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  1.  52
    The Logical Evaluation of Arguments.David Botting - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (2):167-180.
    In this paper I will defend the controversial thesis that all argumentation in natural language can be reconstructed, for the purposes of assessment, as a deductively valid argument. Evaluation of the argumentation amounts to evaluation of the logical coherence of the premises. I will be taking the pragma-linguistic theory of Bermejo-Luque as an initial starting point.
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  2.  41
    A pragma-dialectical default on the question of truth.David Botting - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (4):413-434.
    The problem with the pragma-dialectical view, it has been argued, is that it takes argumentation as aiming at consensus rather than truth or justified belief. The pragma-dialecticians often imply that an argumentative process aiming at consensus in a way constrained by the “Ten Commandments” will in the long run converge on epistemically favourable standpoints. I will argue that they are right provided pragma-dialectics is construed, as they say, as a theory of criticism; pragma-dialectics and the other theories of argumentation have (...)
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  3.  44
    Can 'Big' Questions be Begged?David Botting - 2011 - Argumentation 25 (1):23-36.
    Traditionally, logicians construed fallacies as mistakes in inference, as things that looked like good (i.e., deductively valid) arguments but were not. Two fallacies stood out like a sore thumb on this view of fallacies: the fallacy of many questions (because it does not even look like a good argument, or any kind of argument) and the fallacy of petitio principii (because it looks like and is a good argument). The latter is the concern of this paper. One possible response is (...)
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  4.  31
    The Virtuous Tortoise.David Botting - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 40 (1):31-39.
    There is no philosophically interesting distinction to be made between inference-rules and premises. That there is such a distinction is often held to follow from the possibility of infinite regress illustrated by Carroll's story of Achilles and the tortoise. I will argue that this is wrong on three separate grounds. Consequently, Carroll's fable provides no motivation to abandon the traditional logical separation of arguments into their premises and conclusions. There is no proposition that must be taken to be a rule (...)
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  5.  17
    Two Types of Argument from Position to Know.David Botting - 2018 - Informal Logic 38 (4):502-530.
    In this paper I will argue that there is an inductive and a non-inductive argument from position to know, and will characterise the latter as an argument from authority because of providing content-independent reasons. I will also argue that both types of argument should be doubt-preserving: testimony cannot justify a stronger cognitive attitude in the arguer than the expert herself expresses when she testifies. Failure to appreciate this point undercuts Mizrahi’s claim that arguments from expert opinion are weak.
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  6.  35
    The Virtuous Tortoise.David Botting - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (4).
    There is no philosophically interesting distinction to be made between inference-rules and premises. That there is such a distinction is often held to follow from the possibility of infinite regress illustrated by Carroll's story of Achilles and the tortoise. I will argue that this is wrong on three separate grounds. Consequently, Carroll's fable provides no motivation to abandon the traditional logical separation of arguments into their premises and conclusions. There is no proposition that must be taken to be a rule (...)
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  7.  83
    The Irrelevance of Relevance.David Botting - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (1):1-21.
    The lack of a theory of relevance in the current state of the art of informal logic has often been considered regrettable, a gap that must be filled before the Relevance-Sufficiency-Acceptability model can be considered complete. I wish to challenge this view. A theory of relevance is neither desirable nor possible. Informal logic can get by perfectly well, and has been doing so far, with relevance judgments that are by nature unanalysable and intuitive. Criticism of theories of relevance, for example (...)
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  8.  84
    Pragma-Dialetics Epistemologized: Reply to Lumer.David Botting - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (2):269-285.
    I would like to thank Christoph Lumer for his illuminating comments on my paper “The question of truth” published in this journal (Botting 2010) and would like to exercise my right of reply on a few of the issues that he raises.
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  9.  18
    The Cumulative Force of Analogies.David Botting - 2018 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 27 (1):105-141.
    In this paper I will argue that most objections to deductive analyses of a priori analogies are incorrect, often involve basic misinterpretations of what the deductive reconstruction of those arguments are saying, and sometimes also betray a confusion about what part of the reasoning corresponds to the analogical inference. In particular, I will be focusing on a raft of objections made by Juthe in [2015] and subject his alternative views to criticism. -/- I will then argue that Juthe does implicitly (...)
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  10.  95
    The Paradox of Analogy.David Botting - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (1):98-115.
