Buddhism was not really known in the West until a little more than 150 years ago. Although since the thirteenth century there had been numerous contacts with local Buddhist traditions, the travellers and missionaries of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance had not yet brought to light the history of Buddhism and its unity across this immense diversity of worship and doctrine, disseminated through most of the countries of Asia. Of course, since the seventeenth century some Europeans had guessed at (...) the Indian origin of the Buddha and they succeeded in pinning down his historical existence after a fashion. In 1691 and 1693 Simon de la Loubère, Louis XIV's envoy at the court of the king of Siam, published remarkable research which established the possibility of a link between the different regions of Siam, Ceylon, Japan and China and conjured up the possible existence of a single founder long before Christ. But this far too isolated knowledge had scarcely any impact in Europe. It was only with the foundation of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784 that orientalism was to enjoy a rapid and decisive expansion. The word ‘Buddhism’ appeared from the 1820s onwards, and with it the first conceptualization of a tree with many branchings. But it was not until the publication, in 1844, of Eugène Burnouf's magisterial Introduction l'histoire du buddhisme indien, that more detailed knowledge became available, thanks to a critical scrutiny of the most varied sources. The works of the French scholar and of other pioneers in Buddhist studies - mainly Alexander Csoma de Koros and Edmond Foucaux on Tibet, Jean-Pierre Abel-Remusat and Stanislas Julien on China, Christian Lassen and Spence Hardy on Ceylon - were to give rise to a tremendous craze for Buddhism in Europe. Since then there has been no break in the successive waves disseminating it right up to the present day, when the majority of Western countries appear to be so receptive to the message of the Buddha that for some years the media have been insistently questioning the reasons for this ‘Buddhist wave’. (shrink)

Umberto Eco -- Stephen Jay Gould -- Jean-Claude Carrière -- Jean Delumeau.

A huge bestseller in Europe, Frederic Lenoir’s Happiness is an exciting journey that examines how history’s greatest philosophers and religious figures have answered life’s most fundamental question: What is happiness and how do I achieve it? From the ancient Greeks on—from Aristotle, Plato, and Chuang Tzu to the Buddha, Jesus, and Muhammad; from Voltaire, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer to Kant, Freud, and even modern neuroscientists—Lenoir considers the idea that true and lasting happiness is indeed possible. In clear language, (...) class='Hi'>Lenoir concisely surveys what the greatest thinkers of all time have had to say on the subject, and, with charming prose, raises provocative questions: · Do we have a duty to be happy? · Is there a connection between individual and collective happiness? · Is happiness contagious? · Is there a difference between pleasure and happiness? · Can unhappiness and happiness coexist? · Does our happiness depend on our luck? Understanding how civilization’s best minds have answered those questions, Lenoir suggests, not only makes for a fascinating reading experience, but also provides a way for us to see us how happiness, that most elusive of feelings, is attainable in our own lives. (shrink)

Qu'entendons-nous par "bonheur"? Dépend-il de nos gènes, de la chance, de notre sensibilité? Est-ce un état durable ou une suite de plaisirs fugaces? N'est-il que subjectif? Faut-il le rechercher? Peut-on le cultiver? Souffrance et bonheur peuvent-ils coexister? Pour tenter de répondre à ces questions, Frédéric Lenoir propose un voyage philosophique, joyeux et plein de saveurs. Une promenade stimulante en compagnie des grands sages d'Orient et d'Occident. Où l'on traversera le jardin des plaisirs avec Epicure. Où l'on entendra raisonner le (...) rire de Montaigne et de Tchouang-tseu. Où l'on croisera le sourire paisible du Bouddha et d'Epictète. Où l'on goûtera à la joie de Spinoza et d'Etty Hillesum. Un cheminement vivant, ponctué d'exemples concrets et des dernières découvertes des neurosciences, pour nous aider à vivre mieux. (shrink)

