This moral philosophy text with readings embraces Socrates' observation that ethics is "no small matter, but how we ought to live." How ought we to live? This hard question captures the full range of moral inquiry from traditional moral theory to contemporary moral issues, such as abortion, capital punishment, and war. But there is much more to moral philosophy: How should we be as people? When should we forgive? Are we capable of morality? What about non-western ethics? And most distressing (...) of all, why be moral in the first place? These and other challenging questions show the profundity and inescapable importance of moral philosophy for a life worth living. Life's Hardest Questions combines lively and informative introductory discussions with classic and contemporary writings in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better if we were immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Life, Death, and Meaning brings together key readings, primarily by English-speaking philosophers, on such 'big questions.'.

"Peter Iver Kaufman is admirably and ideally qualified to undertake this project of reading More on politics in the light of Augustine on politics. In vigorous, well-paced prose, he tackles an important and original subject." —_Marcia L. Colish, Frederick B. Artz Professor of History, emerita, Oberlin College_ _“Incorrectly Political_ will attract readers not only because it is written with the author's characteristic flair and liveliness, but also because of his established capacity to bridge centuries of Western thought and (...) history. Written at the dawn of the new century, this book acquires deep resonance from the events unfolding around the world, circumstances to which Augustine’s and More's complex thoughts on political possibility still speak. If ever a study of such hoary figures from the Christian past deserved the label 'timely,' it is surely this one.” —_Kevin Madigan, Harvard University Divinity School_ Augustine in the fourth and fifth centuries and Thomas More in the sixteenth were familiar with the deceits and illusions that enabled even the most vile rulers to shore up their dignity and that gave repressive regimes an inviolability of sorts. Both men knew the politics of their times, both were involved in politics, and both were at one time politically ambitious. Augustine needed and made good use of government's powers of coercion and damage control in his struggle against the Donatists. The clear advantages of political protection and correction preoccupied More in his battle against Martin Luther. Both later changed their minds and believed, finally, the political imagination, based as it is on a desire for power, always and inevitably leads to devastation and suffering. Peter Iver Kaufman explains how and why we have failed to appreciate Augustine's and More's profound political pessimism, reintroducing readers to two of the Christian tradition's most enigmatic yet influential figures. Each had been disturbed by the reach of his own political ambitions—as by those of contemporaries. Each knew that government was useful—yet always deceitful. And each wrote a classic—widely read to this day, Augustine's _City of God_ and More's _Utopia,_as well as abundant correspondence and polemical tracts to explain why government on earth might be used, though never meaningfully improved. (shrink)

Differing findings exist on how Defining Issues Test (DIT) scores relate to intelligence. Further study is needed in order to address aspects of intellect not previously considered and to address how these relationships rival studies that have compared indices of intellect with constructs similar to DIT scores. In the present study, a sample of 117 participants completed the DIT and the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT), which assesses crystallised and fluid intelligence. Structural equation modelling offered supporting evidence (...) that these measurements represent separate sources of information. Statistically significant paths from KAIT crystallised indices to DIT scores were seen, though there was much overlap. Negligible paths were seen from KAIT fluid indices to DIT scores in the sample overall though this relationship strengthens when advanced moral judgement development is considered. Thus, the present study affirms the DIT's construct validity and illustrates how crystallised and fluid intellectual abilities pertain to DIT scores. (shrink)

Do people have free will, or this universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be studied, verified, and understood scientifically? How and why might a sense of free will have evolved? These are a few of the questions this book attempts to answer. People generally act as though they believe in their own free will: they don't feel like (...) automatons, and they don't treat one another as they might treat robots. While acknowledging many constraints and influences on behavior, people nonetheless act as if they (and their neighbors) are largely in control of many if not most of the decisions they make. Belief in free will also underpins the sense that people are responsible for their actions. Psychological explanations of behavior rarely mention free will as a factor, however. Can psychological science find room for free will? How do leading psychologists conceptualize free will, and what role do they believe free will plays in shaping behavior? In recent years a number of psychologists have tried to solve one or more of the puzzles surrounding free will. This book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at ways leading psychologists from all branches of psychology deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will and the importance of consciousness in free will. It also includes commentaries by leading philosophers on what psychologists can contribute to long-running philosophical struggles with this most distinctly human belief. These essays should be of interest not only to social scientists, but to intelligent and thoughtful readers everywhere. (shrink)

Theoretical models propose that attentional biases might account for the maintenance of social anxiety symptoms. However, previous eye-tracking studies have yielded mixed results. One explanation i...