    I will show that there is a type of analogical reasoning that instantiates a pattern of reasoning in confirmation theory that is considered at best paradoxical and at worst fatal to the entire syntactical approach to confirmation and explanation. However, I hope to elaborate conditions under which this is a sound (although not necessarily strong) method of reasoning.
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  11.  51
    The Question of Truth.David Botting - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (4):413-434.
    The problem with the pragma-dialectical view, it has been argued, is that it takes argumentation as aiming at consensus rather than truth or justified belief. The pragma-dialecticians often imply that an argumentative process aiming at consensus in a way constrained by the “Ten Commandments” will in the long run converge on epistemically favourable standpoints. I will argue that they are right provided (i) pragma-dialectics is construed, as they say, as a theory of criticism; (ii) pragma-dialectics and the other theories of (...)
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  12. Wellman's Typology of Arguments.David Botting - 2012 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 28 (41).
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  13. The De Re, the Per Se, the Knowable, and the Known.David Botting - 2011 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (2):191.
     
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  14.  64
    The weak collective agential autonomy thesis.David Botting - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (31):215 - 234.
    Can a collective be an agent in its own right? Can it be the bearer of moral and other properties that we have traditionally reserved for individual agents? The answer, as one might expect, is ‘In some ways yes, in other ways no.’ The way in which the answer is ‘Yes’ has been described recently by Copp; I intend to discuss his position and defend it against objections. This describes a fairly weak form of autonomy that I will claim does (...)
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  15.  39
    Inferences and illocutions.David Botting - 2016 - Argument and Computation 6 (3):246-264.
    Volume 6, Issue 3, September 2015, Page 246-264.
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  16.  15
    Inferences and illocutions.David Botting - 2016 - Argument and Computation 6 (3):246-264.
    Volume 6, Issue 3, September 2015, Page 246-264.
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  17.  3
    Inabilities, excuses and exemptions.David Botting - 2015 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 14 (1):104-127.
    In this paper I will argue, following Moody-Adams’s paper “Culture, responsibility and affected ignorance,” that inability does not excuse in general, but against Moody-Adams I will argue that this is not because of “affected ignorance” but simply because of responsibilities individual agents have by virtue of belonging to and participating in the collective actions of a certain kind of collective. Excusability has been misdiagnosed as depending on whether the ignorance of wrongdoing involved is culpable or non-culpable.
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  18. Reactive Commitments: Reasoning Dialectically about Responsibility.David Botting - 2014 - Abstracta 8 (1):15-29.
    Philosophy has recently been presented with, and started to take seriously, sociological studies in which our ‘folk concepts’ are elaborated. The most interesting concepts studied are moral concepts, and results have been achieved that seem to sharply contradict the speculation of philosophers and to threaten the very way in which moral philosophy has been done in the past. In this paper, I consider certain results in empirical studies of the folk concept of responsibility. I will then sketch a version of (...)
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  19.  8
    Anti-Platonism in De Anima III.5.David Botting - 2023 - Studia Neoaristotelica 20 (2):123-145.
    Famously, Plato argues that the soul pre-exists the body, continues to exist after the body dies, and can come to exist afterwards in another body. Aristotle argues against the transmigration of souls in On Generation and Corruption and for the most part appears not to endorse these Platonic doctrines. But in De Anima III.5 Aristotle also seems to argue that a part of the soul, usually dubbed the nous poiētikos, is separable from the body and eternal. This has presented interpreters (...)
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  20.  13
    The Problem of Modal Upgrading in Aristotle’s Apodictic Syllogistic.David Botting - 2023 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 17 (1):96-120.
    This is another contribution to the unending controversy over the two Barbaras. My approach to the problem is hopefully quite new: I wish to view the issue through the prism of modal upgrading. Modal upgrading occurs when a subject term that has only been predicated of assertorically in the premises is predicated of apodictically either: i) in the conclusion of a given syllogism, or; ii) in some proposition that is derived from either the premises of the given syllogism alone or (...)
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  21. A Priori Abduction.David Botting - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (2):167-181.
    While “All events have a cause” is a synthetic statement making a factual claim about the world, “All effects have a cause” is analytic. When we take an event as an effect, no inference is required to deduce that it has a cause since this is what it means to be an effect. Some examples often given in the literature as examples of abduction work in the same way through semantic facts that follow from the way our beliefs represent those (...)
