Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better to be immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Since Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions first appeared, David Benatar's distinctive anthology designed to introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy has won a devoted following among users in a variety of upper-level and even introductory courses.

How is it possible to respond emotionally to that which we believe is not the case? All of the many responses to this "paradox of fiction" make one or more of three important mistakes: (1) neglecting the context of believing, (2) assuming that belief is an all-or-nothing affair, and (3) assuming that if you believe that p then you cannot also reasonably believe that not-p. My thesis is that we react emotionally to stories because we do believe what stories tell (...) us – not fictionally-believe, not make-believe, but believe in the ordinary way in which we believe anything at all. (shrink)

One kind of attempt to defeat the Epicurean conclusion that "death is nothing to us" is the claim that death could be some kind of unexperienced harm. The possibility of such harm is thought to be made plausible by analogy to the possibility of unexperienced harm in life, and it has motivated the invention of many thought experiments which attempt to show that in life one can indeed be harmed without experiencing the harm or its effects in any way. But (...) such attempts fail to weaken the Epicurean conclusion because they fail to appreciate that something which is taken to be an unexperienceable misfortune could, with equal warrant, be claimed to be an unexperienceable good fortune. Indeed, a more accurate claim is that what is unexperienceable is neither good nor bad, but only nothing at all. At the conclusion of the essay I will propose a Principle of Nothing which expresses the Epicurean lesson to be learned from these investigations. (shrink)

Locke claimed that a government (with legislative, executive and judicial functions) is necessary to relieve people of the inconveniences of a state of nature. But those three functions can be provided by private arrangements in a state of nature.

A criticism of Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment.

Epicurus's claim that "death is nothing to us" is defended. The usual concepts of harm, loss and suffering do not apply in the case of death. Immortality need not be bad. Epicurean prudence does not recommend suicide. Some issues in applied ethics are also discussed: the right to life, egoistic friendship, wills, and life insurance.

The philosophy of Epicurus (c. 341-271 B. C. E.), has been a quietly pervasive influence for more than two millennia. At present, when many long revered ideologies are proven empty, Epicureanism is powerfully and refreshingly relevant, offering a straightforward way of dealing with the issues of life and death. The chapters in this book provide a kaleidoscope of contemporary opinions about Epicurus' teachings. They tell us also about the archeological discoveries that promise to augment the scant remains we have of (...) Epicurus's own writing. the breadth of this new work will be welcomed by those who value Epicurean philosophy as a scholarly and personal resource for contemporary life. "Epicurus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance," is the title of a 2002 conference on Epicurus held at Rochester Institute of Technology, when many of the ideas here were first presented. (shrink)

In recent philosophical debates a number of arguments have been used which have so much in common that it is useful to study them as having a similar structure. Many arguments -- Searle's Chinese Room, for example -- make use of thought experiments in which we are told a story or given a narrative context such that we feel we are in comfortable surroundings. A new notion is then introduced which clashes with our ordinary habits and associations. As a result, (...) we do not bother to investigate seriously the new notion any further. I call such an arrangement, which is perhaps a variation of the fallacy of presumption, a Steep Cliff argument. One remedy for the misdirection of a Steep Cliff argument is to tell a counterstory from the point of view of the rejected notion. (shrink)

The essays in this collection deal with Greek philosopher Lucretius's critique of religion, his critique of traditional attitudes about death, and his influences on later thinkers such as Isaac Newton and Alfred Tennyson. 144 pp.