Early practitioners of the social studies of science turned their attention away from questions of institutionalisation, which had tended to emphasize macrolevel explanations, and attended instead to microstudies of laboratory practice. The author is interested in re-investigating certain aspects of institution formation, notably the formation of scientific, medical, and engineering disciplines. He emphasises the manner in which science as cultural practice is imbricated with other forms of social, political, and even aesthetic practices. The author considers the following topics: the organic (...) physics of 1847; the innovative research program of Carl Ludwig as a model for institutionalising science-based medicine, optics, painting, and ideology in Germany, 1845-95; the Haber-Bosch synthesis of ammonia; and the introduction of nuclear magnetic resonance instrumentation into the practice of organic chemistry. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est le résultat d'un long travail de réflexion sur l'éducation, il pose de manière critique, en s'appuyant sur les théories et les pratiques qui ont irrigué la pédagogie libertaire, la question à la fois fondamentale et d'actualité de l'autogestion et de l'éthique en matière ; d'éducation. Après avoir rappelé quelques principes de base d'une éducation de la liberté par la liberté, l'auteur s'intéresse à l'inutile fracture entre la formation initiale et l'éducation permanente qui n'est à ses yeux qu'une (...) imposture. II développe ensuite un propos, appuyé sur des expériences de terrain, qui tend à démontrer toute l'efficacité des formations coopératives et autogérées. Enfin, il s'attaque à la délicate question de l'éthique et des valeurs nécessaires à la conduite de l'action éducative, en particulier en matière d'évaluation. Un livre qui, sans donner de leçons, donne à penser. (shrink)

Banni de la communauté juive à 23 ans pour hérésie, Baruch Spinoza décide de consacrer sa vie à la philosophie. Son objectif? Découvrir un bien véritable qui lui "procurerait pour l'éternité la jouissance d'une joie suprême et incessante". Au cours des vingt années qui lui restent à vivre, Spinoza édifie une oeuvre révolutionnaire. Comment cet homme a-t-il pu, en plein XVIIe siècle, être le précurseur des Lumières et de nos démocraties modernes? Le pionnier d'une lecture historique et critique de la (...) Bible? Le fondateur de la psychologie des profondeurs? L'initiateur de la philologie, de la sociologie et de l'éthologie? Et surtout, l'inventeur d'une philosophie fondée sur le désir et la joie, qui bouleverse notre conception de Dieu, de la morale et du bonheur? À bien des égards, Spinoza est non seulement très en avance sur son temps, mais aussi sur le nôtre. C'est ce que j'appelle le "miracle" Spinoza. Frédéric Lenoir raconte la vie édifiante de Spinoza que Goethe, Nietzsche, Freud ou Einstein considéraient comme le plus grand des philosophes. Il rend accessible sa pensée foisonnante et livre un traité philosophique d'émancipation, qui se lit presque comme un thriller tant on a envie de connaître l'étape suivante et d'atteindre la joie suprême. Une lecture qui donne une force et une énergie incroyables."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Haeusermann et al. (Citation2023) draw three overall conclusions from their study on closed loop neuromodulation and self-perception in clinical treatment of refractory epilepsy. The first is that closed-loop neuromodulation devices did not substantially change epileptic patient’s personalities or self-perception postoperatively. The second is that some patients and caregivers attributed observed changes in personality and self-perception to the epilepsy itself and not to the DBS treatments. The third is that the devices provided participants with novel ways to make sense of their (...) illness. These findings further demonstrate a misalignment between some neuroethicists’ concerns about putative postoperative changes to personality, and the empirical evidence for such changes. Haeusermann et al. nonetheless concede that “neurotechnology directed at persisting rather than episodic clinical phenomena could have greater implications for personality or self-perception, either because they operate more continuously or are directed at clinical phenomena that are more stably integrated into patients’ self-concepts” (41). We acknowledge that the hypothesis that participants did not report changes because they were only episodically and not continually stimulated offers an interesting line for future investigation. Nonetheless, we would like to propose that potential postoperative personality changes might be correlated with the pathophysiology itself, rather than the stimulation effects of the technology. Generally, we advance the view that unintended effects solely induced by the technology cannot be excluded per se. Regardless, this comment aims to highlight that ethicists’ starting premise should be that patients suffering from diverse pathophysiology, or patients who are treated with stimulation in different brain regions and with differing parameters, would likely not react in the same way to treatment. (shrink)

Focusing on new disciplines in 19th-century German universities, this book reexamines certain critical junctures in the traditional historical picture of the role of the scientist in modern Western society.