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  22.  5
    Interpretative dilemmas.David Botting - unknown
    In this paper I claim that the reason we are reluctant to call many informal fallacies fallacies of relevance is because we can interpret them as providing contextual information about how the argument is to be interpreted. This interpretative dilemma is that the logical form is determined in part by whether the analyst wishes to be charitable to the proponent or the opponent. The evaluation of the argument is nonetheless purely logical.
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  23.  65
    Fallacies of Accident.David Botting - 2012 - Argumentation 26 (2):267-289.
    In this paper I will attempt a unified analysis of the various examples of the fallacy of accident given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations. In many cases the examples underdetermine the fallacy and it is not trivial to identify the fallacy committed. To make this identification we have to find some error common to all the examples and to show that this error would still be committed even if those other fallacies that the examples exemplify were not. Aristotle says (...)
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  24.  81
    What is a Sophistical Refutation?David Botting - 2012 - Argumentation 26 (2):213-232.
    From Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations the following classifications are put forward and defended through extensive excerpts from the text. (AR-PFC) All sophistical refutations are exclusively either ‘apparent refutations’ or ‘proofs of false conclusions’. (AR-F) ‘Apparent refutations’ and ‘fallacies’ name the same thing. (ID-ED) All fallacies are exclusively either fallacies in dictione or fallacies extra dictionem . (ID-nAMB) Not all fallacies in dictione are due to ambiguity. (AMB-nID) Not all fallacies due to ambiguity are fallacies in dictione . (AMB&ID-ME) The set of (...)
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  25.  25
    Aristotle and Hume on the Idea of Natural Necessity.David Botting - 2019 - Studia Neoaristotelica 16 (2):153-227.
    There is a tension in scholarship about Aristotle’s philosophy, especially his philosophy of science, between empiricist readings and rationalist readings. A prime site of conflict is Posterior Analytics II.19 where Aristotle, after having said that we know the first principles by induction suddenly says that we know them by nous. Those taking the rationalist side find in nous something like a faculty of “intuition” and are led to the conclusion that by “induction” Aristotle has some kind of idea of “intuitive (...)
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  26.  45
    A Defence Of Broome’s First-order Model Of Practical Reasoning.David Botting - 2014 - Prolegomena 13 (1):163-182.
    In this paper I will consider criticisms that have been raised against Broome’s first-order model of practical reasoning by Bratman, Brunero, and Høj. I will modify Broome’s exposition so that it is no longer vulnerable to these objections. The main modification I will make is that I will take the principle Broome dubs the “beliefintention link” to express a pragmatic implicature instead of a material implication, on the basis of which implicatures the process of reasoning Broome describes reaches the conclusion-states (...)
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  27.  9
    A Dialectical View of “Freedom and Resentment”.David Botting - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):325-341.
    In this paper I wish to look at the structure of Strawson’s argument in the classic paper “Freedom and Resentment.” My purpose is less to evaluate and criticize Strawson’s paper as to give a dialectical perspective on it in which Strawson and those he is arguing against are given specific dialectical roles and the arguments and counter-arguments are designed with specific dialectical aims in mind. Specifi c parallels will be drawn between some things that Strawson says and certain ideas in (...)
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  28.  13
    A Goldman / Chisholm View of Property-Exemplifications.David Botting - 2010 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 1 (23):44-59.
    I believe that a radically fine-grained property-exemplification theory is the right approach to the metaphysics of events. In this paper I will not be arguing for this detail but will be more concerned with issues over the internal consistency of the property-exemplification theory; in particular, I want to resolve issues about the individuation of property-tokens.
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  29.  8
    A Goldman / Chisholm View of Property-Exemplifications.David Botting - 2010 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):44-59.
    I believe that a radically fine-grained property-exemplication theory is the right approach to the metaphysics of events. In this paper I will not be arguing for this detail but will be more concerned with issues over the internal consistency of the property exemplification theory; in particular, I want to resolve issues about the individuation of property-tokens.
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  30.  25
    Being Reasonable.David Botting - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 42 (1):17-36.
    Where do the rules of critical discussion get their normative force? What kinds of norms are involved? Unreasonable behaviour in the critical discussion - e.g., continuing to assert the contradictory of a proven standpoint, performing some action pragmatically inconsistent with a proven standpoint, or the same with regard to the starting-points agreed to in the opening stage - is liable to moral sanction. Thus, a moral/ethical norm is involved and the rules must have a moral force. Pragma-dialectics as it stands (...)
