Dreams

I am truly humbled and astounded to find myself the grateful recipient of the wise insight, critical engagement, and creative elaboration provided by the three readers of my book, Boram Jeong, Martina Ferrari, and Eric S. Nelson.I begin with Boram Jeong's attention to the decolonizing trajectory of the book. Throughout my writing process, I sought to enact the provincialization of Europe1 by decentering Eurocentric discourse and, at times, actively ignoring it. The result, I suspected, would be that my very theories (...) and methods would become unintelligible to the academic philosophical mainstream. At times, I worried to myself: does this book contribute to a "cross-cultural" philosophical project if other... (shrink)

I contend that the well-established phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness needs to be further supplemented with more refined distinctions between different modes of pre-reflective self-awareness. Here I distinguish between five modes, which we come across in perception, lucid dreams, non-lucid dreams, daydreams, and episodic memory. Building on the basis of a phenomenological description, I argue that perception entails the pre-reflective self-awareness of the perceiving ego; non-lucid dreams implicate the pre-reflective self-awareness of the dreamed ego; in the case of (...) lucid dreams and daydreams, we are faced with a split pre-reflective self-awareness, which entails the self-awareness of the dreaming and the dreamed ego. Lastly, in the case of episodic recollection, we are confronted with a threefold pre-reflective self-awareness: the self-awareness of the remembered ego, the remembering ego, and of the temporal unity of experience. The phenomenological analysis here offered leads to the conclusion that pre-reflective self-awareness need not be spoken of in the singular, but in the plural, and that while some modes of pre-reflective self-awareness constitute the foundations of selfhood, others enable the subject of experience to flee its facticity and become someone other than it is. (shrink)

The ubiquity of gender-bending and sexually ambiguous imagery in the media seems to herald a post-gay era. But are LGBT/Q identities and representation politics really a thing of the past? Inspecti...

Languishing in exile after Louis Napoleon's coup d'état of December 1851 shut down socialist agitation, the followers of the utopian theorist Charles Fourier turned their attention to the New World as an "asylum" where Fourierism's communal ideals might be realized. In so doing they joined a long line of utopian dreamers who saw the young United States as a promised land of free expression and social experimentation. The head of the French Fourierists, Victor Considerant, made contacts with the remnant of (...) the American Fourierist movement, toured the United States in 1853, and was thrilled by the vast open spaces of Texas. Considerant discounted the fate of another French socialist group, the disciples... (shrink)

Is it ever wrong to cheat in a dream? It has been argued that the conjunction of reasonable claims about dreams with Evaluational Internalism entails a positive answer. This implausible result seemingly provides reason to favour an alternative theory of moral evaluation. I here argue that a wide range of Evaluational Externalist views are similarly committed to morality in dreams. I end by identifying implications for theorising about dreams and morality.

My aim is to discuss the rhetoric of expertise as objective, and ideology-and value-free, on the example of environmental policy. The first section introduces examples of the common rhetorical figure of expert, ideology-free environmental protection, revealing their presuppositions. The second introduces objects of comparison - the cartoonish proposals of wiping out humanity - with the aim of showing that the two groups of proposals assume an analogous rhetoric. The third section discusses some prominent features of various proposals of?population control?, along (...) with the links to the current surge of so-called eco-fascism. The aim is to show that all these phenomena represent a scale of the idea of ideology-free environmentalism. The concluding section discusses the distorted understanding of expertise, ideology, and politics, central to examples given in the previous sections, as leading to deplorable ignorance or callous cynicism, and therefore, in effect, a moral failure. (shrink)

My goal is threefold. First, building on the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology of the imagination, I will argue that phantasy is a specific type of intentional experience, which intends its objects as neutralized presentifications. Second, I will turn to dreams and argue that non-lucid dreams are unconscious phantasies, which cannot be conceived in the above-mentioned way. This realization will bring us to the third task. When recognized as the most extreme form of unconscious phantasy, dreams compel us to raise anew (...) the fundamental question: what is the nature of phantasy experience? According to the perspective I will here develop, phantasy is a specific field of experience that lies between two extremes: the fully translucent mode of the as if consciousness and the thoroughly opaque mode of absorption. Most of our phantasies, both conscious and unconscious, voluntary and involuntary, are lived somewhere between these two extremes. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

