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Summary As paradigmatic symptoms of madness, delusions come in various forms and with diverse contents. The poster child of the current literature is the Capgras delusion: the patient may say with certainty that someone they are familiar with, such as their partner, is replaced by an imposter. Philosophical discussion of delusions tends to revolve around three groups of questions: (1) what are delusions? Are delusions beliefs or some other kinds of mental states? Suppose they are beliefs, what distinguish them from other forms of beliefs?; (2) How can we understand or explain the formation and maintenance of delusions? Where are the contents of delusions from? Why do patients adopt them in the first place? Why do patients not reject their delusions in light of counterevidence?; (3) How should we understand the relationship between patients’ delusions and their other mental states and actions? And what are the implications for our understanding of patients' rationality, agency, moral standing, legal status, and so on? 
Key works At the centre of the literature is the question of how we can understand or explain the formation and maintenance of delusions. The most influential account is the two-factor theory, according to which two distinct factors, i.e. departures from normality, are needed to explain a delusion. Factor 1 may be the patient’s anomalous experience that explains the content of the delusion, and Factor 2 may be some impairment of the patient’s hypothesis evaluation system that explains the adoption and maintenance of the delusion (Coltheart & Davies 2021Davies & Egan 2013Aimola Davies & Davies 2009Davies et al 2001). Other accounts include the one-factor theory (Maher 1988; Noordhof & Sullivan-Bissett 2021), the phenomenological theory (Sass & Pienkos 2013; Feyaerts et al 2021), the cognitive-bias theory (Ward & Garety 2019), the predictive processing theory (Corlett et al 2016), the imagining theory (Currie 2000), and the social theory (Bell et al 2021).

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  1. Bayesian Psychiatry and the Social Focus of Delusions.Daniel Williams & Marcella Montagnese - manuscript
    A large and growing body of research in computational psychiatry draws on Bayesian modelling to illuminate the dysfunctions and aberrations that underlie psychiatric disorders. After identifying the chief attractions of this research programme, we argue that its typical focus on abstract, domain-general inferential processes is likely to obscure many of the distinctive ways in which the human mind can break down and malfunction. We illustrate this by appeal to psychosis and the social phenomenology of delusions.
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  2. Certainty and delusion.Rick Bellaar - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    In this paper, I will explore the irrationality of delusions through Wittgenstein’s notion of objective certainty. I will propose that objective certainties are constitutive epistemic norms, and that the specific irrationality of delusions can be captured in terms of the conflict with such constitutive norms. At the same time, however, I will critically examine various recent proposals to understand delusions as the loss of objective certainties, or even in terms of alternative objective certainties. Against these accounts, I will argue that (...)
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  3. Monothematic Delusions and the Limits of Rationality.Adam Bradley & Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Monothematic delusions are delusions whose contents pertain to a single subject matter. Examples include Capgras delusion, the delusion that a loved one has been replaced by an impostor, and Cotard delusion, the delusion that one is dead or does not exist. Two-factor accounts of such delusions hold that they are the result of both an experiential deficit, for instance flattened affect, coupled with an aberrant cognitive response to that deficit. In this paper we develop a new expressivist two-factor account of (...)
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  4. Cotard delusion, emotional experience and depersonalisation.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - forthcoming - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.
    Introduction: Cotard delusion—the delusional belief “I am dead”—is named after the French psychiatrist who first described it: Jules Cotard (1880, 1882). Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998) proposed that the idea “I am dead” comes to mind when a neuropathological condition has resulted in complete abolition of emotional responsivity to the world. The idea would arise as a putative explanation: if “I am dead” were true, there would be no emotional responsivity to the world. Methods: We scrutinised the literature on people who (...)
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  5. Anosognosia for Motor Impairments as a Delusion: Anomalies of Experience and Belief Evaluation.Martin Davies, Caitlin L. McGill & Anne M. Aimola Davies - forthcoming - In A. L. Mishara, P. R. Corlett, P. C. Fletcher, A. Kranjec & M. A. Schwartz (eds.), Phenomenological Neuropsychiatry: How Patient Experience Bridges Clinic with Clinical Neuroscience. Springer.
