An extended argument that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. -/- Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some (...) forms of cognition have content while others—the most elementary ones—do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. -/- Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless—fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix. (shrink)

Seite dualität: Anarchismus 121. Konsequenzen der individualitätszerstörenden Gleichheitstheorie: Stellung der Frau 123; unhistorische Denkweise 123; ...

Seeing from somewhere in particular -- Embracing binocularity -- Creativity and gratitude -- Technology as vlaue-free and as value-laden -- Nobody's against true enhancement -- Comprehending persons as subjectss and as objects -- Respecting persons as subjects and as objects.

"In these essays, health care professionals, scholars, and members of the disability community debate the implications of prenatal testing for people with disabilitties and for parent-child relationships generally."--Cover.

During antiquity, the astronomical questions of the day and the methods used to formulate and answer them were clearly within the realm of philosophy. That changed most notably in the sixteenth century when Tycho Brahe turned astronomy into a modern empirical science by formulating (in principle) testable hypotheses, figuring out how to test them, building the proper instruments, and making – for that time – very accurate and systematic observations of the sky. These observations eventually led to the modern view (...) of the solar system and ultimately the rejection of the classical Aristotelian worldview. Since then, the exploration of space has been located clearly in the realm of natural science – and, to an increasing extent, technology. In parallel to that, space has – at least since World War II –to a high degree been a place for military and political ambitions and activities. The scientists that have been involved in space exploration have mainly been physicists, together with some chemists and geologists. Lately, the exploration of space has engaged more and more biologists in the search for extraterrestrial life. The international space station, along with plans to send humans to Mars, has led to an increased involvement of medical science. If present speculations about space tourism and mining on planets, moons, and asteroids hold true, in the future we will probably see many new professions dealing not just with exploration, but also exploitation of space. Philosophy has never totally left the realm of space exploration. As space exploration and exploitation become more and more interdisciplinary, and as space becomes a bigger part of our lives, it will be time once more for philosophy to turn its attention towards space. The mission for philosophers is not to indulge in speculations over questions that are better dealt with by empirical methods. Ther are, however, several questions connected to the exploration and exploitation of space that are of a philosophical nature and that deserve to be examined seriously from a philosophical perspective. I believe that philosophical scrutiny of these questions will be to the benefit of both space exploration and philosophy. Interesting and, indeed, important philosophical questions arise in many areas of space exploration. Some of the most interesting and important ones relate to the search for extraterrestrial life, of which some will be presented here. I will not attempt to answer these questions here. Instead, this chapter should be seen as an introduction to some of the philosophical questions raised by astrobiology. (shrink)

Some authors argue that we have a moral obligation to leave Mars the way it is, even if it does not harbour any life. This claim is usually based on an assumption that Mars has intrinsic value. The problem with this concept is that different authors use it differently. In this chapter, I investigate different ways in which an uninhabited Mars is said to have intrinsic value. First, I investigate whether the planet can have moral standing. I find that this (...) is not a plausible assumption. I then investigate different combinations of objective value and end value. I find that there is no way we can know whether an uninhabited Mars has objective end value and even if it does, this does not seem to imply any moral obligations on us. I then investigate whether an uninhabited Mars can have subjective end value. I conclude that this is very plausible. I also investigate whether an uninhabited Mars can have objective instrumental value in relation to some other, non-Mars related end value. I find also this very plausible. It is also highly plausible, however, that spreading life to a presently uninhabited Mars can also have subjective end value, as well as objective instrumental value. I mention shortly two ways of prioritising between these values: The utilitarian method of counting the number of sentient beings who entertain each value and determining the strength of the values to them. Finding a compromise that allows colonisation on parts of the planet while leaving other parts untouched. These methods should be seen as examples, not as an exhaustive list. Also, I do not take a definitive stand in favour of any of the two approaches, though it seems at least prima facie that the second approach may have a better chance of actually leading to a constructive result. (shrink)

