Is there some general reason to expect organisms that have beliefs to have false beliefs? And after you observe that an organism occasionally occupies a given neural state that you think encodes a perceptual belief, how do you evaluate hypotheses about the semantic content that that state has, where some of those hypotheses attribute beliefs that are sometimes false while others attribute beliefs that are always true? To address the first of these questions, we discuss evolution by natural (...) selection and show how organisms that are risk-prone in the beliefs they form can be fitter than organisms that are risk-free. To address the second question, we discuss a problem that is widely recognized in statistics – the problem of over-fitting – and one influential device for addressing that problem, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). We then use AIC to solve epistemological versions of the disjunction and distality problems, which are two key problems concerning what it is for a belief state to have one semantic content rather than another. (shrink)

(1995). Heuristics, hypotheses, and social influence: A new approach to the experimental simulation of social epistemology. Social Epistemology: Vol. 9, Simulating Science, pp. 57-69.

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) promises a relatively objective and tractable methodology for ranking the plausibility of competing hypotheses. Unlike Bayesianism, it is computationally modest. Unlike explanationism, it appeals to minimally subjective judgments about relations between hypotheses and evidence. Yet the canonical procedures for ACH allow a certain kind of instability in applications of the methodology, by virtue of supporting competing rankings despite common evidential bases and diagnosticity assessments. This instability should motivate advocates of ACH to focus (...) their efforts toward creating structured methods for individuating items of evidence. (shrink)

Could God Deceive Us? Skeptical Hypotheses in Late Medieval Epistemology.

I evaluate non-factive or truth-insensitive accounts of the ordinary concepts used to evaluate beliefs, evidence, assertions, and decisions. Recent findings show that these accounts are mistaken. I propose three hypotheses regarding how philosophers defending these accounts got things so wrong. I also consider one potential consequence for the discipline.

Those of us who take skepticism seriously typically have two relevant beliefs: (a) it’s plausible (even if false) that in order to know that I have hands I have to be able to epistemically neutralize, to some significant degree, some skeptical hypotheses, such as the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) one; and (b) it’s also plausible (even if false) that I can’t so neutralize those hypotheses. There is no reason for us to also think (c) that the BIV hypothesis, for instance, (...) is plausible or probably true. In order to take skepticism seriously it’s sufficient to hold (a) and (b); one need not hold (c). Indeed, philosophers who accept (a) and (b) never endorse (c). Show me a philosopher who suspects that he is a brain in a vat and I’ll show you someone who is deranged! That’s one thing that bothers undergraduates in philosophy. They object: why on earth do some philosophers take the BIV hypothesis to pose any threat at all to our beliefs given that those very same philosophers think that there’s no real chance that the BIV hypothesis is true? Sure, the BIV hypothesis is formally inconsistent with my belief that I have hands, so if the former is true then my belief is false. But so what? Why should that bare inconsistency matter so much? Is this strange attitude amongst philosophers the result of some logic fetish infecting the philosophical community? It is sometimes said that the skeptical hypotheses are not only inconsistent with our beliefs but are explanatory of our experiences, which is supposed to make them more of a threat. But students aren’t fooled: although the skeptical hypotheses may attempt to explain why our experience is as it is, it’s the kind of attempt appropriate for science fiction movies that are all special effects and virtually no plot. No one with any sense of reality will take the evil demon hypothesis to be even tenuously explanatory. (shrink)

The intention of the present essay is to urge a reconsideration of the Realism-Phenomenalism-Issue, mainly and primarily in regard to the interpretation of scientific hypotheses; secondarily also relating to the basic problems of epistemology.

This book explores new findings on the long-neglected topic of theory construction and discovery, and challenges the orthodox, current division of scientific development into discrete stages: the stage of generation of new hypotheses; the stage of collection of relevant data; the stage of justification of possible theories; and the final stage of selection from among equally confirmed theories. The chapters, written by leading researchers, offer an interdisciplinary perspective on various aspects of the processes by which theories rationally should, and (...) descriptively are, built. They address issues such as the role of problem-solving and heuristic reasoning in theory-building; how inferences and models shape the pursuit of scientific knowledge; the relation between problem-solving and scientific discovery; the relative values of the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic view of theories in understanding theory construction; and the relation between ampliative inferences, heuristic reasoning, and models as a means for building new theories and knowledge. Through detailed arguments and examinations, the volume collectively challenges the orthodox view’s main tenets by characterizing the ways in which the different “stages” are logically, temporally, and psychologically intertwined. As a group, the chapters provide several attempts to answer long-standing questions about the possibility of a unified conceptual framework for building theories and formulating hypotheses. (shrink)

This paper studies the use of hypotheses schemes in generatinginductive predictions. After discussing Carnap–Hintikka inductive logic,hypotheses schemes are defined and illustrated with two partitions. Onepartition results in the Carnapian continuum of inductive methods, the otherresults in predictions typical for hasty generalization. Following theseexamples I argue that choosing a partition comes down to making inductiveassumptions on patterns in the data, and that by choosing appropriately anyinductive assumption can be made. Further considerations on partitions makeclear that they do not suggest (...) any solution to the problem of induction.Hypotheses schemes provide the tools for making inductive assumptions, but theyalso reveal the need for such assumptions. (shrink)

