Popper: Philosophy of Science

Bilime ve onun bilgisine akademik, politik, ekonomik ve kamusal alanlar olmak üzere birçok alanda diğer bilgi iddialarına kıyasla daha fazla güven duyulmaktadır. Bilime duyulan bu güvenin temelinde büyük ölçüde bilimsel süreçlerin ve yöntemlerin nesnel bir şekilde yürütülmesi ve bu nesnel sürecin bir ürünü olarak bilimsel bilginin tarafsız bilim insanları tarafından ortaya konulduğu düşüncesi yatmaktadır. Bu bakımdan toplum tarafından bilimin tartışılmaz statüsünün ve bilimsel bilgiye verilen değerin belirleyicisi olarak nesnellik özelliği ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bilhassa doğa bilimleri söz konusu olduğunda bilimsel yöntemin (...) olgulara ve dış dünyaya ilişkin nesnel bilgiler sağladığı düşünülmektedir. Bu bakımdan doğa bilimleri, bilimde nesnelliğin paradigmatik örnekleri olarak kabul görmektedir. Beşeri ve sosyal bilimler alanında ise doğa bilimlerine kıyasla nesnellik algısı düşük olmasına rağmen, yöntemlerinin bilimsel yöntemle çalışılmaya uygun olmasından dolayı en azından ilke olarak nesnel olduğu değerlendirilmektedir. Bilimin değerler alanından ziyade olgu alanına ilişkin çalışmalar yürütmesi, bilim insanlarının değerler, anlamlar ve ideallerinden de kendisini izole ederek bilimsel nesnelliği temin edilebileceği konusunda genel bir kavrayışa yol açmaktadır. Bu görüşün önde gelen düşünürü Karl Popper’dır. Popper bilimsel nesnelliğin, olgusal içerikli önermelerin – protokol önermeleri – öznelerarası sınanabilir olması ile temin edilebileceğini ve böylece bilim insanlarının çalışmalarında kültür, değer ve inanç gibi öznel kanılarının bilimsel bilginin temellendirilmesi ve sınanması noktasında kullanılamayacağını ifade etmiştir. Ancak bilimin doğasına yönelik bir soruşturma bilimsel bilginin düşünüldüğü kadar nesnel bir sürece sahip olmadığını, bilim faaliyetini gerçekleştiren bilim insanlarının kişisel çıkarlarının, değerlerinin ve içinde yaşamış oldukları kültürel faktörlerin bilimsel bilginin elde edilmesi sürecinde etkili olabileceğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bakımdan bilimin doğasını doğru bir şekilde anlayabilmenin yolu bilimlerde nesnellik ölçütünün sosyolojik ve kültürel unsurlarla yakından ilişkili olduğunu bilmekten geçmektedir. Thomas Kuhn bilimsel değerlendirmelerde değer yargılarının ve kültürel unsurların kaçınılmaz olduğu düşüncesindedir. Kuhn, Popper’ın aksine sosyolojik etmen ve değerleri de işin içerisine katarak bir bilimsel nesnellik değerlendirmesi yapmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, o bilimde fazlasıyla öznel unsurları vurguladığı eleştirilerine imkân vermeyecek şekilde bilim insanlarının takip etmesi gereken ve tavsiye niteliğinde olan belirli değerler neticesinde bilimsel nesnelliğin ve rasyonalitenin sağlanabileceğini ifade etmektedir. Bu kapsamda çalışmada, bilimin en bilinen özelliği olarak göze çarpan nesnellik kavramı ve düşüncesine yönelik kavramsal bir belirlemenin ardından kültür ve değer gibi sosyolojik unsurların bilimsel objektifliğin ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğu argümanı, Popper ve Kuhn’un çalışmaları göz önünde bulundurularak serimlenecektir. (shrink)

Epistemology is often a problem for libertarianism. Many libertarian texts assume that they need to do more than explain and defend the libertarian conjecture. Instead, they try to offer epistemological support for it (whether empirically or morally); which falsificationism and, more broadly, critical rationalism explains is not possible. Moreover, they often mistake this attempt at support for an explanation of libertarianism (which ought to include an abstract theory of liberty and how it relates to liberty in practice). Therefore, when a (...) criticism of falsificationism appears on a libertarian website it seems useful to reply to it (even though no discussion of libertarianism itself is involved). (shrink)