. Computational chemistry grew in a new era of “desktop modeling,” which coincided with a growing demand for modeling software, especially from the pharmaceutical industry. Parameterization of models in computational chemistry is an arduous enterprise, and we argue that this activity leads, in this specific context, to tensions among scientists regarding the epistemic opacity transparency of parameterized methods and the software implementing them. We relate one flame war from the Computational Chemistry mailing List in order to assess in detail the (...) relationships between modeling methods, parameterization, software and the various forms of their enclosure or disclosure. Our claim is that parameterization issues are an important and often neglected source of epistemic opacity and that this opacity is entangled in methods and software alike. Models and software must be addressed together to understand the epistemological tensions at stake. (shrink)

This is _the_ leading introduction 200to professional values and ethics in social work. Frederic G. Reamer provides social workers with a succinct and comprehensive overview of the most critical issues relating to professional values and ethics, including the nature of social work values, ethical dilemmas, and professional misconduct. Conceptually rich and attuned to the complexities of ethical decision making, _Social Work Values and Ethics_ is unique in striking the right balance between history, theory, and practical application. For the third edition, (...) Reamer has updated the content and strengthened the relevance of the case material. Also new to the third edition: o Discussion of the moral dialogue between practitioner and cliento Coverage of virtue ethicso Practical discussion of concepts underlying social work ethicso Expanded application of the National Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics to ethical dilemmas in the professiono A look at the historical evolution of ethical standards in social worko New vignettes, illustrating difficult ethical decisionso More guidance on informed consent and termination of serviceso Discussion questions at the end of each chaptero A section on how to conduct a social work ethics audit. (shrink)

This book is a unique introductory overview of decision theory. It is completely non-technical, without a single formula in the book. Written in a crisp and clear style it succinctly covers the full range of philosophical issues of rationality and decision theory, including game theory, social choice theory, prisoner's dilemma and much else. The book aims to expand the scope and enrich the foundations of decision theory. By addressing such issues as ambivalence, inner conflict, and the constraints imposed upon us (...) by our attachments to others, Frederic Schick reveals that our thinking is often more subtle than standard theories of rationality allow. Only a theory that respects that subtlety can illumine what is otherwise puzzling. The book contains many examples drawn from history and literature dealing with subjects such as love, war, friendship, and crime. (shrink)

One important concern regarding implantable Brain Computer Interfaces is the fear that the intervention will negatively change a patient’s sense of identity or agency. In particular, there is concern that the user will be psychologically worse-off following treatment despite postoperative functional improvements. Clinical observations from similar implantable brain technologies, such as deep brain stimulation, show a small but significant proportion of patients report feelings of strangeness or difficulty adjusting to a new concept of themselves characterized by a maladaptive je ne (...) sais quoi despite clear motor improvement. Despite the growing number of cases in the DBS literature, there is currently no accepted or standardized tool in neuroethics specifically designed to capture the phenomenological postoperative experience of patients implanted with DBS or BCI devices. Given potential risks of postoperative maladaptation, it is important for the field of neuroethics to develop a qualitative instrument that can serve as a shared method for capturing postoperative variations in patient experience of identity and agency. The goal of this article is to introduce an instrument we have developed for this purpose and call for further neuroethical efforts to assess the phenomenology of implantable brain device use. (shrink)

Who would have thought twenty-five years ago that the term “bioethics,” a neologism coined by an American biologist, would have met with such success, becoming one of the cornerstones of philosophical and juridical reflection at the end of the twentieth century? For it was in 1970 that the biologist and oncologist Van Rensalear Potter published his book, Bioethics, Science of Survival.

In response to a mandate conferred on the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of UNESCO in November 1993, the IBC has drafted a "universal declaration on the human genome and human rights," which will be considered by the General Conference of UNESCO in November 1997. This article discusses the development of the document and provides the text of the "revised preliminary draft" of the declaration.

Before the Darwinian revolution species were thought to be universals. Since then, numerous attempts have been made to propose new definitions. The twentieth-century German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann defined 'species' as an individual system of processes and a process of life of a higher-order. To provide a clear understanding of Hartmann's conception of species, I first present his method of definition. Then I look at Hartmann's Philosophie der Natur (1950) to present his concepts of "organism" and "species." And I end the (...) paper by pointing out two possible systematic inconsistencies. (shrink)

Brief, accessible, and affordable, these pocket-sized volumes offer the essential introductions to the great philosophers of the Western tradition-from Plato to Wittgenstein.

