es proporcional a, y causada por, la virtud. Sostengo, utilizando las nociones kantianas aceptadas, que Kant tiene razones convincentes para concluir que el sumo bien es, de hecho, un fin a la vez que un deber. Si esto es correcto, entonces este argumento ofrece la deducción prometida en mi título. This paper attempts a deduction of Kant's concept of the highest good: that is, it attempts to prove, in accordance with Dieter Henrich's interpretation of the notion of deduction, that the highest good is an end that is also a duty. It does this by appealing to features of practical reason that make up the legitimating facts that serve as the premises that any deduction must possess. According to Kant, the highest good consists of happiness, virtue, and relations of proportionality and causationbetween happiness and virtue, such that happiness is proportional to and caused by virtue. I argue, by drawing on accepted Kantian notions, that Kant had compelling reasons for concluding that the highest good is in fact an end that is also a duty. If correct, then this argument provides the deduction promised in my title. (shrink)

The New Zealand philosopher, Robert Nola (1940-2022), has died. He was a kind man, a good friend, and a fine philosopher. Here is how I remember him.

From the scorched-earth works of action-movie provocateurs Seijun Suzuki and Sam Peckinpah to the cargo cult soundscapes of Pere Ubu and the Czech dissidents ...

This paper summarizes a version of the argument from evil for atheism and then assesses several theodicies, including those that appeal to punishment, evil as a necessary counterpart for good, free will, natural evil as natural consequence, natural law, higher-order goods, and the conjunctive "Big Reason" including all the above and more beside.

This fascinating and thought-provoking book provides much-needed philosophical background for counselors, therapists, and healthcare workers looking for broader, deeper foundations in the struggle to help and make sense of others. While examining the best among 20th century philosophy it shows the wealth of inspiration of earlier centuries, and demonstrates with remarkable clarity the way in which the ideas of, and the relations between, these philosophers can inspire, inform, and underpin much of counseling and psychotherapy.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) is leading a global effort to deliver improved diagnostic testing to people living in low‐resource settings. A reliance on the healthcare technologies marketplace and industry, shapes many aspects of the WHO project, and in this situation normative guidance comes by way of the ASSURED criteria — Affordable, Sensitive, Specific, User‐friendly, Rapid and robust, Equipment‐free, and Delivered. While generally improving access to diagnostics, I argue that the ASSURED approach to distributive justice — efficiency — and assessment (...) of worth — productivity — may constrain efforts to deliver timely and accurate diagnosis in the developing world equitably by holding back new and innovative diagnostics and indirectly encouraging program and device design that may unfairly discriminate against certain groups. Even as we try to overcome the problem of global healthcare injustice, we may be entrenching disadvantage. I present my critique of ASSURED by 1) referencing Boltanski and Thévenot's theory of orders of worth to highlight the industrial and market foundations of the ASSURED guidelines; 2) comparing ASSURED with other normative guides that elevate the importance of civic responsibility in evaluations of distributive justice; 3) presenting a case study of the failed promise of microfluidic diagnostic devices. I conclude that a new approach to normative guidance is required to assess the value of developing world diagnostics, preferably, one that does not force global public goods into the marketplace. (shrink)

For William James, work was the problem. Ultimately, going to work was the resolution, and James's quest for meaningful work remains as relevant at the end of the twentieth century as it was in the nineteenth. Weaving letters, diaries, drawings, and published texts, Becoming William James provides a convincing biographical analysis rich in detail and tone. In his new introduction, Howard M. Feinstein adds biological psychiatry to psychoanalytic and family systems theories to inform our understanding of a complex man. (...) In addition, he discusses whether James's mental illness might have been treated with drugs. (shrink)

This book offers an interpretation of the rise of secular historical thought in nineteenth-century Europe. Instead of characterizing 'historicism' and 'secularization' as fundamental breaks with Europe's religious heritage, they are presented as complex cultural permutations with much continuity; for inherited theological patterns of interpreting experience determined to a large degree the conditions, possibilities, and limitations of the forms of historical imagination realizable by nineteenth-century secular intellectuals. This point is made by examining the thought of the German theologian W. M. L. (...) de Wette and that of the Swiss-German historian Jacob Burckhardt. Burckhardt's meeting with de Wette and his subsequent decision to study history over theology are interpreted as revealing moments in nineteenth-century intellectual history. By examining their encounter, its larger historical context, and the thought of both men, the book demonstrates the centrality of theological concerns and forms of knowledge in the emergence of modern, secular historical consciousness. (shrink)