Falsification-aware (hyper)sequent calculi and Kripke semantics for normal modal logics including S4 and S5 are introduced and investigated in this study. These calculi and semantics are constructed based on the idea of a falsification-aware framework for Nelson’s constructive three-valued logic. The cut-elimination and completeness theorems for the proposed calculi and semantics are proved.

In this study, falsification-aware semantics and sequent calculi for first-order classical logic are introduced and investigated. These semantics and sequent calculi are constructed based on a falsification-aware setting for first-order Nelson constructive three-valued logic. In fact, these semantics and sequent calculi are regarded as those for a classical variant of N3. The completeness and cut-elimination theorems for the proposed semantics and sequent calculi are proved using Schütte’s method. Similar results for the propositional case are also obtained.

This work inaugurates a critical inquiry into whether the ideas of Karl Popper, a philosopher of science, are used by astronomers and astrophysicists, a practicing community of scientists. It examines four basic components of Karl Popper's philosophy— falsification, prohibition, simplicity, and risk taking— and the extent that these themes become integrated into recent scientific literature on astronomy, astrophysics, cosmology, and stellar evolutionary theory. It concludes that the philosophy of science is highly relevant to the practice of astronomy, and that (...) Karl Popper plays a unique role in directing different communities of astronomers and cosmologists. (shrink)

This is a response to a claim by Sven Ove Hansson to the effect that Poppers dictum that falsification lies at the heart of all pursuit of science has once and for all been falsified by his study of articles published in Nature during the year 2000. We claim that this is based on a misunderstanding of Poppers philosophy of science interpreting it too literally, and that alternative readings of those papers are fully compliant with falsification. We scrutinize (...) Hansson’s arguments as well as giving an overview of Poppers falsification theory. (shrink)

This volume examines the concept of falsification as a central notion of semantic theories and its effects on logical laws. The point of departure is the general constructivist line of argument that Michael Dummett has offered over the last decades. From there, the author examines the ways in which falsifications can enter into a constructivist semantics, displays the full spectrum of options, and discusses the logical systems most suitable to each one of them. While the idea of introducing falsifications (...) into the semantic account is Dummett's own, the many ways in which falsificationism departs quite radically from verificationism are here spelled out in detail for the first time. The volume is divided into three large parts. The first part provides important background information about Dummett’s program, intuitionism and logics with gaps and gluts. The second part is devoted to the introduction of falsifications into the constructive account and shows that there is more than one way in which one can do this. The third part details the logical effects of these various moves. In the end, the book shows that the constructive path may branch in different directions: towards intuitionistic logic, dual intuitionistic logic and several variations of Nelson logics. The author argues that, on balance, the latter are the more promising routes to take. "Kapsner’s book is the first detailed investigation of how to incorporate the notion of falsification into formal logic. This is a fascinating logico-philosophical investigation, which will interest non-classical logicians of all stripes." Graham Priest, Graduate Center, City University of New York and University of Melbourne. (shrink)

D. W. Peetz; III—Falsification in Science, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 69, Issue 1, 1 June 1969, Pages 17–31, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristo.

This paper reconsiders the possibility of applying the procedure of falsification, which consists in testing a theory by confronting hypotheses derived from the theory with empirical data, in the studies of culture, in particular when evaluating interpretive hypotheses. Falsification, to which, according to Popper and his followers, the natural sciences owe their success, is viewed with strong suspicion when the object of investigation is meanings and values rather than material phenomena. If by interpretation one understands reconstruction of the (...) artefact’s meaning, obvious challenges when falsifying interpretive hypotheses include: the multiplicity, instability and ambiguity (indefiniteness or self-contradictory character) of meanings inherent in artefacts. All of this does not seem to exclude the possibility of identifying as misreadings interpretive hypotheses which clearly contradict relevant (non-contradictory) artefactual evidence. Falsification thus understood seems indispensable in educational contexts. At the same time, it must be admitted that in practice (as contrasted with the logical formula which underlies the procedure) falsification is inconclusive, and the application of the procedure is further complicated when meanings and values are the object of research. This is one of the reasons why falsification in the humanities (as elsewhere) needs to be complemented by other epistemic procedures while the status of literary studies or history of philosophy might best be perceived as partly cognitive (and in so far as the research conducted in these disciplines is empirically testable, also scientific) and partly creative (artistic). (shrink)