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of his passing, this special book features studies on Alexandre Koyré, one of the most influential historians of science of the 20th century, who re-evaluated prevalent thinking on the history and philosophy of science. In particular, it explores Koyré’s intellectual matrix and heritage within interdisciplinary fields of historical, epistemological and philosophical scientific thought. Koyré is rightly noted as both a versatile historian on the birth and development of modern science and for his interest in (...) philosophical questions on the nature of scientific knowledge. In the 1940s and 1950s his activities in the United States established a crucial bridge between the European historical tradition of science studies and the American academic environments, and an entire generation of historians of science grew up under his direct influence. The book brings together contributions from leading experts in the field, and offers much-needed insights into the subject from historical, nature of science, and philosophical perspectives. It provides an absorbing and revealing read for historians, philosophers and scientists alike. (shrink)

In the introduction to his famous book, La Science et l’hypothèse, Poincaré remarks on the necessary role and legitimacy of hypotheses. He establishes a triple classification of hypotheses, dividing them into verifiable, useful, and apparent. However, in chapter 9, entitled ‘Les hypothèses en physique’, he gives a slightly different triadic classification: natural hypotheses, indifferent hypotheses, and real generalizations. The origin of this second classification is a lecture given at the International Congress of Physics, Paris, 1900. What (...) are the similarities and differences between these two classifications? My main purpose is to provide a possible equivalence between the two classifications in order to clarify the role of hypotheses in Poincaré’s epistemology of natural science. The discussion will be based on the two fundamental texts mentioned above and on the contrast between Poincaré’s use of the notion of hypothesis and that of some of his contemporaries. (shrink)

In one of its most urgent folds, Catherine Keller's Cloud of the Impossible juxtaposes negative theology with relational theology for the sake of thinking constructively about today's global climate of religious conflict and ecological upheaval. The tension between these two theological approaches reflects her desire to unsay past harmful theological speech but also to speak into the present silences about the possibility of a future that is not only to be feared. Suffusing Keller's Cloud is the related possibility of living (...) out one's life in conversation with a religious tradition having accepted the nonknowing character of its wisdom. Here, I develop the notion of “hypothetical faith” as an epistemic posture that commits itself to some particular religious tradition even as it acknowledges the unverifiability of that tradition's deepest truths. Understood as operating at the opposite end of the testability spectrum from science, religion-as-hypothesis provides a way of saying and unsaying one's tradition at the same time. (shrink)

In this paper epistemological, ontological and sociological questions concerning the statistical significance of sharp hypotheses in scientific research are investigated within the framework provided by Cognitive Constructivism and the FBST (Full Bayesian Significance Test). The constructivist framework is contrasted with the traditional epistemological settings for orthodox Bayesian and frequentist statistics provided by Decision Theory and Falsificationism.

With regards to the inefficiencies and uncompromising situations within the humanities and social sciences field in Iran, the challenge of problematizing these sciences is inevitable. So far, numerous research analyzing humanities and social sciences’ problems in the Iranian academic system have been published. Considering the important role of humanities and social sciences in the modern Iranian society, we attempt to suggest a theoretical framework for the problematization of humanities and social sciences in Iran. The exploration of the main challenges facing (...) humanities and social sciences in Iran from the community, academy and administration point of view, sparks three hypotheses. First, humanities and social sciences’ theories and teachings are not applied accurately. Second, the humanities and social sciences’ schools of thought are not chosen properly according to Iranian circumstances. And third, there are metaphysical differences between axioms and presupposition of humanities and social sciences having western origins and those with Islamic-Iranian culture. (shrink)

One of the major problems (or sometimes pseudo-problems) that archaeologists and historians encounter in the study of ancient cultures is the need to differentiate and to identify the sources of the various concepts, techniques, institutions, forms, designs, motifs, etc., that, at any given moment of time, form the constituent elements of the culture or cultural product to which they have turned their attention; or—to pose the question in its proper framework—to analyse the process of cultural formation inherent in the subject (...) of their study. Such considerations have a special significance for archaeologists, whose essential concern is with the often incomplete assemblages of material remains left behind by the cultures and civilizations of the past, and whose central task is to enumerate and reconstitute the structures and processes that were operative in the societies in question. The study of acculturation—culture change, cultural diffusion, “stimulus diffusion,” culture contact, etc.—has been part of the theoretical and empirical concerns of anthropologists and sociologists since some decades ago, and the subject of an old and now almost abandoned debate. While the terminology of the social sciences concerned with living societies can also be found in archaeological and historical discussion, such concerns have had inadequate application in the fields of archaeological and historical practice. What has dominated and, to a great extent, continues to dominate historical studies is what we might call “the ‘theory’ of influence” and its corollary, “the migration hypothesis.” Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to say that one of the leading aspects of the study of a past society or culture is the concern with the “parent” culture(s) which influenced it, or the search for the location of its “migratory origins.” While this is especially true of studies relating to the societies of the Third World, it is not exclusively so—as we see, for instance, in the case of European prehistory. The immediate epistemological sources of such approaches are not difficult to identify, being principally located in 19th century diffusionism and, as we shall see shortly, in colonial ideology. (shrink)

The present paper revisits the main methodological problems with conceptual analysis and considers two attempts to rectify them in terms of prototypes and reflective equilibria, respectively. Finding both wanting for the purposes of epistemological analysis, a naturalistic alternative is then sketched that explores the positive implications of aforementioned problems for the demarcation of the respective roles of intuitions and empirical investigation within three epistemological domains, viz., the evaluation of epistemological hypotheses, the amelioration of epistemic practices, and (...) the construction of a theory of epistemic value. (shrink)

