The Infinite

As a philosophy of mathematics, strict finitism has been traditionally concerned with the notion of feasibility, defended mostly by appealing to the physicality of mathematical practice. This has led the strict finitists to influence and be influenced by the field of computational complexity theory, under the widely held belief that this branch of mathematics is concerned with the study of what is “feasible in practice”. In this paper, I survey these ideas and contend that, contrary to popular belief, complexity theory (...) is not what the ultrafinitists think it is, and that it does not provide a theoretical framework in which to formalize their ideas —at least not while defending the material grounds for feasibility. I conclude that the subject matter of complexity theory is not proving physical resource bounds in computation, but rather proving the absence of exploitable properties in a search space. (shrink)

The following essay reconsiders the ontological and logical issues around Frege’s Basic Law (V). If focuses less on Russell’s Paradox, as most treatments of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (GGA)1 do, but rather on the relation between Frege’s Basic Law (V) and Cantor’s Theorem (CT). So for the most part the inconsistency of Naïve Comprehension (in the context of standard Second Order Logic) will not concern us, but rather the ontological issues central to the conflict between (BLV) and (CT). These ontological (...) issues are interesting in their own right. And if and only if in case ontological considerations make a strong case for something like (BLV) we have to trouble us with inconsistency and paraconsistency. These ontological issues also lead to a renewed methodological reflection what to assume or recognize as an axiom. (shrink)

Time may be infinite in both directions. If it is, then, if persons could live at most once in all of time, the probability that you would be alive now would be zero. But if persons can live more than once, the probability that you would be alive now would be nonzero. Since you are alive now, with certainty, either the past is finite, or persons can live more than once.

The concept of infinity is argued to contain self-contradictions. To maintain logical consistency, mathematics ought to abandon the notion of infinity. It is proposed that infinity should be replaced with the concept of “indefiniteness”. This further implies that other fields drawing on mathematics, such as physics and cosmology, ought to reject theories that postulate infinities of space and time. It is concluded that however indefinite our calculations of space and time become, the Universe must nevertheless be finite.

Consider an infinite series whose items are each explained by their immediate successor. Does such an infinite explanation explain the whole series or does it leave something to be explained? Hume arguably claimed that it does fully explain the whole series. Leibniz, however, designed a very telling objection against this claim, an objection involving an infinite series of book copies. In this paper, I argue that the Humean claim can, in certain cases, be saved from the Leibnizian “infinite book copies” (...) objection, and that this provides an interesting way to defuse some cosmological arguments for the existence of God and to give a non-theistic but complete explanation of the Universe. In the course of my argumentation, I also show that circular explanations can be “self-explanatory” as well: explaining two items by each other can explain the couple of items tout court. (shrink)

Modal logic has been used to analyze potential infinity and potentialism more generally. However, the standard analysis breaks down in cases of divergent possibilities, where there are two or more possibilities that can be individually realized but which are jointly incompatible. This paper has three aims. First, using the intuitionistic theory of choice sequences, we motivate the need for a modal analysis of divergent potentialism and explain the challenges this involves. Then, using Beth–Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic, we overcome those (...) challenges. Finally, we apply our modal analysis of divergent potentialism to make choice sequences comprehensible in classical terms. (shrink)

Using Riemann’s Rearrangement Theorem, Øystein Linnebo (2020) argues that, if it were possible to apply an infinite positive weight and an infinite negative weight to a working scale, the resulting net weight could end up being any real number, depending on the procedure by which these weights are applied. Appealing to the First Postulate of Archimedes’ treatise on balance, I argue instead that the scale would always read 0 kg. Along the way, we stop to consider an infinitely jittery flea, (...) an infinitely protracted border conflict, and an infinitely electric glass rod. (shrink)

Thought experiments are common where infinitely many entities acting in concert give rise to strange results. Some of these cases, however, can be generalized to yield almost omnipotent systems from limited materials. This paper discusses one of these cases, bringing out one aspect of what seems so troubling about "New Zeno" cases. -/- This paper is in memory of Josh Parsons.