This piece engages creolization as an approach to the history of philosophy and the sense of justice. Building on ancient philosophical and anthropological accounts of the institutional rituals as well as creolizing analyses by writers of the Black Diaspora, it focuses on the approach outlined by J. A. Gordon’s pathbreaking political theory. Creolization is advanced as an invitation to intensify possibilities lying dormant in the archive of our collective histories and lived experiences. An imaginary or even visual site, first, and (...) only then as a concept, or a discursive practice. (shrink)

Freud’s Interpretations of Dreams - Irfan Ajvazi.

_Dreaming_ is the second part of the trilogy _Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition_. It investigates some of the most fascinating and enduring discussions on dreams in the Greek, Latin, and Arabic reception of Aristotle’s psychology.

Children's conceptions of dreams are an important component of their developing understanding of the mind. Although there is much that even adults do not understand about the nature of dreams, most adults in Western society believe that: Dream entities are not real in the sense that they are nonphysical; they are private in the sense that they are not available to public perception, and are not directly shared with other dreamers; and, dreams are typically fictional in content. Thus, children in (...) our society must confront several dualisms with respect to dreams, such as their physical versus nonphysical, perceptually-public versus perceptually-private, and shared versus individuated nature. Thirty-two children, aged 3- and 4-years-old, were told stories about children who were dreaming about an object, playing with an object, or looking at a photograph of an object, and then were asked questions about the status of these entities with regard to these three dualisms. All children judged dream entities, photographs, and physical objects to be appropriately different in terms of physical versus nonphysical properties and in terms of perceptually-public versus private status. They also understood the fictional nature of dreams. However, whereas most 4-year-olds understood that dreams are individuated, many 3-year-olds believed that dreams are directly shared by more than one person. These findings contrast with earlier research characterizing children's understanding of dreams as realistic. We reconcile these contrasting findings by discussing methodological differences, and we situate our findings regarding children's understanding of dreams within the context of contemporary research on children's theory of mind. (shrink)

Cinema, thanks to its possibilities that are immanent to its existence, is an art that have the ability to dream beyond multiple worlds that has been experienced before and the ability to think upon these dreams. It takes its viewers to journeys in different directions of thinking through extraordinariness, which may never happen scientifically and physically and through the spaces where these occur. Animated films produce the thoughts about the universe and existence in a unique way from the point of (...) view of human and non-human beings with the extraordinary features they attach to the ordinary and the extraordinary images they create. In Gilles Deleuze’s terms, it examines the differences that pour out of life. In this aspect, animation films promises to extend life out of the anthropocentric view which is specific to Modernity, and to produce intellectual journeys about alternative beings. At this point, the question of whether the character designs of nonhuman beings’ which are situated at the center of the established imaginary lives point to a real post-human subjectivity, or these characters are the bearers of an anthropocentric approach, becomes important. This paper aims to debate the possible answers to the given question through Alice in Wonderland, Alice Through the Looking Glass, Mononokehime and Hauru no Ugoku Shiro films. In this study, where it will be examined comparatively of the cinematic comprehension of directors from two different cultures; the answers to questions as; in these narrations, what kind of a world aspiration is being actualized; in these universes where nonhumans are defined, on what extent can these universes step outside the anthropocentric approach, which is structured as a form of domination in the modern world; if a discourse which is opened to alternative becomings has been established or not; what kind of clues are presented regarding interpreting human existence of this imaginary world designs, are going to be looked for. These discussions will be conducted within the framework of concepts such as humanism, post-humanism, difference, becoming, nomadic subjectivity and with reference to the works of authors such as Gilles Deleuze, Rosi Braidotti, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri and Donna Haraway. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