Karl Popper, ca raționalist critic, a fost un oponent al tuturor formelor de scepticism, convenționalism și relativism în știință. Multe dintre argumentele sale sunt îndreptate împotriva membrilor "Cercului Vienez". Popper este de acord cu aceștia cu privire la aspectele generale ale metodologiei științifice și neîncrederea lor în metodologia filosofică tradițională, dar soluțiile sale au fost semnificativ diferite. A contribuit semnificativ la dezbaterile privind metodologia științifică generală, demarcarea științei de pseudoștiință, natura probabilității și metodologia științelor sociale. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27356.85127/1 .

This undergraduate textbook introduces some fundamental issues in philosophy of science for students of philosophy and science students. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with knowledge and values. Chap. 1 presents the classical conception of knowledge as initiated by the ancient Greeks and elaborated during the development of science, introducing the central concepts of truth, belief and justification. Aspects of the quest for objectivity are taken up in the following two chapters. Moral issues are broached in (...) Chap. 4, which discusses some aspects of the use and abuse of science, taking up the responsibilities of scientists in properly conducting their business and decision-makers in their concerns with the import of science for society. Part 2 contrasts the view of scientific progress as the rejecting of old hypotheses and theories and replacing them with new ones, represented by Karl Popper, with the conception of progress as accumulating knowledge, saving as much as possible from older theories, represented by Pierre Duhem. A concluding chapter defends the natural attitude of taking the theories of modern science to be literally true, i.e. realism, in the face of arguments drawn partly from the history of scientific progress in criticism of this stance. (shrink)

Falsification may demarcate science from non-science as the rational way to test the truth of hypotheses. But experimental evidence from studies of reasoning shows that people often find falsification difficult. We suggest that domain expertise may facilitate falsification. We consider new experimental data about chess experts’ hypothesis testing. The results show that chess masters were readily able to falsify their plans. They generated move sequences that falsified their plans more readily than novice players, who tended to confirm their plans. The (...) finding that experts in a domain are more likely to falsify their hypotheses has important implications for the debate about human rationality. (shrink)

scientific progress, natural philosophy of the Late Medieval Period is seen as playing the role of apologetics. For philosophers of science, with their repudiation of metaphysics, the task of providing a rational reconstruction of how scientific progress has occurred is nigh on impossible. Even explanations such as the Popperian and the Kuhnian strain under great difficulty and provide only partly satisfactory results. In his “Logik der Forschung” (1934) Karl Raimund Popper argues that metaphysics plays an accidental part in the emergence (...) of new scientific ideas. Correspondingly, in “Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962), by carrying out theoretical interpretations and classification of empirical facts without their metaphysical premises, Thomas Kuhn comes to the conclusion that natural science was formed under the influence of erroneous interpretations of Aristotelian natural philosophy presented by medieval natural philosophers. These are some of the reasons why medievalists are still made to defend late medieval natural philosophy from shallow convictions that at medieval universities nothing of any significance to contemporary science and philosophy took place at all. Seeking to render a fragment of a coherent reconstruction of the development of natural philosophy, I will investigate one idea of late medieval philosophy – the explanation of motion (impetus). The main statement of the paper holds that the ideas of late medieval natural philosophy have a decisive significance for the development of modern natural science instead of accidental or negative one. In the paper, following Aristotelian philosophical approach, premises of Jean Buridan’s theory of impetus will be exposed. Then, debates over the explanation of projectile motion are going to be presented, and finally, the necessary significance of this metaphysical idea on the modifications of natural philosophy is going to be ascertained. (shrink)