Is a logicist bound to the claim that as a matter of analytic truth there is an actual infinity of objects? If Hume’s Principle is analytic then in the standard setting the answer appears to be yes. Hodes’s work pointed to a way out by offering a modal picture in which only a potential infinity was posited. However, this project was abandoned due to apparent failures of cross-world predication. We re-explore this idea and discover that in the setting of the (...) potential infinite one can interpret first-order Peano arithmetic, but not second-order Peano arithmetic. We conclude that in order for the logicist to weaken the metaphysically loaded claim of necessary actual infinities, they must also weaken the mathematics they recover. (shrink)

Ordinarily, the order in which some objects are attached to a scale does not affect the total weight measured by the scale. This principle is shown to fail in certain cases involving infinitely many objects. In these cases, we can produce any desired reading of the scale merely by changing the order in which a fixed collection of objects are attached to the scale. This puzzling phenomenon brings out the metaphysical significance of a theorem about infinite series that is well (...) known by mathematicians but has so far eluded philosophical scrutiny. (shrink)

It is well known that the set of algebraic numbers (let us call it A) is countable. In this paper, instead of the usage of the classical terminology of cardinals proposed by Cantor, a recently introduced methodology using ①-based infinite numbers is applied to measure the set A (where the number ① is called grossone). Our interest to this methodology is explained by the fact that in certain cases where cardinals allow one to say only whether a set is countable (...) or it has the cardinality of the continuum, the ①-based methodology can provide a more accurate measurement of infinite sets. In this article, lower and upper estimates of the number of elements of A are obtained. Both estimates are expressed in ①-based numbers. (shrink)

Rabattement -- De l'incommensurable -- Évitement -- Il y a de l'incommensurable (la jouissance, l'intime, la mort) -- Dé-commensurabiliser -- Ce qui n'est pas de ce monde, mais qui n'est d'un autre monde -- Un concept peut'il changer la vie? (l'incommensurable déploie l'existence).

This paper argues that, insofar as we doubt the bivalence of the Continuum Hypothesis or the truth of the Axiom of Choice, we should also doubt the consistency of third-order arithmetic, both the classical and intuitionistic versions. -/- Underlying this argument is the following philosophical view. Mathematical belief springs from certain intuitions, each of which can be either accepted or doubted in its entirety, but not half-accepted. Therefore, our beliefs about reality, bivalence, choice and consistency should all be aligned.

In this article, some classical paradoxes of infinity such as Galileo’s paradox, Hilbert’s paradox of the Grand Hotel, Thomson’s lamp paradox, and the rectangle paradox of Torricelli are considered. In addition, three paradoxes regarding divergent series and a new paradox dealing with multiplication of elements of an infinite set are also described. It is shown that the surprising counting system of an Amazonian tribe, Pirah ̃a, working with only three numerals (one, two, many) can help us to change our perception (...) of these paradoxes. A recently introduced methodology allowing one to work with finite, infinite, and infinitesimal numbers in a unique computational framework not only theoretically but also numerically is briefly described. This methodology is actively used nowadays in numerous applications in pure and applied mathematics and computer science as well as in teaching. It is shown in the article that this methodology also allows one to consider the paradoxes listed above in a new constructive light. (shrink)

