We study the extension of dependence logic \ by a majority quantifier \ over finite structures. We show that the resulting logic is equi-expressive with the extension of second-order logic by second-order majority quantifiers of all arities. Our results imply that, from the point of view of descriptive complexity theory, \\) captures the complexity class counting hierarchy. We also obtain characterizations of the individual levels of the counting hierarchy by fragments of \\).

The advent of intelligent artificial systems has sparked a dispute about the question of who is responsible when such a system causes a harmful outcome. This paper champions the idea that this dispute should be approached as a conceptual engineering problem. Towards this claim, the paper first argues that the dispute about the responsibility gap problem is in part a conceptual dispute about the content of responsibility and related concepts. The paper then argues that the way forward is to evaluate (...) the conceptual choices we have, in the light of a systematic understanding of why the concept is important in the first place—in short, the way forward is to engage in conceptual engineering. The paper then illustrates what approaching the responsibility gap problem as a conceptual engineering problem looks like. It outlines argumentative pathways out of the responsibility gap problem and relates these to existing contributions to the dispute. (shrink)

he paper examines the thesis that participants in shared intentional activities have first-person plural ‘practical knowledge’ of what they are jointly doing, in the sense of ‘practical knowledge’ articulated by G.E.M Anscombe. Who is supposed to be the subject of such knowledge? The group, or members of the group, or both? It is argued that progress with this issue requires conceiving of collective activities (of the kind affording ‘plural practical knowledge’)as instances, not of supra-personal agency, but of interpersonal agency; specifically: (...) as involving communication. There is a sense, it is suggested, in which the basic form of plural practical knowledge is relational: ‘I am doing x with you.’. (shrink)

On what I will call the No Subject view, there is a sense in which one may be aware of a thought, conceived as an event in one's stream of consciousness, without being aware of oneself thinking something. Philosophical work on the delusion of thought insertion is one of the areas in which the No Subject view has been highly influential: the view has framed what, in the philosophy of mind, has become the standard interpretation of the delusion. Here I (...) want to present a challenge to the No Subject view, developing from reflection on the ontology of thinking. I will also consider how, if the standard interpretation fails, we are to understand thought insertion. In particular, I will suggest that we should question the widespread assumption that understanding the delusion has to be a matter of making sense of it. (shrink)

Future weapons will make life-or-death decisions without a human in the loop. When such weapons inflict unwarranted harm, no one appears to be responsible. There seems to be a responsibility gap. I first reconstruct the argument for such responsibility gaps to then argue that this argument is not sound. The argument assumes that commanders have no control over whether autonomous weapons inflict harm. I argue against this assumption. Although this investigation concerns a specific case of autonomous weapons systems, I take (...) steps towards vindicating the more general idea that superiors can be morally responsible in virtue of being in command. (shrink)

This chapter argues for a structural injustice approach to the governance of AI. Structural injustice has an analytical and an evaluative component. The analytical component consists of structural explanations that are well-known in the social sciences. The evaluative component is a theory of justice. Structural injustice is a powerful conceptual tool that allows researchers and practitioners to identify, articulate, and perhaps even anticipate, AI biases. The chapter begins with an example of racial bias in AI that arises from structural injustice. (...) The chapter then presents the concept of structural injustice as introduced by the philosopher Iris Marion Young. The chapter moreover argues that structural injustice is well suited as an approach to the governance of AI and compares this approach to alternative approaches that start from analyses of harms and benefits or from value statements. The chapter suggests that structural injustice provides methodological and normative foundations for the values and concerns of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. The chapter closes with an outlook onto the idea of “structure” and on responsibility. The idea of a structure is central to justice. An open theoretical research question is to what extent AI is itself part of the structure of society. Finally, the practice of responsibility is central to structural injustice. Even if they cannot be held responsible for the existence of structural injustice, every individual and every organization has some responsibility to address structural injustice going forward. (shrink)

