Evidence, For the most part from books I and iv of locke's "essay concerning human understanding", Is presented to show that the issue about innate ideas as understood by locke was not primarily psychological but methodological. Locke's philosophic ire was directed against those who used the doctrine of innate ideas to advocate a close-Minded, As opposed to an open-Minded, Method of inquiry.

It is to misunderstand the nature of moral reasoning to suppose, As does andrew oldenquist in his "universalizability and nondescriptivism" (the journal of philosophy. Xlv, 3, Feb. 8, 1968, Pp. 57-79), That a distinction obtains between moral judgements and moral principles to the effect that a moral judgement requires supportability by reasons as a necessary condition, Whereas a moral principle is exempt from this condition. Four arguments are given against the view that there can be a sort of moral statement, (...) Here called a "moral principle," that is exempt from the requirement of supportability. (shrink)

Language, said Locke, “is the great instrument and common tie of society.” “Language,” said Dewey, is “the tool of tools.” According to Wittgenstein, “Language is an instrument.” The instrumental characterization of language has had a long and respectable history, which is a curious fact, considering that as often as not philosophers and others who have affirmed it have evidenced less than full satisfaction with it. It is perhaps such dissatisfaction that urged Locke to add the qualification of “common tie” and (...) that moved Wittgenstein to throw in the suggestion that language is “a form of life”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:128 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The result is that this Hellenistic-Middle Age syncretism has had a far-reaching influence upon Paracelsus's thought. Because he was in no way a systematic philosopher, his writings are full of contradictions, developments, unitarian and dualistic tendencies, theistic and pantheistic trends, Christian and pagan elements, spiritualism, and occultism. According to Pagel, the originality of Paracelsus is not to be found in detailed discoveries and theories but (...) in his attempt to create the great synthesis of the fundamental correlations of things above and below throughout the whole realm of nature and medicine. By that, medicine and alchemy were given a new direction. The work closes with five pictures and a subject index. As one expects from an author like Pagel, this book shows a profound knowledge of the text material. It should be emphasized that the relevance is by no means limited to the field of the history of medicine, but that it is equally important for the history of philosophy, religion, and theology. HANs DIETER B~TZ Claremont Graduate School Hume's Philosophy of Belief: A Study of His First Inquiry. By Antony Flew. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1961. Pp. ix -~ 286. $6.00.) This book, neither a commentary nor an independent work, holds a place intermediate between the two, and a place that is to be heartily welcomed. It is not a commentary because, though it treats in sequence the chief topics of Hume's Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, there is no attempt to discuss the full text in detail. For example, Section III, "Of the/kssociation of Ideas," is all but ignored. The nature of Flew's book can best be grasped in terms of his two stated purposes, the first of which is to consider Hume's Inquiry "as a book standing on its own, rather than as a miscellany of appendices, restatements, and irrelevant notoriety-hunting insertions" (p. 15). The second purpose, which explains the intermediate status of Flew's study, is "to take Hume's arguments as starting points for discussions of the main philosophical issues which he selected for treatment in this Inquiry" (p. 16). In fulfilling this second purpose what Flew does is not merely to expound Hume's positions in Hume's terms but to expound them by considering whether they are tenable, and in studies of traditional philosophers this kind of consideration, as an alternative to plain exposition, is always to be welcomed. It ought, however, to be said that "main philosophical issues which Hume selected" does not mean main philosophical issues which the Inquiry can be read as provoking but for the most part just those issues named in the section titles of Hume's work. The first question apt to arise concerning such a study as Flew's is why discuss Hume's theories and contentions concerning belief and understanding only as put forth in the Inquiry. Flew offers no satisfactory answer to this question, which he does not distinguish from the closely associated question, answered at length: Why focus on the first Inquiry? In his first chapter, Flew observes that the Inquiry merits special study because it is much more than a radical abridgement of Book I of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. For one thing, a good quarter of the Inquiry is occupied with topics not considered in the Treatise, the topics of miracles and of providence. And for another, the program of the Inquiry is not the same as that of the earlier work, though both programs intersect in that the aim, proposed in the Introduction of the Treatise, to pursue "the science of man," reappears in the Inquiry, Section I, as the aim to discover "the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations." But the Inquiry is primarily polemical, whereas the Treatise aspires ambitiously to be scientific, with Hume daring "to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences [of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics]; which being once masters of, we may everywhere else hope for an easy victory." In contrast the concern uppermost in the later Inquiry is to carry a "war into the... (shrink)