Theory Selection in Modal Epistemology

American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):381-395 (2015)
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Abstract

Accounts of modal knowledge are many and varied. How should we choose between them? I propose that we employ inference to the best explanation, and I suggest that there are three desiderata that we should use to rank hypotheses: conservatism, simplicity, and the ability to handle disagreement. After examining these desiderata, I contend that they can’t be used to justify belief in the modal epistemology that fares best, but that they can justify our accepting it in an epistemically significant sense. Finally, I outline a modal epistemology that seems to do well by the standards I’ve recommended.

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Bob Fischer
Texas State University

Citations of this work

A Theory-based Epistemology of Modality.Bob Fischer - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):228-247.
Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?Peter Hawke - 2016 - In Bob Fischer & Felipe Leon (eds.), Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Cham: Springer. pp. 281-308.

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References found in this work

Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Laws and symmetry.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Naming and necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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