This article historicises a dream analytic intervention launched in the 1930s by Scottish psychiatrist and future professor of psychological medicine at the University of Glasgow, Thomas Ferguson Rodger. Intimate therapeutic meetings with five male patients are preserved within the so-called ‘dream books’, six manuscript notebooks from Rodger’s earlier career. Investigating one such case history in parallel with lecture material, this article elucidates the origins of Rodger’s adapted, rapport-centred psychotherapy, offered in his post-war National Health Service, Glasgow-based department. Oriented in a (...) reading of the revealing fourth dream book, the article unearths a history of the reception and adaptation of psychoanalysis from within a therapeutic encounter and in a non-elite context. Situating Rodger’s psychiatric development in his Glasgow environment, it then contextualises the psychosocial narrative of the fourth book in relation to contrasting therapeutic commitments: an undiluted Freudianism and a pragmatic ‘commonsense’ psychotherapy, tempered to the clinical psychiatric, and often working-class, interwar Glasgow context. An exploration of pre-recorded dreams, transcribed free associations, and ‘weekly reports’ reveals that in practice, Rodger’s Meyerian attitude worked productively with Freudian techniques to ennoble the patient’s psychosocial testimony and personal wisdom. This psychotherapeutic eclecticism underpinned and made visible the patient’s concurrent faith in and resistance to psychoanalytic interpretation. Chronicling a collaborative route to psychotherapeutic knowledge within a discrete encounter, the article situates post-war treatment values in the interwar impasse of outpatient psychiatry. (shrink)

Deep sleep has traditionally been deemed as a period that lack consciousness. However, recent evidence challenges this assumption and highlights the possibility of experiencing awareness during deep sleep. By drawing from Indian philosophical traditions, this thesis defends a positive view of consciousness during dreamless sleep – the period of sleep where we are aware but not dreaming. Moreover, this thesis also challenges classic views on the nature of conscious states where consciousness is reduced to representational content. For that purpose, this (...) thesis develops a taxonomy of dreamless sleep that, contrary to other research in the area, considers the existence of different sorts of awareness with different degrees of content. Thus, a full spectrum of mental states during conscious dreamless sleep are considered: from awareness of substantial content to awareness devoid of content altogether. The aim of the thesis is to show how such a taxonomy can encourage a shift from a two-dimensional view of consciousness to a multidimensional one — from a view that only considers brain activation and reportable content to one that assesses conscious states on different level of analysis. This shift will result in an adequate conceptualisation of dreamless sleep as a period where we could have conscious states with content, but also, conscious states without content. Moreover, this shift on a multidimensional approach will allow us to undertake a proper comparison compare between different sleep phenomena. In order to develop this taxonomy of dreamless sleep, I explore definitions on awareness during dreamless sleep found in Indian philosophical traditions and Western analytical philosophy. From the definitions found in the literature, I argue that all the types of conscious states proposed in my taxonomy can be identified. Then, I test my taxonomy in a pilot study about awareness during deep sleep that I carried out. The results show that the different types of awareness can be recognised in the phenomenological descriptions gathered from the participants. Finally, I compare the phenomenon of dreamless sleep with other associated experiences, such as dreams and hypnagogia. My claim is that the differences among sleep phenomena are gradual and that in some cases there is not a strict cut-off line between them. Notwithstanding this assumption, I defend the development of future research were my proposed taxonomy can be improved by considering typical cases of dreamless sleep. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates an objection to introspective arguments for human freedom found within Spinoza's Ethics. The objection-- which we call Spinoza's dream argument -- challenges the evidentiary value of a person's experience of her own freedom by pointing out that some choices made within dreams are experienced as no less free than choices made while awake despite the fact that choices made within dreams are not free. After reconstructing Spinoza's dream argument, we critically evaluate it, concluding ultimately that it (...) fails in two respects. First, we draw upon the results of an experiment we conducted that suggests that dreamt choices are not experienced as free to the same extent as choices made while awake. Second, we argue that there is no compelling justification for the claim that choices made within dreams are not free. (shrink)

