The book illustrates the concept of action in three different contexts - the justification of actions, people's life history, and pragmatism.Because of ...

When we want to justify claims against one another, we discover that conceptual thought alone is not sufficient to legitimize property and income in the relative and proper proportions among members of a productive group. Instead, the basis for justification should also be seen in motivational states, validated less by rational thought than by an effective behaviour. To circumnavigate otherwise dangerously utopian claims to justice, the social sciences, and especially behavioural economics, are the most reliable basis for normative distributive justice. (...) This article builds on recent findings of experiments, first of all in order to give proof of the extent to which a general behavioural tendency towards equality is widespread among people, and second of all in order to highlight ‘desert’ and ‘need’ as the crucial criteria of just distribution, which will then sum up to justified inequality in the economic sphere. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 16 Heft: 1 Seiten: 159-178.

Sustainability is currently the term dominating environmental policy. Its extensive political diffusion is in stark contrast, however, to the extent to which there is agreement over its meaning. Its ability to motivate is not in question, but a certain scepticism surrounds its ideological content. Since ideological terms have no objective basis, it is therefore important for the purposes of environmental policy to establish whether such scepticism is justified.

Health and beauty are the most important physical ideals. This paper seeks to compare and contrast these ideals, based on a value theory of human abilities. Health is comprehended as a potential ability to act grounded in bodily functions. Beauty is explained as a symbolising reference to happiness, physical beauty as a combination of organic orientation to purpose and virtuous orientation to action. Physical beauty is the implicit symbolic expression of mental and physical health. This teleological theory is tested and (...) exemplified using current stereotypes such as youthfulness, slimness and shapeliness. (shrink)

This collection takes stock of J.M. Coetzee's impact from a number of interesting angles, Including animals, sexuality, race, and reason. The time is truly ripe for such a volume.

Es soll die These begründet werden, daß die Suche nach Wahrheitskriterien als philosophische Anstrengung sinnlos ist, weil einerseits mit Wahrheit ein Absolutheitsanspruch der Erkenntnis erhoben werden muß, andererseits aber ein solcher Anspruch mit Hilfe von Wahrheitskriterien nicht eingelöst werden kann. Die Begründung faßt den spezifischen Geltungscharakter des Wahrheitsanspruchs und einen unausweichlichen Regreß bei Wahrheitsfragen als geeignete Hinweise auf, daß und wieso Wahrheitskriterien logisch unmöglich sind; daß und wieso die Erkenntnispraxis darunter keinen Schaden erleidet; daß und wieso Wahrheit als die regulative (...) Rolle verstanden werden soll, welche der Wahrheitsanspruch in der Erkenntnis hat. (shrink)

The article gives an overview on arguments typically used within discussions on the ethical aspects of abortion. Five types of argument especially are analyzed more closely. Only one type withstands critical scrutiny: so-called interest-arguments, arguments referring to whether or when being killed (as involved in abortion) is against the interest of the fetus. In critical revision of a proposal due to Peter Singer the result is that abortion should be seen as morally neutral up to four months of pregnancy.

Since Hobbes' Leviathan was published in 1651, the 'problem of order' has been known for some time. Despite this long gestation period for social theory even today we do not have a universally agreed upon answer to this 'problem'. One of the reasons behind this lacuna may be the overly dispersed work being done in the economic and sociological traditions. Whereas one tradition favours 'collective action' as a central answer, the other thinks of the problem itself being dissolved by the (...) acceptance of 'socialized man'. Here, an attempt is made to offer the phenomenon of 'cooperation' as a promising middle ground for both traditions. To underline the importance of cooperation as an elementary social activity, first, cooperation is shown as working in tandem with its rival 'competition'. Secondly, several conceptual analyses of what is included in collective action and cooperation are offered. These analyses, thirdly, are deepened by an overview of the motivational bases potentially advancing cooperation. Overall, an awareness of the self-creating character of cooperation is explored, and put forward as the most feasible way of answering the classical problem of order. (shrink)

Foucault's twofold attack on the modern concept of power gives us something to think about. Backed by ingenious historical analyses he devises an idea of systemic an productive power, abstracted from the conceptual connections between power and individual power-sources, viz. power and restrictions of freedom. The article probes Foucault's historical sketches on these two tasks. It defends the less radical view of power as constraining interests and freedom.