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  31.  1
    Circular Demonstration and the Necessity of Minor Premises.David Botting - 2020 - Méthexis 32 (1):155-185.
    In the Prior Analytics Aristotle famously endorses the validity of the mixed modal syllogism Barbara lxl, but in the Posterior Analytics we appear to find Aristotle arguing that since demonstrations are only of what cannot be otherwise, both premises need to be necessary. One would almost think that Aristotle had forgotten what he said about mixed modal syllogisms were it not for the fact that he also appears to refer to it directly in Posterior Analytics i.6. This is puzzling. In (...)
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  32.  5
    Commentary on: Geoffrey C. Goddu's "Why I still do not know what a 'real' argument is".David Botting - unknown
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  33.  43
    Do Syllogisms Commit the Petitio Principii? The Role of Inference-Rules in Mill's Logic of Truth.David Botting - 2014 - History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3):237-247.
    It is a common complaint that the syllogism commits a petitio principii. This is discussed extensively by John Stuart Mill in ‘A System of Logic’ [1882. Eighth Edition, New York: Harper and Brothers] but is much older, being reported in Sextus Empiricus in chapter 17 of the ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’ [1933. in R. G. Bury, Works, London and New York: Loeb Classical Library]. Current wisdom has it that Mill gives an account of the syllogism that avoids being a petitio by (...)
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  34.  21
    “Even Though”: On the Different Functions of Discounting Expressions in Pro and Con Arguments.David Botting - 2018 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 55 (1):167-186.
    We often say things like “Even though X, Y” or “In spite of Y, X”. What do we mean when we say things like this? What does it imply about the reasons involved? I will argue that there are at least some cases, namely when they are used in the conclusions of conductive arguments, where it should be seen as modifying our expression of X and indicating a certain kind of affect towards X, and this is characteristic of (the most (...)
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  35. Even though": on the different functions of discounting expressions in pro and con arguments.David Botting - 2018 - In Martin Hinton & Marcin Koszowy (eds.), The philosophy of argumentation. Białystok: University of Białystok.
     
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  36.  10
    High Confirmation and Inductive Validity.David Botting - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):119-142.
    Does a high degree of confirmation make an inductive argument valid? I will argue that it depends on the kind of question to which the argument is meant to be providing an answer. We should distinguish inductive generalization from inductive extrapolation even in cases where they might appear to have the same answer, and also from confirmation of a hypothesis.
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  37.  37
    Johnson and the Soundness Doctrine.David Botting - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (4):501-525.
    Why informal logic? Informal logic is a group of proposals meant to contrast with, replace, and reject formal logic, at least for the analysis and evaluation of everyday arguments. Why reject formal logic? Formal logic is criticized and claimed to be inadequate because of its commitment to the soundness doctrine. In this paper I will examine and try to respond to some of these criticisms. It is not my aim to examine every argument ever given against formal logic; I am (...)
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  38.  12
    Probability and rational choice.David Botting - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (1):01.
    In this paper I will discuss the rationality of reasoning about the future. There are two things that we might like to know about the future: which hypotheses are true and what will happen next. To put it in philosophical language, I aim to show that there are methods by which inferring to a generalization and inferring to the next instance can be shown to be normative and the method itself shown to be rational, where this is due in part (...)
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  39.  47
    Refutations and Sophistical Refutations—Logical or Dialectical Concepts?David Botting - 2016 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 31 (3):5-21.
    In this paper I will defend a logical conception of refutations and fallacies against objections that are meant to show that a dialectical conception of refutations or fallacies is necessary. I will show that there is only one dialectical concept—not that of a thesis, as those favouring a dialectical analysis argue, but that of a concession—that may need to be added to a logical conception for such a conception to be adequate.
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  40.  36
    Resentment and the Impossibility of Universal Abnormality.David Botting - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (2):157-169.
    P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” argues that it is self-contradictory for abnormality to be the universal condition. This argument is claimed by Paul Russell to be faulty because conflating abnormality and incapacity, there being no contradiction involved in incapacity being a universal condition. Russell’s critique has become the mainstream view, but it will be shown that from the first-person point of view, universal incapacity could not be any basis on which we could in practice modify our attitudes.
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  41.  22
    The Collectivity of Blaming.David Botting - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1-39.