Traditionally, dream research focuses on accounting for typical psychological features of dream experiences characteristic of different sleep stages in terms of the global physiological features of the sleep stages in question. However, as subtle differences got into the forefront of enquiry, as, for example, in questions concerning between-stage similarities and within-stage differences of mentations, this methodology became insufficient. What recent findings and theoretical developments suggest is that understanding mental activity during sleep requires studying the fine-grained characteristics of the phenomenal features (...) of individual dreams, which, in turn, demands identifying specific neural processes that might underlie different characteristics of the experiences, and tracking their changes not just between but also within standard sleep stages. The paper argues that such a shift of focus from describing global stages to understanding the significance of local changes results in a true paradigm shift in dream research that can break away from the tradition of thinking about sleep mentation in terms of discrete categories, and offers a novel way of looking at dreams as forming a multidimensional continuum. (shrink)

The relationship between place and remembering has been a long-standing matter of phenomenological concern. The role of the 'lived body' in mediating acts of remembering in context is clearly crucial. In this paper we contribute to an 'expanded view of memory' by describing how remembering difficult or problematic events -- 'vital memories' -- draws upon inter-subjective and inter-objective relations. We discuss two conceptual tools that provide an analytic framework -- the concept of 'life space' drawn from Kurt Lewin and the (...) idea of the 'setting specificity' of remembering. From this perspective we can see that the 'lived body' does not constitute a singular unity but rather a 'plurality' of potential bodies that have 'operative solidarity' with the material relations in which they are constituted. Drawing on the work of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, we argue that 'body memories' need to be analysed from within the embodied material-relational perspective wherein they are afforded. (shrink)

Bodily experience in dreams should be considered illusory to the extent that they cannot be satisfactorily explained or fruitfully investigated by appealing to brain activity alone; rather, to wholly understand the unique phenomenology of embodied selfhood in dreams, one must understand how the brain processes real-body inputs to produce the phenomenology of embodied selfhood in dreams, and why the brain responds the way it does to external stimuli during sleep.

It has been argued that if dreams are genuine conscious experiences that are constituted solely by neural processes, then sensorimotor enactivism cannot pass as a general theory of consciousness. However, the existence of brain-bound dreams would not eliminate the possibility of sensorimotor enactivism being true about veridical perceptual experiences. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the existence of brain-bound dreams would undermine the main motivation and weaken the explanatory appeal of sensorimotor enactivism about perceptual experiences. For if dreams are fully (...) brain-bound then it cannot be the case that brains are incapable of generating the phenomenal features that are explanatorily relevant for sensorimotor enactivists. Hence it remains a plausible hypothesis -- regardless of all the apparent explanatory success of sensorimotor enactivism --- that a future brain-bound account of dreams entails also an illuminating brain-bound account of perceptual experiences. (shrink)

Deja reve has been hypothesized as a cause for various forms of déjà experience. With deja reve one has the distinct impression that the uncanny familiarity one is sensing has come from a preceding dream, but one not usually remembered until the experience is taking place. In this exploratory investigation, 2,492 respondents filled out online questionnaires in which they were queried about the incidence of their deja reve experiences, about dream frequency, and about their attitudes to dreams. The Big Five (...) personality factors were also measured using a separate, standardized questionnaire. Nearly 80% claimed to have had such experiences and the associated frequencies are presented. Age was negatively correlated with the incidence and there was little gender dependence. The results of the Big Five personality factors are also presented. Suggestions are made for future research. (shrink)

Controlled research into alleged psychic functioning can aid our understanding of the nature and limits of consciousness. Some commentators have suggested that the decline in positive results from dream precognition studies might be due to the early experiments being carried out in sleep laboratories whilst later studies tested participants in their own homes. The present study assessed this argument. Twenty participants were selected for prior precognitive dream experience, and were invited to a sleep laboratory. Participants were asked to dream about (...) a target video they would later view. A judge rated participants' dreams against the target and decoys. No evidence was found for dream precognition. The study also tested the hypothesis that precognitive dream experiences may occur when a person subconsciously incorporates sensory information into their dream. A sound clip was played to sleeping participants and a judge rated the target and decoy clips against the participants' dream tran-scripts. The correlation between degree of sensory incorporation and prior precognitive dream experience was non-significant. Suggestions for future research in this area are discussed. (shrink)