Epictetus was born a slave. His master, Epaphroditus, allowed him to attend the lectures of the Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus and later gave him his freedom. From numerous references in his Discourses it is clear that Epictetus valued freedom as a precious possession. He would have been on the side of the many people living now who, while not actually enslaved, are denied true freedom by the harsh circumstances of their lives. Epictetus's teachings about freedom and human dignity have echoed (...) through the millennia-in the writings of Spinoza, Thomas Paine and Martin Luther King, Jr., to name a few. He was much concerned with human behavior. His advice to not worry about what is not in our control is pointedly relevant to our busy modern society-which is often fraught with anxiety. Some people might argue that what Epictetus taught is not serious philosophy, more like self-help. But the range of topics addressed by the essays in this book clearly indicates that the teachings of Epictetus provide strong incentive to present day philosophical thinking. "Epictetus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance" is the title of a conference on Epictetus held at Rochester Institute of Technology in April 2012, when many of the ideas in these essays were first presented. (shrink)

Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better if we were immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Life, Death, and Meaning brings together key readings, primarily by English-speaking philosophers, on such 'big questions.'.

Russell and Strawson sparked a well known debate on the subject of Linguistic Presupposition inspiring many linguists and philosophers to follow suit, including Frege, whose work initiated the modern study in this area. Beaver begins with the most comprehensive overview and critical discussion of this burgeoning field published to date. He then goes on to motivate and develop his own account based on a Dynamic Semantics. This account is a recent line of theoretical work in which the Tarskian emphasis on (...) truth conditions is questioned. The central plank of the theory of meaning is a formal account of the change in information effected by use of language on hearers or readers. The proposal thus consolidates ideas of Stalnaker, Karttunen and Heim, all of whom had suggested that such an account was needed. At the same time it provides a new impulse and motivation to Dynamic Semantics itself. (shrink)

This is an introduction to the structure of sentences in human languages. It assumes no prior knowledge of linguistic theory and little of elementary grammar. It will suit students coming to syntactic theory for the first time either as graduates or undergraduates. It will also be useful for those in fields such as computational science, artificial intelligence, or cognitive psychology who need a sound knowledge of current syntactic theory.

This paper introduces a suite of articles devoted to Philip Kitcher’s The Main Enterprise of the World: Rethinking Education (Oxford University Press, 2021). The suite opens with a paper by Kitcher, which presents the central themes of his important book. This is followed by an assessment of the work as whole by John White, and four commentaries discussing in detail various aspects of Kitcher’s position by Ben Kotzee (on science education), Alexis Gibbs (on arts education), Sheron Fraser-Burgess (on deliberative democracy (...) and inclusivity), and Nigel Tubbs (on Kitcher’s ‘Deweyan Society’). In the final contribution, Kitcher replies to his critics. The introduction sketches the character of Kitcher’s project and comments on his pragmatist method. (shrink)

Contrary to what many philosophers believe, Calvinism neither makes the problem of evil worse nor is it obviously refuted by the presence of evil and suffering in our world. Or so most of the authors in this book claim. While Calvinism has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years amongst theologians and laypersons, many philosophers have yet to follow suit. The reason seems fairly clear: Calvinism, many think, cannot handle the problem of evil with the same kind of plausibility as other (...) more popular views of the nature of God and the nature of God's relationship with His creation. This book seeks to challenge that untested assumption. With clarity and rigor, this collection of essays seeks to fill a significant hole in the literature on the problem of evil. (shrink)

I criticise the ‘liberal’view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned by its producer. If natural (...) parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be ‘licensed’but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I approve. (shrink)

`Quantum theory' is not a single physical theory but a framework in which many different concrete theories fit. As such, a solution to the quantum measurement problem ought to provide a recipe to interpret each such concrete theory, in a mutually consistent way. But with the exception of the Everett interpretation, the mainextant solutions either try to make sense of the abstract framework as if it were concrete, or else interpret one particular quantum theory under the fiction that it is (...) fundamental and exact. In either case, these approaches are unable to help themselves to the very theory-laden, level-relative ways in which quantum theory makes contact with experiment in mainstream physics, and so are committed to major revisionary projects which have not been carried out even in outline. As such, only the Everett interpretation is currently suited to make sense of quantum physics as we find it. (shrink)

