s This paper reports studies designed to examine perceptions of preferential selection. Subjects evaluated the fairness of hypothetical cases of selection decisions based on either candidate sex or ethnic origin. A within-subjects design and a between-subjects design yielded convergent results showing that (1) preferential selection was perceived as unfair, irrespective of respondent sex or the basis for the preferential treatment (i.e., candidate sex or ethnic origin), (2) the level of perceived injustice was directly related to the discrepancy in merits between (...) the successful minority candidate and the more qualified yet unsuccessful majority candidate, and (3) the provision of either an ethical or legislative justification for the selection decisions further exacerbated feelings of injustice. Possible interpretations for the findings and practical implications of the study were then discussed. (shrink)

The study ascertained (1) whether an observer's scope of justice with reference to either the moral agent or the target person of a moral act, would affect his/her judgements of the ethicality of the act, and (2) whether observer judgements of ethicality parallel the moral agent's decision processes in systematically evaluating the intensity of the moral issue. A scenario approach was used. Results affirmed both research questions. Discussions covered the implications of the findings for the underlying cognitive processes of moral (...) judgements, for the link between judgements of fairness and ethicality, as well as for the debate of ethical absolutism versus relativism. (shrink)

Abstract:The present paper focuses on the linkage between two academic paradigms in the enquiry into business ethics: normative philosophy and empirical social sciences. The paper first reviews existing research pertaining to a normative-empirical dialogue. Further empirical data on the relationship between various standards of morality are discussed in relation to the normative frameworks of ethics. Lastly, future directions for such a dialogue in business ethics are suggested.

Abstract:The present paper focuses on the linkage between two academic paradigms in the enquiry into business ethics: normative philosophy and empirical social sciences. The paper first reviews existing research pertaining to a normative-empirical dialogue. Further empirical data on the relationship between various standards of morality are discussed in relation to the normative frameworks of ethics. Lastly, future directions for such a dialogue in business ethics are suggested.

Using a scenario approach involving hypothetical moral decisions, the study aims to (1) compare managerial professionals' ethicality judgments with those made by the general public, and (2) ascertain the roles of perceived intensity (Jones, 1991) as well as perceived fairness of the moral issue in judgments of ethicality. While the two respondent groups made similar ratings on variables of moral intensity, fairness, and ethicality; the evaluation processes underlying their ethicality judgments were different. Empirically, the study has also established a link (...) between judgments of fairness and judgments of ethicality. (shrink)

Towards the general goal of generating a normative-empirical dialogue about ethics and justice, the present study explored three issues: (1) the extent to which the normative criteria of ethics and justice prescribed by moral philosophers are indeed reflected in managerial professionals' subjective beliefs of what ethical and just work behaviour ought to be, (2) the relationship between people's ought beliefs and their perceptions of actual ethical and just work behaviour, and (3) the relationship between the notions of ethics and justice. (...) To do so, a review of the normative and positive theories of ethics was carried out which revealed the key normative criteria of ethics (i.e., utility, rights, justice, principle and care) and justice (i.e., due procedure and due outcome). Using both the interview and the repertory grid procedures, key determinants of ethical and just work behaviour as perceived by the managerial professionals were generated. These determinants were used to construct the questionnaires for the assessment of people's subjective ought beliefs, and their is judgements, of ethical and just work behaviour. There were three respondent samples: managerial professionals, general public and university students. Results showed that (1) people's subjective ought beliefs closely reflected the normative standards of ethics and justice, (2) there were significant discrepancies between people's subjective ought beliefs and their perceptions of actual ethical and just work behaviour, (3) individual differences in ought beliefs had some influence on is judgements, (4) both the ought beliefs and is judgements pertaining to the notion of justice could be accounted for by measures of the other four criteria of ethics and in particular, the notion of rights. The implications of the findings for normative theories of ethics and for ethics education are discussed. (shrink)

Many leading management scientists have advocated ethicalism: the incorporation of social and ethical concerns into traditional "rational" OR-MS techniques and management decisions. In fact, elementary forms of decision analysis can readily be augmented, using ethical theory, in ways that sweep in ethical issues. In addition, alternative conceptual models of Decision-Analysis, Game-Theory and Optimality are now available, all of which have brought OR-MS and Business-Ethics into a closer alignment.