Some authors argue that we have a moral obligation to leave Mars the way it is, even if it does not harbour any life. This claim is usually based on an assumption that Mars has intrinsic value. The problem with this concept is that different authors use it differently. In this chapter, I investigate different ways in which an uninhabited Mars is said to have intrinsic value. First, I investigate whether the planet can have moral standing. I find that this (...) is not a plausible assumption. I then investigate different combinations of objective value and end value. I find that there is no way we can know whether an uninhabited Mars has objective end value and even if it does, this does not seem to imply any moral obligations on us. I then investigate whether an uninhabited Mars can have subjective end value. I conclude that this is very plausible. I also investigate whether an uninhabited Mars can have objective instrumental value in relation to some other, non-Mars related end value. I find also this very plausible. It is also highly plausible, however, that spreading (human or other) life to a presently uninhabited Mars can also have subjective end value, as well as objective instrumental value. I mention shortly two ways of prioritising between these values: (1) The utilitarian method of counting the number of sentient beings who entertain each value and determining the strength of the values to them. (2) Finding a compromise that allows colonisation on parts of the planet while leaving other parts untouched. These methods should be seen as examples, not as an exhaustive list. Also, I do not take a definitive stand in favour of any of the two approaches, though it seems at least prima facie that the second approach may have a better chance of actually leading to a constructive result. (shrink)

The coronavirus pandemic made the biopolitics of infection control the core object of states around the world. Globally, states governed spheres usually free of state control, implementing various restrictions, closing down society in the process. This is possible due to the state's capacities to act through and over society, grounded in the state's powers. I argue that while the pandemic has led to useful and interesting state-centric Foucauldian literature on the politics of COVID-19, this literature has not fully taken the (...) theoretical lessons of the pandemic into account. Explicating these lessons, I discuss how the pandemic invites us to reconsider the Foucauldian approach to the state. The purpose of this article is to combine the Foucauldian theory of power with a Weberian state theory based on Michael Mann's work on the state and the sources of power, so to lay the foundations for a Weberian-Foucauldian theory of the state. (shrink)

The aim of this investigation is to answer the question of why it is prima facie morally wrong to cause or contribute to the extinction of species. The first potential answer investigated in the book is that other species are instrumentally valuable for human beings. The results of this part of the investigation are that many species are instrumentally valuable for human beings but that not all species are equally valuable in all cases. The instrumental values of different species also (...) have to compete with other human values. Sometimes these other values probably outweigh the value of the continued existence of the species. In general the degree of uncertainty is very high and the precautionaty principle is recommended to deal with these uncertainties. We also found that we have a duty to consider the interests of future generations of human beings and that these duties, in general, speak in favour of preservation. Anthropocentric instrumentalism therefore provides us with rather strong reasons to consider many cases of human caused extinction as prima facie morally wrong. Even so, anthropocentric instrumentalism does not fully account for the moral intuition we set out to investigate. The next potential answer that is investigated in the book is that species have a moral standing in their own right. The result of this part of the investigation is that this idea is highly unlikely, in particular because species cannot have any interests to consider. Anotgher potential answer is that species have intrinsic value in some other meaning that does not imply moral standing. We concluded that it is possible to be subjectively valued as an end and that many species have properties that make them highly suitable for being valued as ends by human beings. Finally, we found that our contributions to the extinction of species in most cases frustrate the interests of many non-human sentient beings. This is true if the species in question is made up of sentient individuals, and it is also true when the species in question is made up of non-sentient individuals that have instrumental value for sentient individuals of other species. There are exceptions to this rule, but all in all it seems that the inclusion of non-human sentient individuals together with us humans as moral objects, in most cases, tip the scale drastically in favour of preservation. The main result of the investigation is that there is not one but several explanations to why it is prima facie morally wrong to contribute to the extinction of species – and all of them are about duties to respect the interests of individual sentient animals, including human beings. (shrink)