Introduction -- Part I: The meaning of life -- Richard Taylor, The meaning of life -- Thomas Nagel, The absurd -- Richard Hare, Nothing matters -- W.D. Joske, Philosophy and the meaning of life -- Robert Nozick, Philosophy and the meaning of life -- David Schmidtz, The meanings of life -- Part II: Creating people -- Derek Parfit, Whether causing someone to exist can benefit this person -- John Leslie, Why not let life ecome extinct? -- James Lenman, On (...) becoming extinct -- David Benatar, Why it is better never to come into existence -- Part III: Death -- Stephen E. Rosenbaum, How to be dead and not care : a defense of epicurus -- GeorgePpitcher, The misfortunes of the dead -- Steven Luper, Annihilation -- Fred Fldman, Some puzzles about the evil of death -- Frederick Kaufman, Pre-vital and post-mortem non-existence -- David B. Suits, Why death is not bad for the one who died -- Part IV: Suicide -- David Hume, Of suicide -- Immanuel Kant, Suicide and duty -- David Benatar, Suicide : a qualified defence -- Part V: Immortality -- James Lenman, Immortality : a letter -- Bernard Williams, The Makropulos case : reflections on the tedium of immortality -- John Martin Fischer, Why immortality is not so bad -- Christine Overall, from here to eternity : is it good to live forever? -- Part VI: Optimism and pessimism -- Margaret A. Boden, Optimism -- Michaelis Michael and Peter Caldwell, The consolations of optimism -- Bruce N. Waller, The sad truth : optimism, pessimism, and pragmatism -- Arthur Schopenhauer, On the suffering of the world. (shrink)

The notion of maximal greatness is arguably part of the very concept of God: something greater than God is not even possible. But how should we understand this notion? The aim of this paper is to provide a Śaivist answer to this question by analyzing the form of theism advocated in the Pratyabhijñā tradition. First, I extract a model of divine greatness, the Hierarchical Model, from Nagasawa’s work "Maximal God". According to the Hierarchical Model, God is that than which nothing (...) could be greater by virtue of being better suited than all other beings in relation to certain great-making properties (§1). I then offer an analysis of the form of theism advocated in the Pratyabhijñā tradition by discussing passages from the works of Somānanda, the founder of the Pratyabhijñā school, and of Utpaladeva, the most prominent of Somānanda’s disciples. I argue that the Pratyabhijñā theist cannot account for divine greatness in terms of the Hierarchical Model. My argument is that the Hierarchical Model requires a comparison between God and other beings that cannot be made with the Pratyabhijñā God (§2). Finally, I develop an original alternative model, the Unlimited Nature Model, that accounts for God’s maximal greatness in a way that suits Pratyabhijñā’s theism. According to the Unlimited Nature Model, the nature of all ordinary beings is metaphysically limited as a result of realizing only a small portion of the potential of what could be, and God is maximally great because only he has a completely unlimited nature (§3). (shrink)

Supervaluational theories of vagueness have achieved considerable popularity in the past decades, as seen in eg [5], [12]. This popularity is only natural; supervaluations let us retain much of the power and simplicity of classical logic, while avoiding the commitment to strict bivalence that strikes many as implausible. Like many nonclassical logics, the supervaluationist system SP has a natural dual, the subvaluationist system SB, explored in eg [6], [28].1 As is usual for such dual systems, the classical features of SP (...) (typically viewed as benefits) appear in SB in ‘mirror-image’ form, and the nonclassical features of SP (typically viewed as costs) also appear in SB in ‘mirror-image’ form. Given this circumstance, it can be difficult to decide which of two dual systems is better suited for an approach to vagueness.2 The present paper starts from a consideration of these two approaches— the supervaluational and the subvaluational—and argues that neither of them is well-positioned to give a sensible logic for vague language. §2 presents the systems SP and SB and argues against their usefulness. Even if we suppose that the general picture of vague language they are often taken to embody is accurate, we ought not arrive at systems like SP and SB. Instead, such a picture should lead us to truth-functional systems like strong Kleene logic (K3) or its dual LP. §3 presents these systems, and argues that supervaluationist and subvaluationist understandings of language are better captured there; in particular, that a dialetheic approach to vagueness based on the logic LP is a more sensible approach. §4 goes on to consider the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness within an LP-based approach, and §5 closes with a consideration of the sorites argument itself. (shrink)

