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Hypotheses and Inductive Predictions

Synthese 141 (3):333-364 (2004)

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  1. Putnam’s Diagonal Argument and the Impossibility of a Universal Learning Machine.Tom F. Sterkenburg - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):633-656.
    Putnam construed the aim of Carnap’s program of inductive logic as the specification of a “universal learning machine,” and presented a diagonal proof against the very possibility of such a thing. Yet the ideas of Solomonoff and Levin lead to a mathematical foundation of precisely those aspects of Carnap’s program that Putnam took issue with, and in particular, resurrect the notion of a universal mechanical rule for induction. In this paper, I take up the question whether the Solomonoff–Levin proposal is (...)
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  • On the truth-convergence of open-minded bayesianism.Tom F. Sterkenburg & Rianne de Heide - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (1):64-100.
    Wenmackers and Romeijn (2016) formalize ideas going back to Shimony (1970) and Putnam (1963) into an open-minded Bayesian inductive logic, that can dynamically incorporate statistical hypotheses proposed in the course of the learning process. In this paper, we show that Wenmackers and Romeijn’s proposal does not preserve the classical Bayesian consistency guarantee of merger with the true hypothesis. We diagnose the problem, and offer a forward-looking open-minded Bayesians that does preserve a version of this guarantee.
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  • Abducted by Bayesians?Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):430-439.
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