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  6. A vessel without a pilot: Bodily and affective experience in the Cotard delusion of inexistence.Philip Gerrans - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    The initial cause of Cotard delusion is pervasive dyshomeostasis (dysregulation of basic bodily function).This explanation draws on interoceptive active inference account of self-representation. In this framework, the self is an hierarchical predictive model made by the brain to facilitate homeostatic regulation. The account I provide is an alternative to two factor accounts of the Cotard delusion that treat depersonalisation experience as the first factor in genesis of the Cotard delusion. I argue that depersonalisation experience and the Cotard delusion are produced (...)
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  7. How the Cognitive Science of Belief Can Transform the Study of Mental Health.Eric Mandelbaum & Nicolas Porot - forthcoming - JAMA Psychiatry.
    The cognitive science of belief is a burgeoning field, with insights ranging from detailing the fundamental structure of the mind, to explaining the spread of fake news. Here we highlight how new insights into belief acquisition, storage, and change can transform our understanding of psychiatric disorders. Although we focus on monothematic delusions, the conclusions apply more broadly. -/- .
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  8. Delusional Perception Revisited.Kasper Møller Nielsen, Julie Nordgaard & Mads Gram Henriksen - forthcoming - Psychopathology.
    Delusional perception designates a sudden, idiosyncratic, and often self-referential delusion triggered by a neutral perceptual content. In classical psychopathology, delusional perception was considered almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. Since delusional perception has been erased from ICD-11 and always been absent in DSM, it risks slipping out of clinical awareness. In this article, we explore the clinical roots of delusional perception, elucidate the psychopathological phenomenon, and discuss its two predominant conceptualizations, i.e., Schneider’s well-known two-link model and Matussek’s lesser known one-link model. The (...)
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  9. The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion.Paul Noordhof & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - forthcoming - In Paul Henne & Samuel Murray (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Routledge.
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  10. Delusions and Everyday Life.Lucy O'Brien & Douglas Lavin - forthcoming - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter aims to get away from the ‘psychological attitude’ approach framing current philosophical discussion of delusion. We ask not what kind of attitude a delusion is – a belief or an imagination? Something else? – as if it were already clear what the ‘content’ of a delusion could be. We aim instead to shift attention to the question of the ‘object’ of delusions. What is delusion of? What is the object of this form of thinking? This focus on a (...)
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  11. Charting New Phenomenological Paths for Empirical Research on Delusions: Embracing Complexity, Finding Meaning.R. Ritunnano, M. Broome & G. Stanghellini - forthcoming - JAMA Psychiatry.
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  12. Finding order within the disorder: a case study exploring the meaningfulness of delusions.R. Ritunnano, C. Humpston & M. R. Broome - forthcoming - BJPsych Bulletin:1–7.
    Can delusions, in the context of psychosis, enhance a person’s sense of meaningfulness? The case described here suggests that, in some circumstances, they can. This prompts further questions into the complexities of delusion as a lived phenomenon, with important implications for the clinical encounter. While assumptions of meaninglessness are often associated with concepts of ’disorder’, ’harm’ and ’dysfunction’, we suggest that meaning can nonetheless be found within what is commonly taken to be incomprehensible or even meaningless. A phenomenological and value-based (...)
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  13. Thought insertion and the ontology of thinking.Johannes Roessler - forthcoming - In P. López-Silva & T. McClelland (eds.), Intruders in The Mind: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Thought Insertion. Oxford University Press.
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  14. Misidentification delusions as mentalization disorders.Adrianna Smurzyńska - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
    The aim of this article is to analyze those theories that interpret misidentification delusions in terms of mentalization. The hypothesis under examination holds that a mentalization framework is useful for describing misidentification delusions when identification is thought to be partially based on mentalization. The article provides both a characterization and possible interpretations of such delusions, and possible relations between misidentification and mentalization are scrutinized. Whether the mentalization approach may explain or describe such kinds of mental disorders is considered, with the (...)
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  15. Belief, Imagination, and Delusion.Ema Sullivan-Bissett (ed.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
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  16. What’s the Linguistic Meaning of Delusional Utterances? Speech Act Theory as a Tool for Understanding Delusions.Julian Hofmann, Pablo Hubacher Haerle & Anke Maatz - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology.