Human reproductive cloning has become the most palpable example of the globalization of science. Throughout the world, events and conjectures in the media, such as the birth and death in the United Kingdom of the cloned sheep Dolly and projects to clone human beings by Korean scientists, by members of the Canadian-based Raelian cult, and by the Italian physician Antinori in an undisclosed country, have galvanized the political will of individual countries to ban human reproductive cloning.Yet, international attempts to harmonize (...) policies in the area of biomedical ethics and human research, such as the 1997 Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, and most recently, the United Nations’ efforts to adopt an international convention against human reproductive cloning, have been insufficient to trigger a substantial global policy design process on issues relating to these new technologies. (shrink)

In The Ethics of Food, Gregory E. Pence brings together a collection of voices who share the view that the ethics of genetically modified food is among the most pressing societal questions of our time. This comprehensive collection addresses a broad range of subjects, including the meaning of food, moral analyses of vegetarianism and starvation, the safety and environmental risks of genetically modified food, issues of global food politics and the food industry, and the relationships among food, evolution, and human (...) history. (shrink)

This book is a qualitative, interpretive, phenomenological, and interdisciplinary, examination of food and food practices and their meanings in the modern world. Each chapter thematically focuses upon a particular food practice and on some key details of the examined practice, or on the practice’s social and cultural impact.

This study explored drug users’ attitudes toward and understanding of randomized controlled trials testing addiction therapies. A video portraying a fictional consent conference for a randomized controlled trial with placebo arm was shown to poor male and female drug users of diverse ethnic status and sexual orientation. The video stimulated focus group discussion in which participants’ comments often reflected “experimental realism”—a realistic view of the trial—and adequate understanding of the uncertain efficacy of the treatment being tested, as well as the (...) concepts of randomization and placebo control. However, participants’ comprehension of the nature of placebos was compromised by the widespread view that placebos are a way of testing a subject’s willpower and personal control over his or her addiction. Comments also showed a mistrust of the video investigator’s integrity and competence and signs of therapeutic misconception and misestimation. The study’s findings underscore the importance of tailoring informed consent encounters to the personal and sociohistorical context of participants’ lived experiences. (shrink)

As one of the most important ethicists to emerge since the Second World War, Alan Gewirth continues to influence philosophical debates concerning morality. In this ground-breaking book, Gewirth's neo-Kantianism, and the communitarian problems discussed, form a dialogue on the foundation of moral theory. Themes of agent-centered constraints, the formal structure of theories, and the relationship between freedom and duty are examined along with such new perspectives as feminism, the Stoics, and Sartre. Gewirth offers a picture of the philosopher's theory and (...) its applications, providing a richer, more complete critical assessement than any which has occurred to date. (shrink)

In 2003, South African writer J. M. Coetzee was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature for his riveting portrayals of racial repression, sexual politics, the guises of reason, and the hypocrisy of human beings toward animals and nature. Coetzee was credited with being "a scrupulous doubter, ruthless in his criticism of the cruel rationalism and cosmetic morality of western civilization." The film of his novel _Disgrace_, starring John Malkovich, brought his challenging ideas to a new audience. Anton Leist and Peter (...) Singer have assembled an outstanding group of contributors who probe deeply into Coetzee's extensive and extraordinary corpus. They explore his approach to ethical theory and philosophy and pay particular attention to his representation of the human-animal relationship. They also confront Coetzee's depiction of the elementary conditions of life, the origins of morality, the recognition of value in others, the sexual dynamics between men and women, the normality of suppression, and the possibility of equality in postcolonial society. With its wide-ranging consideration of philosophical issues, especially in relation to fiction, this volume stands alone in its extraordinary exchange of ethical and literary inquiry. (shrink)

In its comprehensive overview of Alain Locke's pragmatist philosophy this book captures the radical implications of Locke's approach within pragmatism, the critical temper embedded in Locke's works, the central role of power and empowerment of the oppressed and the concept of broad democracy Locke employed.

Phillips & Singer's compelling presentation is weakest in its demonstration of commonalities between sensory plasticity and higher forms of learning and behavior. We propose that available data on schizophrenia can provide such evidence, because of the presence of impairments in a number of functions central to their model, and strong relationships between these dysfunctions and behavior.