From the Publisher: -/- This book presents a new powerful supercomputing paradigm introduced by Yaroslav D. Sergeyev -/- It gives a friendly introduction to the paradigm and proposes a broad panorama of a successful usage of numerical infinities -/- The volume covers software implementations of the Infinity Computer -/- Abstract -/- This book provides a friendly introduction to the paradigm and proposes a broad panorama of killing applications of the Infinity Computer in optimization: radically new numerical algorithms, great theoretical insights, (...) efficient software implementations, and interesting practical case studies. This is the first book presenting to the readers interested in optimization the advantages of a recently introduced supercomputing paradigm that allows to numerically work with different infinities and infinitesimals on the Infinity Computer patented in several countries. One of the editors of the book is the creator of the Infinity Computer, and another editor was the first who has started to use it in optimization. Their results were awarded by numerous scientific prizes. This engaging book opens new horizons for researchers, engineers, professors, and students with interests in supercomputing paradigms, optimization, decision making, game theory, and foundations of mathematics and computer science. -/- “Mathematicians have never been comfortable handling infinities… But an entirely new type of mathematics looks set to by-pass the problem… Today, Yaroslav Sergeyev, a mathematician at the University of Calabria in Italy solves this problem… ” -/- MIT Technology Review -/- “These ideas and future hardware prototypes may be productive in all fields of science where infinite and infinitesimal numbers (derivatives, integrals, series, fractals) are used.” A. Adamatzky, Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of Unconventional Computing. -/- “I am sure that the new approach … will have a very deep impact both on Mathematics and Computer Science.” D. Trigiante, Computational Management Science. -/- “Within the grossone framework, it becomes feasible to deal computationally with infinite quantities, in a way that is both new (in the sense that previously intractable problems become amenable to computation) and natural”. R. Gangle, G. Caterina, F. Tohmé, Soft Computing. -/- “The computational features offered by the Infinity Computer allow us to dynamically change the accuracy of representation and floating-point operations during the flow of a computation. When suitably implemented, this possibility turns out to be particularly advantageous when solving ill-conditioned problems. In fact, compared with a standard multi-precision arithmetic, here the accuracy is improved only when needed, thus not affecting that much the overall computational effort.” P. Amodio, L. Brugnano, F. Iavernaro & F. Mazzia, Soft Computing. (shrink)

Gaisi Takeuti extended Gentzen's work to higher-order case in 1950's–1960's and proved the consistency of impredicative subsystems of analysis. He has been chiefly known as a successor of Hilbert's school, but we pointed out in the previous paper that Takeuti's aimed to investigate the relationships between "minds" by carrying out his proof-theoretic project rather than proving the "reliability" of such impredicative subsystems of analysis. Moreover, as briefly explained there, his philosophical ideas can be traced back to Nishida's philosophy in Kyoto's (...) school. For the proving the consistency of such systems, it is crucial to prove the well-foundedness of ordinals called "ordinal diagrams" developed for it. Takeuti presented such arguments several times in order to show that they are admitted in his stand point. As a starting point of investigating his finitist stand point, we formulate the system of ordinal notations up to ε0 and reconstruct the well-foundedness arguments of them. (shrink)

Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) is commonly thought to have attempted to develop a theory of size for infinite collections that follows the so-called part–whole principle, according to which the whole is always greater than any of its proper parts. In this paper, we develop a novel interpretation of Bolzano’s mature theory of the infinite and show that, contrary to mainstream interpretations, it is best understood as a theory of infinite sums. Our formal results show that Bolzano’s infinite sums can be equipped (...) with the rich and original structure of a non-commutative ordered ring, and that Bolzano’s views on the mathematical infinite are, after all, consistent. (shrink)

What is infinity? It's reading the last line of a book and imagining the rest. No, wait, it's the instruction manual for the machine that operates the sun and the stars. In unexpected observations, captivating images, and even some equations, celebrated Argentinian author-illustrator Pablo Bernasconi, finalist for the 2018 Hans Christian Andersen Award, offers up verses about what infinity could mean to all of us. Winner of the Grand Prize from the Asociación de Literatura Infantil y Juvenil de la Argentina (...) (ALIJA) in 2018, Infinity is a book children and adults alike will find endlessly fascinating. (shrink)

We generalize Kada’s definable strengthening of Dilworth’s characterization of the class of quasi-orders admitting an antichain of a given finite cardinality.

Time may be infinite in both directions. If it is, then, if persons could live at most once in all of time, the probability that you would be alive now would be zero. But if persons can live more than once, the probability that you would be alive now would be nonzero. Since you are alive now, with certainty, either the past is finite, or persons can live more than once.