    Delusions have traditionally been considered the hallmark of mental illness, and their conception, diagnosis and treatment raise many of the fundamental conceptual and practical questions of psychopathology. One of these fundamental questions is whether delusions are understandable. In this paper, we propose to consider the question of understandability of delusions from a philosophy of language perspective. For this purpose, we frame the question of how delusions can be understood as a question about the meaning of delusional utterances. Accordingly, we ask: (...)
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  17. Beliefs, delusions, and dry-functionalism.C. J. Atkinson - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-7.
    Kengo Miyazono, in his work Delusions and Beliefs, defends a teleo-functional account of delusions. In my contribution to this symposium, I question one of Miyazono’s motivations for appealing to teleo-functionalism over its main rival, dry-functionalism. Miyazono suggests that teleo-functionalism, unlike dry-functionalism, can account for the compatibility of the theses that delusions are genuine doxastic states and that delusions do not perform the typical causal roles of beliefs. I argue, however, that there are also ways for dry-functionalism to account for this (...)
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  18. Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions.Federico Bongiorno - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):720-752.
    The Spinozan theory of belief fixation holds that mentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I explore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, (...)
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  19. Are delusions pathological beliefs?Lisa Bortolotti - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-10.
    In chapter 3 of Delusions and Beliefs, Kengo Miyazono argues that, when delusions are pathological beliefs, they are so due to their being both harmful and malfunctional. In this brief commentary, I put pressure on Miyazono’s account of delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs. No delusions might satisfy the malfunction criterion and some delusions might fail to satisfy the harmfulness criterion when such conditions are interpreted as criteria for pathological beliefs. In the end, I raise a general concern about attributing pathological (...)
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  20. What is Capgras delusion?Max Coltheart & Martin Davies - 2022 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 27:69-82.
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  21. Doubt, Delusion and Diagnosis.Huw Green - 2022 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 29 (1):21-23.
    A team of professionals considers whether a patient in her early 50s is developing Alzheimer’s. The patient is not experiencing the memory symptoms typical of that disease, with so far a few years of sporadic attentional lapses as the predominant cognitive complaint. Her most dramatic symptom is her impression that two versions of her husband live with her. One is her real husband, the other a “fake.” There is no elaborated story about who the fake is or why he is (...)
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  22. Is the biological adaptiveness of delusions doomed?Eugenia Lancellotta - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):47-63.
    Delusions are usually considered as harmful and dysfunctional beliefs, one of the primary symptoms of a psychiatric illness and the mark of madness in popular culture. However, in recent times a much more positive role has been advocated for delusions. More specifically, it has been argued that delusions might be an answer to a problem rather than problems in themselves. By delivering psychological and epistemic benefits, delusions would allow people who face severe biological or psychological difficulties to survive in their (...)
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  23. Précis of Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry.Kengo Miyazono - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-5.
    The central hypothesis of this book, Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry, is that delusions are malfunctional beliefs ; they belong to the category of belief but, unlike mundane false or irrational beliefs, they fail to perform some functions of belief. More precisely, delusions directly or indirectly involve some malfunctioning cognitive mechanisms, which is empirically supported by the two-factor account of delusion formation.
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  24. Delusions and beliefs: a knowledge-first approach.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-7.
    In Delusions and Beliefs, Kengo Miyazono proposes an extended and convincing argument for the thesis that delusions are malfunctional beliefs. One of the key assumptions for this argument is that belief is a biological notion, and that the function of beliefs is a product of evolution. I challenge the thesis that evolutionary accounts can furnish an epistemologically satisfying account of beliefs because evolutionary success does not necessarily track epistemic success. Consequently, also delusions as beliefs cannot be explained in a satisfactory (...)
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  25. Expressing experience: the promise and perils of the phenomenological interview.Elizabeth Pienkos, Borut Škodlar & Louis Sass - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):53-71.