Theoretical and manipulative abduction conjectures and manipulations : the extra-theoretical dimension of scientific discovery. -- Non-explanatory and instrumental abduction : plausibility, implausibility, ignorance preservation. -- Semiotic brains and artificial minds : how brains make up material cognitive systems. -- Neuromultimodal abduction : pre-wired brains, embidiment, neurospaces. -- Animal abduction : from mindless organisms to srtifactual mediators. -- Abduction, affordances, and cognitive niches : sharing representations and creating chances through cognitive niche construction. -- Abduction in human and logical agents : hasty (...) generalizers, hybrid abducers, fallacies. -- Morphodynamical abduction : causation of hypotheses by attractors dynamics. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDuncan Pritchard proposes a biscopic solution to the problem of radical skepticism, which consists in epistemological disjunctivism and a theory about the limits of rational evaluation inspired by Wittgenstein's On Certainty. According to the latter theory, we cannot have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, a consequence that Pritchard finds attractive insofar as he thinks that claims to know the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses are epistemically immodest. I argue that there is room (...) for a neo-Moorean to dispute Pritchard's argument for the Wittgensteinian proposal and I raise some doubts about its underlying motivation. Finally, I put forward an alternative, which I call “moderate neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivism.” While this theory contends that we possess rationally grounded anti-skeptical knowledge, it also allows for a degree of epistemic modesty, by conceding that perceptual knowledge never amounts to knowledge that is absolutely certain. (shrink)

Purpose: Whereas ethical considerations on imaging techniques and interpretations of neuroimaging results flourish, there is not much work on their preconditions. In this paper, therefore, we discuss epistemological considerations on neuroimaging and their implications for neuroethics. Results: Neuroimaging uses indirect methods to generate data about surrogate parameters for mental processes, and there are many determinants influencing the results, including current hypotheses and the state of knowledge. This leads to an interdependence between hypotheses and data. Additionally, different levels (...) of description are involved, especially when experiments are designed to answer questions pertaining to broad concepts like the self, empathy or moral intentions. Interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks are needed to integrate findings from the life sciences and the humanities and to translate between them. While these epistemological issues are not specific for neuroimaging, there are some reasons why they are of special importance in this context: Due to their inferential proximity, 'neuro-images' seem to be self-evident, suggesting directness of observation and objectivity. This has to be critically discussed to prevent overinterpretation. Additionally, there is a high level of attention to neuroimaging, leading to a high frequency of presentation of neuroimaging data and making the critical examination of their epistemological properties even more pressing. Conclusions: Epistemological considerations are an important prerequisite for neuroethics. The presentation and communication of the results of neuroimaging studies, the potential generation of new phenomena and new 'dysfunctions' through neuroimaging, and the influence on central concepts at the foundations of ethics will be important future topics for this discipline. (shrink)

This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.

We investigate the epistemological consequences of a positive polymerase chain reaction SARS-CoV test for two relevant hypotheses: V is the hypothesis that an individual has been infected with SARS-CoV-2; C is the hypothesis that SARS-CoV-2 is the cause of flu-like symptoms in a given patient. We ask two fundamental epistemological questions regarding each hypothesis: First, how much confirmation does a positive test lend to each hypothesis? Second, how much evidence does a positive test provide for each hypothesis (...) against its negation? We respond to each question within a formal Bayesian framework. We construe degree of confirmation as the difference between the posterior probability of the hypothesis and its prior, and the strength of evidence for a hypothesis against its alternative in terms of their likelihood ratio. We find that test specificity—and coinfection probabilities when making inferences about C—were key determinants of confirmation and evidence. Tests with 8) for V against ¬V regardless of sensitivity. Accordingly, low specificity tests could not provide strong evidence in favor of C in all plausible scenarios modeled. We also show how a positive influenza A test disconfirms C and provides weak evidence against C in dependence on the probability that the patient is influenza A infected given that his/her symptoms are not caused by SARS-CoV-2. Our analysis points out some caveats that should be considered when attributing symptoms or death of a positively tested patient to SARS-CoV-2. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions on causal inference in medicine are stuck in dyadic camps, each defending one kind of evidence or method rather than another as best support for causal hypotheses. Whereas Evidence Based Medicine advocates the use of Randomised Controlled Trials and systematic reviews of RCTs as gold standard, philosophers of science emphasise the importance of mechanisms and their distinctive informational contribution to causal inference and assessment. Some have suggested the adoption of a pluralistic approach to causal inference, and an (...) inductive rather than hypothetico-deductive inferential paradigm. However, these proposals deliver no clear guidelines about how such plurality of evidence sources should jointly justify hypotheses of causal associations. We here develop such guidelines by first giving a philosophical analysis of the underpinnings of Hill’s viewpoints on causality. We then put forward an evidence-amalgamation framework adopting a Bayesian net approach to model causal inference in pharmacology for the assessment of harms. Our framework accommodates a number of intuitions already expressed in the literature concerning the EBM vs. pluralist debate on causal inference, evidence hierarchies, causal holism, relevance, and reliability. (shrink)

The History of scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza is often called upon to support three theses: first, that Descartes had a dogmatic notion of systematic knowledge, and therefore of physics; second, that the hypothetical epistemology of physics which spread during the xviith century was the result of a general sceptical crisis; third, that this epistemology was more successful in England than in France. I reject these three theses: I point first to the tension in Descartes’ works between the ideal of (...) a completely certain science and a physics replete with hypotheses; further, I argue that the use of hypotheses by mechanical philosophers cannot be separated from their conception of physics; finally I show that, at the end of the xviith century, physicists in France as well as in England spoke through hypotheses and I examine different ways of explaining this shared practice. Richard H. Popkin’s book serves therefore as a starting point for insights into the general problem: to what extent and for what reasons some propositions in physics have been presented as hypotheses in the xviith century? (shrink)