‘Mathematics is the science of the infinite, its goal the symbolic comprehension of the infinite with human, that is finite, means.’ Along this line, in The Open World, Hermann Weyl contrasted the desire to make the infinite accessible through finite processes, which underlies any theoretical investigation of reality, with the intuitive feeling for the infinite ‘peculiar to the Orient,’ which remains ‘indifferent to the concrete manifold of reality.’ But a critical analysis may acknowledge a valuable dialectical opposition. Struggling to spell (...) out the infinity of real numbers mathematicians come to see the active role of emptiness. Pondering over the essence of self-awareness, the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitarō comes to see the ‘place’ where it abides as absolute nothingness. Thus, the two ways of seeing coalesce into a perspective in which infinity and nothingness mirror each other. (shrink)

In this paper, I present and motivate a modal set theory consistent with the idea that there is only one size of infinity.

Our relationship to the infinite is controversial. But it is widely agreed that our powers of reasoning are finite. I disagree with this consensus; I think that we can, and perhaps do, engage in infinite reasoning. Many think it is just obvious that we can't reason infinitely. This is mistaken. Infinite reasoning does not require constructing infinitely long proofs, nor would it gift us with non-recursive mental powers. To reason infinitely we only need an ability to perform infinite inferences. I (...) argue that we have this ability. My argument looks to our best current theories of inference and considers examples of apparent infinite reasoning. My position is controversial, but if I'm right, our theories of truth, mathematics, and beyond could be transformed. And even if I'm wrong, a more careful consideration of infinite reasoning can only deepen our understanding of thinking and reasoning. -/- (Note for readers: the paper's brief discussion of uniform reflection and omega inconsistency is misleading. The imagined interlocutor's argument makes an assumption about the PA-provability of provability generalizations that, while true for the Godel sentence's instances, is unjustified, in general. This means my position is stronger against this objection than the paper suggests, since omega inconsistent theories are not automatically inconsistent with their uniform reflection principles, you also need to assume the arithmetically true Pi-2 sentences.). (shrink)

Linnebo and Shapiro have recently given an analysis of potential infinity using modal logic. A key technical component of their account is to show that under a suitable translation ◊ of nonmodal language into modal language, nonmodal sentences ϕ 1, …, ϕ n entail ψ just in case ϕ 1 ◊, …, ϕ n ◊ entail ψ ◊ in the modal logic S4.2. Linnebo and Shapiro establish this result in nonfree logic. In this note I argue that their analysis of (...) potential infinity should be carried out in a free logic. I then extend their key theorems to the setting of negative free logic. (shrink)

In Bertrand Russell's 1903 Principles of Mathematics, he offers an apparently devastating criticism of the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen's Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History (PIM). Russell's criticism is motivated by his concern that Cohen's account of the foundations of calculus saddles mathematics with the paradoxes of the infinitesimal and continuum, and thus threatens the very idea of mathematical truth. This paper defends Cohen against that objection of Russell's, and argues that properly understood, Cohen's views of limits and infinitesimals (...) do not entail the paradoxes of the infinitesimal and continuum. Essential to that defense is an interpretation, developed in the paper, of Cohen's positions in the PIM as deeply rationalist. The interest in developing this interpretation is not just that it reveals how Cohen's views in the PIM avoid the paradoxes of the infinitesimal and continuum. It also reveals some of what is at stake, both historically and philosophically, in Russell's criticism of Cohen. (shrink)

A common argument in support of a beginning of the universe used by advocates of the kalām cosmological argument (KCA) is the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite, or the “Infinity Argument”. However, it turns out that the Infinity Argument loses some of its force when compared with the achievements of set theory and it brings into question the view that God predetermined an endless future. We therefore defend a new formal argument, based on the nature of time (...) (just as geometrical reasoning is based on the nature of space), which addresses more directly the question of beginningless time. (shrink)

The infinite pigeonhole principle for 2-partitions asserts the existence, for every set A, of an infinite subset of A or of its complement. In this paper, we study the infinite pigeonhole pr...