The concept of ecosystem services is a way of visualizing the instrumental value that nature has for human beings. Most ecosystem services can be performed by more than one species. This fact is sometimes used as an argument against the preservation of species. However, even though substitutability does detract from the instrumental value of a species, it also adds option value to it. The option value cannot make a substitutable species as instrumentally valuable as a non-substitutable species, but in many (...) cases, it can add enough value to make the species more valuable than the projects that threaten its existence. (shrink)

For successful climate change adaptation, the distribution of responsibility within society is an important question. While the literature highlights the need for involving both public and private actors, little is still known of how citizens perceive their own and others’ responsibility, let alone the moral groundings for such perceptions. In this paper, we report the results of a survey regarding people’s attitudes towards different ways of distributing responsibility for climate change adaptation. The survey was distributed to citizens in six Swedish (...) municipalities and completed by 510 respondents. A large number of respondents wanted to assign responsibility for making decisions about and implementing adaptation measures to local governments, but also to property owners, whereas the national government was raised as responsible for setting decision boundaries and for financial support. The most preferred principles for a fair distribution of responsibility among the respondents were desert, ability, efficiency and need, while the principle of equal shares found less support. All principles received some support, indicating that it is necessary to consider several principles when distributing responsibility for climate change adaptation. Compared to earlier studies, this study shows more nuanced perceptions on who should be responsible and on what moral grounds. (shrink)

Distribution of responsibility is one of the main focus areas in discussions about climate change ethics. Most of these discussions deal with the distribution of responsibility for climate change mitigation at the international level. The aim of this paper is to investigate if and how these principles can be used to inform the search for a fair distribution of responsibility for climate change adaptation on the local level. We found that the most influential distribution principles on the international level were (...) in turn built on one or more of seven basic principles: (P1) equal shares, (P2) desert, (P3) beneficiary pays, (P4) ability, (P5) self-help, (P6) limited responsibility for the worst off, and (P7) status quo preservation. It was found that all the basic principles, but P1, P3, and P7, are to some extent translatable to local climate adaptation. Two major problems hamper their usefulness on the local level: (1) several categories of agents need to take on responsibility; and (2) emissions do not work as a base for all principles. P4, P5, and P6 are applicable to local adaptation without changes. P4 is of particular importance as it seems to solve the first problem. P2 is applicable only if the second problem is solved, which can be achieved by using risk of harm instead of emissions as the basis for desert. (shrink)

If we find life on another world, it will be an extremely important discovery and we will have to take great care not to do anything that might endanger that life. If the life we find is sentient we will have moral obligations to that life. Whether it is sentient or not, we have a duty to ourselves to preserve it as a study object, and also because it would be commonly seen as valuable in its own right. In addition (...) to this we would also have a duty to our fellow humans and other earthly life forms not to expose them to danger by advertently or inadvertently exposing them to potentially harmful space organisms. When space exploration turns into exploitation it will therefore be important to be able to show that a world that is up for exploitation is uninhabited before the exploitation starts. Showing that a world is uninhabited is, however, a different kind of task than showing that it is inhabited. The latter task can be accomplished through one positive finding but it is not clear how to go about the former task. In this paper I suggest that it is a gradual process asymptotically approaching certainty rather than a discovery in the traditional sense of the word. It has to be handled in two steps. The first is to connect degree of certainty with research setup. The second is to decide how certain we need to be. The first step is about the number, diversity and quality of observations. The second step is a decision we have to make based on the purpose of the investigation. The purpose and therefore the degree of certainty needed to establish that a world is uninhabited will be different for a world that is up for exploitation than for a world that is not. In the latter case it is only a matter of epistemic values. In the former case also ethical values have to be considered. (shrink)

If humans eventually attain the ability to create new life forms, how will it affect the value of life? This is one of several questions that can be sources of concern when discussing synthetic life, but is the concern justified? In an attempt to answer this question, I have analyzed some possible reasons why an ability to create synthetic life would threaten the value of life in general (that is, not just of the synthetic creations), to see if they really (...) give us reason to worry. The main conclusion is that it is unlikely that a future human ability to create life will really have a great negative impact on these characteristics of life. It therefore seems unlikely that the value of life will be negatively affected by the ability to create synthetic life, though it is possible that the properties in question will be less salient in the synthetic life and thus that the value of the synthetic life will be lower than that of existing life, which in turn can lead to a disturbing difference in value between different kinds of life. (shrink)