Ernst Fehr's experimental research on altruistic behaviour aims at superseding the classical homo oeconomicus in micro-economic behaviour theory. This essay discusses Fehr's results from two points of view: rst, in regard to the understanding of social action associated with the term "altruism"; second, in regard to the 'anthropological' strategy of research that is based on the laboratory method. Against the emphasis on altruism it will be argued that it misleads into providing a distorted description of social acting, and that, due (...) to insu cient clarity about motives for acting, Fehr's empirical results give evidence not of altruism but rather of phenomena of social recognition. The objection against the anthropological strategy will be that it makes visible only local phenomena within prevailing social conditions and that it thus assumes more than it explains. (shrink)

It is not easy to give up on a tradition that promises to rationalize, explain, and thereby ultimately help improve, society. This article narrates the history of Critical Theory in three stages, following the dynamics of its own self-criticism during distinct historical periods and within different societies. Horkheimer/Adorno, Habermas and Honneth are read as participating in a philosophical project of societal rationalism which can be criticized by appeal to a pragmatist view of social theories, and specifically the ‘pragmatic maxim’. In (...) spite of its post-metaphysical announcements, Critical Theory overextends itself when it seeks to reconcile fully the normative and the empirical. An alternative, and more explicitly ethical and empirically controllable, scheme for critical theories is suggested. (shrink)

“Having a moral right” in private and public debates probably is one of the most important arguments to bring some foundation to one’s claims. Within international law and politics, for example, one easily falls back on universal “human rights”, especially if neither a more subtle moral argument nor prudential reasons find a hold. But in some contrast to this agreement on the strong practical relevance of rights, both the conceptual analysis and normative justification of rights are rather controversial in moral (...) philosophy. There is, perhaps, a consensus on a constructivist understanding of rights, that is that rights have to be constructed from a basis of more “elementary parts” of morality. There is no agreement, however, on the exact character of these parts and their normative import within an overall construction of rights. It seems to be clear somehow that rights have to secure and promote interests — of a human and animal kind. Not so clear is the kind of foundation rights can be given within the sphere of interests, especially if this is understood in a reductive sense. Nevertheless, because the function of rights is to secure interests, the construction of rights from an understanding of interests seems to suggest itself. It is in the interest of all beings to have their interests secured and furthered by rights. Therefore, an “interest theory of rights” provides itself as a primary option — meaning thereby the justificatory, and not the directive side of rights. (shrink)

Some goods cannot, according to MacLean, be dealt with adequately by cost-benefit analysis. An explanation for this thesis is given, linking these goods to the altruism implied in intimate social relations. MacLean's argument is then shown to be insufficient when extended to matters of public relevance. The integration of political values and economic costs should be possible, on a level doing justice to both.

During the last years Anglosaxon discussion about Marx and Marxism has been characterized by an intensified interest in historical materialism as a general theory of history. The most extensive, careful and analytically rigorous among several new treatments is the one by G. A. Cohen, which is the subject of four critical articles in the present issue of ANALYSE & KRITIK. To make these articles and Cohen's project understandable to the German reader, an attempt is made in the following to summarize (...) the main arguments of Cohen's defence of historical materialism and of the ensuing comprehensive and detailed discussion. (shrink)

Today philosophy falls apart into a “theoretical” and a “practical” sub-discipline, a situation to the detriment of both. On the back of a sketch of three stages of Western philosophy a diagnosis is made as to the practical origin of the theoretical/practical split, which also already contains within it the clue for a therapy. Both parts of philosophy could be set on a convergent path by recognizing two practical conflicts underlying philosophical problems: the biographical conflict of accepting the world and (...) the social conflict of accepting others. A non-reductivist study of these conflicts might mitigate the present alienation within philosophy. (shrink)