I argue that the hard problem of consciousness should be viewed from the perspective of the philosophy of science. In this context, the hard problem can be reformulated as a serious anomaly for the currently dominating research programme in the cognitive neurosciences. I cite empirical evidence from dream research to argue that for this research programme, consciousness is a phenomenon located inside the brain, but for whose constitution no plausible underlying constitutive mechanisms can at the moment be pointed out. Evidence (...) from dream research demonstrates the anomaly in a particularly clear and challenging form, and the empirical facts of dreaming also demonstrate that externalist, embodied, and enactive explanations of consciousness will not be able to solve the problem. (shrink)

This study sets out to investigate the “poetry of grammar“, more specifically the role of the body in figurative speech, in African languages mainly belonging to Nilotic and Bantu. Apprehending the semantics and pragmatics of metaphorical and metonymic expressions in these languages presupposes an interaction between a number of cognitive processes, as argued below. Interestingly, these languages seem to use these strategies involving figurative speech in tandem with alternative strategies involving on-record statements. This multivocality only makes sense if we place (...) language and language structure more in the social world in which it is used.ni. (shrink)

Freud saw the dream as occupying a very important position in his theoretical model. If there were to be problems with his theoretical account of the dream then this would impinge upon proposed therapy and, of course, education as the right balance between the instincts and the institution of culture. Wittgenstein, whilst stating that Freud was interesting and important, raised several issues in relation to psychology/psychoanalysis, and to Freud in particular. Why would Wittgenstein have seen Freud as having some important (...) things to say, even though he was sharply critical of Freud's claims to be scientific? The major issues to be considered in this paper are, in Section 1, the scientific status of Freud's work—was it science or was it more like philosophy than science; the analysis of dreams; rationality, and dreams and madness. Section 2 considers Freud and education, including the indignity of Freud's notion of ‘the talking cure.’ Section 3 considers psychoanalytic explanations not as theory but as a manner of speaking: ‘une façon de parler.’. (shrink)

Beenfeldt assesses Dennett's approach to the philosophical problem of consciousness.

Ernest Sosa has proposed at least three responses to the dream argument for skepticism in his writings in the past decade. The first and the main purpose of this paper is to critically examine the three Sosaian responses, as well as a Wittgensteinian response Sosa would endorse, by investigating whether they can refute the six different versions of the dream argument found in a passage in the Zhuangzi. The second purpose of this paper is exactly to offer an exposition of (...) the passage in the Zhuangzi so as to show that there were already sophisticated versions of the dream argument in ancient China. The main results of the critical examination are as follows. For four of the six versions of the dream argument found in the Zhuangzi, each of them can be refuted by either the Wittgensteinian response or one of the three Sosaian responses. With respect to the remaining two versions of the dream argument, one of them can be refuted partially by two of Sosa’s responses. First, that version of the dream argument can be refuted by one of Sosa’s responses, provided the imagination model of dreaming is adopted. Second, it can also be refuted by another of Sosa’s responses without assuming the imagination model of dreaming, though both the view that there is unsafe knowledge and a certain externalist reliabilism need to be adopted. However, another of the two remaining versions of the dream argument cannot be refuted by any of the Sosaian responses, nor the Wittgensteinian response. This shows that the three Sosaian responses and the Wittgensteinian response cannot refute significantly many different versions of the dream argument. Sosa’s responses, including the Wittgensteinian response, therefore are not in general successful in the refutation of he dream argument for skepticism. (shrink)

This updated paper - translated into Mexican Spanish - analyses Malcolm Lowry, La Mordida in terms of its provision of redemption and atonement for the debts of the past. It also traces various English, European, and American literary influences on Lowry's novel, as well as that of Walter Benjamin.

Nearly half the Nonnes Preestes Tale is devoted to the dream of Chauntecleer and his discussion of it with Pertelote. Their debate on divination through dreams provides a major conflict and a major theme of the poem as Pertelote contends that “Nothyng, God woot, but vanitee in sweven is” 1 while Chauntecleer brings forth authorities and anecdotes to prove that “dremes been to drede” and concludes by saying, “I shal han of this avisioun / Adversitee” . jQuery.click { event.preventDefault(); }).