The theological task in North America is not the correlation of faith and world or the appropriation of creedal concepts, but the effort to show how the gospel story itself functions as the model of theology. Opening this dimension for the imagination of faith is our primary challenge.

The core of J.G. Herder's philosophy of nationalism lies in the conviction that human creativity must be embedded in the particular culture of a communal language. While he acknowledged that this cultural particular must be integrated into a more universal humanity, he insisted that each culture should preserve its incommensurable distinctiveness. He also called for a new method of enquiry regarding history, one that demands empathetic sensitivity toward the uniquely individual while realizing that there are few gains without losses. F.M. (...) Barnard demonstrates that Herder, despite his innovative work on the idea of nationality, was fully aware of the dangers of ethnic fanaticism, but also of the hazards of what is now known as globalization, recognizing that these must be tempered by a sense of universal humanity. Barnard shows that Herder anticipated modern theories of the dynamics of cultures and traditions through the problematic interplay of persistence and change and that his speculations on cultural and political pluralism, on language as a democratic bond, and on the possible fusion of communitarian and liberal dimensions of public life remain relevant to contemporary debates. (shrink)

This book offers an introduction to the thought of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who is one of the most significant Christian writers of the Middle Ages. It pays particular attention to the Aquinas's context as a Dominican friar, devoted to the task of preaching the Christian gospel.

In this introduction to philosophy, philosophers in their areas of specialization have produced essays written specifically for the novice. The collection includes traditional topics such as logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of religion , personal identity, and contemporary topics such as philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

John Henry Newman’s philosophical reflection on the nature of faith and its relation to evidence is fascinating, complex, and slightly misleading; yet it shows constructive promise. In particular, I argue that his broader construal of reason should concomitantly play out in a broader construal of evidence. Accordingly, I show how Newman’s distinction between different modes of reasoning informs his understanding of the relationship between faith and evidence. I conclude with three areas that deserve further epistemological attention and development: namely, a (...) more expansive construal of evidence in light of Newman’s broader account of reason, a more constructive understanding of the relationship between his cumulative, though informal, approach and natural theology, and whether his account of faith and evidence operates with a kind of phenomenal conservatism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 122.3 (2001) 440-444 [Access article in PDF] Arnd Kerkhecker. Callimachus' Book of Iambi. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. xxiv + 334 pp. 5 plates. Cloth, $85.00. The Iambi have been slow to profit from Callimachus' recent popularity, even though our much changed sense of the archaic iambicists, especially Archilochus, makes the collection due for a major reassessment. In Hellenistica Groningana 1 (1993), the Iambi claim scarcely (...) two pages out of two hundred, and in Alan Cameron's iconoclastic Callimachus and His Critics (1995) a bit more than five out of five hundred. Though Callimachean polyeideia cannot be well understood without the Iambi, readers continue to be daunted by these difficult fragments, which in places are little more than a tale told by a diegete, signifying nothing very certain.Now, twenty years after Dee Lister Clayman's fine, short survey of the Iambi, we have not one, but two, book-length readings of the collection. As if the [End Page 440] poet had suddenly risen to sow discord while preaching eunoia, Kerkhecker's formidable Oxford dissertation of 1997 comes to us already in pitched disagreement with Benjamin Acosta-Hughes's Stanford thesis (1995), forthcoming from the University of California Press as Polyeideia: The Iambi of Callimachus and the Archaic Iambic Tradition. Callimachus would not have it any other way.These rival projects complement each other as well as disagree. Acosta-Hughes accommodates the Greekless reader with translations of the Diegesis and the ten Iambi he discusses; in addressing classicists generally, Kerkhecker provides close guidance to the papyri for nonspecialists. As his title indicates, Acosta-Hughes focuses on aesthetics; Kerkhecker revives J. K. Newman's question, "Do the Iamboi make no moral appeal?" (9). Where Acosta-Hughes reads the collection by thematic groupings, Kerkhecker reads the Iambi in sequence and, importantly, as a single composition in thirteen parts. The operative word in his title is "book." I limit myself below to Kerkhecker's monograph, which provides an indispensable ancilla to and partial updating of Pfeiffer's edition, and which constructs as strong a case as can be imagined, on the current evidence, for the designed unity of the Iambi: "Callimachus is not just collecting and editing his own poems, much like those of others; he is composing with the collection in mind, with a view to the scholarly edition, for the Book" (290).Kerkhecker presents an impressive range of mastery, from papyrology to connoisseurship of a later Aufklärungszeitalter. Wieland, Lessing, Herder, and even Fielding offer a reminder of what was once at stake in debates about art. Kerkhecker writes lucid, lively, and often witty prose that is worthy of his tastes and subject. To counter the current age of theory, he reasserts a reminiscently Enlightenment faith in the text; "social text" and "intertext" join Euhemerus in silence and disgrace. Kerkhecker reads the Iambi as a self-enclosed poetic universe, without relying on speculations about chronology, Ptolemaic patronage, designed correspondence to the Aetia, Horatian imitation, or Cameron's questions about performance. On Greek "poetry books," Cameron and Kerkhecker stand in diametrical opposition. In Kerkhecker's view, Callimachus' book articulates a "new Iambic Spirit" (293) by looking inward: to manners more than morals, to Selbstkritik rather than Zeitkritik, and to self-parody beneath feigned polemic. As in later ages, the mark of such hermetic and self-conscious Buchdichtung is multilayered irony.Reconstructions of Greek poetry books proceed against stiff resistance, but Kerkhecker's monograph securely earns a place on the shelf near Pfeiffer by the rigor and erudition of his interpretation on all levels. Chapters on individual Iambi begin with a reassessment of Pfeiffer's edition based on Kerkhecker's collation of the papyri and with an explanation of Pfeiffer's rationale in combining papyri, quotations, and other evidence. Kerkhecker discusses unpublished readings by Coles, Maas, and Rea, and differs in some sixty places from Pfeiffer, whose authority survives this scrutiny intact. Until the now faded Oxyrhynchus Papyri VII.1011 can be reedited, the reader has a full and fair assessment of how the evidence stands. Kerkhecker forthrightly discloses the extent of his own... (shrink)