S'inscrivant dans le prolongement des travaux de P. Duhem et d'A. Koyré, cet ouvrage retrace l'histoire de la cosmologie au XVIIIe siècle en Europe, qui s'accompagne alors d'une conceptualisation de l'infini. Une place centrale est accordée à E. Kant, depuis la période précritique jusqu'aux œuvres posthumes. Ce livre poursuit la réflexion entamée dans Dieu, l'Univers et la sphère infinie.

In the analysis of Anaxagoras’ physics in view of the relation between his teachings on multitude and heterogeneity, two central questions emerge: 1) How can the structure of the universe considered purely mereo-topologically help us explain that at the first cosmic stage no qualitative difference is manifest in spite of the fact that the entire qualitative heterogeneity is supposedly already present there? 2) How can heterogeneity become manifest at the second stage, resulting from the noûs intervention, if according to fragment (...) B 6 such a possibility requires the existence of “the smallest”, while according to the general principle stated in fragment B 3 there is not “the smallest” but always only “a smaller”? This paper showcases the perplexity of these two questions but deals only with the former. The answer follows from Anaxagoras’ being a thoroughgoing infinitist in the way in which no Greek physicist was: the principle of space isotropy operative in geometry is extended to physics as well. So any two parts of the original mixture are similar to each other not only in view of the smaller-larger relation but also because each contains everything that the other one contains. This in effect means that at the stage of maximal possible heterogeneity each part of any part contains infinitely many heterogeneous parts of any kind whatsoever. So, neither can there be homogeneous parts in view of any qualitative property, nor can there be predominance in quantity of parts of any kind that would make some property manifest. (shrink)

This article is about the ontological dispute between finitists, who claim that only finitely many numbers exist, and infinitists, who claim that infinitely many numbers exist. Van Bendegem set out to solve the 'general problem' for finitism: how can one recast finite fragments of classical mathematics in finitist terms? To solve this problem Van Bendegem comes up with a new brand of finitism, namely so-called 'apophatic finitism'. In this article it will be argued that apophatic finitism is unable to represent (...) the negative ontological commitments of infinitism or, in other words, that which does not exist according to infinitism. However, there is a brand of infinitism, so-called 'apophatic infinitism', that is able to represent both the positive and the negative ontological commitments of apophatic finitism. Unfortunately, apophatic finitism cannot adopt that way without losing the ability to represent the positive ontological commitments of infinitism. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAccording to a famous argument by Dummett, the concept of set is indefinitely extensible, and the logic appropriate for reasoning about the instances of any such concept is intuitionistic, not classical. But Dummett's argument is widely regarded as obscure. This note explains how the final chapter of Rumfitt's important new book advances our understanding of Dummett's argument, but it also points out some problems and unanswered questions. Finally, Rumfitt's reconstruction of Dummett's argument is contrasted with my own preferred alternative.

The concept of linguistic infinity has had a central role to play in foundational debates within theoretical linguistics since its more formal inception in the mid-twentieth century. The conceptualist tradition, marshalled in by Chomsky and others, holds that infinity is a core explanandum and a link to the formal sciences. Realism/Platonism takes this further to argue that linguistics is in fact a formal science with an abstract ontology. In this paper, I argue that a central misconstrual of formal apparatus of (...) recursive operations such as the set-theoretic operation merge has led to a mathematisation of the object of inquiry, producing a strong analogy with discrete mathematics and especially arithmetic. The main product of this error has been the assumption that natural, like some formal, languages are discretely infinite. I will offer an alternative means of capturing the insights and observations related to this posit in terms of scientific modelling. My chief aim will be to draw from the larger philosophy of science literature in order to offer a position of grammars as models compatible with various foundational interpretations of linguistics while being informed by contemporary ideas on scientific modelling for the natural and social sciences. (shrink)

This paper discusses an infinite regress that looms behind a certain kind of historical explanation. The movement of one barbarian group is often explained by the movement of others, but those movements in turn call for an explanation. While their explanation can again be the movement of yet another group of barbarians, if this sort of explanation does not stop somewhere we are left with an infinite regress of barbarians. While that regress would be vicious, it cannot be accommodated by (...) several general views about what viciousness in infinite regresses amounts to. This example is additional evidence that we should prefer a pluralist approach to infinite regresses. (shrink)