In this reply, I defend my views on Nietzsche's “falsification thesis” and his perspectivism against Maudemarie Clark's recent criticisms, which appeared in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 49.1. I begin by amplifying my interpretation of Gay Science 110 and 111, which, I argue, show that the falsification thesis is absent from The Gay Science. I then turn to perspectivism and argue that, contrary to Clark's claims, perspectivism never involves the falsification of the views to which it applies. (...) It is therefore unnecessary to apply perspectivism, as Clark does, only to value-imbued viewpoints and not to empirical knowledge or the natural sciences. Perspectivism, as Nietzsche, I believe, makes clear, applies to every aspect of human knowledge. (shrink)

Efficient thinking is the foundation of efficient operation. The correct definition of concepts, especially the basic ones for a given field, in order to reach the truth, is a condition for the development of science and its social utility. The Petrażycki’s research methodology of law is a thoroughly modern method, as it enables effective examination of the accuracy of contemporary legal theories created after Petrażycki’s input. A model contemporary theory susceptible to an examination through the research methodology of law by (...) Petrażycki is the normative theory of legal rules and non-legal standards by Dworkin. For this purpose some falsifications will be subject, i.e. selected ad hoc among many others, two important theories of normative law theory Dworkin. The first one is the thesis classifying legal norms into two groups of norms, namely legal rules and non-legal standards. The second one is a thesis about the existence of who are capable of discovering and issuing lawful and, at the same time, fair court decisions, which are also the only ones for resolving particular court disputes. Unfortunately, owing to the seemingly cognitive research methodology of Petrażycki, both Dworkin’s deformed division of legal norms as well as Dworkin’s Hercules judges - cannot stand the test of authenticity. Due to the Petrażycki’s methodology, the legal-normative theory of Dworkin does not lose an innovative outlook on the existence of social norms, which are being discovered by judges in the jurisprudence, indifferently to the doubts over their proper classification. Moreover, Dworkin’s theory is placed between naive theories, regardless of whether they are considered realistically naive theories or nihilistically naive theories A few random reflections on the well-known work of Dworkin with the help of Petrażycki’s methodology serve to provide a new perspective on the contemporary legal normativity. (shrink)

Summary In two articles Friedrich Rapp argues that there is a methodological symmetry between falsification and verification in contradistinction to the logical asymmetry that obtains between them. (The Methodological Symmetry between Verification and Falsification,Ztschr. f. Allg. Wissth., Band VI/1 (1975), pp 139–144; A Helpful Argument — Reply to K. Eichner,Ztschr. f. Allg. Wissth., Band VII/1 (1976), pp. 121–123). Rapp puts forward the thesis that methodological falsification of a theory T implies the acceptance of an inference from ~ (...) (x) Tx to (x) ~ Tx. However, this thesis does not have to be accepted even if the premises of Rapp's argument were accepted. Furthermore, Rapp has not shown that the falsification of a theory T implies that T will not be retained. Neither has Rapp formulated assumptions that are sufficient to guarantee that the outcome of an intended test of a theory T can be considered as an outcome of an actual test of T. (shrink)

Gillies introduced a propensity interpretation of probability which is linked to experience by a falsifying rule for probability statements. The present paper argues that general statistical tests should qualify as falsification rules. The ‘goodness-of-fit paradox’ is introduced: the confirmation of a probability model by a test refutes the model's validity. An example is given in which an independence test introduces dependence. Several possibilities to interpret the paradox and to deal with it are discussed. It is concluded that the propensity (...) interpretation properly reflects statistical practice, but it is not as objective as some adherents claim. (shrink)