Critical social science has to acknowledge that every fundamental critique of society implies the justification of alternative norms and institutions. Several current objections against such an explicitly normative understanding of critical social science are discussed. The following outline of a theory of a just society tries co meet two demands: the rational consensus of all individuals concerned and the satisfaction of individual interests. In societies characterized by class struggles, however, these two aims turn out co be incompatible. Therefore an ethical (...) realist approach is offered which takes into account the clarification and normative reinterpretation of interests. The tools of analytic philosophy can be given new application in combina-tion with an analysis of interests under the title of a critique of ideology. (shrink)

Morality and society in moral philosophy are rarely brought into direct contact, at least not at a fundamental level of justification. David Copp develops an account of practical and moral rationality that could constitute a radical change. According to Copp moral theory has to be 'society-centered' rather than focussing on the individual. This article is devoted to the moral content and structural features of a socially centered moral theory, and along those lines to its critical assessment. Concluding, it will seek (...) to present an argument why moral philosophy ought not place society at the centre of its view. (shrink)

Health and beauty are the most important physical ideals. This paper seeks to compare and contrast these ideals, based on a value theory of human abilities. Health is comprehended as a potential ability to act grounded in bodily functions. Beauty is explained as a symbolising reference to happiness, physical beauty as a combination of organic orientation to purpose and virtuous orientation to action. Physical beauty is the implicit symbolic expression of mental and physical health. This teleological theory is tested and (...) exemplified using current stereotypes such as youthfulness, slimness and shapeliness. (shrink)

Die Kantische Ethik gilt bis heute als die dominante Theorie der Moral, und das nicht nur mit Blick auf ihre moralischen Inhalte, sondern mehr noch mit Bezug auf ihre Begründung der moralischen Prinzipien aus der Vernunft. Die Auseinandersetzung mit Kant führt jedoch zu der Einsicht, daß wir unsere Vorstellungen vom Verhältnis zwischen Ethik und Moral, sowie von der Verbindung von Moral und sozialer Realität reformulieren müssen. Die im vorliegenden Buch gesammelten Artikel verbindet die Erwartung, daß die Moral statt über die (...) Vernunft über ihre Funktion im Rahmen sozialer Beziehungen besser zu verstehen und gestalten sein sollte. Den konkreten Reichtum unserer Handlungsziele, Beziehungsmöglichkeiten und sozialen Fähigkeiten sind wir nur dann in der Lage zu erschließen, wenn wir das Werkzeug der abstrakten Vernunft als unbrauchbar beiseite legen und statt dessen mit den alltäglichen, persönlichen und überpersönlichen, Erfahrungen arbeiten, nit denen wir uns auskennen. Weil einzig aus den Beziehungsformen Normativität erwächst, sollten uns diese selbst, ihre Bedeutungen und ihre Wandelbarkeit interessieren, weniger kodifizierbare moralische Pflichten und Regeln. Gegenstand der Ethik der Beziehungen sind die konkreten Spielräume und Kräfte der sozialen Verhältnisse zwischen Menschen, nicht die abstrakten Fingerzeige eines von den Beziehungen unabhängigen ‚moralischen Gesetzes'. (shrink)

Among philosophers and social scientists, Hume’s idea of justice is generally identified with a system of rules based on mutual advantage, their moral quality playing either an insignificant or no part at all. This conventional or contractarian model, respectively, is not adequate to the special institution of morality or, in Hume, to the virtues, artificial or natural. It is not self-interest but sympathy in combination with the indirect passions of pride and humility that gives conventions their moral quality and social (...) relevance. This article suggests exegetic and systematic reasons for the normative importance of Hume’s moral psychology, which should open the way to a developing morality much more in agreement with actual Western societies than a static morality based on self-interest would allow. (shrink)

In acting within large groups the single actor typically suffers from the symptom of irrelevance of his contribution. A single contributory effect may be extremely small or, due to 'threshold effects', even non-existent. Given such conditions not only self-interested action, also purely altruistically motivated contribution seems to be rendered irrational. The article reasons that the famous 'principles of generalization' are of no help on this problem. However, a 'principle of division' could be used in show-ing that in many situations of (...) collective action altruistically motivated contribution is rationally sound. (shrink)