The Russian philosopher Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky adhered to an evolutionary metaphysics of reincarnation according to which the world is constituted of immortal souls or monads, which he calls ‘substantival agents.’ These substantival agents can evolve or devolve depending on the goodness or badness of their behavior. Such evolution requires the possibility for monads to reincarnate into the bodies of creatures of a higher or of a lower level on the scala perfectionis. According to this theory, a substantival agent can evolve (...) by being gradually reincarnated multiple times through a sort of process of metamorphosis from the level of the most elementary particles all the way up to the level of human beings or even higher. In ‘Ученiе Лейбница о перевоплощенiи какъ метаморфозѣ’, Lossky argues that the works of Leibniz contain scattered elements of such a systematic evolutionary doctrine of reincarnation as metamorphosis and he attempts to reconstitute this doctrine. The present article is intended as an historical introduction to the translation of Lossky’s ‘Leibniz’s Doctrine of Reincarnation as Metamorphosis.’. (shrink)

Introduction -- 1e Intermed consid -- Marx -- Simmel -- Weber -- Lukács -- 2e intermed consid -- Horkheimer -- Adorno -- 3e intermed consid -- Habermas I -- Habermas II -- Habermas III -- Conclusion -- Postscript -- Bibliography.

Philosophy is one of the most intimidating and difficult of disciplines, as any of its students can attest. This book is an important entry in a distinctive new series from Routledge: The Great Philosophers . Breaking down obstacles to understanding the ideas of history's greatest thinkers, these brief, accessible, and affordable volumes offer essential introductions to the great philosophers of the Western tradition from Plato to Wittgenstein. In just 64 pages, each author, a specialist on his subject, places the philosopher (...) and his ideas into historical perspective. Each volume explains, in simple terms, the basic concepts, enriching the narrative through the effective use of biographical detail. And instead of attempting to explain the philosopher's entire intellectual history, which can be daunting, this series takes one central theme in each philosopher's work, using it to unfold the philosopher's thoughts. (shrink)

This book is a guide to working with social science concepts. Concepts are the prisms through which we see the social world. They are foundational to the social science enterprise, and the quality of investigations hinges in part on how well researchers make use of them. Most social science concepts are drawn from ordinary language used in everyday ways; however, many social scientists "reconfigure" ordinary words to meet their research needs. They tinker with the meanings of words to fit their (...) theoretical aims and make them precise, useful tools of measurement and comparison. This book examines social science concepts through an interpretivist lens with the aim of providing concrete conceptual guidance for future research. Specifically, this book seeks to: 1) identify characteristic dangers that attend the making and use of reconfigured concepts; 2) lay out ways in which a select number of interpretivist approaches have been used to mitigate these dangers; 3) introduce practical tools that rework these interpretivist approaches into explicit and useable research methods; 4) show concretely how these elucidation tools can be gainfully used by social scientists working both within and outside of the interpretivist tradition. It will be an essential guide for social science research. (shrink)

What are the motivational bases that help explain the various normative judgements that social agents make, and the normative reasoning they employ? Answering this question leads us to consider the relationships between thoughts and emotions. Emotions will be described as thought-dependent and thought-directing, and as being intimately related to normativity. They are conceived as the grounds that motivate social agents to articulate their reasoning with respect to the values and norms they face and/or share in their social collective. It is (...) argued that because they are modes of thinking, emotions generate cognitive activities that relate to the making of evaluative and deontic judgements, the utterance of speech acts, the mastering of normative concepts and the building of arguments. Furthermore, each type of emotion generates its own constitutive judgements and structures normative thinking according to its own logic. The main thesis is that emotions provide sociological explanations for social agents’ thinking and speech, for emotions are precisely what motivate and, especially, structure normative reasoning and language. Being observable in language, emotions allow us to explain a) how social subjects reason and argue through norms and values, and b) how social subjects through their speech acts can contribute to the (un-)making of the social world. (shrink)