The Precautionary Principle is both celebrated and criticized. It has become an important principle for decision making, but it is also subject to criticism. One problem that is often pointed out with the principle is that is not clear what it actually says and how to use it. I have taken on this problem by performing an analysis of some of the most influential formulations of the principle in an attempt to identify the core ideas behind it, with the purpose (...) of producing a formulation of the principle that is clear and practically applicable. It was found that what is called the Precautionary Principle is not a principle that tells us what do to achieve extra precaution or how to handle situations when extra precaution is called for. Instead, it was found to be a list of circumstances that each justify extra precaution. An analysis of some of the most common and influential formulations of the Precautionary Principle identified four such circumstances: (1) When we deal with important values that tend to be systematically downplayed by traditional decision methods – such as human health and the environment. (2) When we suspect that the decision might lead to irreversible and severe consequences and the values at stake are also irreplaceable, (3) When timing is at least as important as being right. (4) When it is more important to avoid false negatives than false positives. This interpretation of the Precautionary Principle does not say anything about what kind of actions to take when extra precaution is called for, but it does provide a clear and practically useful list of circumstances that call for extra precaution and that is not subject to the most common objections to the Precautionary Principle. (shrink)

A high standard of planetary protection is important for astrobiology, though the risk for contamination can never be zero. It is therefore important to find a balance. If extraterrestrial life has a moral standing in its own right, it will also affect what we have to do to protect it. The questions of how far we need to go to protect extraterrestrial life will be even more acute and complicated when the time comes to use habitable worlds for commercial purposes. (...) There will also be conflicts between those who want to set a world aside for more research and those who want to give the green light for development. I believe it is important to be proactive in relation to these issues. The aim of my project is therefore to identify, elucidate, and if possible, suggest solutions to potential conflicts between astrobiology, planetary protection, and commercial use of space. (shrink)

It is plausible to claim that it is morally worse to kill an innocent person than to give any number of people a mild one‐hour headache. Alaistar Norcross has argued that consequentialists, at least, should reject this claim. According to him, any harm that can befall a person can be morally outweighed by a sufficient number of very small harms. He gives a general argument for this view, and tries to show, by means of an argument from analogy, that it (...) is less counter‐intuitive than it appears. I show that his main argument relies on a false assumption, and argue that the purported analogy is dubious. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to use philosophy and, in particular ethical theory, to identify and explore some potential conflicts.

The paper extends previous accounts of informational privacy as a contextual notion. Where previous accounts have focused on interpretations of the privacy context itself as being contextual and open for negotiation and interpretation, this paper extends those analyses and shows that personal information itself is in fact best understood as contextual and situational—and as such open for interpretation. The paper reviews the notion of information as it has been applied in informational privacy and philosophy of information, and suggests that personal (...) information ought to be regarded as communicative acts. The paper suggests a reconceptualization of informational privacy from having its focus on controlling, limiting, and restricting access to material carriers of information to a focus on a regulation of the use, analysis, and interpretation of personal information. (shrink)

Om människan någon gång kommer att få förmågan att skapa nya livsformer, hur kommer det att påverka livets värde? Detta är en fråga som kan vara en källa till oro när man diskuterar konstgjort liv, men är oron befogad? I ett försök att svara på den frågan kommer jag att gå igenom några möjliga skäl till varför förmågan att skapa konstgjort liv skulle hota livets värde, och se om de verkligen ger oss skäl att oroa oss.

