Miracles, Misc

The most recent and, arguably, the most scientifically rigorous study of the healing power of intercessory prayer, the so-called “STEP” (“Study of the Therapeutic Effects of Prayer”) study involved over 1,800 subjects and roughly a decade of study. Though the results did little, if anything, to lend support to the idea that prayers really can heal the sick, religious believers might remain optimistic. Two main reasons for this optimism stem from, first, a crucial missing (though practically unavoidable) study control and, (...) second, the warning that studying the effectiveness of prayer amounts to an (improper) attempt at quantifying God’s effects in the world. And few serious religious believers will want to say that we could ever pin God down in that way and, hence, that God, in order to maintain the importance of faith in religion, would have good reason to manipulate the results of an experiment on the effectiveness of prayer (even if prayer was very effective when not formally studied). But, then, the only evidence to which prayer proponents can appeal is anecdotal. The problems associated with anecdotal evidence as support for hypotheses is discussed here (generally, as well as with respect to intercessory prayer) and, I submit, the empirical case for the healing powers of prayer is weak. (shrink)

We respond to Stephen T. Davis’ criticism of our earlier essay, “Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis.” We argue that the Standard Model of physics is relevant and decisive in establishing the implausibility and low explanatory power of the Resurrection hypothesis. We also argue that the laws of physics have entailments regarding God and the supernatural and, against Alvin Plantinga, that these same laws lack the proviso “no agent supernaturally interferes.” Finally, we offer Bayesian arguments for the Legend hypothesis and against the (...) Resurrection hypothesis. (shrink)

C-Inductive arguments are arguments that increase the probability of a hypothesis. This can be contrasted with what is called a P-Inductive argument. A P-inductive argument is an argument that shows the overall probability of a hypothesis to be more probable than not. In this paper, we put forth a C-inductive argument for the truth of the Catholic hypothesis (CH). Roughly, we take CH to be the hypothesis that the core creedal beliefs found within the Catholic Tradition are true. Specifically, we (...) argue that we would expect the Miracle of Fátima on CH, but, we wouldn’t expect it as much on ~CH. In order to establish this thesis, we first discuss the basics of confirmation theory. Second, we give the historical context of the Miracle of Fátima. Third, we briefly survey and then reject two possible non-supernatural explanations of the apparent miracle. Doing this will help make plausible that the Miracle of Fátima is actual evidence that a hypothesis needs to predict. Fourth, we give the details as to why we should expect the Miracle of Fátima more on CH than ~CH. Finally, we argue that miracles that occur in Protestant contexts, generally don’t carry the same evidential weight for a Protestant hypothesis as the Miracle of Fátima carries for CH. (shrink)

The hypothesis that God supernaturally raised Jesus from the dead is argued by William Lane Craig to be the best explanation for the empty tomb and postmortem appearances of Jesus because it satisfies seven criteria of adequacy better than rival naturalistic hypotheses. We identify problems with Craig’s criteria-based approach and show, most significantly, that the Resurrection hypothesis fails to fulfill any but the first of his criteria—especially explanatory scope and plausibility.

John Herbinius (1633–1679) was a well-known Lutheran theologian and writer. Living for a long time on the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, he wrote a description of the religious caves of Kyiv, which was published in 1675 in Jena. Plenty of popular cults of Ruthenian spiritual life of the first half of the seventeenth century are reflected in the book. It is important to underline that Herbinius did not criticize the glorification and imitation of saints. He briefly mentioned their post-mortem (...) waiting role in the place of salvation and omitted the Orthodox prayers to them. The great Orthodox mistake for Herbinius was glorifying human and not Christ’s merits as a cause of sanctity and miracle. This very important theological difference was, however, the only one distinction that Herbinius saw between the Orthodox and Protestant traditions of the veneration of saints. The veneration of relics was not criticized by John Herbinius either. On the contrary, relics of Christ’s followers can and must be worshiped, through them God performs miracles, the Protestant author believed. However, Herbinius did not share the Orthodox idea of miraculous unperishability of the saints’ remains in the Cave Monastery. Those remains, as he wrote, are particularly damaged and particularly preserved because of the existing ventilation system in the caves; the saints’ heads are oozing the oil as a result of absorbing of the special air as well. Trying to provide these arguments, Herbinius aimed to deny the core of the Orthodox belief that Kyiv relics preserved undamageed because of great merits and dignities possessed by the Cave fathers in the eyes of God. Obviously, the very idea of merits, earned by the monks due to their ascetic efforts, could have not been accepted by the Protestant author. It strongly contradicted with his confessional views and was unambiguously treated by him as idolatry. (shrink)