We live in an age alleged devoted to evidence-based medicine. Evidence-based medicine, however, depends on reliable data and if the data are largely, if not completely, manipulated by the manufacturer of pharmaceuticals, then the data are not reliable. Evidence-based medicine is an illusion. This book raises and attempts to answer the following questions: What are the ways in which the profit motive of industry undermines the integrity of science? How is science protected from corporate malfeasance in a capitalist economy? Our (...) particular focus is the relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and medicine. We argue that medicine desperately needs to re-evaluate its relationship with the pharmaceutical industry and re-affirm the ideal of evidence-based medicine. In our view, Karl Popper’s philosophy of science, Falsificationism and Critical Rationalism, provides a rigorous conception of science required to preserve the integrity of the scientific basis of medicine against the commercial influences. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada bilginin kazandığı doğru nitelemesi ve bilimsel bilgide doğrunun bir dogma haline gelmesi, kökenleriyle birlikte tartışılacaktır. Bu hususta Karl Popper'ın yanlışlamacı bilim imgesinin anlatıldığı bu çalışmada ikili bir yol izlenecektir. İlki; Popper'ın neye, neden karşı çıktığı üzerine, ikincisi ise bu karşı çıkış sonucunda açılan boşluğun nasıl doldurulduğudur. Dolayısıyla birinci aşama Popper açısından geleneksel imgeye yapılan bir kritik niteliğinde olurken, ikinci aşama ise Poppercı bilim imgesinin serimlendiği bölümü oluşturacaktır. Nihayetinde Popper yenilikleriyle bilimsel düşünüşe yeni bir soluk getirirken, son bölümde sisteminin (...) ne gibi eksiklikler barındırdığı tartışılacaktır. Bu eksiklikler ise Ayer ve Duhem-Quine tezi ile sırasıyla yanlışlamanın mantıksal olarak imkânsızlığı ve kuramın yanlışlanmasında holistik yaklaşımın gerekliliğini kapsayacaktır. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give an account of the change in Feyerabend's philosophy that made him abandon methodological monism and embrace methodological pluralism. In this paper I offer an explanation in terms of a simple model of 'change of belief through evidence'. My main claim is that the evidence triggering this belief revision can be identified in Feyerabend's technical work in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, in particular his reevaluation of Bohr's contribution to it. This highlights an (...) under-appreciated part of Feyerabend's early work and makes it central to an understanding of the dynamics in his overall philosophy of science. (shrink)

Karl Popper's celebrated theory of falsification provides a rigorous view of science but it has been criticized as failing to explain how science makes progress. In this essay, I compare Popper's falsificationism with Nicholas Maxwell's aim-oriented empiricism and examine the role that metaphysics plays in explaining scientific progress.

One of the most enduring contributions of Sir Karl Popper to the philosophy of science was his deductive approach to the scientific method, as opposed to Hilary Putnam’s absolute faith in science as an inductive process. Popper’s logic of discovery counters the whole inductive procedure that modern science is so often identified with. While the inductive method has generally characterized how scientists commence their work in laboratories, for Popper scientific theories actually start with generalizations inside our mind whose validity the (...) scientific method must test until those come to be falsified. A step further in the scientific method is the function of paradigms that Thomas Kuhn’s revolutionary science has developed. Kuhn’s community and consensus-based approach and Popper’s hypothesis-based approach are both important in the development of science as it is. This paper seeks to show how models of development may be integrated in the above debate in order to derive insightful implications that are crucial to the understanding of economic progress and human development. (shrink)

The contributions to this book touch the different aspects of Popper's philosophy of science.

According to influential accounts of scientific method, such as critical rationalism, scientific knowledge grows by repeatedly testing our best hypotheses. But despite the popularity of hypothesis tests in statistical inference and science in general, their philosophical foundations remain shaky. In particular, the interpretation of non-significant results—those that do not reject the tested hypothesis—poses a major philosophical challenge. To what extent do they corroborate the tested hypothesis, or provide a reason to accept it? Popper sought for measures of corroboration that could (...) adequately answer this question. According to Popper, corroboration is different from probability-raising, and grounded in the predictive success and testability of a hypothesis. As such, corroboration becomes an indicator of the scientific value of a hypothesis and guides our practical preferences over hypotheses that have been subjected to severe tests. This article proves two impossibility results for corroboration measures based on statistical relevance. The generality of these results shows that Popper’s qualitative characterization of corroboration must be misguided. I explore what a more promising and scientifically useful concept of corroboration could look like. (shrink)