This article reviews the seven “visions” of evolution proposed by Depew and Weber , concluding that each posited relationship between natural selection and self-organization has suited different aims and approaches. In the second section of the article, we show that these seven viewpoints may be collapsed into three fundamentally different ones: natural selection drives evolution; self-organization drives evolution; and natural selection and self-organization are complementary aspects of the evolutionary process. We then argue that these three approaches are not mutually exclusive, (...) since each may apply to different stages of development of different systems. What emerges from our discussion is a more encompassing view: that self-organization proposes what natural selection disposes. (shrink)

In this new introduction to a classic philosophical text, David Stern examines Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. He gives particular attention to both the arguments of the Investigations and the way in which the work is written, and especially to the role of dialogue in the book. While he concentrates on helping the reader to arrive at his or her own interpretation of the primary text, he also provides guidance to the unusually wide range of existing interpretations, and to the reasons (...) why the Investigations have inspired such a diversity of readings. Following closely the text of the Investigations and meant to be read alongside it, this survey is accessible to readers with no previous background in philosophy. It is well-suited to university-level courses on Wittgenstein, but can also be read with profit by students in other disciplines. (shrink)

Two contemporary strategies in cadaver organ transplantation, both with the potential to affect significantly expanding organ transplant waiting list sizes, have evolved: elective ventilation and use of nonheart-beating donors. Both are undergoing a period of critical review. It is not clear how widely EV is practiced around the world. In Great Britain, the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital was the first hospital to develop an EV protocol, in 1988, after which other British hospitals followed suit. In the 1980s, new NHBD (...) protocols of two distinct types were implemented worldwide, although both rely on death confirmed by traditional cardiopulmonary criteria. The first type involves the removal of organs immediately after death, the preeminent example being the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Protocol. The second involves the perfusion and cooling of kidneys immediately following death and subsequent organ removal. Protocols of this type have sprung up in Holland, Great Britain, Italy, France, Spain, Japan, and the United States. (shrink)

Here I examine Bernard Suits’s definition of games and explain why that definition is in need of reference to representation or, put more generally, to semiosis. And, once admitting the necessity of the representational in games, Suits’s definition must also then admit the essential paradoxy of games.

To explain why, in scientific problem solving, a diagram can be “worth ten thousand words,” Jill Larkin and Herbert Simon (1987) relied on a computer model: two representations can be “informationally” equivalent but differ “computationally,” just as the same data can be encoded in a computer in multiple ways, more or less suited to different kinds of processing. The roots of this proposal lay in cognitive psychology, more precisely in the “imagery debate” of the 1970s on whether there are image-like (...) mental representations. Simon (1972, 1978) hoped to solve this debate by thoroughly reducing the differences between forms of mental representations (e.g., between images and sentences) to differences in computational efficiency; to carry out this reduction, he borrowed from computer science the concepts of data type and of data structure. I argue that, in the end, his account amounted to nothing more than characterizing representations by the fast operations on them. This analysis then allows me to assess what Simon’s approach actually achieves when transported from psychology to the study of scientific representations, as in Larkin and Simon (1987): it allows comparing, not representations in and of themselves, but rather the computational roles they play in particular problem-solving processes—that is, representations together with a particular way of using them. (shrink)