    This paper outlines several of the challenges that are inherent in any attempt to communicate subjective experience to others, particularly in the context of a clinical interview. It presents the phenomenological interview as a way of effectively responding to these challenges, which may be especially important when attempting to understand the profound experiential transformations that take place in schizophrenia. Features of language experience in schizophrenia—including changes in interpersonal orientation, a sense of the arbitrariness of language, and a desire for faithful (...)
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  26. Critical Notice: Iain McGilchrist, The Matter With Things: Our Brains, Our Delusions, and the Unmaking of the World (Perspectiva, 2021). 2 volumes, 1500 pages, no price. [REVIEW]Rupert Read - 2022 - Philosophical Investigations 45 (4):528-539.
    Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 4, Page 528-539, October 2022.
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  27. Delusional rationality.Stephanie Rhodes, Niall Galbraith & Ken Manktelow - 2022 - In Shira Elqayam, Igor Douven, Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Nicole Cruz (eds.), Logic and Uncertainty in the Human Mind: A Tribute to David E. Over. Routledge.
    In this chapter we review recent research in an area in which David Over has made an important contribution: reasoning in people with delusions. Delusional beliefs can be distinguished from the strong beliefs that everyone holds by the extra intensity with which they are held and their abnormally weak evidential basis, together with their tendency to disrupt an individual’s everyday functioning. However, non-clinical delusional ideation can also be found, where people tend to ‘jump to conclusions’ on the basis of apparently (...)
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  28. Do delusions have and give meaning?Rosa Ritunnano & Lisa Bortolotti - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):949-968.
    Delusions are often portrayed as paradigmatic instances of incomprehensibility and meaninglessness. Here we investigate the relationship between delusions and meaning from a philosophical perspective, integrating arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology and phenomenological psychopathology. We review some of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to two claims about delusions and meaning: delusions are meaningful, despite being described as irrational and implausible beliefs; some delusions can also enhance the sense that one’s life is meaningful, supporting agency and creativity in some circumstances. (...)
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  29. Dreaming as a virtual reality delusion simulator: gaining empathy whilst we sleep.Melanie G. Rosen - 2022 - International Journal of Dream Research 1 (15):73–85.
    The conscious experiences we have during sleep have the potential to improve our empathetic response to those who experience delusions and psychosis by supplying a virtual reality simulation of mental illness. Empathy for those with mental illness is lacking and there has been little improvement in the last decades despite efforts made to increase awareness. Our lack of empathy, in this case, may be due to an inability to accurately mentally simulate what it’s like to have a particular cognitive disorder. (...)
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  30. On the nature, pathology, and etiology of delusions: comments on Miyazono’s delusions and beliefs.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-8.
    Kengo Miyazono’s Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry is an attempt to provide a unified account of the nature, pathology, and etiology of delusions. The strength of his book resides in the clarity of arguments and its consistent adoption of a biological explanation of delusions, based on teleo-functionalism about mental states. However, there are some weaknesses in each of his arguments regarding the nature, pathology, and etiology of delusions. Regarding the nature of delusions, teleo-functionalism makes it difficult to confirm that (...)
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  31. Delusions and madmen: against rationality constraints on belief.Declan Smithies, Preston Lennon & Richard Samuels - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-30.
    According to the Rationality Constraint, our concept of belief imposes limits on how much irrationality is compatible with having beliefs at all. We argue that empirical evidence of human irrationality from the psychology of reasoning and the psychopathology of delusion undermines only the most demanding versions of the Rationality Constraint, which require perfect rationality as a condition for having beliefs. The empirical evidence poses no threat to more relaxed versions of the Rationality Constraint, which only require only minimal rationality. Nevertheless, (...)
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  32. Debunking Doxastic Transparency.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A3)5-24.
    In this paper I consider the project of offering an evolutionary debunking explanation for transparency in doxastic deliberation. I examine Nicole Dular and Nikki Fortier’s (2021) attempt at such a project. I suggest that their account faces a dilemma. On the one horn, their explanation of transparency involves casting our mechanisms for belief formation as solely concerned with truth. I argue that this is explanatorily inadequate when we take a wider view of our belief formation practices. I show that Dular (...)