This article focuses upon the popular devotion for la Santa Muerte that emerged in Mexico and is gaining a rapid increase in notoriety in the country and abroad. The first sections reconstruct in detail its protean manifestations, as well as the interpretations contained in extant scholarly investigations, popular Mexican press and other texts. The final section, adopting a fine-grained, theological-epistemological viewpoint argues that la Santa’s interventions in human affairs, essential to explain her popularity, although usually described as ‘miracles’ can be (...) better understood as paros—a term employed by devotees in order to define the end of a situation, usually unpleasant or unfavourable. It is also argued that a careful examination of such paros provides us with deeper insights into the devotion’s success and resiliency. (shrink)

According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argument is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson’s argument only applies to one of two versions of the NMA. The other version, which resembles the form in which the argument was initially presented by Putnam and Boyd, remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We provide a formal reconstruction of that version of the NMA and show that it is valid. Finally, (...) we demonstrate that the use of subjective priors is consistent with the realist implication of the NMA and show that a core worry with respect to the suggested form of the NMA can be dispelled. (shrink)

Evan Fales has recently argued that, although I provide the most promising approach for those concerned to defend belief in divine intervention, I nevertheless fail to show that such belief can be rational. I argue that Fales’ objections are unsuccessful.

Using a process-oriented understanding of the relation between actions and agents, the author argues that an ontological agent is the ongoing effect or by-product rather than the antecedent cause of actions. Applied to the relation between natural and supernatural in philosophical cosmology, this allows one to claim, first, that agents (whether natural or supernatural) are not sensibly perceived, but only inferred from the ongoing observation of empirical actions; second, that the distinction between the natural and the supernatural is then conceivably (...) a distinction between interrelated processes rather than between independently existing agents; and third, that a higher order process of supernatural origin could be operative in a lower order empirical process without interference even though its existence and activity could only be established on the basis of a faith commitment, not empirical evidence. What Paul Ricoeur referred to as a “surplus of meaning” over and above the scientific explanation of an event would be in play with the claim of divine guidance for the cosmic process. (shrink)

Criteria of historical assessment are applied to the Turin Shroud to determine which hypothesis relating to the image formation process is the most likely. To implement this, a ‘Minimal Facts’ approach is followed that takes into account only physicochemical and historical data receiving the widest consensus among contemporary scientists. The result indicates that the probability of the Shroud of Turin being the real shroud of Jesus of Nazareth is very high; historians and natural theologians should therefore pay it increased attention.

We consider the impact of negative natural theology on the prospects of Christian ramified natural theology with reference to Richard Swinburne’s argument for the Incarnation and Resurrection. We argue that Swinburne’s pivotal claim—that God would not allow deceptive evidence to exist for the Incarnation and Resurrection—is refuted by key evidence from negative natural theology. We argue, further, that Swinburne’s argument omits dominating items of evidence of negative natural theology which seem to critically weaken the probability of the Incarnation and Resurrection. (...) Negative natural theology thus serves as a formidable obstacle to Christian ramified natural theology. (shrink)

This article is comprised of a dialogue between Pentecostal-Charismatic and Process-Relational theologies on the perennial issue of miracles. The language of supernaturalism, widely employed by Pentecostal-Charismatic theologians, is contrasted with the metaphysical naturalism of Process-Relational theology; it is proposed that a philosophically and scientifically sensitive theology of miracles is possible through a synthesis of both traditions. Themes such as nonmaterialism over materialism, spiritual experience, and prayer for healing miracles are explored. A theology of miracles, mutually informed by both Pentecostal-Charismatic and (...) Process-Relational theologies, may focus less on whether or not miracles are possible, but instead focus more on what kind of miracles human beings might value most. By mutually engaging a theology of nonsupernatural, metaphysically grounded miracles, Pentecostal-Charismatic and Process-Relational theologians may collaborate to establish the groundwork for creative scientific enterprises, especially in the non-Western world where Pentecostalism continues to experience its most rapid growth, Such perspectives may eventually lead to cutting-edge discoveries about the fundamental nature of, and God's interaction with, reality itself. Implications for future research are proposed. (shrink)