Many historical and philosophical studies treat infinity as an exclusively quantitative notion, whose proper domain of application is mathematics and physics. The main aim of this paper is to disentangle, by critically examining, three notions of infinity in the early modern period, and to argue that one—but only one—of them is quantitative. One of these non-quantitative notions concerns being or reality, while the other concerns a particular iterative property of an aggregate. These three notions will emerge through examination of three (...) central figures in the period: Locke, Descartes, and Leibniz. (shrink)

This paper considers non-standard analysis and a recently introduced computational methodology based on the notion of ①. The latter approach was developed with the intention to allow one to work with infinities and infinitesimals numerically in a unique computational framework and in all the situations requiring these notions. Non-standard analysis is a classical purely symbolic technique that works with ultrafilters, external and internal sets, standard and non-standard numbers, etc. In its turn, the ①-based methodology does not use any of these (...) notions and proposes a more physical treatment of mathematical objects separating the objects from tools used to study them. It both offers a possibility to create new numerical methods using infinities and infinitesimals in floating-point computations and allows one to study certain mathematical objects dealing with infinity more accurately than it is done traditionally. In these notes, we explain that even though both methodologies deal with infinities and infinitesimals, they are independent and represent two different philosophies of Mathematics that are not in a conflict. It is proved that texts :539–555, 2017; Gutman and Kutateladze in Sib Math J 49:835–841, 2008; Kutateladze in J Appl Ind Math 5:73–75, 2011) asserting that the ①-based methodology is a part of non-standard analysis unfortunately contain several logical fallacies. Their attempt to show that the ①-based methodology can be formalized within non-standard analysis is similar to trying to show that constructivism can be reduced to the traditional Mathematics. (shrink)

In this book, best-selling author and mathematician Haim Shapira presents an introduction to mathematical theories which deal with the most beautiful concept ever invented by humankind: infinity. Written in clear, simple language and aimed at a lay audience, this book also offers some strategies that will allow readers to try their ability at solving truly fascinating mathematical problems. Infinity is a deeply counter-intuitive concept that has inspired many great thinkers. In this book we will meet many sages, both familiar and (...) unfamiliar: Zeno and Pythagoras, Georg Cantor and Bertrand Russell, Sofia Kovalevskaya and Emmy Noether, al-Khwarizmi and Euclid, Sophie Germain and Srinivasa Ramanujan. The world of infinity is inhabited by many paradoxes, and so is this book: Zeno paradoxes, Hilbert's "Infinity Hotel", Achilles and the gods paradox, the paradox of heaven and hell, the Ross-Littlewood paradox involving tennis balls, the Galileo paradox and many more. Aimed at the curious but non-technical reader, this book refrains from using any fearsome mathematical symbols. It uses only the most basic operations of mathematics: adding, subtracting, multiplication, division, powers and roots - that is all. But that doesn't mean that a bit of deep thinking won't be necessary and rewarding. Writing with humour and lightness of touch, Haim Shapira banishes the chalky pallor of the schoolroom and offers instead a truly thrilling intellectual journey. Fasten your seatbelt - we are going to Infinity, and beyond! (shrink)

Eu dou uma revisão detalhada de "os limites exteriores da razão" por Noson Yanofsky de uma perspectiva unificada de Wittgenstein e psicologia evolutiva. Eu indico que a dificuldade com tais questões como paradoxo na linguagem e matemática, incompletude, undecidabilidade, computabilidade, o cérebro eo universo como computadores, etc., todos surgem a partir da falta de olhar atentamente para o nosso uso da linguagem no apropriado contexto e, consequentemente, a falta de separar questões de fato científico a partir de questões de como (...) a linguagem funciona. Discuto os pontos de vista de Wittgenstein sobre incompletude, paraconsistência e indecidabilidade e o trabalho de Wolpert sobre os limites para a computação. Para resumir: o universo de acordo com o Brooklyn---boa ciência, não tão boa filosofia. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