In 1982, the President's Commission produced its report on human gene therapy. One of that report's recommendations was to expand the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee to the National Institutes of Health to include a subcommittee on human gene therapy. In 1984, the Human Gene Therapy Subcommittee was established, and in 1989 it produced a document—“Points to Consider for Protocols for the Transfer of Recombinant DNA into Human Subjects”—that stated the RAC's position on what sorts of protocols it would approve.In assessing (...) the impact of the President's Commission report, Alexander Capron wrote,[t]he line [the report] drew between somatic cell and germ-line therapies has shaped subsequent discussions and policy formulation. Its conclusion … that somatic cell therapy resembles medical treatment is the basic premise of the RAC subcommittee's “Points to Consider,” while the Commission's view that ethical as well as technical barriers preclude present attempts to alter germ cells continues to be generally accepted by scientists and nonscientists alike. (shrink)

International uproar followed the recent announcement of the birth of twin girls whose genomes had been edited with a breakthrough DNA editing-technology. This technology, called clustered regularly interspaced short palindrome repeats or CRISPR-Cas9, can alter any DNA, including DNA in embryos, meaning that changes can be passed to the offspring of the person that embryo becomes. Should we use gene editing technologies to change ourselves, our children, and future generations to come? The potential uses of CRISPR-Cas9 and other gene editing (...) technologies are unprecedented in human history. By using these technologies, we eradicate certain dreadful diseases. Altering human DNA, however, raises enormously difficult questions. Some of these questions are about safety: Can these technologies be deployed without posing an unreasonable risk of physical harm to current and future generations? Can all physical risks be adequately assessed, and responsibly managed? But gene editing technologies also raise other moral questions, which touch on deeply held, personal, cultural, and societal values: Might such technologies redefine what it means to be healthy, or normal, or cherished? Might they undermine relationships between parents and children, or exacerbate the gap between the haves and have-nots? The broadest form of this second kind of question is the focus of this book: What might gene editing--and related technologies--mean for human flourishing? In the new essays collected here, an interdisciplinary group of scholars asks age--old questions about the nature and well-being of humans in the context of a revolutionary new biotechnology--one that has the potential to change the genetic make-up of both existing people and future generations. Welcoming readers who study related issues and those not yet familiar with the formal study of bioethics, the authors of these essays open up a conversation about the ethics of gene editing. It is through this conversation that citizens can influence laws and the distribution of funding for science and medicine, that professional leaders can shape understanding and use of gene editing and related technologies by scientists, patients, and practitioners, and that individuals can make decisions about their own lives and the lives of their families. (shrink)

Urban agriculture has, forcenturies, served as a vital input in thelivelihood strategies of urban households inthe developing countries. As a response to theeconomic crises exacerbated by the structuraladjustment programs and increasing migration,urban agriculture has expanded rapidly withinthe last 20 years. An examination of thegeneral trends in urban agriculture reveals anumber of issues policy-makers in developingcountries should address to provide services toensure a sustainable behavior towards urbancultivation. Most important is the legalizationof urban agriculture as a step towards securinglands for the urban (...) poor. The illegal statushas left a governance vacuum, which should befilled through policy formulation and regularinstitutionalized management in a participatorymanner including all relevant stakeholders iffood security has to be increased andenvironment improved in an urban developmentcontext. (shrink)

Many philosophers have claimed that extensive or additive measurement is incompatible with the existence of "higher values", any amount of which is better than any amount of some other value. In this paper, it is shown that higher values can be incorporated in a non-standard model of extensive measurement, with values represented by sets of ordered pairs of real numbers, rather than by single reals. The suggested model is mathematically fairly simple, and it applies to structures including negative as well (...) as positive values. (shrink)