Trolley cases are widely considered central to the ethics of autonomous vehicles. We caution against this by identifying four problems. Trolley cases, given technical limitations, rest on assumptions that are in tension with one another. Furthermore, trolley cases illuminate only a limited range of ethical issues insofar as they cohere with a certain design framework. Furthermore, trolley cases seem to demand a moral answer when a political answer is called for. Finally, trolley cases might be epistemically problematic in several ways. (...) To put forward a positive proposal, we illustrate how ethical challenges arise from mundane driving situations. We argue that mundane situations are relevant because of the specificity they require and the scale they exhibit. We then illustrate some of the ethical challenges arising from optimizing for safety, balancing safety with other values such as mobility, and adjusting to incentives of legal frameworks. (shrink)

Much of the debate on the ethics of self-driving cars has revolved around trolley scenarios. This paper instead takes up the political or institutional question of who should decide how a self-driving car drives. Specifically, this paper is on the question of whether and why passengers should be able to control how their car drives. The paper reviews existing arguments—those for passenger ethics settings and for mandatory ethics settings respectively—and argues that they fail. Although the arguments are not successful, they (...) serve as the basis to formulate desiderata that any approach to regulating the driving behavior of self-driving cars ought to fulfill. The paper then proposes one way of designing passenger ethics settings that meets these desiderata. (shrink)

Statements purporting to convey practical knowledge in Anscombe's sense are subject to two distinctive kinds of error: errors in performance and errors of practical judgement. I argue that reflection on these kinds of errors sheds light both on the nature of practical knowledge and on the status of Anscombe's account of it. Briefly: practical knowledge is knowledge we ordinarily find intelligible in the light of the agent's non-defective exercise of practical judgement. And Anscombe's account is not primarily designed to make (...) practical knowledge intelligible to philosophers but to make explicit how such knowledge is seen as intelligible — and claims to such knowledge are seen to be justifiable — by those who are engaged in the practice of sharing it. I go on to consider how this interpretation bears on the disagreement between Anscombe's view and what she calls a 'contemplative' conception of knowledge. (shrink)

Der Band gibt wichtige Impulse für die methodologische Reflexion der historischen Kulturwissenschaften. Er geht auf eine Tagung zurück, deren Thema "Dichtung und Wahrheit. Zum Verhältnis von Narration und Erklärung in den Kultur-, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften" war. Die Autoren greifen zum ersten Mal im kulturwissenschaftlichen Kontext Anregungen vor allem aus der Analytischen Philosophie auf und diskutieren ihren Wert für historisches und kulturwissenschaftliches Arbeiten. Im Fokus der Untersuchungen steht eine Begriffstrias, die für die Sozial-, Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften gleichermaßen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (...) eine große Herausforderung darstellt: Erklären, Verstehen und Erzählen. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungParallel zu einer noch immer weitestgehenden Tabuisierung von Homosexualität und normabweichendem Geschlecht im Leistungssport haben sich im Bereich des Breitensports in der Vergangenheit zahlreiche queere Sportvereine gegründet, die insbesondere homo-, bisexuelle, Trans*- und Inter-*, Non-Binary- bzw. queere Personen zur Zielgruppe haben. Der vorliegende Beitrag basiert auf einer qualitativ angelegten Interviewstudie, in der Mitglieder eines queeren (LGBTI*) Sportvereins zu ihren Sporterfahrungen und Motiven der Partizipation befragt wurden. Die Befunde zeigen, dass nicht nur auf Heteronormativität basierende Negativerfahrungen im herkömmlichen Verein ausschlaggebend sind, (...) sondern auch die Selbstsegregation innerhalb des queeren Vereins eine eigene Anziehungskraft hat. Dabei erweist sich der Verein für die Befragten als Gemeinschafts- und Wohlfühlraum, Kontaktbörse oder auch als mentaler Schutzraum. Im Beitrag werden die Bedeutungsfacetten des queeren Vereins ausdifferenziert beschrieben und kritische Perspektiven hinsichtlich der Teilnahme am queeren Sport aufgezeigt. (shrink)

The ongoing debate on the ethics of self-driving cars typically focuses on two approaches to answering such questions: moral philosophy and social science. I argue that these two approaches are both lacking. We should neither deduce answers from individual moral theories nor should we expect social science to give us complete answers. To supplement these approaches, we should turn to political philosophy. The issues we face are collective decisions that we make together rather than individual decisions we make in light (...) of what we each have reason to value. Political philosophy adds three basic concerns to our conceptual toolkit: reasonable pluralism, human agency, and legitimacy. These three concerns have so far been largely overlooked in the debate on the ethics of self-driving cars. (shrink)

This chapter outlines a framework for thinking about justice in the global digital economy. The chapter first proposes to understand the digital economy as about infrastructure, then describes some of the problems of justice raised by the global digital economy and sketches potential reforms.