This paper takes part in the methodological debate concerning the nature and the justification of hypotheses about computational systems in software engineering by providing an epistemological analysis of Software Testing, the practice of observing the programs’ executions to examine whether they fulfil software requirements. Property specifications articulating such requirements are shown to involve falsifiable hypotheses about software systems that are evaluated by means of tests which are likely to falsify those hypotheses. Software Reliability metrics, used to (...) measure the growth of probability that given failures will occur at specified times as new executions are observed, is shown to involve a Bayesian confirmation of falsifiable hypotheses on programs. Coverage criteria, used to select those input values with which the system under test is to be launched, are understood as theory-laden principles guiding software tests, here compared to scientific experiments. Redundant computations, fault seeding models and formal methods used in software engineering to evaluate test results are taken to be instantiations of some epistemological strategies used in scientific experiments to distinguish between valid and non-valid experimental outcomes. The final part of the paper explores the problem, advanced in the context of the philosophy of technology, of defining the epistemological status of software engineering by conceiving it as a scientifically attested technology. (shrink)

Há um vasto número de lamentações a respeito da falta de inteligibilidade da mecânica quântica. Alguns ingredientes da mecânica quântica, contudo, podem possivelmente ser compreendidos pela referência a primeiros princípios, ou seja, a princípios (ou postulados) básicos que, para a intuição, são claros e distintos. Em particular, se nos basearmos em um primeiro princípio denominado princípio da não-singularidade, que pode ser visto como uma hipótese, afirmamos que a mecânica quântica pode ser vista como uma consequência a priori de uma exigência (...) racional. O estatuto do princípio de não-singularidade, óbvio para a maioria dos físicos, pode, contudo, ser criticado, com base em que não há uma intuição universal e que qualquer enunciado é, em princípio, revisável. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p393. (shrink)

There is a huge number of laments concerning the lack of intelligibility of quantum mechanics. Some ingredients of quantum mechanics may however be possibly understood by referring to first principles, that is to say to basic principles which are clear and distinct to the intuition. In particular, if we rely on a first principle called non-singularity principle, which may be viewed as a hypothesis, we claim that quantum mechanics can be viewed as the a priori consequence of a rational demand. (...) The status of the non-singularity principle, obvious to most physicists, may however be criticized, on the basis that there is no universal intuition and that any statement is in principle revisable. (shrink)

The epistemology of śabda is one of the main themes in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī, and, in the hypotheses explored in this paper, also the conceptual basis of Jayanta’s textual re-use. The sixth chapter of the Nyāyamañjarī contains a debate between Vaiyākaraṇas and Mīmāṃsakas who, respectively, advocated an holistic or atomistic theory of language. Selected Jayanta’s re-uses from Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya sources are here surveyed and analyzed, with a focus on their meaning and on the context. The method of (...) analysis is partially following Moravcsik’s scheme for a classification of citations, as well as Small’s classification by symbolic functions. By re-using texts Jayanta not only imparted authority to his own arguments, but also reassessed the relation of his tradition with other ones. Re-used ideas and words stand for symbols of those authors’ tenets, and those authors represent symbols of their respective traditions. Moreover, by quoting a certain author Jayanta often anointed him with a symbolic status of trustworthy authority, and his statement with a status of śabdapramāṇa. (shrink)