The canonical version of the history of twentieth century philosophy of science tells us that Lakatos was Popper’s disciple, but it is rarely mentioned that Popper would have learned anything from Lakatos. The aim of this paper is to examine Lakatos’ influence on Popper’s philosophical system and to argue that Lakatos did have an important, yet somewhat unexpected, impact on Popper’s thinking: he influenced Popper’s evolutionary model for ‘progress’ in science. And Lakatos’ influence sheds new light on why and how (...) Popper continually revised one of the central claims of his philosophy of science: the evolutionary account of scientific theory change. (shrink)

Van Fraassen, like Popper before him, assumes that confirmation and disconfirmation relations are logical relations and thus hold only among abstract items. This raises a problem about how experience, for Popper, and observables, for van Fraassen, enter into epistemic evaluations. Each philosopher offers a drastic proposal: Popper holds that basic statements are accepted by convention; van Fraassen introduces his “pragmatic tautology.” Another alternative is to reject the claim that all evaluative relations are logical relations. Ayer proposed this option in responding (...) to Popper, as did Sosa in a different context. I argue that this option should be pursued and propose a line of research that the option suggests.Keywords: Popper; van Fraassen; Representation; Confirmation; Logic; Cognitive abilities. (shrink)

We all think that science is special. Its products—its technological spin-off—dominate our lives which are thereby sometimes enriched and sometimes impoverished but always affected. Even the most outlandish critics of science such as Feyerabend implicitly recognize its success. Feyerabend told us that science was a congame. Scientists had so successfully hood-winked us into adopting its ideology that other equally legitimate forms of activity—alchemy, witchcraft and magic—lost out. He conjured up a vision of much enriched lives if only we could free (...) ourselves from the domination of the ‘one true ideology’ of science just as our ancestors freed us from the domination of the Church. But he told us these things in Switzerland and in California happily commuting between them in that most ubiquitous product of science—the aeroplane. (shrink)

Science, and in particular the process of theory-change in science, formed the major inspiration for Karl Popper's whole philosophy. Popper learned about the success of Einstein's revolutionary new theory in 1919, and Einstein ‘became a dominant influence on my thinking—in the long run perhaps the most important influence of all.’ Popper explained why: In May, 1919, Einstein's eclipse predictions were successfully tested by two British expeditions. With these tests a new theory of gravitation and a new cosmology suddenly appeared, not (...) just as a mere possibility, but as an improvement on Newton—a better approximation to the truth … The general assumption of the truth of Newton's theory was of course the result of its incredible success, culminating in the discovery of the planet Neptune … Yet in spite of all this, Einstein had managed to produce a real alternative and, it appeared, a better theory … Like Newton himself, he predicted new effects within our solar system. And some of these predictions, when tested, had now proved successful. (shrink)

Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science divides thinkers into the scientific and the prejudiced, using as a standard the up-to-date science textbook. Inductivists regard the history of science as progressing smoothly, from facts rather than from problems, to increasingly general theories, undisturbed by contending scientific schools. Conventionalists regard theories as pigeonholes for classifying facts; history of science is the development of increasingly simple theories, neither true nor false. Conventionalism is useless for reconstructing and weighing conflicts between schools, and overemphasizes science's internal (...) organic growth. For Popper, not for inductivists or conventionalists, the successful criticism of theories is the heart of science. Popper's view admits the existence of valuable errors and enables us to avoid being wise after the event, thereby improving our understanding of the history of science through reconstructions of the actual interplay of theories and facts. (shrink)