The famous story of Diogenes searching for a man (ánthrōpon zētō̂) with his lantern in broad daylight (D.L. VI 41) has been interpreted in two ways, according to the meaning assigned to the word ánthrôpos (« human »). Proponents of the nominalist interpretation, by giving it the sense of human as a concept, see in the quest of Diogenes an attack against Plato’s Ideas. Defenders of the moral interpretation rather give the word ánthrôpos a concrete meaning with meliorative value: Diogenes (...) is searching in vain for a virtuous human. After showing that both interpretations are equally valid, our paper argues for a middle way, called the « falsification of language », which reconciles the two positions through an analysis of the relationship between language and truth in the Cynics. (shrink)

Our starting point is Michael Luntley's falsificationist semantics for the logical connectives and quantifiers: the details of his account are criticised but we provide an alternative falsificationist semantics that yields intuitionist logic, as Luntley surmises such a semantics ought. Next an account of the logical connectives and quantifiers that combines verificationist and falsificationist perspectives is proposed and evaluated. While the logic is again intuitionist there is, somewhat surprisingly, an unavoidable asymmetry between the verification and falsification conditions for negation, the (...) conditional, and the universal quantifier. Lastly we are lead to a novel characterization of realism. (shrink)

Recent discussion of the problem of the conclusive falsification of scientific hypotheses has generally regarded the Duhemian Thesis (D-Thesis) as both true and interesting [10] but has dismissed the claim that disconfirmed hypotheses can be retained in explanations of the disconfirming evidence as either trivial [3] or unargued [12]. This paper rejects these positions. First, the status, in the argument for the D-Thesis, of the claim that auxiliary assumptions are necessary for the derivation of evidential propositions from hypotheses is (...) examined. It is concluded that depending on this status, the D-Thesis is either trivially true or unargued. Then the retention of contextually disconfirmed hypotheses is discussed. It is found that the use of such hypotheses in explanations of the disconfirming evidence is mediated by principles of scientific methodology. A new thesis is presented connecting the problem of conclusive falsification with changes in methodology. The argument for this thesis introduces a new analysis of methodological principles as inductive generalizations from scientific practice. Finally, the contribution of this analysis to the understanding of scientific change is described. (shrink)

Dans ce travail, je vais m'efforcer de critiquer la thèse poppérienne de la dissymétrie entre les procédures de vérification et de réfutation des théories empiriques. Pour caractériser les théories empiriques, j'utiliserai le critère suivant: l'analyse des procédures discursives employées ne suffit pas comme base de discussion de leur valeur de vérité. On doit faire appel à quelque chose dont on considère que la donnée est en quelque façon, et du point de vue de la connaissance, extérieure à la théorie. Dans (...) le titre, j'ai employé «falsification» parce que c'était le terme habituel des traducteurs français de Popper jusqu'à une date récente. Je trouve cette terminologie peu claire et j'utiliserai les couples vérifier/réfuter, confirmer/infirmer. (shrink)

Scientists have rules pertaining to data fabrication and falsification that are enforced with significant punishments, such as loss of funding, termination of employment, or imprisonment. These rules pertain to data that describe observable and unobservable entities. In this commentary I argue that scientists would not adopt rules that impose harsh penalties on researchers for data fabrication or falsification unless they believed that an aim of scientific research is to develop true theories and hypotheses about entities that exist, including (...) unobservable ones. This argument presents a challenge for constructive empiricists, such as van Fraassen. Constructive empiricists need to be able to explain why rules pertaining to data fabrication and falsification do not threaten their philosophy of science. (shrink)

It has been suggested that the enterprise of developing mechanistic theories of the human cognitive architecture is flawed because the theories produced are not directly falsifiable. Newell attempted to sidestep this criticism by arguing for a Lakatosian model of scientific progress in which cognitive architectures should be understood as theories that develop over time. However, Newell's own candidate cognitive architecture adhered only loosely to Lakatosian principles. This paper reconsiders the role of falsification and the potential utility of Lakatosian principles (...) in the development of cognitive architectures. It is argued that a lack of direct falsifiability need not undermine the scientific development of a cognitive architecture if broadly Lakatosian principles are adopted. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the Lakatosian concepts of positive and negative heuristics for theory development and of general heuristic power offer methods for guiding the development of an architecture and for evaluating the contribution and potential of an architecture's research program. (shrink)