Sidgwick's defence of esoteric morality has been heavily criticized, for example in Bernard Williams's condemnation of it as 'Government House utilitarianism.' It is also at odds with the idea of morality defended by Kant, Rawls, Bernard Gert, Brad Hooker, and T.M. Scanlon. Yet it does seem to be an implication of consequentialism that it is sometimes right to do in secret what it would not be right to do openly, or to advocate publicly. We defend Sidgwick on this issue, and (...) show that accepting the possibility of esoteric morality makes it possible to explain why we should accept consequentialism, even while we may feel disapproval towards some of its implications. (shrink)

This collection takes stock of J.M. Coetzee's impact from a number of interesting angles, Including animals, sexuality, race, and reason. The time is truly ripe for such a volume.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Roots of the Blues in Trauma, Loss, and Adversity Transforming Trauma, Loss, and Adversity The Blues as Living Oral History Transformation through Music Emotional Regulation in the Blues The Creative Reverberation of Traumatic Loss The Blues as a Living, Evolving Legacy Notes.

In his Axel Hägerström Lectures, given in Sweden in 1991, Dick Hare referred to Hägerström as a pioneer in ethics who had made the most important breakthrough that there had been in ethics during the twentieth century. Although Hägerström's development of a nondescriptivist approach to ethics certainly was pioneering philosophical work, when the history of twentieth century ethics comes to be written, I believe that it is Hare's own work that will be seen as having made the most important contribution.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hume and Hume’s Connexions ed. by M. A. Stewart, John P. WrightIra SingerM. A. Stewart and John P. Wright, eds. Hume and Hume’s Connexions. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1995. Pp. xvi + 266. Cloth, $40.00. Paper, $18.95.This collection is organized around the theme of Hume’s connections with his philosophical predecessors, contemporaries, and successors.In a historical prelude, Roger Emerson meticulously describes the factions that supported and opposed (...) Hume’s efforts to gain a professorship. Emerson attributes Hume’s failure not only to the charges of impiety leveled against him, but also to the intricate workings of a political patronage system.Four essays about moral theory follow. James Moore attacks the conventional view that Hume’s moral theory is deeply similar to Hutcheson’s. In fact, Moore argues, surface similarities here mask systematic disagreements about justice, self-interest, teleology, theology, reason’s role within a sentimentalist framework, and about whether morality is, fundamentally, justified approbation for benevolence (Hutcheson) or sympathy’s merely natural tendency to generate feelings of approbation (Hume). These differences make sense, Moore notes, in light of Hutcheson’s debts to Stoicism, and Hume’s debts to Epicureanism. Stephen Darwall argues that, by parting company with Hutcheson on one crucial point, Hume opens up a logical space for Bentham’s Utilitarianism. Hutcheson explains the goodness of natural [End Page 141] goods, such as happiness, in terms of our distinctively moral approval of benevolence: happiness is good because a benevolent person wills general happiness. Hume instead explains our moral approval of qualities of character in terms of natural goods and the psychological mechanism of sympathy: a benevolent person receives moral approval because she produces happiness for herself and others, including sympathetic spectators. Darwall claims that Hume thus foreshadows Bentham’s efforts to set our moral judgments on an uncontroversial nonmoral foundation. Pauline C. Westerman discusses the relation between Hume and the natural lawyers. Hume shares some of their characteristic concerns, such as accounting for the origin of private property, and employs some of their terminology. Still, Westerman argues, while Grotius and Pufendorff wanted to justify morality, Hume wants only to explain it. Finally, John P. Wright invokes Butler’s account of habit to illuminate Hume’s notion of a calm passion. Butler argues that, as a habit develops, repetition weakens feelings while strengthening the tendency to act: distress will seldom shock someone habituated into generosity, who will reliably act to relieve that distress. Citing this psychological dynamic, Wright argues, helps to explain what a calm passion is, and how it can prevail over a violent passion.Two essays concern philosophy of mind and epistemology. P. B. Wood uses Thomas Kuhn’s concept of texts that are “exemplars” for working scientists to illuminate the “science of mind” as Hume and Reid practiced it. David Owen puts “inductive skepticism” into historical context, arguing that in that context, Hume appears as neither the victim nor the opponent of deductivism about rationality. Instead, Hume’s focus is Locke’s account of probable reasoning, according to which such reasoning involves a chain of associated ideas (not a formal structure of propositions). Hume’s argument is that our causal thinking proceeds differently than Locke requires, because in it we do not follow an unbroken series of associated perceptions, but rather leap over the gap between our impressions up to now and the general causal idea.The book’s centerpiece is a fragmentary Hume manuscript, discovered in 1993, about the problem of evil. The manuscript appears in both facsimile and transcription. In introducing the manuscript, M. A. Stewart argues plausibly that it is one of the “nobler parts” that Hume cut from the Treatise to avoid offending Bishop Butler.Four essays discuss philosophy of religion. Reflecting on miracles, Stewart traces a tradition of critically examining religious testimony back to the Port-Royal Logic and to Locke; moreover, Stewart emphasizes that Hume’s method in “Of Miracles” is similar to his method in debunking the Ossian poems. Michel Malherbe, taking as his point of departure those remarks by “Pamphilus” that preface the Dialogues, and reviewing in detail Shaftesbury’s pronouncements about the art of philosophical dialogue, discusses... (shrink)