We argue that a fashionable interpretation of the theory of natural selection as a claim exclusively about populations is mistaken. The interpretation rests on adopting an analysis of fitness as a probabilistic propensity which cannot be substantiated, draws parallels with thermodynamics which are without foundations, and fails to do justice to the fundamental distinction between drift and selection. This distinction requires a notion of fitness as a pairwise comparison between individuals taken two at a time, and so vitiates the interpretation (...) of the theory as one about populations exclusively. (shrink)

Intentional explanation, according to Elster, seeks to elucidate an action by showing that it was intentionally conducted, in order to bring about certain goals . Intentional actions furthermore, are rational actions: they imply that agents establish a connection between the goals they target and the means that are appropriate to reach them, by way of different beliefs about the means, the goals and the environment. But how should we understand intentional actions in the light of philosophical research on emotions, rationality, (...) and normativity? This question is the departure point of this article. Various philosophers have analyzed the relationships between rationality and emotion, those between emotion and normativity, and those between emotion and intentional action. Nonetheless, their theses are scattered and do not offer an integrative view on how rationality, normativity and emotions work from the standpoint of intentional explanation. By using de Sousa’s distinction between the epistemic and the strategic modes of rationality as a theoretical framework, this article proposes therefore to remedy this deficit by unifying these philosophical insights with the goal of elaborating a theory of intentional explanation which brings together rationality, normativity and emotions. (shrink)

This book, originally released in 1919, contains five lectures given by the author while he was Professor to the Inns of Court during the late 1800s. The lectures were revised to include notes & annotations by A.H.F. LeFroy.

When developing phylogenetic systematics, the entomologist Willi Hennig adopted elements from Nicolai Hartmann’s ontology. In this historical essay I take on the task of documenting this adoption. I argue that in order to build a metaphysical foundation for phylogenetic systematics, Hennig adopted from Hartmann four main metaphysical theses. These are (1) that what is real is what is temporal; (2) that the criterion of individuality is to have duration; (3) that species are supra-individuals; and (4) that there are levels of (...) reality, each of which may be subject to different kinds of law. Reliance on Hartmann’s metaphysics allowed Hennig to ground some of the main theoretical principles of phylogenetic systematics, namely that the biological categories—from the semaphoront to the highest rank—have reality and individuality despite not being universals, and that they form a hierarchy of levels, each of which may require different kinds of explanation. Hartmann’s metaphysics thereby provided a philosophical justification for Hennig’s phylogenetic systematics, both as a theory and as a method of classification. (shrink)

The author attempts to encompass the self, or a self, that, while at some times appears to be his own, at other times not, thus encompassing and continually morphing. It is a mixture of poetry and prose.

Le présent dossier est issu d’une collaboration de plusieurs années entre le directeur, Frédéric Gabriel, et les différents auteurs des articles. Il répond à un programme de recherche qui avait été présenté comme suit : La revue ThéoRèmes entend se concentrer sur l’expérience comme vecteur de compréhension des religions, dans toute la richesse des disciplines que son texte de présentation mentionne : sociologie, histoire, anthropologie, psychologie ou sciences cognitives. Qu’en est-il du droi...

This is _the_ leading introduction 200to professional values and ethics in social work. Frederic G. Reamer provides social workers with a succinct and comprehensive overview of the most critical issues relating to professional values and ethics, including the nature of social work values, ethical dilemmas, and professional misconduct. Conceptually rich and attuned to the complexities of ethical decision making, _Social Work Values and Ethics_ is unique in striking the right balance between history, theory, and practical application. For the third edition, (...) Reamer has updated the content and strengthened the relevance of the case material. Also new to the third edition: o Discussion of the moral dialogue between practitioner and cliento Coverage of virtue ethicso Practical discussion of concepts underlying social work ethicso Expanded application of the National Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics to ethical dilemmas in the professiono A look at the historical evolution of ethical standards in social worko New vignettes, illustrating difficult ethical decisionso More guidance on informed consent and termination of serviceso Discussion questions at the end of each chaptero A section on how to conduct a social work ethics audit. (shrink)