För att kunna känna igen liv när vi hittar det och för att veta hur vi skall leta behöver vi ha en uppfattning om vad liv är. Att försöka konstruera en definition av liv hjälper oss också att formulera våra tankar kring vad liv är. De flesta av oss har nog en intuitiv uppfattning av vad liv är, och kan i de flesta situationer utan problem skilja ut vad som är levande från vad som inte är det. Det finns dock (...) situationer när det inte är fullt så enkelt. Man är till exempel inte överens om huruvida virus är liv. Virus kan föröka sig och genomgår evolution men de har ingen egen metabolism vilket många hävdar är en nödvändig egenskap för att vara levande. Numera finns det också datorprogram som har vissa egenskaper gemensamma med sådant som vi normalt kallar liv. De kan till exempel föröka sig och genomgå en slags evolution. Däremot är de inte uppbyggda av DNA, och dessutom är de ju tillverkade av oss. Trots detta finns det de som vill hävda att datorprogram kan vara levande. Å andra sidan finns det desto fler som förnekar det. Många förnekar också att levande datorprogram alls är möjligt. De som gör det kan till exempel hävda att liv måste ha en viss form av kemisk bas eller vara ett resultat av naturligt urval i motsats till urval baserat på regler som vi människor har konstruerat. När man diskuterar utomjordiskt liv så blir det ofta ännu svårare att avgöra vad som är levande än när vi diskuterar liv här på jorden. Utomjordiskt liv kommer förmodligen att vara väldigt olikt det vi normalt kallar liv men någonting bör det ju ha gemensamt med livet på jorden för att det skall vara befogat att använda beteckningen liv om båda. När man letar efter liv i extrema miljöer här på jorden, och i ännu högre grad när man letar efter liv på andra himlakroppar, är det av avgörande betydelse att man har någon slags uppfattning om vad liv är. Det finns framför allt två skäl till det. Det ena är att man behöver kunna avgöra om det man hittar är liv. Det andra är att vi behöver bestämma oss för hur och var vi skall leta (resurserna för att leta efter liv är ju inte obegränsade). Man behöver till exempel välja rätt slags instrument som reagerar på rätt saker. För att kunna göra det behöver man veta vilka egenskaper man skall leta efter, det vill säga man behöver veta vad liv är. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Editor's NoteErik DoxtaderThe freedom of conversation is being lost. … Warmth is ebbing from things.—Walter Benjamin, One-way StreetInsufficient data for a meaningful answer.—Multivac (Isaac Asimov, The Last Question)This issue of Philosophy & Rhetoric, a somewhat rare double-issue, features significant and inspiring work that moves in a variety of directions and proceeds in a number of idioms, while also responding directly and indirectly to a complex exigence, though perhaps in (...) a less familiar sense of the term, as what Giorgio Agamben calls a "messianic modality" that "coincides with the possibility of philosophy itself"—exigency as the expression of what remains unforgettable in the midst of all that is no longer remembered for the sake of history's progress. Appearing between contingency and necessity, exigency is not then a problem to be re-solved but the opening of a question; or more precisely, the epideictic expression of question-ability, the beginning of inquiry into what calls forth and perhaps even demands its possibility, for now. On what grounds do old questions stand? Through what power and by what happenstance are new questions found and formed? And when—in what kinds of moments do questions appear? With what force do they arrive? At what cost? What questions inflict violence? What violence thwarts a question? What do we (not) ask? How does the (un)questionable give way? Can multiple disciplines ever pose let alone inquire into the same question? What are the (de)constitutive elements of a good question? What does a good question do? Has pious genealogy corrupted the question? Does the discovery of a question remain one of the last "secrets," the unhinged authentic insight about which little can or should be