Through a series of provocative conversations, Frederick Luis Aldama and Herbert Lindenberger, who have written widely on literature, film, music, and art, locate a place for the discomforting and the often painfully unpleasant within aesthetics. The conversational format allows them to travel informally across many centuries and many art forms. They have much to tell one another about the arts since the advent of modernism soon after 1900—the nontonal music, for example, of the Second Vienna School, the chance-directed music (...) and dance of John Cage and Merce Cunningham, the in-your-faceness of such diverse visual artists as Francis Bacon, Pablo Picasso, Willem de Kooning, Egon Schiele, Otto Dix, and Damien Hirst. They demonstrate as well a long tradition of discomforting art stretching back many centuries, for example, in the Last Judgments of innumerable Renaissance painters, in Goya’s so-called “black” paintings, in Wagner’s Tristan chord, and in the subtexts of Shakespearean works such as King Lear and Othello. This book is addressed at once to scholars of literature, art history, musicology, and cinema. Although its conversational format eschews the standard conventions of scholarly argument, it provides original insights both into particular art forms and into individual works within these forms. Among other matters, it demonstrates how recent work in neuroscience may provide insights in the ways that consumers process difficult and discomforting works of art. The book also contributes to current aesthetic theory by charting the dialogue that goes on—especially in aesthetically challenging works—between creator, artifact, and consumer. (shrink)

An engaging look at the deeds and words of politicians in the US, in India, and elsewhere. Bailey (anthropology, U. of California, San Diego) demonstrates that there is a vast confusion about in politics claims to have a monopoly on truth can rarely be sustained, and that people often find themselves treating what they believe to be false as if it were true, because it pays to do so. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new 'modal' version of (...) this causal powers argument. I argue that Fodor's argument (in old or new dress) is a non sequitur. It neither establishes the existence of narrow content nor the need for a content other than broad content to explain intentional behavior. (shrink)