Two complementary debates of the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century are examined here: the debate on the legitimacy of hypotheses in the natural sciences and the debate on intentionality and ‘representations without object’ in philosophy. Both are shown to rest on two core issues: the attitude of the subject and the mode of presentation chosen to display a domain of phenomena. An orientation other than the one which contributed to shape twentieth-century philosophy of science is explored through (...) the analysis of the role given to assumptions in Boltzmann’s research strategy, where assumptions are contrasted to hypotheses, axioms, and principles, and in Meinong’s criticism of the privileged status attributed to representations in mental activities. Boltzmann’s computational style in mathematics and Meinong’s criticism of the confusion between representation and judgment give prominence to an indirect mode of presentation, adopted in a state of suspended belief which is characteristic of assumptions and which enables one to grasp objects that cannot be reached through direct representation or even analogies. The discussion shows how assumptions and the movement to fiction can be essential steps in the quest for objectivity. The conclusion restates the issues of the two debates in a contemporary perspective and shows how recent developments in philosophy of science and philosophy of language and mind can be brought together by arguing for a twofold conception of reference.Keywords: Assumption; Hypothesis; Description; Mode of presentation; Ludwig Boltzmann; Alexius Meinong. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 30 GER Lloyd discerns two conflicting hypotheses concerning human cognition: cross-cultural universality and cultural relativity. The history of science is one discipline among many actively contributing to our understanding of human cognition at present. Not surprisingly, then, the dichotomy is also present in the history of science. In contrast to current approaches to the history of science, which highlight cultural relativity, genetic epistemology, which is conceived by Jean Piaget as a science of the acquisition of (...) knowledge, emphasises cross-cultural universality. Using the multidimensionality of phenomena and different styles of inquiry, I will argue that there is no inherent contradiction in the different approaches to the history of science. However, the amicable co-existence of both approaches has been undermined by Peter Damerow, who criticised the applicability of genetic epistemology to the historical development of knowledge on historical and theoretical grounds. In this paper, I will review Damerow’s theoretical critique, and, in formulating a response, I will argue that genetic epistemology cannot be dismissed as one of many legitimate styles of inquiry into the history of science on the basis of this critique. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 30 GER Lloyd discerns two conflicting hypotheses concerning human cognition: cross-cultural universality and cultural relativity. The history of science is one discipline among many actively contributing to our understanding of human cognition at present. Not surprisingly, then, the dichotomy is also present in the history of science. In contrast to current approaches to the history of science, which highlight cultural relativity, genetic epistemology, which is conceived by Jean Piaget as a science of the acquisition of (...) knowledge, emphasises cross-cultural universality. Using the multidimensionality of phenomena and different styles of inquiry, I will argue that there is no inherent contradiction in the different approaches to the history of science. However, the amicable co-existence of both approaches has been undermined by Peter Damerow, who criticised the applicability of genetic epistemology to the historical development of knowledge on historical and theoretical grounds. In this paper, I will review Damerow’s theoretical critique, and, in formulating a response, I will argue that genetic epistemology cannot be dismissed as one of many legitimate styles of inquiry into the history of science on the basis of this critique. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 2, pp 249 - 278 GER Lloyd discerns two conflicting hypotheses concerning human cognition: cross-cultural universality and cultural relativity. The history of science is one discipline among many actively contributing to our understanding of human cognition at present. Not surprisingly, then, the dichotomy is also present in the history of science. In contrast to current approaches to the history of science, which highlight cultural relativity, genetic epistemology, which is conceived by Jean Piaget as a (...) science of the acquisition of knowledge, emphasises cross-cultural universality. Using the multidimensionality of phenomena and different styles of inquiry, I will argue that there is no inherent contradiction in the different approaches to the history of science. However, the amicable co-existence of both approaches has been undermined by Peter Damerow, who criticised the applicability of genetic epistemology to the historical development of knowledge on historical and theoretical grounds. In this paper, I will review Damerow’s theoretical critique, and, in formulating a response, I will argue that genetic epistemology cannot be dismissed as one of many legitimate styles of inquiry into the history of science on the basis of this critique. (shrink)

The Duhem-Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and W. V. Quine. Duhem resolves underdetermination (...) by appealing to a cluster of virtues called 'good sense', and it has recently been argued by Stump (Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sei, 18(1):149-159,2007) that good sense is a form of virtue epistemology. This paper considers whether Quine, who's philosophy is heavily influenced by the very thesis that led Duhem to the virtues, is also led to a virtue epistemology in the face of underdetermination. Various sources of Quinian epistemic normativity are considered, and it is argued that, in conjunction with other normative commitments, Quine's sectarian solution to underdetermination amounts to a skills based virtue epistemology. The paper also sketches formal features of the novel form of virtue epistemology common to Duhem and Quine that challenges the adequacy of epistemic value truth-monism and blocks any imperialist naturalization of virtue epistemology, as the epistemic virtues are essential to the success of the sciences themselves. (shrink)

This study was carried out to investigate the roles of epistemic beliefs and writing self-efficacy in predicting second language writing anxiety among learners of English as a foreign language. To this end, three validated scales were distributed among 240 EFL students. They were asked to complete the questionnaires during their regular courses. A structural equation modeling approach was utilized to analyze the hypothesized SEM model and the causal paths among the constructs. The direct and indirect path analyses of the hypothesized (...) model indicated that EBs and WSE accounted for 43% of the variance in L2WA. Although both constructs had a significant effect on L2WA, EBs turned out to be a robust predictor of increasing L2WA. Notably, it was revealed that learners’ EBs directly and significantly influenced their L2WA. Besides, the results indicated that WSE had a unique effect in reducing L2WA. More precisely, students who had a higher level of EBs seemed to have a greater L2WA, and those who had a higher level of WSE experienced less L2WA. The findings of this explanatory study suggest that L2 teachers and material developers should pay serious attention to the Students’ cognitive and affective variables as they were known to be significant factors in influencing L2WA. (shrink)

Three of Zeno's objections to motion are answered by utilizing a version of nonstandard analysis, internal set theory, interpreted within an empirical context. Two of the objections are without force because they rely upon infinite sets, which always contain nonstandard real numbers. These numbers are devoid of numerical meaning, and thus one cannot render the judgment that an object is, in fact, located at a point in spacetime for which they would serve as coordinates. The third objection, an arrow never (...) appears to be moving, is answered by showing that it only applies to a finite number of instants of time. A theory of motion is also advanced; it consists of a finite series of contiguous infinitesimal steps. The theory is immune to Zeno's first two objections because the number of steps is finite and each lies outside the domain of observation. Present motion is hypothesized to be an unobservable process taking place within each step. The fact of motion is apparent through a summing (Riemann integration) of the steps. (shrink)