Conventional, positivist science is not well suited for addressing the contemporary risk landscape. To address high-uncertainty, high-stakes risks, Funtowicz and Ravetz have called for a postnormal science. Two key characteristics of postnormal science are the involvement of an extended peer community and the deliberation of extended facts. The health research community has responded to the shortcomings of normal science with approaches to field research, known collectively as community-based participatory research. A review of case literature shows that although CBPR is not (...) inherently postnormal, it can be friendly to a postnormal approach. A postnormal CBPR practice would rely more heavily on a deliberative process, which engages a broad range of expertise, including experts in normal science, in decisions about data collection, analysis, and actions. (shrink)

This volume is the product of an important recent conference, convened by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, focusing on the intellectual legacy of the Tibetan philosopher, yogi, and saint Tsongkhapa (1357-1419). Entitled "Jé Tsongkhapa: Life, Thought, and Legacy," the conference commemorated the sixth hundredth anniversary of Tsongkhapa's passing and was held on December 21-23, 2019, at Ganden Monastery in Mundgod, India. Part 1 concerns Madhyamaka, a natural reflection of the very important and well-known contributions Tsongkhapa made to the study of (...) Indian philosophical thought. The first essay, Guy Newland's "Start Making Sense: Finding Tsongkhapa's Middle Way," provides a straightforward and clear introduction to Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Madhyamaka philosophy, showing how Tsongkhapa played an essential role in clarifying Candrakīrti's contributions to Madhyamaka thought. The second essay, "Celebrating Jé Tsongkhapa: The Twofold Object of the Identity View" by Dr. Dechen Rochard explores Tsongkhapa's understanding of Candrakīrti's negation of individual identity. The essay neatly demonstrates the centrality of the practitioner's view of self to the path to spiritual awakening. In the third chapter, "Thinking Beyond Thought: Tsongkhapa and Mipham on the Conceptualized Ultimate," Jay L. Garfield explores Tsongkhapa's views on the nature of ultimate reality, specifically Tsongkhapa's argument that this entails a movement from inferential to direct awareness of emptiness. The essay explores the need for accurate philosophical analysis in the context of meditation practice so as to directly realize the truths about the nature of self and reality that are the objects of the practice. It thus nicely points to the integration of Buddhist theory and practice. The second section of this volume is dedicated to Tsongkhapa's writings on the tantras. In the first chapter in this section, "Tsongkhapa's Masterful Exegesis of Cakrasaṃvara Tantra," I elucidate Tsongkhapa's approach to the study of tantric literature with a focus on his commentary on the Cakrasaṃvara Tantra. Chapter 6 is Gavin Kilty's contribution, "A Lamp to Illuminate the Five Stages: Tsongkhapa's Reformatory Work on Guhyasamāja Tantra." Kilty first surveys the Guhyasamāja tradition and its transmission to Tibet and the two main Indian exegetical traditions, the Ārya and J.ānapāda schools. Outlining Tsongkhapa's approach to the Guhyasamāja Tantra, he then focuses on how the tradition conceptualizes the generation-stage and completion-stage practices. Chapter 7, "The Shadow of Heshang: Tsongkhapa on Chan, Dzokchen, and Mahāmudrā" by Roger R. Jackson. Jackson explores the claim that Tsongkhapa received and secretly transmitted esoteric instructions on advanced meditation practices to realize the nature of mind and awakening. The volume concludes with a section entitled "Moving Minds," which explores Tsongkhapa's legacy and impact both in Tibet and beyond. It opens with "Jé Tsongkhapa's Contribution to Buddhist Hermeneutics" by Geshé Ngawang Samten. Buddhist hermeneutics, as understood here, is a response to the challenge posed by scriptures that appear to contradict one another. Chapter 9, "Tsongkhapa's Hermeneutics and the Perfection of Wisdom," contributed by Gareth Sparham, takes a more focused look at the interpretation of the Perfection of Wisdom literature in both India and Tibet. The tenth chapter is "Jé Tsongkhapa's Teachings and Translations in Mongolian" by Bataa Mishig-Ish, who surveys the dissemination of Tsongkhapa's oeuvre to Mongolia. The final chapter is BhikṣuṇīThubten Chodron's "Learning, Living, and Teaching Bodhicitta: Jé Tsongkhapa's Contribution to Spreading Compassion in the World." Venerable Chodron argues that Tsongkhapa's approach to teaching compassion is particularly suited for the modern, Western context. While this volume does not come close to exhausting the limits of what might be said concerning the impact of Tsongkhapa's work in Tibet and beyond, it does reunite contributions to this study that briefly converged in Preface xi Mundgod, India, just before the global pandemic ushered in a new awareness of our profound human interdependence. Hopefully these essays will advance the appreciation of Tsongkhapa's intellectual legacy in the wider English-speaking world, where he remains a little understood figure of Asian religious history, unlike in the Tibetan-speaking world, where his impact is justly celebrated. (shrink)