This volume provides an overview of the most recent developments in empirical investigations of morality and assesses their impact and importance for ethical thinking. It involves contributions of scholars both from philosophy, theology and empirical sciences with firm standings in their own disciplines, but an inclination to step across borders-in particular the one between the world of facts and the world of norms. Human morality is complex, and probably even messy-and this clean distinction becomes blurred whenever one looks more closely (...) at the various components that enable and influence our moral actions and ethical orientations. In that way, morality may indeed be located between facts and norms-and an empirically informed ethics that is less concerned with analytical purity but immerses into this moral complexity may be an important step to make the contributions of ethics to this world more valuable and relevant. (shrink)

Hierarchical groups shape social, political, and personal life. This paper concerns the question of how individuals within such groups can be responsible. The paper explores how individual responsibility can be partially grounded in difference-making. The paper concentrates on the control condition of responsibility and takes into view three distinct phenomena of responsibility in hierarchical groups. First, a superior can be responsible for outcomes that her subordinates bring about. Second, a subordinate can be responsible although she is unable to prevent the (...) outcome she brings about. Third, a superior can sometimes be responsible to a greater degree than her subordinates. It is argued that difference-making, as an interpretation of the control condition that partially grounds responsibility, accounts for all three of these phenomena within a limited but significant range of circumstances and can hence partially ground individual moral responsibility in hierarchical groups. The paper provides an element of a theory of individual responsibility to complement theories of corporate responsibility. (shrink)

Background Despite the great benefits of intelligent assistive technology (IAT) for dementia care – for example, the enhanced safety and increased independence of people with dementia and their caregivers – its practical adoption is still limited. The social and ethical issues pertaining to IAT in dementia care, shaped by factors such as culture, may explain these limitations. However, most studies have focused on understanding these issues within one cultural setting only. Therefore, the aim of this study was to explore and (...) compare the attitudes of Israeli and German dementia experts toward IAT in dementia care, to contribute to a more cultural-comparative perspective. Methods Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 35 experts (15 Israelis and 20 Germans) in key roles in health and community services for people with dementia as well as in the fields of dementia and IAT (e.g., computer science, electrical/biomedical engineering, ethics, nursing, and gerontology). Thematic content analysis was used to analyze the data. Findings Israeli and German experts identified the same social accelerators in the development and implementation of IAT in dementia care (i.e., changes in family structure and social digitization) and benefits of adopting IAT (e.g., enhancing the safety of people with dementia and increasing their independence). However, there were differences in inhibitor/risk assessments between the two groups. Namely, economic considerations and the cognitive capacity of people with dementia were identified by both groups as inhibitors, while Israeli experts additionally reported stigma and ageism. Whereas both groups agreed that IAT might reduce human connection, and that the technology is not yet reliable enough, German experts highlighted concerns regarding privacy; in contrast, Israeli experts prioritized safety over privacy. Conclusions Our research findings allow for the identification of relevant similarities but also important differences between German and Israeli experts’ perspectives. As such, an important basis has been provided for a more in-depth discussion regarding where, why, and how culturally-sensitive technology development is needed. (shrink)

The logic of genetic discovery has changed little over time, but the focus of biology is shifting from simple genotype–phenotype relationships to complex metabolic, physiological, developmental, and behavioral traits. In light of this, the traditional reductionist view of individual genes as privileged difference‐making causes of phenotypes is re‐examined. The scope and nature of genetic effects in complex regulatory systems, in which dynamics are driven by regulatory feedback and hierarchical interactions across levels of organization are considered. This review argues that it (...) is appropriate to treat genes as specific actual difference‐makers for the molecular regulation of gene expression. However, they are often neither stable, proportional, nor specific as causes of the overall dynamic behavior of regulatory networks. Dynamical models, properly formulated and validated, provide the tools to probe cause‐and‐effect relationships in complex biological systems, allowing to go beyond the limitations of genetic reductionism to gain an integrative understanding of the causal processes underlying complex phenotypes. (shrink)