Accounts of modal knowledge are many and varied. How should we choose between them? I propose that we employ inference to the best explanation, and I suggest that there are three desiderata that we should use to rank hypotheses: conservatism, simplicity, and the ability to handle disagreement. After examining these desiderata, I contend that they can’t be used to justify belief in the modal epistemology that fares best, but that they can justify our accepting it in an epistemically significant (...) sense. Finally, I outline a modal epistemology that seems to do well by the standards I’ve recommended. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Epistemology in Pracīna and Navya NyāyaJonardon GaneriEpistemology in Pracīna and Navya Nyāya. By Sukharanjan Saha. Kolkata: Jadavpur University, 2003. Pp. 166.Epistemology in Pracīna and Navya Nyāya, by Sukharanjan Saha, usefully collates ten previously published essays on Indian epistemology: two longer essays first published in 1986 and a series of more recent shorter pieces. The leading thesis of the book is that the epistemology of the older writers in (...) the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiṣesika is, in important respects, better than the "new epistemology" originating with Gaṅgeśa. Sustained attention is given to the epistemology of the Vaiśeṣika thinker Praśastapāda (ca. A.D. 660), and the first six essays all "seek to show that Praśastapāda's views are more acceptable than those of Gaṅgeśa considered from the point of view of contemporary epistemology" (p. 4). The remaining essays argue in support of a similar conclusion with regard to certain ideas found in the older Nyāya of Gautama and Vātsyāyana. The titles of the essays collected here are: (1) "Epistemology in Pracīna and Navya Nyāya"; (2) "Kindred Points in an Old Epistemology" (1986); (3) "Gaṅgeśa's Reactions to Some Gettier-like Problems" (1986); (4) "The Unestab-lished Reason in Nyāya"; (5) "The Savyabhicāra Hetvābhāsa in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Schools"; (6) "The Thesis of Nirvikalpaka in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika"; (7) "Truth as Avyabhicāritatva"; (8) "A Note on the Definition of Pramā; (9) "Nyāya Theory of Predication"; (10) "The Present and Its Knowledge"; and (11) "Types of Inference in Gautama and Vātsyāyana."Whether or not one finds oneself in agreement with Saha's specific arguments, the general conception of the book seems to me to be laudable. The astonishing [End Page 120] continuity of the Indian philosophical tradition makes it all too easy to survey the history of Indian philosophy and assume that historical development runs in tandem with philosophical progression. It is tempting to think, for example, that Gaṅśa, reviewing the epistemology of the older tradition, and considering the various objections that had been brought against it by external critics like Śrīharṣa and the later Buddhists, produced a new theory that was both an improvement on and a systematization of earlier Nyāya epistemology. To succumb to this temptation would be a mistake, however, for at least two reasons. First, it might be that the discussion of the earlier thinkers was, though less sophisticated, "closer to the ground," so to speak, than that of their successors. The comparative absence of theoretical baggage may have enabled those earlier writers to remain true to the facts, even when they could not easily be explained or systematized. This does indeed seem to be the case with the sūtra texts, and it is also very noticeably the case with Praśastapāda, who exhibited, for instance in his discussion of motion, an openness to the facts rather than closure born of theoretical over-commitment.Second and relatedly, it might be that the earlier thinkers had not yet closed down the range of topics and approaches deemed worthy of philosophical discussion or exploration. Thus, again in the sūtras, we find the beginnings of discussions on an enormous array of issues and hypotheses, not all of which were subsequently picked up or extended in later theory. Saha, for example, argues that Gaṅgeśa committed the later tradition to a rigid causal theory of knowledge, and suggests further that because of this he "failed to appreciate the richness of the philosophical insight of the founders of the system of philosophy to which he owes his allegiance" (p. 69). If this is right, then a return to the earlier strata of the tradition might well lead to an enrichment of our understanding of the range of philosophical possibility. Saha's approach, then, helps to guard the modern student of Indian philosophy from mistakenly thinking that "newer is always better," just as we have learned to be on guard against the older and contrary... (shrink)

The complexity of cognitive emulation of human diagnostic reasoning is the major challenge in the implementation of computer-based programs for diagnostic advice in medicine. We here present an epistemological model of diagnosis with the ultimate goal of defining a high-level language for cognitive and computational primitives. The diagnostic task proceeds through three different phases: hypotheses generation, hypotheses testing and hypotheses closure. Hypotheses generation has the inferential form of abduction (from findings to hypotheses) constrained under (...) the criterion of plausibility. Hypotheses testing is achieved by a deductive inference (from generated hypotheses to expected findings), followed by an eliminative induction, constrained under the criterion of covering, which matches expected findings against patient''s findings to select the best explanation. Hypotheses closure is a deductive-inductive type of inference very similar to the inferences operating in hypotheses testing. In this case induction matches the consequences of the generated hypotheses against the patient''s characteristics or preferences under the criterion of utility. By using the language exploited in this epistemological model, it is possible to describe the cognitive tasks underlying the most influential knowledge-based diagnostic systems. (shrink)

From one perspective, the fundamental notions of point-set topology have to do with sequences (of points or of numbers) and their limits. A broad class of epistemological questions also appear to be concerned with sequences and their limits. For example, problems of empirical underdetermination–which of a collection of alternative theories is true–have to do with logical properties of sequences of evidence. Underdetermination by evidence is the central problem of Plato’s Meno [Glymour and Kelly 1992], of one of Sextus Empiricus’ (...) many skeptical doubts, and arguably it is the idea in Kant’s antinomies, for example of the infinite divisibility of matter [Kelly 1995, Ch.3]. Many questions of methodology, or of the logic of discovery, have to do with sequences and their limits, for example under what conditions Bayesian procedures, which put a prior probability distribution over alternative hypotheses and possible evidence and form conditional probabilities as new evidence is obtained, converge to the truth ([Savage 1954], [Hesse 1970], [Osherson and Weinstein 1988], [Juhl 1993]). Some analyses of “S knows that p” seem to appeal to properties of actual and possible sequences of something–for example Nozick’s proposal that knowledge of p is belief in p produced by a method that would not produce belief in p if p were false and would produce belief in p if p were true. Even questions about finding the truth under a quite radical relativism, in which truth 1 depends on conceptual scheme and conceptual schemes can be altered, have been analyzed as a kind of limiting property of sequences [Kelly et al. 1994]. (shrink)