The debate about the definition of scientific miscon duct is being revisited by the scientific community in response to the Commission on Research Integrity's recommendation for a new definition. Scientists and lawyers are debating whether scientific misconduct should include acts that are not unique to the scientific community and do not affect the research. Falsification of credentials is one form of such misconduct.The Office of Research Integrity and the National Science Foundation, the two federal agencies primarily responsible for developing (...) policies on scientific misconduct, have struggled to define scientific rnisconduct and to decide which forms of professional misconduct do and do not fall within the definition. Although falsification of credentials is not unique to the scientific community, OR1 and NSF have determined that when researchers lie about their credentials, such conduct may constitute scientific misconduct. The question is why this form of professional misconduct has been labeled scientific misconduct when it occurs in a research setting, and whether any distinction exists between this white coat crime and white collar crime. (shrink)

The debate about the definition of scientific miscon duct is being revisited by the scientific community in response to the Commission on Research Integrity's recommendation for a new definition. Scientists and lawyers are debating whether scientific misconduct should include acts that are not unique to the scientific community and do not affect the research. Falsification of credentials is one form of such misconduct.The Office of Research Integrity and the National Science Foundation, the two federal agencies primarily responsible for developing (...) policies on scientific misconduct, have struggled to define scientific rnisconduct and to decide which forms of professional misconduct do and do not fall within the definition. Although falsification of credentials is not unique to the scientific community, OR1 and NSF have determined that when researchers lie about their credentials, such conduct may constitute scientific misconduct. The question is why this form of professional misconduct has been labeled scientific misconduct when it occurs in a research setting, and whether any distinction exists between this white coat crime and white collar crime. (shrink)

Revelation and Falsification: The Kitāb al-qirāʾāt of Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Sayyārī. Edited by Etan Kohlberg and Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi. Texts and Studies on the Qurʾān, vol. 4. Leiden: Brill, 2009. Pp. viii + 363 + 201. $259.

The main result of this paper is that KT is closed under a cancellation principle. This result extends to KTG1, but it does not extend to modal systems associated with the provability interpretation of L, such as KW and KT4Grz. Following Williamson, these results are applied to philosophical concerns about the proper form for theories of meaning, via the interpretation of L as some kind of veriflability. The cancellation principle can then be read as saying that verifilability conditions and falsiflability (...) conditions jointly determine truth conditions. (shrink)

Contemporary empiricism has attempted to ground its analysis of science in a falsificationism based in selection theory. This paper links these evolutionary epistemologies with commitments to certain epistemological and ontological assumptions found in the later work of K. Popper, D. Campbell, and D. Hull, I argue that their assumptions about the character of contemporary empiricism are part of a shared paradigm of epistemological explanation which results in unresolved tensions within their own projects. I argue further that their claim to be (...) doing a science of science is not defensible. Hull's selectionism is analyzed to show how this epistemological agenda has played itself out in late empiricism. I suggest some directions that Hull might take toward an historical epistemology. (shrink)