    In this paper I want to argue that acts of blame are performed by collectives, and not by any collective but only by collectives that satisfy certain conditions { broadly those that, by collectivizing reason, can be held to be autonomous subjects to which it makes sense to attribute attitudes, including participant reactive attitudes such as resentment. The actors involved must also be related to the collective in particular ways in order to hold and be held responsible, but they need (...)
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  42.  41
    The Logic of Intending and Predicting.David Botting - 2017 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):1-24.
    Can human acts be causally explained in the same way as the rest of nature? If so, causal explanation in the manner of the Hempelian model shouldn’t the human sciences and the natural sciences equally. This is not so much a question of whether the Hempelian model is a completely adequate account of causal explanation, but about whether it is adequate or inadequate in the same way for each: if there is some unique feature of human acts that dictates that (...)
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  43.  34
    Toulmin’s Logical Types.David Botting - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (2):433-449.
    In “The Uses of Argument” Toulmin introduces a number of concepts that have become popular in argumentation theory, such as data, claim, warrant, backing, force, field, and, most fundamentally, the concept of a “logical type”. Toulmin never defines the concept of a logical type or a field very clearly, and different interpretations can be found in the literature, either reconstructing what Toulmin has in mind, or revising his concepts to suit other concerns. A natural history of these concepts is not (...)
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  44.  4
    The resentful and the indignant.David Botting - 2016 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 15 (1):36-49.
    In “Freedom and Resentment” P.F. Strawson distinguishes between the participant reactive attitudes like resentment and the moral reactive attitudes like indignation described by Strawson as their “vicarious analogues,” where we are not the injured party and it is not our own personal relationships at stake. Through naturalistic description of the participant reactive attitudes a set of conditions for moral responsibility can be discovered that, moreover, are held to be immune to any external review or to require external justification. Except for (...)
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  45.  8
    The Twofold Indeterminacy of Intention.David Botting - 2012 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):39-55.
    In this paper I hope to answer the questions "How do we make something an intentional object?" and "What kinds of things can be intentional objects?" My response will be a direct reference theory following Chisholm. Such a theory has as a consequence, I will argue, different types of indeterminacy in our attitudes. This is due to Chisholm's concept of conceptual entailment. I hold that if the self-ascribed attribute conceptually entails another which gives a different intentional object, then the attitude (...)
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  46.  7
    The Twofold Indeterminacy of Intention.David Botting - 2012 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 1 (26):39-55.
    In this paper I hope to answer the questions "How do we make something an intentional object?" and "What kinds of things can be intentional objects?" My response will be a direct reference theory following Chisholm. Such a theory has as a consequence, I will argue, different types of indeterminacy in our attitudes. This is due to Chisholm's concept of conceptual entailment. I hold that if the self-ascribed attribute conceptually entails another which gives a different intentional object, then the attitude (...)
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  47.  57
    Three theses on acts.David Botting - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):65 – 79.
    In 'A Theory of Human Action' (1970) Alvin Goldman launched an attack on what has become known as the Anscombe-Davidson Identity Thesis. In brief, this is the thesis that our acts are our body movements, and that all the different effects of that movement do not entail that different acts have been performed, but only that an identical act has different descriptions. In her response to Goldman, Anscombe (1981) claims that Goldman is arguing at cross-purposes. I will argue that this (...)
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  48.  44
    The Two One Fallacy Theory Theory.David Botting - 2011 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos. pp. 37-56.
  49.  29
    The Value Problem of A Priori Knowledge.David Botting - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (2):229-252.
    In recent years, there has been a “value turn” in epistemology. We intuitively think of knowledge as having a value, a value that mere true belief does not have, and it has been held to be a condition of adequacy on theories of knowledge that they be able to explain why. Unfortunately, for most theories their explanations suffer from the “swamping problem” because what has to be added to turn true belief into knowledge has value only instrumentally to truth; for (...)
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  50.  31
    Without Qualification: An Inquiry Into the Secundum Quid.David Botting - 2014 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 36 (1):161-170.
    In this paper I will consider several interpretations of the fallacy of secundum quid as it is given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations and argue that they do not work, one reason for which is that they all imply that the fallacy depends on language and thus fail to explain why Aristotle lists this fallacy among the fallacies not depending on language, amounting often to a claim that Aristotle miscategorises this fallacy. I will argue for a reading that preserves (...)
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