said? A century ago, announcing the launch of Angelus Novus, Benjamin reflected on the moment and contended that the "vocation of a journal is to proclaim the spirit of its age." Such a task, in his view, demanded a strict "relevance to the present" even over "unity or clarity" and required exposing the "talented fakes" and resisting "the sterile pageant of new and fashionable events" that obscure how "impossible it is in our age to give a voice to [End Page 213] any communality [Gemeinsamkeit]." It is a tall and certainly debatable order, one that Benjamin himself was unable to realize—Angelus never got off the ground. But perhaps the underlying insight remains, the basic importance of holding space for work that discerns and expresses the potential of question-ability. This potential may well be the spirit-breath of an age. And, for now, here and now, it may well be a pressing question—on the shore of Ontario's Crawford Lake, waiting for official word that the Holocene has ended; in a largely unacknowledged transition, seemingly out of the pandemic's worst, ramping back up to speed, and yet deeply uncertain about the next normal; in the midst of the two "wars" (a term to which all participating parties will not agree) that make the front page (or the top of the feed) and the many that do not, the grotesque surfeit of increasingly automatic-droning violence unfolding on the grounds of sanctified rage that makes it difficult to ask let alone grasp what violence is; at the gates of the university, where so much inquiry is supplanted with so many strategic plans, and academic freedom is slowly juridified to the advantage of legislatures eager to rewrite the mission; and, in the midst of the noisy quietude that thwarts so many of the small inquiries into well-being that weave the fabric of public life. It's been a pleasure to work with all of those who have contributed to this issue of Philosophy & Rhetoric. Indeed, the pages that follow radiate with curiosity and insight. Together, they are an expression of inquiry in which question-ability remains unforgettable and there remains a moment to ask—after the question. [End Page 214]Copyright © 2024 The Pennsylvania State University... (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly influential in most people’s lives. This raises many philosophical questions. One is what responsibility we have as individuals to guide the development of AI in a desirable direction. More specifically, how should this responsibility be distributed among individuals and between individuals and other actors? We investigate this question from the perspectives of five principles of distribution that dominate the discussion about responsibility in connection with climate change: effectiveness, equality, desert, need, and ability. Since much (...) is already written about these distributions in that context, we believe much can be gained if we can make use of this discussion also in connection with AI. Our most important findings are: (1) Different principles give different answers depending on how they are interpreted but, in many cases, different interpretations and different principles agree and even strengthen each other. If for instance ‘equality-based distribution’ is interpreted in a consequentialist sense, effectiveness, and through it, ability, will play important roles in the actual distributions, but so will an equal distribution as such, since we foresee that an increased responsibility of underrepresented groups will make the risks and benefits of AI more equally distributed. The corresponding reasoning is true for need-based distribution. (2) If we acknowledge that someone has a certain responsibility, we also have to acknowledge a corresponding degree of influence for that someone over the matter in question. (3) Independently of which distribution principle we prefer, ability cannot be dismissed. Ability is not fixed, however and if one of the other distributions is morally required, we are also morally required to increase the ability of those less able to take on the required responsibility. (shrink)