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  33. Self-treatment of psychosis and complex post-traumatic stress disorder with LSD and DMT—A retrospective case study.Mika Turkia - 2022 - Psychiatry Research Case Reports 1 (2):100029.
    This article describes a case of a teenager with early complex trauma due to chronic domestic violence. Cannabis use triggered auditory hallucinations, after which the teenager was diagnosed with an acute schizophrenia-like psychotic disorder. Antipsychotic medication did not fully resolve symptoms. Eventually the teenager chose to self-medicate with LSD in order to resolve a suicidal condition. The teenager carried out six unsupervised LSD sessions, followed by an extended period of almost daily use of inhaled low-dose DMT. Psychotic symptoms were mostly (...)
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  34. Unfeigning the delusion: Antinatalism and the end of suffering.Robbert Zandbergen - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (9):e12871.
    In this article I explore the antinatalist view according to which it would be better if humans were to stop reproducing in order to contribute to the non-violent and voluntary extinction of the species as a whole. Not only is reproduction morally problematic in an already vastly overpopulated world, it is held that the human predicament can only be solved by slowly, but surely removing human presence altogether. Radical as this might sound, it must be noted that, far from a (...)
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  35. Derationalizing Delusions.Vaughan Bell, Nichola Raihani & Sam Wilkinson - 2021 - Clinical Psychological Science : A Journal of the Association for Psychological Science 9 (1):24-37.
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  36. Strange beliefs: essays on delusion formation.Federico Bongiorno Dr - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
    This thesis is set out as a collection of self-standing essays. Throughout these essays, I try to illuminate a number of controversies surrounding the way in which delusions are formed, and relatedly, their nature and epistemic standing. In Chapter 2, after an introductory chapter, I flesh out a new ‘endorsement’ approach to the Capgras delusion, the main idea being that the delusion is formed by endorsing the content of a metaphorical-perceptual state in which a loved one is represented metaphorically as (...)
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  37. Can there be delusions of pain?Lisa Bortolotti & Martino Belvederi Murri - 2021 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (2):167-172.
    : Jennifer Radden argues that there cannot be delusional pain in depression, putting forward three arguments: the argument from falsehood, the argument from epistemic irrationality, and the argument from incongruousness. Whereas delusions are false, epistemically irrational, and incongruous with the person’s experience, feeling pain from the first-person perspective cannot be false or irrational, and is congruous with the person’s experience in depression. In this commentary on Radden’s paper, we share her scepticism about the notion of delusional pain, but we find (...)
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  38. Advancing research on delusions: Fostering dialogue between cognitive and phenomenological researchers.Pavan Brar, Sass S., Kalarchian Louis & A. Melissa - 2021 - Schizophrenia Research 233:62–63.
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  39. Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief.Max Coltheart & Martin Davies - 2021 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 26 (4): 213-230.
    INTRODUCTION: In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce. METHODS: In this (...)
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  40. How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway.Max Coltheart & Martin Davies - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 87:103037.
    People acquire new beliefs in various ways. One of the most important of these is that new beliefs are acquired as a response to experiencing events that one did not expect. This involves a form of inference distinct from both deductive and inductive inference: abductive inference. The concept of abduction is due to the American pragmatist philosopher C. S. Peirce. Davies and Coltheart elucidated what Peirce meant by abduction, and identified two problems in his otherwise promising account requiring solution if (...)
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  41. Modelling delusions as temporally-evolving beliefs.P. R. Corlett & P. Fletcher - 2021 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 26 (4):231-241.
    Introduction: Delusions demand an explanation in terms of their neural, psychological, and sociological mechanisms. We must bridge these levels of explanation in order to understand and ultimately treat delusions. To this end, debates continue as to the number of contributing factors, how those factors interact, and their underlying computational mechanisms.Methods: One popular family of models suggests that two separate insults are necessary, a problem with perception and an independent problem with belief. In particular, new work proposes that the belief problem (...)
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  42. Metaphorical Thinking and Delusions in Psychosis.Felicity Deamer & Sam Wilkinson - 2021 - In Maxime Amblard, Michel Musiol & Manuel Rebuschi (eds.), Coherence of Discourse: Formal and Conceptual Issues of Language. Springer Verlag. pp. 119-130.