Muḳātil b. Sulaymān’s (d. 150/767) tafsīr named al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, is accepted as the first completed tafsīr that has reached us from the early sources of tafsīr literature. One of the issues that the mufassir, deals with emphatically by emphasizing the concealment of the Prophet’s tabs̲h̲īr in the Bible. The Mufassir make a connection between the concealment of the Prophet’s tabs̲h̲īr and the falsification of the Bible. When we examine the verses that Muḳātil commented to prove his claim related with (...) falsification of these books, we encounter the phenomenon of takhṣīs in tafsīr. Takhṣīs is a term used in the literature of fiḳh method, in the sense of explaining with a word, with a proof, that some of the individuals it covers are meant. Considering the content of this term, it is understood that Muḳātil’s takhṣīs in tafsīr means limiting the meaning of words with many meanings to only one content. The main issue that prompted Muḳātil to make a takhṣīs in tafsīr is falsification. The issue of falsification of the Bible has been a subject that attracted the attention of Muslim scholars. Because in the Ḳurʾān, the distortion of the Torah is described in the following terms: يحرفون “they distort”, فبدل “altered”, يلون السنتهم “who twist their tongues”, يكتمون “they conceal”, ولا تلبسوا الحق بالباطل “confound not truth with falsehood”, وتكتموا الحق “conceal the truth”, يكتبون الكتاب بِاَيْد۪يهِمْ “They write the book with their hands”. The Ḳurʾān’s statement on this matter encouraged the criticism of the scholars about the Torah. Among the issues criticized there are; tabs̲h̲īr of Muḥammad in previous books, the origin of the Torah, inaccuracy in chronological order, stylistic differences, information errors and contradictions. Among these criticisms directed at the People of the Book, Muḳātil focuses on tabs̲h̲īr. The main source that leads him to argue that Muḥammad was heralded in previous books is the verses of the Ḳurʾān. In addition to this, it is highly probable that the geography where the mufassir lived was also influential in shaping his criticisms. Considering the Jewish population in the neighborhoods where he lived, such as Balk̲h̲ and Marw, it is possible for the commentator to develop a dialogue with the Jews, and it is also possible that his criticisms will be shaped within the framework of these dialogues. Muḳātil’s falsification criticism is expressed in the context of the Prophet’s tabs̲h̲īr. However, the mufassir’s emphasis on tabs̲h̲īr goes beyond the criticism of falsification. The mufessir always keeps the issue alive on the reader’s agenda with short phrases such as “كتم أمر محمد / بكتمان أمر محمد Muḥammad’s subject is hidden in the Torah”, “نعت محمد / صفة محمد / Muḥammad’s qualification”. As far as we can determine, there are fifty-two verses in al-Tafsīr al-kabīr that Muḳātil consider directly related to tabs̲h̲īr. He deals with the issue of distortion in thirty-eight verses. The number of verses that the mufassir associates with both distortion and tabs̲h̲īr is thirty-six. The number of verses that he does not associate with falsification but only about tabs̲h̲īr is twelve. Among them, it has been determined that Muḳātil made takhṣīs in the interpretation of forty-eight verses in total. When we classify his takhṣīs’s, we can form a tidy framework under four main headings: in the interpretation of sila sentences, idioms and idiomatic expressions, determining the content of words, and indicates of pronoun. Since the thought of tabs̲h̲īr is one of the main motifs in the mind of the commentator, his tafsīr’s follow a parallel course to this motif. In the interpretation of many verses, there are examples of interpretations that will legitimize this thought and confirm this claim. As a matter of fact, in the interpretation of the expression يلوون ألسنتهم بالكتاب “While reading the Book, they bend their tongues” in the 78th verse of sūrat āl ʿImrān, it is said that Muḥammad’s qualification in the Torah were deleted and other adjectives were written instead of it. In the tafsīr of the 37th verse of sūrat al-Nisāʾ, there are the expressions like this: “The concealment of Muḥammad’s tabs̲h̲īr and its removal from the Torah (بكتمان أمر محمد و محوه من التوراة)”. Muḳātil narrowed the content of the expression, which has a wide meaning area. This narrowing of the meaning is technically considered an example of takhṣīs. Other examples where takhṣīs made in tafsir are present in the interpretations of the phrases of guidance/aberration, right/false, belief/disbelief, verse, word, stinginess, knowledge, promise, declaration, turning away and the book of Allah. The tafsīr’s extreme loyalty to the context is accompanied by his limiting the meaning of words with broad content to a narrow content. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay focuses on one of Nietzsche's greatest challenges to our understanding of perception and cognition: his “falsification thesis.” I argue that despite several innovative and insightful attempts to understand Nietzsche's claims about falsification, they have failed because they have not made an adequate connection between Nietzsche's falsification claims and his naturalistic account of the development of human cognition. Nietzsche's most important insight is that the basic falsifications and simplifications of sensation and language are not only (...) often quite useful but are also the cornerstone of knowledge and science. The central implications that follow are that cognition can succeed without correspondence between mind and world and that the standard assumption thought to be absolutely indispensable for science, that the world is fundamentally ordered, or a cosmos, is unnecessary. That is, Nietzsche's naturalism explains how we may have knowledge and successfully pursue science without avoiding falsification altogether. (shrink)

