Summary |
“Divine Hiddenness” in
contemporary philosophy of religion may refer to the supposed fact that the
existence of God is less than obvious, or to an argument against theism based
on this supposed fact. The argument begins with the observation that many
people of apparently good will and at least average intelligence have
investigated the claims of theism, and yet still do not believe that God
exists. Suppose, as many theists do, that the greatest human good is found in a
personal relationship with God. Not believing that God exists seems an obvious
barrier to such a relationship; but many of those who do not believe in God
seem morally and epistemically blameless in their lack of belief. If the God of
theism—an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good personal being—did exist,
then surely those who genuinely seek God would find God: an omnipotent God
would be capable of providing clear self-revelation to those who genuinely
seek, and a perfectly good God would want to provide such revelation. That so
many of those who do seek or have sought God persist in unbelief is therefore
itself evidence that God does not exist. Or so claims the advocate of the
“argument from divine hiddenness.” Some philosophers have responded by argued
that “the problem of divine hiddenness” is simply a special case of the more
general problem of evil, adding nothing new to the case against the existence
of God, nor any new challenge to extant responses to the problem of evil. For
example, it could be that there is some outweighing good that can only be
obtained by God allowing blameless disbelief to continue in a person’s life. Other
philosophers have argued that a good God might provide only “purposive
evidence”; i.e., evidence that may only be made available to one if it would
accomplish God’s purpose in one’s life (e.g., that one would respond to the
evidence not just by believing that God exists, but also by loving and obeying
God). |