Pierre Duhem’s (1861-1916) lifelong opposition to 19th century atomic theories of matter traditionally has been attributed to his conventionalist and/or positivist philosophy of science. Relatively recently, the traditional view has been challenged by the new claim that Duhem’s opposition to atomism was due to the precarious state of atomic theories at the beginning of the 20th century. In this paper, I present some of the difficulties with both the traditional and the new interpretation of Duhem’s opposition to atomism, and provide (...) a new framework in which to understand Duhem's rejection of atomic hypotheses. I argue that although not positivist, instrumentalist, or conventionalist, Duhem’s philosophy of physics was not compatible with belief in unobservable atoms and molecules. The key for understanding Duhem’s resistance to atomism during the final phase of his career is the historicist arguments he presented in support of his ideal of physics. (shrink)

Dorian Abbot and twenty-eight coauthors from many quarters of science have recently published a spirited defense of a perceived ‘liberal’ scientific meritocratism—roughly the view that rivalrous or excludable goods in the sphere of scientific work should be distributed entirely based on potential recipients’ merits in that sphere. They propose to understand merit in terms of ‘achievements,’ not least in the form of individual academic track records. A closer examination of their argument reveals their implicit reliance on several incompatible conceptions of (...) merit. Moreover, they conspicuously ignore the typical collective nature of academic achievements in modern science. In this paper, I argue that a different version of scientific meritocratism, based on the central theses of standpoint epistemology, represents an attractive compromise between Abbot et al. and anti-meritocratic theories informed by the sociology of science. Ultimately, however, the credentials of this ‘strong scientific meritocratism’ rest on empirical hypotheses which remain underexamined. (shrink)

Idealization is a necessity. Stripping away levels of complexity makes questions tractable, focuses our attention, and lets us develop comprehensible, testable models. Applying such models, however, requires care and attention to how the idealizations incorporated into their development affect their predictions. In epistemology, we tend to focus on idealizations concerning individual agents' capacities, such as memory, mathematical ability, and so on, when addressing this concern. By contrast, this dissertation focuses on social idealizations, particularly those pertaining to salient social categories like (...) race, sex, and gender. In Chapter II, Privilege and Superiority, we begin with standpoint epistemology, one of the earliest efforts to grapple with the ways that social structures affect our epistemic lives. I argue that, if we interpret standpoint epistemologists' claims as hypotheses about the ways that our social positions affect access to evidence, we can fruitfully employ recent developments in evidence logic to study the consequences. I lay the groundwork for this project, developing a model based on neighborhood semantics for modal logic. Adapting this framework to standpoint epistemology helps to clarify the meaning of terms like "epistemic privilege" and "superior knowledge" and to elucidate the differences between various accounts of standpoint epistemology. I also address a longstanding criticism of these views: Longino's (1990) bias paradox, which suggests that there is no objective position from which to judge the goodness of a particular standpoint. Chapter III, Evidence in a Non-Ideal World, turns to the broader social context, looking at how ideology affects the availability of evidence. Throughout the chapter, I take the formation, justification, and maintenance of racist, sexist, and otherwise oppressive beliefs as a central case. I argue that these beliefs are, at least sometimes, formed as a result of evidential distortion, a structural feature of our epistemic contexts that skews readily available evidence in favor of dominant ideologies. Because they are formed this way, such beliefs will appear justified on prominent accounts of justification, both internalist and externalist. As a result, epistemic norms that fail to account for such non-ideal conditions will deliver verdicts that are not only counter-intuitive, but also morally unpalatable. This, I argue, reveals a kind of structural epistemic injustice, especially where oppressive ideology is involved and suggests the need for epistemic norms that are sensitive to agents' social contexts. Much of the discussion in Chapters II and III depends on social categories like race and gender, arguing that they have a distinctive influence on our epistemic lives. In Chapter IV, I Know You Are, But What Am I?, my co-author and I focus on social categories themselves, distinguishing between self-identity, social identity, and social role. We self-identify as gay or straight, men or women, couch-potatoes or gym rats. Sometimes, these identities affect our social roles---the way we are perceived and treated by others---and sometimes they do not. This relationship between our internal identities and our preferred public perceptions begs for explanation. On our account, this relationship is captured by what we refer to as 'social identity'---roughly, internal identities made available to others. We argue that this account of social identity plays an illuminating role in structural explanation of discrimination and individual behavior, dissolves puzzles surrounding the phenomenon of 'passing', and explains certain moral and political obligations toward individuals. (shrink)

Internalism holds that epistemic justification is determined by what is internal to the mind, not by facts about the mind-independent world. This paper introduces and defends a new kind of internalism that is rooted in rationalist ideas that have been neglected in recent epistemology, despite inspiring internalist projects in cognitive science. Ignoring rationalist insights has, I argue, damaged the prospects for internalism, by needlessly saddling internalists with empiricist burdens. Internalists can refuse these burdens by accepting a better philosophy of mind. (...) Rather than looking to 17th century rationalists, I look to Kant, and especially his idea that normativity is grounded in the constitution of agency and mind. A Kantian approach can avoid stock objections to internalism, I argue, and can also capture all the alleged benefits of externalism. The paper is structured as follows. In §2, I get back to basics and consider more ways to satisfy the core internalist template than have become standard. I draw attention to rationalist insights about how normativity could be grounded in the constitution of mind, and hypothesize that if internalism respects these insights, some problems disappear. I develop this hypothesis in §3 with a Kantian view. I further defend this view in §4. I conclude in §5 by explaining why Kantian internalism answers the latest challenges to internalism. (shrink)