An d rew Ku per begins his cri ti que of my vi ews on poverty by accepti n g the crux of my moral argument: The interests of all persons ought to count equally, and geographic location and citizenship m a ke no intrinsic differen ce to the ri gh t s and obl i ga ti ons of i n d ivi du a l s . Ku per also sets out some key facts about global poverty, for (...) example, that 30,000 children die every day from preventable illness and starvation, while most people in devel oped nati on s have plenty of disposable income that they s pend on lu x u ries and items that sati s f y mere wants, not basic needs. Yet after summarizing an essay I wrote for the New York Times Magazine in which I argued that the avera ge Am erican family should don a te a l a r ge porti on of t h eir income to or ga n i z ati ons like UNICEF and Ox f a m , Ku per wri te s : “ But if Si n ger ’s ex h ort a ti ons make you want to act immediately in the ways he recom m en d s , you s h ould not do so.” Why not? Because the approach I advoc a te “would seriously harm the poor.” These are strong words. It is startling to be told that a substantial transfer of resources from comfortably-off American families to UNICEF or Oxfam would harm the poor. What abo ut those 3 0,0 0 0 ch i l d ren dyi n g from preventable illness and starvation? In its 2001 fund-raising material,the U.S. Committee for UNICEF says that a donation of $17 will provide immunization “to protect a child for life against the six leading ch i l d - killing and maiming diseases:measles,polio. (shrink)

The idea of human cruelty to animals so consumes novelist Elizabeth Costello in her later years that she can no longer look another person in the eye: humans, especially meat-eating ones, seem to her to be conspirators in a crime of stupefying magnitude taking place on farms and in slaughterhouses, factories, and laboratories across the world. Costello's son, a physics professor, admires her literary achievements, but dreads his mother’s lecturing on animal rights at the college where he teaches. His colleagues (...) resist her argument that human reason is overrated and that the inability to reason does not diminish the value of life; his wife denounces his mother’s vegetarianism as a form of moral superiority. At the dinner that follows her first lecture, the guests confront Costello with a range of sympathetic and skeptical reactions to issues of animal rights, touching on broad philosophical, anthropological, and religious perspectives. Painfully for her son, Elizabeth Costello seems offensive and flaky, but—dare he admit it?—strangely on target. In this landmark book, Nobel Prize–winning writer J. M. Coetzee uses fiction to present a powerfully moving discussion of animal rights in all their complexity. He draws us into Elizabeth Costello’s own sense of mortality, her compassion for animals, and her alienation from humans, even from her own family. In his fable, presented as a Tanner Lecture sponsored by the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University, Coetzee immerses us in a drama reflecting the real-life situation at hand: a writer delivering a lecture on an emotionally charged issue at a prestigious university. Literature, philosophy, performance, and deep human conviction—Coetzee brings all these elements into play. As in the story of Elizabeth Costello, the Tanner Lecture is followed by responses treating the reader to a variety of perspectives, delivered by leading thinkers in different fields. Coetzee’s text is accompanied by an introduction by political philosopher Amy Gutmann and responsive essays by religion scholar Wendy Doniger, primatologist Barbara Smuts, literary theorist Marjorie Garber, and moral philosopher Peter Singer, author of Animal Liberation. Together the lecture-fable and the essays explore the palpable social consequences of uncompromising moral conflict and confrontation. (shrink)