Two contemporary strategies in cadaver organ transplantation, both with the potential to affect significantly expanding organ transplant waiting list sizes, have evolved: elective ventilation and use of nonheart-beating donors. Both are undergoing a period of critical review. It is not clear how widely EV is practiced around the world. In Great Britain, the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital was the first hospital to develop an EV protocol, in 1988, after which other British hospitals followed suit. In the 1980s, new NHBD (...) protocols of two distinct types were implemented worldwide, although both rely on death confirmed by traditional cardiopulmonary criteria. The first type involves the removal of organs immediately after death, the preeminent example being the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Protocol. The second involves the perfusion and cooling of kidneys immediately following death and subsequent organ removal. Protocols of this type have sprung up in Holland, Great Britain, Italy, France, Spain, Japan, and the United States. (shrink)

Although best known for his contributions to the theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion, Hume also influenced developments in the philosophy of mind, psychology, ethics, political and economic theory, political and social history, and aesthetic theory. The fifteen essays in this volume address all aspects of Hume's thought. The picture of him that emerges is that of a thinker who, though often critical to the point of scepticism, was nonetheless able to build on that scepticism a constructive, viable, (...) and profoundly important view of the world. Also included in this volume are Hume's two brief autobiographies and a bibliography suited to those beginning their study of Hume. This second edition of one our most popular Companions includes six new essays and a new introduction, and the remaining essays have all been updated or revised. (shrink)

How should one define the republican democratic and ‘laïque’ spirit in both the most concise and effective manner, as well as that most suited to the French case? The republican spirit resides without doubt in refusing submission to any single individual whoever that individual may be. The democratic spirit does not consist of decreeing the sovereignty of the people, but in developing formal modalities of political life allowing the people not to be divested of it. The ‘laïque’ spirit rejects all (...) distinctions concerning the nature and rights of citizens; it also equally rejects religious laws being imposed over political law. (shrink)

I criticise the ‘liberal’view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned by its producer. If natural (...) parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be ‘licensed’but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I approve. (shrink)

Parfit advertised the priority view as a new and fundamental theory in the ethics of distribution. He never discusses risk, and many writers follow suit when discussing the priority view. This article formalizes two popular arguments for a commonly accepted risk-free definition of the priority view. One is based on a direct attempt to define the priority view, the other is based on a contrast with utilitarianism and egalitarianism. But neither argument succeeds, and more generally, it is not possible to (...) make sense of the priority view in a risk-free framework. The article pays particular attention to the proper role of evaluative measurements in theorizing about the ethics of distribution. Despite appearances, approaching the priority view in terms of risk from the outset is argued to be quite natural. (shrink)

The phrase 'economic system' refers to the organizational arrangements and processes through which a society makes its production and consumption decisions. In this book, Professor Conkin explores the diversity of economic systems and the choices societies must face in determining the economic systems best suited to their needs. He discusses the alternative objectives and alternative decision modes that are available to societies. Objectives such as efficiency, growth, liberty, and equality - though themselves desirable - frequently involve trade-offs; the more complete (...) attainment of any one objective may involve the partial sacrifices of another. In pursuit of its objectives, each society uses a combination of decision modes. Professor Conklin examines six of these: free enterprise, price controls, subsidies, taxation, non-price regulations, and public enterprise. He ends with a discussion of the processes societies use to make their choice among objectives and decision modes. (shrink)