Most management researchers pause at the threshold of objective right and wrong. Their hesitation is understandable. Values imply a “subjective,” personal dimension, one that can invite religious and moral interference in research. The dominant epistemological camps of positivism and subjectivism in management stumble over the notion of moral objectivity. Empirical research can study values in human behavior, but hard-headed scientists should not assume that one value can be objectively better than another. In this article, we invite management researchers to (...) rethink this presumption. We show how accepting at least a limited form of moral objectivity, namely, an epistemic orientation that seeks objective moral reasons, can benefit management research by 1. guiding research practice; 2. using patterns of moral objectivity as clues for formulating empirical hypotheses for psychological explanations; and 3. adding prescriptive power to empirical theories. (shrink)

This article aims to defend Locke against Quine’s charge, made in his famous “two dogmas” paper, that Locke’s theory of knowledge is badly flawed, not only for assuming the dogmas, but also for adopting an “in-tolerably restrictive” version of the dogma of reductionism. It is shown here that, in his analysis of the epistemological status of scientific laws, Locke has effectively transcended the narrow idea-empiricism which un-derlies this version of reductionism. First, in order to escape idealism, he introduced the (...) notion of “sensitive knowledge of the particular existence of finite beings without us,” broadening thus his initial definition of knowledge in terms of the “perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas” — a definition compatible with Quine’s interpretation. Sec-ondly, after showing that we can have virtually no a priori knowledge of universal truths about substances, Locke extended the notion of “sensi-tive knowledge” to the particular propositions of “coexistence” in sub-stances, appealing to the notion of “probability” for treating their induc-tive generalizations and, in particular, the phenomenological laws of sci-ence. Finally, acknowledging the essential presence of hypothetical, non-phenomenological laws in science, he anticipated much of the contempo-rary views on their role and nature, including, remarkably, a mild ver-sion of the epistemological holism championed by Quine. (shrink)

I examine, from Mayo's severe testing perspective, the case found in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change fourth report for the claim that increases in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations caused most of the post-1950 global warming. My examination begins to provide an alternative to standard, probabilistic assessments of OUR FAULT. It also brings out some of the limitations of variety of evidence considerations in assessing this and other hypotheses about the causes of climate change, and illuminates the epistemology of (...) optimal fingerprinting studies. Finally, it shows that some features of Mayo's perspective should be kept in whatever approach is preferred for assessing hypotheses about the causes of climate change. (shrink)

Linguistic data are commonly considered a defeasible source of evidence from which it is legitimate to draw philosophical hypotheses and conclusions. Traditionally epistemologists have relied almost exclusively on linguistic data from western languages, with a primary focus on contemporary English. However, in the last two decades there has been an increasing interest in cross-linguistic studies in epistemology. In this entry, we provide a brief overview of cross-linguistic data discussed by contemporary epistemologists and the philosophical debates they have generated.

From one perspective, the fundamental notions of point-set topology have to do with sequences and their limits. A broad class of epistemological questions also appear to be concerned with sequences and their limits. For example, problems of empirical underdetermination—which of a collection of alternative theories is true—have to do with logical properties of sequences of evidence. Underdetermination by evidence is the central problem of Plato’s Meno, of one of Sextus Empiricus’ many skeptical doubts, and arguably it is the idea (...) at work in Kant’s antinomies, for example in his account of the infinite divisibility of matter. Many questions of methodology, or of the logic of discovery, have to do with sequences and their limits. For example, under what conditions do Bayesian procedures, which put a prior probability distribution over alternative hypotheses and possible evidence and form conditional probabilities as new evidence is obtained, converge to the truth? Some analyses of “S knows that p” seem to appeal to properties of actual and possible sequences of something—for example Nozick’s proposal that knowledge of p is belief in p produced by a method that would not produce belief in p if p were false and would produce belief in p if p were true. Even questions about finding the truth under a quite radical relativism, in which truth depends on conceptual scheme and conceptual schemes can be altered, have been analyzed as a kind of limiting property of sequences. (shrink)

Scholars Karl R. Popper and Thomas S. Kuhn developed new frameworks that helped shape practical science policies and contributed to a greater understanding of the power and limitations of science. Popper did not accept induction as a method of arriving at scientific conclusions and rejected the justification of scientific theories and hypotheses. On the other hand, Kuhn advocated the progress of science and accepted some principles of scientific practices, including law, theory, instrumentation and application. -/- .

Luigi Einaudi was a leading liberal economist, economic historian and political figure. This book provides the English-speaking world with a first critical edition of an unpublished version of Einaudi’s most important epistemological essay. The issues analysed here lie at the core of the problem concerning the nature and scope of economic sciences and the role played by economists in the public sphere, with particular emphasis on the interaction between economists and the ruling class. The earlier version of this essay (...) has also been considered the "historical epilogue" of the Italian tradition in public finance. An extensive reappraisal of this newly discovered document will help to reconsider and cast light on that tradition. This critical edition includes a comprehensive introduction and conclusion, both of which aim to place Einaudi’s essay in the context of his earlier epistemological speculation and the associated debates, and to assess the unsettled questions he left as an enduring heritage for the current generation of social scientists. (shrink)