Résumé – Nous nous intéressons à l’enseignement et l’apprentissage de l’infini en classe de mathématiques en considérant les différences et les relations entre infini potentiel et infini actuel. Nous présentons les principaux éléments de notre étude philosophique, épistémologique et didactique, ainsi que trois situations visant à conduire un travail explicite avec les élèves sur ces questions en début de lycée. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------- Abstract – We are interested in the teaching and learning of infinite in mathematics class, taking into account the relations (...) between potential infinite and actual infinite. We report the main elements of our current philosophical, epistemological and didactical study; we also present three mathematical situations that we consider relevant for this purpose and to be explored with 10 and 11 grade students. (shrink)

This paper deals with two different problems in which infinity plays a central role. I first respond to a claim that infinity renders counting knowledge-level beliefs an infeasible approach to measuring and comparing how much we know. There are two methods of comparing sizes of infinite sets, using the one-to-one correspondence principle or the subset principle, and I argue that we should use the subset principle for measuring knowledge. I then turn to the normalizability and coarse tuning objections to fine-tuning (...) arguments for the existence of God or a multiverse. These objections center on the difficulty of talking about the epistemic probability of a physical constant falling within a finite life-permitting range when the possible range of that constant is infinite. Applying the lessons learned regarding infinity and the measurement of knowledge, I hope to blunt much of the force of these objections to fine-tuning arguments. (shrink)

Richard Dedekind’s theorem 66 states that there exists an infinite set. Its proof invokes such apparently nonmathematical notions as the thought-world and the self. This article discusses the content and context of Dedekind’s proof. It is suggested that Dedekind took the notion of the thought-world from Hermann Lotze. The influence of Kant and Bernard Bolzano on the proof is also discussed, and the reception of the proof in the mathematical and philosophical literature is covered in detail.

In this paper, I develop a new interpretation of the order of nature, its function, and its implications in Margaret Cavendish’s philosophy. According to the infinite balance account, the order of nature consists in a balance among the infinite varieties of nature. That is, for Cavendish, nature contains an infinity of different types of matter: infinite species, shapes, and motions. The potential tumult implicated by such a variety, however, is tempered by the counterbalancing of the different kinds and motions of (...) matter against one another, or what Cavendish calls the “poising” of nature’s actions by their opposites. The infinite balance account of order offers insight into a central notion of Cavendish’s system and bears important implications for other interpretive issues. To wit, the account resolves the standing issue of whether there is genuine disorder in Cavendish’s universe and elucidates the nature of her opposition to atomism. Nevertheless, the interpretation faces an epistemic challenge, insofar as Cavendish appears to deny knowledge of infinity. I argue that, for Cavendish, our knowledge of the order of nature is conceptual and non-empirical, revealing limits to her apparent empiricism. (shrink)

This third edition of The Infinite includes a new part 'Infinity Superseded' which contains two new chapters refining Moore's ideas through a re-examination of the ideas of Spinoza, Hegel, and Nietzsche. Much of this is heavily influenced by the work of Deleuze. There is also a new technical appendix on still unresolved issues about different infinite sizes.

Alexander R. Pruss examines a large family of paradoxes to do with infinity - ranging from deterministic supertasks to infinite lotteries and decision theory. Having identified their common structure, Pruss considers at length how these paradoxes can be resolved by embracing causal finitism.

The distinction between the discrete and the continuous lies at the heart of mathematics. Discrete mathematics (arithmetic, algebra, combinatorics, graph theory, cryptography, logic) has a set of concepts, techniques, and application areas largely distinct from continuous mathematics (traditional geometry, calculus, most of functional analysis, differential equations, topology). The interaction between the two – for example in computer models of continuous systems such as fluid flow – is a central issue in the applicable mathematics of the last hundred years. This article (...) explains the distinction and why it has proved to be one of the great organizing themes of mathematics. (shrink)