Previous research has found no consistent relationship between measures of disconfirmatory evidence, alternative hypotheses, and people's success in rule-discovery tasks. The present paper explores falsification's inductive benefit under the ?context of discovery? in Wason's 2?4?6 task by developing a new type of alternative hypothesis, which we label the ?new-perspective hypothesis?. Experiment 1 found that falsification is effective only when a new-perspective hypothesis is generated, rather than a same-perspective hypothesis. The total number of alternative hypotheses was also unrelated to (...) rule-discovery success. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 but included the addition of a different name-content task as well as two levels of task difficulty. The main findings were similar to those for Experiment 1, and the new-perspective hypothesis was observed to be most important for the difficult rule-discovery task. These results help to clarify the important ways new-perspective hypotheses and disconfirmatory evidence contribute to successful rule-discovery performance. (shrink)

This paper is a detailed critical study of Adolf Grünbaum's work on the Duhemian thesis. I show that (a) Grünbaum's geometrical counterexample to the (D1) subthesis is unsuccessful, even with minimal claims made for what the counterexample is supposed to show, and (b) the (D2) subthesis is not a reasonable one (and cannot correctly be attributed to Duhem). The paper concludes with an argument about the relation between the Duhemian thesis, concerning component hypotheses of a scientific theory, and the view (...) that it is impossible to falsify entire theories conclusively. (shrink)

In this paper we try to make a clear distinction between quantum mysticism and quantum mind theory. Quackery always accompanies science especially in controversial and still under development areas and since the quantum mind theory is a science youngster it must clearly demarcate itself from the great stuff of pseudo-science currently patronized by the term "quantum mind". Quantum theory has attracted a big deal of attention and opened new avenues for building up a physical theory of mind because its principles (...) and experimental foundations are as strange as the phenomenon of consciousness itself. Yet, the unwarranted recourse to paranormal phenomena as supporting the quantum mind theory plus the extremely bad biological mismodeling of brain physiology lead to great scepticism about the viability of the approach. We give as an example the Hameroff-Penrose Orch OR model with a list of twenty four problems not being repaired for a whole decade after the birth of the model in 1996. In the exposition we have tried not only to pesent critique of the spotted flaws, but to provide novel possibilities towards creation of neuroscientific quantum model of mind that incorporates all the available data from the basic disciplines (biochemistry, cell physiology, etc.) up to the clinical observations (neurology, neurosurgery, molecular psychiatry, etc.). Thus in a concise fashion we outline what can be done scientifically to improve the Q-mind theory and start a research programme (in Lakatos sense) that is independent on the particular flaws in some of the existing Q-mind models. (shrink)

The challenge was originally put nearly twenty years ago in the concluding sentences of my initial contribution to a discussion in the now defunct journal University ; a contribution reprinted in 1955 in New Essays in Philosophical Theology , and in several other places since then. Those sentences read: ‘We are reassured again. But then perhaps we ask: what is this assurance of God's love worth, what is this apparent guarantee really a guarantee against? Just what would have to happen (...) not merely to tempt but also to entitle us to say “God does not love us” or even “God does not exist”? I therefore put to the succeeding symposiasts the simple central questions, “What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God?”’. (shrink)

Not too many years ago Antony Flew voiced a challenge. His challenge was directed to religious believers and it was this: ‘What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God?’ It was Flew's implicit argument that unless such a challenge could be met an utterance like ‘There is a God’ in fact denied nothing and so asserted nothing either . One great merit of Flew's (...) challenge was that it crystallised a malaise felt by many into a hard, pointed question. As a challenge this question elicited two basic reactions. (shrink)