On the basis of his unpublished thesis ‘Gewohnheit und Gesetzerlebnis in der Erziehung’ a historical reconstruction is given of the genesis of Popper's ideas on induction and demarcation which differs radically from his own account in Unended quest. It is shown not only that he wholeheartedly endorses inductive epistemology and psychology but also that his ‘demarcation’ criterion is inductivistic. Moreover it is shown that his later demarcation thesis arises not from his worries about, on the one hand, Marxism and psychoanalysis (...) and, on the other hand, Einstein's physics, but rather from his urgent preoccupation with providing pedagogy with a psychological foundation, which has its sources in Karl Bühler's cognitive psychology as well as, surprisingly, Adler's Characterology. Aside from Adler some lesser known psychologists, such as Karl Groos, will also be seen to have played a formative role on Popper's early thinking. (shrink)

Explains Popper's views on natural and social science, ranging in Part I from metaphysical considerations to his interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics, and in Part II from the errors of historicism and holism to the roles of theoretical models, institutions, traditions and history.

This is a response to a claim by Sven Ove Hansson to the effect that Poppers dictum that falsification lies at the heart of all pursuit of science has once and for all been falsified by his study of articles published in Nature during the year 2000. We claim that this is based on a misunderstanding of Poppers philosophy of science interpreting it too literally, and that alternative readings of those papers are fully compliant with falsification. We scrutinize Hansson’s arguments (...) as well as giving an overview of Poppers falsification theory. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of Contessa’s. First, I show that Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery argues against the view that the logical probability of a hypothesis is identical to its degree of confirmation, rather than against Bayesianism. Second, I explain that his argument to this effect does not depend on the assumption that ‘the universe is infinite’. Third, and finally, I refine Popper’s case by developing an argument which requires only that some universal laws have a logical (...) probability of zero relative to any finite evidence, and providing an example concerning Newtonian mechanics. (shrink)

This book seeks to rectify misrepresentations of Popperian thought with a historical approach to Popper’s philosophy, an approach which applies his own mature view, that we gain knowledge through conjectures and refutations, to his own development, by portraying him in his intellectual growth as just such a series. Gattei seeks to reconstruct the logic of Popper’s development, in order to show how one problem and its tentative solution led to a new problem.

This book seeks to rectify misrepresentations of Popperian thought with a historical approach to Popper’s philosophy, an approach which applies his own mature view, that we gain knowledge through conjectures and refutations, to his own development, by portraying him in his intellectual growth as just such a series. Gattei seeks to reconstruct the logic of Popper’s development, in order to show how one problem and its tentative solution led to a new problem.

This entry gives an account of falsifiability both as championed in particular by Karl Popper and also more generally and examines its wider implications for scientific methodology.

The aim of this dissertation is to present Popper's account of objectivity. To this end, we follow the general chronology of his thought, however our emphasis in our critical exposition is on his confrontation with particular problems in the philosophy of science and the picture of objectivity that results. Popper identifies science as the locus of objectivity. For Popper all knowledge begins as common-sense knowledge and is inherently self-critical. Science is characterized by the refinement of the critical process initiated by (...) human interaction with the world. Thus science is common-sense "Writ Large." Consequently, according to Popper, a thesis is objective to the extent that it's susceptible to intersubjective criticism characteristic of scientific methodology. Therefore, the focus of our account of Popper's treatment of objectivity is his writings in the philosophy of science that directly address issues of scientific methodology. ;Specifically, we treat of the problem of demarcation, the falsifiability of probability statements, Popper's identification of the method of conjecture and refutation with Neo-Darwinian evolution, and lastly the problem of convention in scientific methodology. The dissertation concludes with a general sketch of the picture of objectivity that results from our critical exposition, and a consideration of both possible criticisms of our account and a prospectus of some areas of possible future research. (shrink)