The Qurʾan contains many miracle stories, from Moses’s staff turning into a serpent to Mary’s conceiving Jesus as a virgin. In _Understanding the Qurʾanic Miracle Stories in the Modern Age_, Isra Yazicioglu offers a glimpse of the ways in which meaningful implications have been drawn from these apparently strange narratives, both in the premodern and modern era. It fleshes out a fascinating medieval Muslim debate over miracles and connects its insights with early and late modern turning points in Western thought (...) and with contemporary Qurʾanic interpretation. Building on an apparent tension within the Qurʾan and analyzing crucial cases of classical and modern Muslim engagement with these miracle stories, this book illustrates how an apparent site of conflict between faith and reason, or revelation and science, can become a site of fruitful exchange. This book is a distinctive contribution to a new trend in Qurʾanic studies: it reveals the presence of insightful Qurʾanic interpretation outside of the traditional line-by-line commentary genre, engaging with the works of Ghazali, Ibn Rushd, and Said Nursi. Moreover, focused as it is on the case of miracle stories, the book also goes beyond these specific passages to reflect more broadly on the issue of Qurʾanic hermeneutics. It notes the connections between literal and symbolic approaches and highlights the importance of approaching the Qurʾan with an eye to its potential implications for everyday life. (shrink)

A solicited response to Robert Larmer's defence of the supernaturalist model of miracles. I show why Larmer fails to make his claim plausible that there aren't any good theological reasons to turn away from the supernaturalist model of miracles.

What aspects and features of events impel people to label them as miraculous? Three studies examined people’s miracle conceptions and the factors that lead them to designate an event as a miracle. Study 1 identified the basic elements of laypersons’ miracle beliefs by instructing participants to define a miracle, to list five events that they considered miraculous, and to state what they believed to be the purpose of miracles. Results showed that individuals tend to view miracles as highly improbable and (...) beneficial occurrences that instill hope and faith in people. Studies 2 and 3 investigated people’s intuitive miracle theories. Findings demonstrated that people tend to label events as miracles when the events in question were of high magnitude, were obtained in an unusual manner, resulted in a beneficial health outcome, personally affected the participant, involved a person of worthy character, and depicted a low-probability event. (shrink)

Philosophers have made numerous and varied attempts to analyse the concept of a miracle. To the end, an assortment of necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth an instantiation of a miracle have been offered. In this paper we discuss one of the most common of these conditions - the violation restriction. This restriction holds that all miracles involve a violation of a law of nature.

The claim that a miracle is a violation of a law of nature has sometimes been used as part of an a priori argument against the possibility of miracle, on the grounds that a violation is conceptually impossible. I criticize these accounts but also suggest that alternative accounts, when phrased in terms of laws of nature, fail to provide adequate conceptual space for miracles. It is not clear what a ???violation??? of a law of nature might be, but this is (...) not relevant to the question of miracles. In practice, accounts of miracle tend to be phrased in terms of God's act not in terms of laws of nature. Finally, I suggest that the a priori argument reflects an intellectual commitment that is widely held, though wrongly built into the argument itself. (shrink)

Each and every one of us has our personal secrets, secrets which we do not disclose to outsiders. If we do decide to let an outsider into those secrets, we want to be certain that they will be properly understood and respected. Revealing our secrets to someone else is also normally preceded by a long acquaintanceship, which serves to create an atmosphere of trust. If we accept that nature, understood as the entire physical reality of the universe, contains within itself (...) secrets regarding its origins, functioning, and ulterior development, then the study of these secrets is only possible for beings such as ourselves, possessed of consciousness, sensory tools, and intellect. In this context, the history of .. (shrink)

This book provides students with a scholarly introduction to miracles, which also covers philosophical, medical and historical issues.

Wonder, miracle, occult science, poetry, and the epistemological implications in Renaissance authors: Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico, Pietro Pomponazzi, Agrippa of Nettesheim, Giordano Bruno, Francesco Patrizi, Tommaso Campanella, Francisco Suárez.