In "After Anscombe," I argue that, although Bratman's account of intention "has provided a conceptual tool for many directions of research in philosophy and cognitive psychology," it cannot do the work in ethics that moral philosophers, especially Kantians, use it for. This can be shown by considering the problems in using intention to make a moral distinction in cases of double effect. If so, Bratman's is not the same concept of intention that Anscombe had in mind when she wrote her (...) book. I show that Ancombe's account of intention is a much broader concept, with deeper historical roots. This does not mean that Bratman's concept of intention should be abandoned. Rather, we need to make a distinction between desire and intention that is implicit in Anscombe's account. That is, the aspects of intention that make her concept suited for ethics do not belong to Bratman's narrower concept and should be attributed to a concept that can be distinguished from intention. Evidence for what the latter concept is can be found in Aquinas' account of intentio from which the concept of intention has borrowed its name. Intentio for Aquinas is an act of will in regard to the end, whereas Bratman's intention is of the means that are chosen in practical reasoning. Intentio seems to be an intrinsic desire for the end. If this is right, then it is desire that is relevant for ethics, and not intention in its modern use. Recognition that desire and not intention is the relevant concept for ethics, in both Anscombe's and Aquinas' accounts of human agency, dovetails perfectly with their ethical theories, for it is Aristotle's ethics that has guided both philosophers in their ethical writings. After all, Aristotelian virtue ethicists are concerned with moral evaluation of the agent's character, which consists in a set of dispositions to seek ends that are desired for their own sake. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Glen Pettigrove addresses the proportionality principle in ethics, the principle that ‘our actions, attitudes, or emotions should be proportional to the degree of value present in the object or events to which they are responding’. He argues this is inconsistent with some familiar features of common-sense morality. In response, he brings virtuous character into the picture, a move we support but wish to modify. We show that certain helping actions should be guided by whether one has the virtue profile (...) most suited to the situation from among a surrounding network of people. (shrink)

This paper outlines different types of knowledge and how they are applied to different problem types. It makes the case that co-created knowledge, generated by innovative and collaborative partnerships of scholars within a transdisciplinary framework is best suited to address the most complex and therefore most important problems in food systems scholarship. It applies Transaction Costs theory to highlight some of the options we scholars face and applies these concepts to the issue of Payments for Ecosystems Services., with an analogy (...) and questions to ponder. (shrink)

Using the perspective of situated cognition we studied how people interact with a physical map to help them navigate through an unfamiliar environment. The study used a mixture of cognitive ethnography and traditional experimental methods. We found that the difference between high and low performing navigators showed up in the speed they completed their task and also in the way they use maps. High performers plan routes using a survey method whereas low performers use a route strategy. We suggest that (...) when people are given a task that does not match their cognitive style they try to transform the task to better suit their cognitive abilities and cognitive style. (shrink)