One of Karl Popper's main aims in The Logic of Scientific Discovery is to solve the problem of induction. As he formulates it, the problem of induction is a conflict between the demand that all scientific statements be decidable, and the inadmissibility of inductive arguments. Popper tries to solve this problem by showing that, if we lessen this demand to the requirement that all scientific statements be falsifiable, science can search for true scientific theories rationally, without using induction. This is (...) because it is possible to deduce the falsity of theories from the truth of "basic statements." ;Popper's account of science, however, encounters a new problem, for it seems as if we cannot ascertain the truth-values of basic statements. Popper calls this "the problem of the empirical basis." To solve this problem, most empiricists adopt the view that perceptual experiences, although not a criterion of truth for basic statements, are nevertheless a reason for their acceptance. Popper, however, rejects this theory , and adopts instead a conventionalist theory of the empirical basis. On his view, basic statements are accepted by a "free decision"; they can neither be justified, nor completely tested. ;Critics have long taken Popper to task for his conventionalism. They argue that we have no reason to prefer an unrefuted theory to a 'refuted' theory, if we have no reason to think that accepted basic statements are true. Furthermore, Popper cannot avoid this problem by turning to psychologism, for perceptual experiences can constitute reasons for accepting basic statements only if inductive inferences are presupposed. Since conventionalism and psychologism exhaust the viable alternatives, Popper cannot solve the problem of induction. ;The aim of this dissertation is to answer the question: If Popper must choose either conventionalism or psychologism, does it follow that he fails to solve the problem of induction? This question is answered affirmatively by arguments that show: that Popper's conventionalism undermines his attempted solution to the problem of induction, that psychologism does not entail inductivism, and that, in spite of this, Popper can give no reason to search for truth with his empiricist methodology, rather than a logically consistent, non-empirical alternative, unless he invokes induction. (shrink)

Karl Popper's influential theory of science has been widely debated and vigorously criticized over the last few decades. The central concepts of Popper's theory, those of falsifiability, corroboration, and verisimilitude have been by-words in the literature of the Philosophy of Science during this period. Popper's challenges to orthodoxy and, in some ways, radical views, have generated considerable controversy. There have been sharp criticisms and a few defenders---but even among the defenders one sees mostly appropriations, rather than genuine defense. There has (...) not, however, been any systematic general defense of his central views in the literature. This dissertation attempts such a defense, by way of a careful examination and sympathetic interpretation of the main themes of Popper's theory, namely, the role of falsifiability in responding to the demarcation problem and solving the problem of induction, the insistence on corroboration as a desirable feature of scientific theories as well as an indicator of empirical progress, and the theory of verisimilitude, according to which the long-term aim of science is properly pursued by means of advancing theories which constitute better approximations to the truth than their competitors. ;The overall strategy is to review carefully the most important criticisms of each of the above themes in Popper's theory. After providing background for a discussion of the matters at issue, I try to disarm the objections by showing that they misconstrue Popper's intent; to this end I provide alternative interpretations of how Popper can be properly understood and propose minor revisions to the concepts analyzed . After dissolving the objections and developing the fundamental notions with the revisions introduced, Popper's theory of science emerges rehabilitated. (shrink)

Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science divides thinkers into the scientific and the prejudiced, using as a standard the up-to-date science textbook. Inductivists regard the history of science as progressing smoothly, from facts rather than from problems, to increasingly general theories, undisturbed by contending scientific schools. Conventionalists regard theories as pigeonholes for classifying facts; history of science is the development of increasingly simple theories, neither true nor false. Conventionalism is useless for reconstructing and weighing conflicts between schools, and overemphasizes science's internal (...) organic growth. For Popper, not for inductivists or conventionalists, the successful criticism of theories is the heart of science. Popper's view admits the existence of valuable errors and enables us to avoid being wise after the event, thereby improving our understanding of the history of science through reconstructions of the actual interplay of theories and facts. (shrink)

Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science: Rationality without FoundationsThomas Kuhn's “Linguistic Turn” and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism: Incommensurability, Rationality, and the Search for Truth by Stefano Gattei; Stefano Gattei.

The aim of the paper is to test the possibility of adopting in the humanities Karl R. Popper’s model of science. Its raison d’être is the contemporary situation of the humanities. Difficult on account of their complex and elusive subject, it has recently become aggravated as a result of the poststructuralist rejection of the classical concept of science in favour of either cognitive relativism or approaches openly admitting to ideological bias. Popper’s model of science might help protect the standards of (...) research in the humanities, as it entails inter alia falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation for science, the correspondence theory of truth, and, above all, the method of critical rationalism. An attempt to apply Popper’s ideas in the humanities is further legitimized by his recognition that, although the object of their investigation is World 3, their method is the same as that of the sciences: problems, tentative solutions and their critical examination. The most problematic issues in the project concern falsification, formulation of universal laws and predictions. Some of the difficulties might be overcome with the help of Popper’s cognitive theory of art. Popper argued, namely, that art’s primary function is cognitive , that its nature is semiotic, that its origin is mythic, and that the process of its creation consists in interaction between the mind of the artist and the object of World 3 the mind is engaged in creating. Key words POPPER, HUMANITIES, FALSIFICATION. (shrink)