The asylum system faces problems on two fronts. States undermine it with populist politics, and migrants use it to satisfy their migration preferences. To address these problems, asylum services should be commodified. States should be able to pay other states to provide determination and protection-elsewhere. In this article, I aim to identify a way of implementing this idea that is both feasible and desirable. First, I sketch a policy proposal for a commodification of asylum services. Then, I argue that this (...) policy proposal is not only compatible with the right to asylum, but also supported by moral considerations. Despite some undesirable moral features, a market in asylum facilitates the provision of asylum to those who need it. (shrink)

This paper is about the status of collective actions. According to one view, collective actions metaphysically reduce to individual actions because sentences about collective actions are merely a shorthand for sentences about individual actions. I reconstruct an argument for this view and show via counterexamples that it is not sound. The argument relies on a paraphrase procedure to unpack alleged shorthand sentences about collective actions into sentences about individual actions. I argue that the best paraphrase procedure that has been put (...) forward so far fails to produce adequate results. (shrink)

Several authors have recently questioned whether dehumanization is a psychological prerequisite of mass violence. This paper argues that the significance of dehumanization in the context of National Socialism can be understood only if its ideological dimension is taken into account. The author concentrates on Alfred Rosenberg’s racist doctrine and shows that Nazi ideology can be read as a political anthropology that grounds both the belief in the German privilege and the dehumanization of the Jews. This anthropological framework combines biological, cultural (...) and metaphysical aspects. Therefore, it cannot be reduced to biologism. This new reading of Nazi ideology supports three general conclusions: First, the author reveals a complex strategy of dehumanization which is not considered in the current psychological debate. Second, the analysis of the ideological mechanism suggests a model of dehumanization that is more plausible than other psychological models. Third, the author provides evidence that this kind of dehumanization had psychological consequences and hence was an important feature of Nazi reality. (shrink)

A central dispute in social ontology concerns the existence of group minds and actions. I argue that some authors in this dispute rely on rival views of existence without sufficiently acknowledging this divergence. I proceed in three steps in arguing for this claim. First, I define the phenomenon as an implicit higher-order disagreement by drawing on an analysis of verbal disputes. Second, I distinguish two theories of existence—the theory-commitments view and the truthmaker view—in both their eliminativist and their constructivist variants. (...) Third, I examine individual contributions to the dispute about the existence of group minds and actions to argue that these contributions have an implicit higher-order disagreement. This paper serves two purposes. First, it is a study to apply recent advances in meta-ontology. Second, it contributes to the debate on social ontology by illustrating how meta-ontology matters for social ontology. (shrink)

Both thought experiments and simulation experiments apparently belong to the family of experiments, though they are somewhat special members because they work without intervention into the natural world. Instead they explore hypothetical worlds. For this reason many have wondered whether referring to them as “experiments” is justified at all. While most authors are concerned with only one type of “imagined” experiment – either simulation or thought experiment – the present chapter hopes to gain new insight by considering what the two (...) types of experiment share, and what they do not. A close look reveals at least one fundamental methodological difference between thought and simulation experiments: while thought experiments are a cognitive process that employs intuition, simulation experiments rest on automated iterations of formal algorithms. It will be argued that this difference has important epistemological ramifications. (shrink)

This paper develops a taxonomy of kinds of actions that can be seen in group agency, human–machine interactions, and virtual realities. These kinds of actions are special in that they are not embodied in the ordinary sense. I begin by analysing the notion of embodiment into three separate assumptions that together comprise what I call the Embodiment View. Although this view may find support in paradigmatic cases of agency, I suggest that each of its assumptions can be relaxed. With each (...) assumption that is given up, a different kind of disembodied action becomes available. The taxonomy gives a systematic overview and suggests that disembodied actions have the same theoretical relevance as the actions of any ordinarily embodied human. (shrink)