    This paper explores how metaphorical thinking might contribute to an aetiology of florid delusions in psychosis. We argue that this approach helps to account for the path from experience to the delusional assertion, which, though relatively straightforward for monothematic delusions like the Capgras delusion, has always been difficult to account for in florid delusions in psychosis. Our account also helps to account for double book-keeping and the relative agential inertia of the belief.
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  43. Delusions beyond beliefs: a critical overview of diagnostic, aetiological, and therapeutic schizophrenia research from a clinical-phenomenological perspective.J. Feyaerts, M. G. Henriksen, S. Vanheule, I. Myin-Germeys & L. A. Sass - 2021 - Lancet Psychiatry 8 (3):237-249.
    Delusions are commonly conceived as false beliefs that are held with certainty and which cannot be corrected. This conception of delusion has been influential throughout the history of psychiatry and continues to inform how delusions are approached in clinical practice and in contemporary schizophrenia research. It is reflected in the full psychosis continuum model, guides psychological and neurocognitive accounts of the formation and maintenance of delusions, and it substantially determines how delusions are approached in cognitive-behavioural treatment. In this Review, we (...)
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  44. Phenomenology, delusions, and belief – Authors’ reply.Jasper Feyaerts, Mads Henriksen, Vanheule G., Myin-Germeys Stijn, Sass Inez & Louis - 2021 - The Lancet Psychiatry 8 (4):273–274.
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  45. Uncovering the realities of delusional experience in schizophrenia: a qualitative phenomenological study in Belgium.Jasper Feyaerts, Wouter Kusters, Zeno Van Duppen, Stijn Vanheule, Inez Myin-Germeys & Louis Sass - 2021 - Lancet Psychiatry 8 (9):784-796.
    BACKGROUND: Delusions in schizophrenia are commonly approached as empirical false beliefs about everyday reality. Phenomenological accounts, by contrast, have suggested that delusions are more adequately understood as pertaining to a different kind of reality experience. How this alteration of reality experience should be characterised, which dimensions of experiential life are involved, and whether delusional reality might differ from standard reality in various ways is unclear and little is known about how patients with delusions value and relate to these experiential alterations. (...)
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  46. Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.
    Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...)
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  47. The Myth of Irrationality: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Delusions and to the Principle of Charity.Mathieu Frèrejouan - 2021 - In Maxime Amblard, Michel Musiol & Manuel Rebuschi (eds.), Coherence of Discourse: Formal and Conceptual Issues of Language. Springer Verlag. pp. 131-151.
    The principle of charity is most often understood as that which justifies ascribing rationality to every interlocutor, regardless of the agent appears irrational. As such, a recurring question in the field of the philosophy of psychiatry is whether the said principle should be advocated as a way of understanding delusions as rational or should be rejected as a form of over-rationalization. The aim of this paper is to show, by defending an understanding of rationality inspired by the late philosophy of (...)
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  48. Delusions and pathologies of belief : making sense of conspiracy beliefs via the psychosis continuum.Niall Galbraith - 2021 - In Valentina Cardella & Amelia Gangemi (eds.), Psychopathology and Philosophy of Mind: What Mental Disorders Can Tell Us About Our Minds. Routledge.
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  49. Inserted Thoughts and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2021 - In Pascual Angel Gargiulo & Humbert Mesones-Arroyo (eds.), Psychiatry and Neurosciences Update: Vol 4. Springer. pp. 61-71.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M” (Rosenthal 2005, Gennaro 2012). In a previous publication (...)
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  50. The Archangel Delusion. Descriptive Ethics and Its Role in the Education of Ethicists.Jarosław Kucharski - 2021 - Studia Philosophiae Christianae 57 (2):35-49.
    The role of ethicists is to provide a genuine ethical theory to help non-ethicists interpret and solve moral dilemmas, to define what is right or wrong, and, finally, to clarify moral values. Therefore, ethicists are taught to address morality with rational procedures, to set aside their moral intuitions and emotions. Sometimes, professional ethicists are prone to falling into the archangel delusion – the belief that they are beyond the influence of their own emotions. This can lead to ousting moral intuitions (...)
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