Philosophy begins with wonder, according to Plato and Aristotle. Yet Plato and Aristotle did not expand a great deal on what precisely wonder is. Does this fact alone not raise curiosity in us as to why this passion or concept is important? What is wonder.

John Polkinghorne claims there are no real distinctions between general providence, special providence and miracle. In this paper I determine whether this claim could be true given Polkinghorne’s wider account of these types of divine action. I conclude that this claim could be true, but only given a particular reading of Polkinghorne. I then defend this reading in light of two potential objections.

C.S. Lewis, the scholar of English mediaeval and Renaissance literature who died in 1963 and is still widely respected as a Christian apologist, complained that academic biblical scholars simply assume that miracles cannot have occurred in the fashion reported in the New Testament. In a lecture quoted by A.I.C. Heron 1 , he said: ‘The canon “If miraculous, unhistorical” is one they bring to their study of the texts, not one they have learned from it.’ In fact, as John Kent (...) retorted, they did not rule out in advance the idea of supernatural events, but were able, without it, to give adequate and plausible accounts of how the biblical documents reached their present form, by means of a method ‘based on questions of probability in terms of evidence’, not ‘on an a priori rejection of miracle’. 2 Conclusions concerning historical events of any kind are similarly based. ‘No historians’, says the historian R.J. Evans, ‘really believe in the absolute truth of what they are writing, simply in its probable truth, which they have done their utmost to establish by following the usual rules of evidence’. 3 To this question of ‘absolute’ truth I shall return. (shrink)

Notions of a developing public sphere in the eighteenth century have assumed, following Jürgen Habermas, that this is a necessarily secular space in which the better argument alone would prevail. This project examines efforts by French Jansenists to use the new public sphere to argue in public that God had performed miracles through a Jansenist saint, the late deacon François de Pâris, and thus expressed His rejection of the standing order in church and state. These works, culminating in Carré de (...) Montgeron’s 1737 ’Verité des miracles’, sought to base their case on ’facts’ and ’evidence’ for the miracles; they used techniques of virtual witnessing that bore a striking similarity to the literary techniques of early modern science as analyzed by Steven Shapin. Savants responded to Montgeron’s case not with refutation but with a refusal to give any serious consideration to the ’evidence’ presented. The Pâris affair is therefore a revealing moment in the emergence of Enlightenment epistemo. (shrink)

God is the creator of the laws of nature and therefore he is able to change and to irrupt them. The suspension of one norm is completely consistent with the affirmation of the law as a whole; and therefore the miracle underlines the eternal law as valid and the fidelity of God.

Framed as a critique of David Hume’s analysis of miracles, Peirce offers a sustained argument against an approach to historical inference he calls the “Method of Balancing Likelihoods‘ (MBL). In MBL the posterior probability that a disputed historical event has occurred is computed on the basis of the prior probability of that event occurring and the probability that each purported witness of the event has given accurate testimony. Peirce’s critique of this method is hierarchical: he denies that an objective probability (...) obtains for the truthfulness of witness testimony. Conceding this point, he asserts that, even if such objective probabilities exist, it is implausible to believe that witnesses are independent of one another. Conceding the first two points, Peirce argues that the very sampling process inherent to history necessarily introduces a strong probabilistic dependence that makes MBL unreliable. Finally, irrespective of the success of his first three criticisms, Peirce argues that MBL can be shown by empirical means to fail as a reliable method of inference. I reconstruct this hierarchical critique from a handful of Peirce’s manuscripts, and emphasize its continuing relevance for modern accounts of judgment aggregation. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw out a tension between miracles, prophecy, and Spinoza’s assertions about Moses in the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP). The three seem to constitute an inconsistent triad. Spinoza’s account of miracles requires a naturalistic interpretation of all events. This categorical claim must therefore apply to prophecy; specifically, Moses’ hearing God’s voice in a manner which does not seem to invoke the imagination or natural phenomena. Thus, Spinoza seemingly cannot maintain both Moses’ exalted status and his account of miracles. (...) I consider some possible solutions, but find that they are either untrue to Spinoza’s position, or would undercut his categorical argument against miracles. I therefore conclude that Spinoza leaves an unresolved tension in the TTP. (shrink)