In this article we examine the natural interpretation of a ramified type hierarchy into Martin-Löf type theory with an infinite sequence of universes. It is shown that under this predicative interpretation some useful special cases of Russell’s reducibility axiom are valid, namely functional reducibility. This is sufficient to make the type hierarchy usable for development of constructive mathematical analysis in the style of Bishop. We present a ramified type theory suitable for this purpose. One may regard the results of this (...) article as an alternative solution to the problem of the proliferation of levels of real numbers in Russell’s theory, which avoids impredicativity, but instead imposes constructive logic. The intuitionistic ramified type theory introduced here also suggests that there is a natural associated notion of predicative elementary topos. (shrink)

Review of James S. J. Schwartz and Tony Milligan, eds.: The Ethics of Space Exploration.

Denna artikel är den första i en serie om två artiklar som introducerar astrobiologins filosofi. Detta är ett förhållandevis nytt och i Sverige nästan okänt forskningsfält som dock befinner sig i snabb tillväxt internationellt. Ämnet presenteras här i form av exempel på några centrala frågeställningar inom området. I den här artikeln presenteras några frågeställningar hemmahörande i teoretisk filosofi.

The project “A Plurality of Lives” was funded and hosted by the Pufendorf Institute for Advanced Studies at Lund University, Sweden. The aim of the project was to better understand how a second origin of life, either in the form of a discovery of extraterrestrial life, life developed in a laboratory, or machines equipped with abilities previously only ascribed to living beings, will change how we understand and relate to life. Because of the inherently interdisciplinary nature of the project aim, (...) the project took an interdisciplinary approach with a research group made up of 12 senior researchers representing 12 different disciplines. The project resulted in a joint volume, an international symposium, several new projects, and a network of researchers in the field, all continuing to communicate about and advance the aim of the project. (shrink)

Planetary protection is not just a matter of science. It is also a matter of value. This is so independently of whether we only include the protection of science or if we also include other goals. Excluding other values than the protection of science is thus a value statement, not a scientific statement and it does not make planetary protection value neutral. It just makes the axiological basis (that is, the value basis) for planetary protection more limited in a way (...) that is inconsistent with the axiological grounds for back contamination, ethically questionable and strategically unwise. However we look at it, we cannot get away from the conclusion that the axiological dimension of planetary protection is a task that needs to involve experts on value theory as well as experts from a range of different sciences and also include opinions from outside the academic community. (shrink)

Denna artikel är den andra i en serie om två artiklar som introducerar astrobiologins filosofi. Detta är ett förhållandevis nytt och i Sverige nästan okänt forskningsfält som dock befinner sig i snabb tillväxt internationellt. Ämnet presenteras här i form av exempel på några centrala frågeställningar inom området. I den här artikeln presenteras några frågeställningar hemmahörande i praktisk filosofi.

When working with garden archaeology and garden archaeobotany, the plant material is of great importance. It is important to be able to identify which plants have grown in a particular garden and which have not, which of the plants you find in the garden today that are newly introduced or have established themselves on their own, and which plants that may be remnants of earlier cultivation. During the past two years, my colleagues and I have been involved in a project (...) that deals with the latter kind of plants, that is, plants that were once actively cultivated and that have survived in their original place of cultivation until the present time(Persson, Ansebo & Solberg, this volume). When we started the project we simply called the plants we worked with ‘relict plants’. This is also the term that has been used unofficially in this field of research for some time. It was in no way an official term, however, and as it turned out, the term already had a different meaning in botany that was both older and better established. We were therefore in need of a better name for the plants we worked with. To single out the plants we were working with, we used the following working definition: “Plants that were once, but are no longer cultivated in a certain area, and where a part of the population still exists even though it is no longer actively maintained”. Although we still think this is a decent approximation, we have realized that there are several complicating factors we have had to think more about. We thus needed both a better name and a better definition. Both these tasks became important parts of the project. (shrink)

Sokrates var inte bara en filosofisk nydanare. Genom sitt sätt att involvera sina samtalspartners i den filosofiska processen var han också i hög utsträckning en pedagogisk nydanare. Hans pedagogiska grundidé var den så kallade majeutiska metoden – det vill säga ”barnmorskemetoden”. Med det menade han att han inte överförde sina egna färdiga tankar till den han talade med utan han hjälpte sin samtalspartner att föda sina egna tankar. Inom pedagogiken är det vanligt att använda den så kallade ”Sokratiska metoden” vilket (...) i sin enklaste form bara innebär att man ställer frågor till studenterna. Den här artikeln kommer emellertid att handla om en mer sofistikerad metod som används för begreppsanalys/begreppsdefinition i grupp. Metoden är inspirerad av Sokrates men skiljer sig också en del från hur Sokrates själv grep sig an sina dialoger – åtminstone så som de beskrivs av Platon. Artikeln innehåller en kort historisk och pedagogisk bakgrund men syftar framför allt till att utgöra en praktisk vägledning för genomförande av sokratiska dialoger i filosofiundervisningen. Artikeln bygger framför allt på mina egna erfarenheter av att använda Sokratisk Dialog i undervisningen vid Filosofiska institutionen vid Lunds universitet, Lunds Tekniska Högskola, Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet och i det privata näringslivet. Artikeln vänder sig till alla som undervisar i filosofi på universitetet eller gymnasiet eller i filosofiska metoder för studenter vid andra utbildningar, t.ex. värdeteori, vetenskapsteori eller tillämpad etik för ingenjörer eller medicinare – eller i vilket annat ämne som helst där det förekommer begrepp som saknar en enkel och knivskarp definition men som är viktiga för ämnet. (shrink)