In “The Uses of Argument” Toulmin introduces a number of concepts that have become popular in argumentation theory, such as data, claim, warrant, backing, force, field, and, most fundamentally, the concept of a “logical type”. Toulmin never defines the concept of a logical type or a field very clearly, and different interpretations can be found in the literature, either reconstructing what Toulmin has in mind, or revising his concepts to suit other concerns. A natural history of these concepts is not (...) my concern. I will analyse logical types according to what Toulmin uses this concept for, namely to raise a problem with deductive logic and motivate its replacement with the Toulmin model. I will argue that a logical type and the distinction he draws between different logical types resembles distinctions made in logical positivism between the directly and the indirectly verifiable, and the problem raised is, in essence, the positivist’s problem of how indirect propositions can be justified on the basis of direct propositions. I will show that Toulmin makes a straw man of the positivists’ own solution to the problem and hence does not prove there to be an adequate motivation for replacing deductive logic with the Toulmin model. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Leibniz and the Two ClocksDavid ScottAnyone familiar with Leibniz’s philosophy in general and with his critique of occasionalism in particular is likely familiar with his example of two clocks. Generally speaking, the example illustrates a range of hypotheses that, according to Leibniz, might possibly explain the connections between substances in the world. The most important of these hypotheses are Leibniz’s own doctrine of the preestablished harmony and the occasionalist—for (...) present purposes, Malebranche’s—doctrine of causation. In Leibniz’s mind at least, the two clocks example (so-called because substances are represented by two clocks) illustrates the superiority of the hypothesis of the preestablished harmony over occasionalism. Whether the example in fact succeeds in this regard is the primary question of this paper.Given the times, Leibniz’s choice of example is understandable. A clock is ideally suited to represent a mechanism, of course; and in view of the general “mechanization of the world view” of that time, the example seems to have been in the air.1 Spring-driven clocks had appeared at the outset of the sixteenth century, and the kind of clock Leibniz seems to have in mind in his example, namely, one driven by a pendulum, was the invention, in about 1656, of Christian Huygens, who was a significant influence on Leibniz. Huygens’s invention in fact provided the impetus for a broadening of the importance and extent of horology.2Although Leibniz’s choice of example was understandable, it was not a happy one, and the general importunity of his use of this example was [End Page 445] recognized by both his contemporary critics and his subsequent commentators.3 In fact his choice of the example becomes almost ironic when it is recalled that Geulincx, who is most commonly associated with the example, was an occasionalist. The operations of two clocks, between which there is a constant and fixed relation, say, of keeping the same time, cannot normally be said to be “related.” The example is more intuitively taken to indicate the random, accidental, unnecessary, and unconnected nature of the otherwise constant and regular relation between the clocks; and so one would think the example more suited to an occasionalist’s position than to that of Leibniz.In what follows I aim to judge the effectiveness—in Leibniz’s own terms—of the two clocks example. In gauging the effectiveness of Leibniz’s use of the example, I expect that a few things can be learned about Leibniz’s system in general and about his critique of occasionalism in particular. My procedure will be to examine separately what I take to be four significant occasions in which Leibniz compares things or substances in the world and clocks. The passages in question date from a period spanning ten years, and in each instance the example is put to service in Leibniz’s attempt to better occasionalism.Beyond this, although the comparison is employed or appraised in slightly different ways each time, the uses to which it is put are basically two. In the first two instances examined below, it is employed primarily to distinguish the preestablished harmony from occasionalism. I will be arguing that, to the extent that it fails to illustrate his point, Leibniz fails adequately to distinguish these two doctrines. This was Arnauld’s criticism.4 In the third and fourth instances, however, the example is employed solely to illustrate certain features of the preestablished harmony. On my analysis, it does not appear to fulfill this role either. [End Page 446]First Use of the ExampleOne of the more well known statements of the two clocks example is from an explanation Leibniz gives to Basnage de Beauval in 1696 of his “New System” (1695):Imagine two clocks or watches which are in perfect agreement. Now this can happen in three ways. The first is that of a natural influence.... The second way of making two clocks, even poor ones, agree is always to assign a skilled craftsman to them who adjusts them and constantly sets them in agreement. The third way is to construct these two timepieces at the beginning with such skill and accuracy that one can... (shrink)

Form should follow function but often technical aspects of function dictate form. Form fitting and shape hugging are concepts we associate with a comfy jumper or a well cut suit or dress not with hard wearable technology. How many of the objects we buy are going to transition from worn to unworn? It is not until we have to wear something or are subjected to technology for medical reasons that we realise how uncomfortable some of it is. This paper addresses (...) the issues of form and function in relation to the growing world of unwearables. (shrink)