The eponymous protagonist of Okja is an adorable “super-pig,” larger than an ordinary pig not only in size but also in heart and mind. The film explores and interrogates different ways of seeing Okja, different portraits of Okja’s moral status, as philosophers would put it. To the Mirando Corporation, Okja has no moral status. She is a mere product to be used as they see fit. To the Animal Liberation Front, Okja is a dramatic symbol of animals everywhere who are (...) mistreated and deprived of their rights. She represents a rare opportunity to further their political cause. To the young girl Mija, Okja is unquestionably a person, a member of her family, her lifelong companion and friend. The film subjects both the Mirando Corporation and the Animal Liberation Front to satirical critique and invites the audience to come to see Okja as Mija does. So what is the moral status of an animal like Okja? Philosophers like Peter Singer have argued on behalf of animals, super or not, and protested the ways they are treated, often focused on factory farming and the use of animals in scientific research. Like these philosophical animal advocates, this film pushes human beings to expand the boundaries of the moral community beyond their own species. Simply put, Okja argues that animals matter. (shrink)

Ben Saunders claims that actual consent is not necessary for organ donation due to ‘normative consent’, a concept he borrows from David Estlund. Combining normative consent with Peter Singer's ‘greater moral evil principle’, Saunders argues that it is immoral for an individual to refuse consent to donate his or her organs. If a presumed consent policy were thus adopted, it would be morally legitimate to remove organs from individuals whose wishes concerning donation are not known. This paper disputes Saunders' (...) arguments. First, if death caused by the absence of organ transplant is the operational premise, then, there is nothing of comparable moral precedence under which a person is not obligated to donate. Saunders' use of Singer's principle produces a duty to donate in almost all circumstances. However, this premise is based on a flawed interpretation of cause and effect between organ availability and death. Second, given growing moral and scientific agreement that the organ donors in heart-beating and non-heart-beating procurement protocols are not dead when their organs are surgically removed, it is not at all clear that people have a duty to consent to their lives being taken for their organs. Third, Saunders' claim that there can be good reasons for refusing consent clashes with his claim that there is a moral obligation for everyone to donate their organs. Saunders' argument is more consistent with a conclusion of ‘mandatory consent’. Finally, it is argued that Saunders' policy, if put into place, would be totalitarian in scope and would therefore be inconsistent with the freedom required for a democratic society. (shrink)

Zhizneopisanie -- Kniga znanii︠a︡ -- Ukazanii︠a︡ i nastavlenii︠a︡ -- Kniga o dushe.

In recent years, bioethical discourse around the topic of ‘genetic enhancement’ has become increasingly politicized. We fear there is too much focus on the semantic question of whether we should call particular practices and emerging bio-technologies such as CRISPR ‘eugenics’, rather than the more important question of how we should view them from the perspective of ethics and policy. Here, we address the question of whether ‘eugenics’ can be defended and how proponents and critics of enhancement should engage with each (...) other. (shrink)

The justification for advance directives is grounded in the notion that they extend patient autonomy into future states of incompetency through patient participation in decision making about end-of-life care. Four objections challenge the necessity and sufficiency of individual autonomy, perceived to be a defining feature of liberal philosophical theory, as a basis of advance care planning. These objections are that the liberal concept of autonomy (i) implies a misconception of the individual self, (ii) entails the denial of values of social (...) justice, (iii) does not account for justifiable acts of paternalism, and (iv) does not account for the importance of personal relationships in the advance care planning process. The last objection is especially pertinent in light of recent empirical research highlighting the importance of personal relationships in advance care planning. This article examines these four objections to autonomy, and the liberal theoretical framework with which it is associated, in order to re-evaluate the philosophical basis of advance care planning. We argue that liberal autonomy (i) is not a misconceived concept as critics assume, (ii) does not entail the denial of values of social justice, (iii) can account for justifiable acts of paternalism, though it (iv) is not the best account of the value of personal relationships that arise in advance care planning. In conclusion, we suggest that liberalism is a necessary component of a theoretical framework for advance care planning but that it needs to be supplemented with theories that focus explicitly on the significance of personal relationships. (shrink)

Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I (...) introduce a theory of moral motivation that supplements the intuitive responses to different amoralist cases. According to moral judgment purposivism (MJP), in rough approximation, a purpose of moral judgments is to motivate corresponding behaviors such that a mental state without this purpose is not a moral judgment. MJP is consistent with conceptual desiderata, provides an illuminating analysis of amoralist cases, and offers a step forward in the internalist-externalist debates. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dispelling the Myth of the Non-Singer:Embracing Two Aesthetics for SingingLouise M. PascaleI entered the Music Workshop course with trepidation. Of all the courses in my Master's program, I feared this one the most. My experiences with music have always been negative ones. As I entered the classroom, memories surfaced of the time I was told to mouth the words so I would not throw the rest of the (...) class off key and when I was laughed off the stage after a friend and I attempted a rendition of "Rolling O'er the Billows." After that, I was convinced I should not sing.1Maxine Greene reminds us how easy it is to get caught in the "main text of life," one that is "negotiated mostly by convention, routine, habit, duty and one we have very little choice in."2 Our long-held acceptance of the "singer" and "non-singer" provides a perfect example of Greene's metaphor. The traditional meaning of "singing" is created out of convention and habit, perpetuated by the "main text" (white, middle class) values of American society.Singing, as it is understood in today's educational settings, settled into its role in American music education as a result of a number of significant decisions made as early as the 1600s by prominent leaders of the church.3 Each of these decisions added to the growth and strength of the view of singing that became [End Page 165] what I refer to as a "taproot"4 in music education. This taproot continued to settle comfortably into the groundwork of music education and has had major and long-lasting effects on how we generally perceive and experience singing.The Western perspective of singing is wedded to a multitude of assumptions and beliefs and, over a period of time, has taken on complex meaning. It is associated with subtle nuances, such as valuing the high, lilting soprano voice over the alto. It is connected to various philosophies and strongly held convictions, such as improving vocal performance through the mastery of musical literacy, and even exclusionary practices, such as selecting out the "better singers" and suggesting that others refrain from singing at all.Perhaps the most profound consequence of this entrenched taproot is that it has left American society with a very limited perception of "singing." This singular, well-supported root, albeit strong, impenetrable, and closely connected with a number of cultural and societal assumptions, effectively narrows the scope of our perceptions, our language, our philosophy, and our teaching practices in the domain of singing in education. Illustration of the powerful ways music relates to and directly expresses the social attitudes and cognitive processes of a culture are found in the work of John Blacking and John Miller Chernoff.5 Their work provides an opportunity to reflect on the cultural and societal influences of the "taproot" philosophy of music education and the ways these have created limitations on who expresses themselves musically, why, how, and for whom.One of the most critical of those limitations is that we have classroom teachers who rarely, if ever, sing with their students. The gap between those in education who sing and offer musical activities to their students and those who do not is greater than ever. The "non-singer" mentality persists in educational communities and is not being addressed in music education circles. Singing continues to be considered, by most educators, to be a complicated skill that must be learned and requires training in breathing, vocal technique, and diction, and a basic knowledge of note reading.Many have strong feelings about singing; it is not a neutral subject. When the topic of singing is brought up, some involved in the conversation are likely to personalize it and be eager to share stories about their singing ability and to express their opinions about whether or not they qualify as a "singer." Sometimes the reactions can be extreme. Some people shy completely away from singing, to the point of running from the room at the mere suggestion that they might be asked to participate in singing in public. Others have an opposite reaction and experience singing as an enjoyable activity... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dispelling the Myth of the Non-Singer:Embracing Two Aesthetics for SingingLouise M. PascaleI entered the Music Workshop course with trepidation. Of all the courses in my Master's program, I feared this one the most. My experiences with music have always been negative ones. As I entered the classroom, memories surfaced of the time I was told to mouth the words so I would not throw the rest of the (...) class off key and when I was laughed off the stage after a friend and I attempted a rendition of "Rolling O'er the Billows." After that, I was convinced I should not sing.1Maxine Greene reminds us how easy it is to get caught in the "main text of life," one that is "negotiated mostly by convention, routine, habit, duty and one we have very little choice in."2 Our long-held acceptance of the "singer" and "non-singer" provides a perfect example of Greene's metaphor. The traditional meaning of "singing" is created out of convention and habit, perpetuated by the "main text" (white, middle class) values of American society.Singing, as it is understood in today's educational settings, settled into its role in American music education as a result of a number of significant decisions made as early as the 1600s by prominent leaders of the church.3 Each of these decisions added to the growth and strength of the view of singing that became [End Page 165] what I refer to as a "taproot"4 in music education. This taproot continued to settle comfortably into the groundwork of music education and has had major and long-lasting effects on how we generally perceive and experience singing.The Western perspective of singing is wedded to a multitude of assumptions and beliefs and, over a period of time, has taken on complex meaning. It is associated with subtle nuances, such as valuing the high, lilting soprano voice over the alto. It is connected to various philosophies and strongly held convictions, such as improving vocal performance through the mastery of musical literacy, and even exclusionary practices, such as selecting out the "better singers" and suggesting that others refrain from singing at all.Perhaps the most profound consequence of this entrenched taproot is that it has left American society with a very limited perception of "singing." This singular, well-supported root, albeit strong, impenetrable, and closely connected with a number of cultural and societal assumptions, effectively narrows the scope of our perceptions, our language, our philosophy, and our teaching practices in the domain of singing in education. Illustration of the powerful ways music relates to and directly expresses the social attitudes and cognitive processes of a culture are found in the work of John Blacking and John Miller Chernoff.5 Their work provides an opportunity to reflect on the cultural and societal influences of the "taproot" philosophy of music education and the ways these have created limitations on who expresses themselves musically, why, how, and for whom.One of the most critical of those limitations is that we have classroom teachers who rarely, if ever, sing with their students. The gap between those in education who sing and offer musical activities to their students and those who do not is greater than ever. The "non-singer" mentality persists in educational communities and is not being addressed in music education circles. Singing continues to be considered, by most educators, to be a complicated skill that must be learned and requires training in breathing, vocal technique, and diction, and a basic knowledge of note reading.Many have strong feelings about singing; it is not a neutral subject. When the topic of singing is brought up, some involved in the conversation are likely to personalize it and be eager to share stories about their singing ability and to express their opinions about whether or not they qualify as a "singer." Sometimes the reactions can be extreme. Some people shy completely away from singing, to the point of running from the room at the mere suggestion that they might be asked to participate in singing in public. Others have an opposite reaction and experience singing as an enjoyable activity... (shrink)