One of the main goals of the Institute “Vienna Circle”, founded in October 1991, is to do justice to its second name and establish itself as a “Society for Advancement of the Scientific World View”. This includes the effort to document and further develop the work and influence of the Vienna Circle and its “periphery” in areas of science and adult education, as well as “the cultivation and application of logical empiricism, critical rationalism, and linguistic analysis in the sense of (...) a scientific philosophy and coordinated with general socio-cultural developments”. (shrink)

In this first English translation the author has included all of the original text and has added new footnotes, preface, and 150 more pages of text. The new material is conveniently starred. A monumental work which develops the view Popper calls "deductivism" --the theory of the deductive method of testing.--J. E. M.

A provocative collection of technical and popular essays dealing with a variety of scientific and political topics which Popper has treated in his major works. For the most part Popper develops, sharpens, and extends to new areas, themes which he has already explored. The major theme running through the essays is that knowledge grows by unjustified and unjustifiable anticipations, guesses and conjectures. These are controlled by criticisms and refutations. Theories can never be positively justified; they can only prove to be (...) resistant to rational criticism. The boldness of Popper's conjectures demands attempted refutations on the part of the reader.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Dr Chaudhury is concerned to defend what is responsible and hopeful in contemporary ecological thinking, but to avoid the trap of denying that any positive contribution can be made by western science and technology. Critical rationalists do not need to agree with her suggestions and recommendations in order to welcome her positioning of environmental issues alongside the traditional human and political debates about freedom. The Indian perspective that informs this book is particularly impressive and interesting. David Miller Professor Mahasweta Chaudhury (...) is Professor for Philosophy at Calcutta University in India. In the late sixties she studied at the London School of Economics under Karl Popper, John Watkins, Alan Musgrave and Imre Lakatos. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's _Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ has sold over a million copies in more than twenty languages and has remained one of the ten most cited academic works for the past half century. In contrast, Karl Popper's seminal book _The Logic of Scientific Discovery_ has lapsed into relative obscurity. Although the two men debated the nature of science only once, the legacy of this encounter has dominated intellectual and public discussions on the topic ever since. Almost universally recognized as the (...) modern watershed in the philosophy of science, Kuhn's relativistic vision of shifting paradigms -- which asserted that science was just another human activity, like art or philosophy, only more specialized -- triumphed over Popper's more positivistic belief in science's revolutionary potential to falsify society's dogmas. But has this victory been beneficial for science? Steve Fuller argues that not only has Kuhn's dominance had an adverse impact on the field but both thinkers have been radically misinterpreted in the process. This debate raises a vital question: Can science remain an independent, progressive force in society, or is it destined to continue as the technical wing of the military-industrial complex? Drawing on original research -- including the Kuhn archives at MIT -- Fuller offers a clear account of "Kuhn vs. Popper" and what it will mean for the future of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

This paper utilizes the framework of Karl Popper’s 3-world ontology to make the case that forensic science is a specialized coding system that establishes meaningful connections between the world of biology and the world of human society . Forensic science is a cross-disciplinary endeavor that uses scientific methods to determine what transpired in a crime so the legal system can determine how to prosecute the offender. On a Popperian analysis of forensic science, world 1 consists of evidence gathered at the (...) crime scene, which enables investigators to develop a detailed reconstruction of the incident for consideration under the legal and ethical codes of society, which are products of world 3. Understanding forensic science in this way serves two purposes: first, it extends Marcello Barbieri’s code biology into the realm of philosophical considerations in science, law and ethics; and second, it situates forensic science within the larger context of debates in contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)