The idea that deep brain stimulation (DBS) induces changes to personality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy and self (PIAAAS) is so deeply entrenched within neuroethics discourses that it has become an unchallenged narrative. In this article, we critically assess evidence about putative effects of DBS on PIAAAS. We conducted a literature review of more than 1535 articles to investigate the prevalence of scientific evidence regarding these potential DBS-induced changes. While we observed an increase in the number of publications in theoretical neuroethics (...) that mention putative DBS-induced changes to patients’ postoperative PIAAAS, we found a critical lack of primary empirical studies corroborating these claims. Our findings strongly suggest that the theoretical neuroethics debate on putative effects of DBS relies on very limited empirical evidence and is, instead, reliant on unsubstantiated speculative assumptions probablyin lieuof robust evidence. As such, this may reflect the likelihood of a speculative neuroethics bubble that may need to be deflated. Nevertheless, despite the low number of first-hand primary studies and large number of marginal and single case reports, potential postoperative DBS changes experienced by patients remain a critical ethical concern. We recommend further empirical research in order to enhance theoretical neuroethics work in the area. In particular, we call for the development of better instruments capable of capturing potential postoperative variations of PIAAAS. (shrink)

resumo Trata-se aqui de mostrar como a filosofia de Bergson decorre da constatação da passagem do tempo enquanto fato primordial e originário; nessa medida, as suas obras podem ser consideradas como diferentes tentativas de esclarecer tal experiência da temporalidade que, filosoficamente considerada, consiste na intuição da duração. Para isso, examina-se a forma pela qual o tratamento dado a problemas filosóficos distintos e discutidos em cada um de suas obras efetiva-se como meditação sobre o fato primitivo e seu esclarecimento progressivo. Em (...) primeiro lugar, acompanhamos o percurso de dedução das principais características da duração, sucessão, conservação e ato, sublinhando algumas de suas conseqüências filosóficas. A seguir, examinamos a dimensão crítica da filosofia de Bergson pela análise do pensamento do instante, aquele que desfigura a experiência do tempo e origina a via equivocada da metafísica tradicional; nesse exame procuramos diferenciar tal pensamento da experiência da simultaneidade, que é constitutiva de nossa relação concreta com as coisas. palavras-chave duração, sucessão, simultaneidade, criação, experiência, instante. (shrink)

Trata-se aqui de mostrar como a filosofia de Bergson decorre da constatação da passagem do tempo enquanto fato primordial e originário; nessa medida, as suas obras podem ser consideradas como diferentes tentativas de esclarecer tal experiência da temporalidade que, filosoficamente considerada, consiste na intuição da duração. Para isso, examina-se a forma pela qual o tratamento dado a problemas filosóficos distintos e discutidos em cada um de suas obras efetiva-se como meditação sobre o fato primitivo e seu esclarecimento progressivo. Em primeiro (...) lugar, acompanhamos o percurso de dedução das principais características da duração, sucessão, conservação e ato, sublinhando algumas de suas conseqüências filosóficas. A seguir, examinamos a dimensão crítica da filosofia de Bergson pela análise do pensamento do instante, aquele que desfigura a experiência do tempo e origina a via equivocada da metafísica tradicional; nesse exame procuramos diferenciar tal pensamento da experiência da simultaneidade, que é constitutiva de nossa relação concreta com as coisas.Duração. Sucessão. Simultaneidade. Criação. Experiência. Instante. The bergsonian Conception of Time AbstractThe aim of this article is to show how Bergson´s philosophy derives from the understanding of the passing of time as an original and primordial fact. In this way, his works can be considered to be different attempts to explain this experience of temporality which, philosophically considered, consist of the intuition of duration. Thus, we examine the way in which the treatment given to distinct philosophical problems discussed in each of his works takes place as a meditation on the primitive fact and its progressive clarification. Firstly, we follow the course of deduction of the main characteristics of duration, succession, conservation and act, emphasizing some of his philosophical consequences. We then examine the critical dimension of Bergson´s philosophy through the analysis of the thought of the instant, which distorts the experience of time and gives rise to an equivocal way of traditional metaphysics; in this examination we shall seek to differentiate this idea from the experience of simultaneity that constitutes our concrete relationship with things.Duration. Succcession. Simultaneity. Creation. Experience. Instant. (shrink)