Phillips & Singer (P&S) extend ideas derived from the observation eight years ago that the coherence (synchronization) of cortical oscillations can be modulated by the structure of visual stimuli. As described in the target article, a large part of the continued interest in this finding is related to independent theoretical work suggesting that synchronized cell firing could help solve the problem of binding together within cortex neuronal activity associated with different attributes of visual stimuli. The authors present an abstract (...) “proof of concept” model describing how their cortical processing scheme could work, but our biologically realistic models of cortical relationships suggest that the proposal is biologically implausible. Our realistic models lead to a very different interpretation of the significance of cortical oscillations. (shrink)

Duties to future persons contribute critically to many important contemporaneous ethical dilemmas, such as environmental protection, contraception, abortion, and population policy. Yet this area of ethics is mired in paradoxes. It appeared that any principle for dealing with future persons encountered Kavka's paradox of future individuals, Parfit's repugnant conclusion, or an indefensible asymmetry. In 1976, Singer proposed a utilitarian solution that seemed to avoid the above trio of obstacles, but Parfit so successfully demonstrated the unacceptability of this position that (...) Singer abandoned it. Indeed, the apparently intransitivity of Singer's solution contributed to Temkin's argument that the notion of "all things considered better than" may be intransitive. In this paper, I demonstrate that a time-extended view of Singer's solution avoids the intransitivity that allows Parfit's mere addition paradox to lead to the repugnant conclusion. However, the heart of the mere addition paradox remains: the time-extended view still yields intransitive judgments. I discuss a general theory for dealing with intransitivity that was inspired by Temkin's sports analogy, and demonstrate that such a solution is more palatable than Temkin suspected. When a pair-wise comparison also requires consideration of a small number of relevant external alternatives, we can avoid intransitivity and the mere addition paradox without infinite comparisons or rejecting the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Principle. (shrink)

Duties of beneficence are not well understood. Peter Singer has argued that the scope of beneficence should not be restricted to those who are, in some sense, near us. According to Singer, refusing to contribute to humanitarian relief efforts is just as wrong as refusing to rescue a child drowning before you. Most people do not seem convinced by Singer’s arguments, yet no one has offered a plausible justification for restricting the scope of beneficence that doesn’t produce (...) counterintuitive results elsewhere. I offer a defence of this restricted scope by introducing the notion of unique dependence, a notion that is both intuitively attractive and theoretically grounded. It explains why your reason to rescue the drowning child is more stringent than your reason to contribute to humanitarian relief, while blocking the conclusion that we have no reason at all to aid distant sufferers . (shrink)