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Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content

Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press (2017)

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  1. From Deed to Word: Gapless and Kink-Free Enactivism: In Memoriam John V. Canfield (1934–2017).Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):405-425.
    In their most recent book, Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content, Dan Hutto and Eric Myin claim to give a complete and gapless naturalistic account of cognition, but it comes with a kink. The kink being that content-involving cognition has special properties found nowhere else in nature, making it the case that minds capable of contentful thought differ in kind, in this key respect, from more basic minds. Contra Hutto and Myin, I argue that content-involving practices are themselves simply a (...)
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  • From Deed to Word: Gapless and Kink-Free Enactivism.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    In their most recent book, Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content, Dan Hutto and Eric Myin claim to give a complete and gapless naturalistic account of cognition, but it comes with a kink. The kink being that content-involving cognition has special properties found nowhere else in nature, making it the case that minds capable of contentful thought differ in kind, in this key respect, from more basic minds. Contra Hutto and Myin, I argue that content-involving practices are themselves simply a (...)
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  • The enactive naturalization of normativity: from self-maintenance to situated interactions.Laura Mojica - 2021 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (4):1-27.
    The autopoietic enactive account of cognition explains the emergence of normativity in nature as the norm of self-maintenance of life. The autonomous nature of living agents implies that they can differentiate events and regulate their responses in terms of what is better or worse to maintain their own precarious identity. Thus, normative behavior emerges from living organisms. Under this basic understanding of normativity as self-maintenance, autopoietic enactivism defends a continuity between biological, cognitive, and social norms. The self-maintenance of an agent’s (...)
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  • On the Spatiotemporal Extensiveness of Sense-Making: Ultrafast Cognition and the Historicity of Normativity.Laura Mojica & Tom Froese - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):447-460.
    The enactive approach conceives of cognition as acts of sense-making. A requirement of sense-making is adaptivity, i.e., the agent’s capacity to actively monitor and regulate its own trajectories with respect to its viability constraints. However, there are examples of sense-making, known as ultrafast cognition, that occur faster than the time physiologically required for the organism to centrally monitor and regulate movements, for example, via long-range neural feedback mechanisms. These examples open a clarificatory challenge for the enactive approach with respect to (...)
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  • Enactive Pain and its Sociocultural Embeddedness.Katsunori Miyahara - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):871-886.
    This paper disputes the theoretical assumptions of mainstream approaches in philosophy of pain, representationalism and imperativism, and advances an enactive approach as an alternative. It begins by identifying three shared assumptions in the mainstream approaches: the internalist assumption, the brain-body assumption, and the semantic assumption. It then articulates an alternative, enactive approach that considers pain as an embodied response to the situation. This approach entails the hypothesis of the sociocultural embeddedness of pain, which states against the brain-body assumption that the (...)
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  • Action-based versus cognitivist perspectives on socio-cognitive development: culture, language and social experience within the two paradigms.Robert Mirski & Arkadiusz Gut - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5511-5537.
    Contemporary research on mindreading or theory of mind has resulted in three major findings: There is a difference in the age of passing of the elicited-response false belief task and its spontaneous–response version; 15-month-olds pass the latter while the former is passed only by 4-year-olds. Linguistic and social factors influence the development of the ability to mindread in many ways. There are cultures with folk psychologies significantly different from the Western one, and children from such cultures tend to show different (...)
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  • Memory Without Content? Radical Enactivism and (Post)Causal Theories of Memory.Kourken Michaelian & André Sant’Anna - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):307-335.
    Radical enactivism, an increasingly influential approach to cognition in general, has recently been applied to memory in particular, with Hutto and Peeters New directions in the philosophy of memory, Routledge, New York, 2018) providing the first systematic discussion of the implications of the approach for mainstream philosophical theories of memory. Hutto and Peeters argue that radical enactivism, which entails a conception of memory traces as contentless, is fundamentally at odds with current causal and postcausal theories, which remain committed to a (...)
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  • Imagining the Past Reliably and Unreliably: Towards a Virtue Theory of Memory.Kourken Michaelian - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7477-7507.
    Philosophers of memory have approached the relationship between memory and imagination from two very different perspectives. Advocates of the causal theory of memory, on the one hand, have motivated their preferred theory by appealing to the intuitive contrast between successfully remembering an event and merely imagining it. Advocates of the simulation theory, on the other hand, have motivated their preferred theory by appealing to empirical evidence for important similarities between remembering the past and imagining the future. Recently, causalists have argued (...)
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  • Editorial: Enaction and Ecological Psychology: Convergences and Complementarities.Marek McGann, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Manuel Heras-Escribano & Anthony Chemero - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
  • Remembering the Personal Past: Beyond the Boundaries of Imagination.Christopher Jude McCarroll - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
  • The Boundaries and Location of Consciousness as Identity Theories Deem Fit.Riccardo Manzotti - 2021 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (3):225-241.
    : In this paper I approach the problem of the boundaries and location of consciousness in a strictly physicalist way. I start with the debate on extended cognition, pointing to two unresolved issues: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. I then propose using identity to single out the physical basis of consciousness. As a tentative solution, I consider Mind-Object Identity and compare it with other identity theories of mind. Keywords: Extended Mind; Spread Mind; Enactivism; Cognition; (...)
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  • Teleosemantics and the Hard Problem of Content.Stephen Francis Mann & Ross Pain - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (1):22-46.
    Hutto and Myin claim that teleosemantics cannot account for mental content. In their view, teleosemantics accounts for a poorer kind of relation between cognitive states and the world but lacks the theoretical tools to account for a richer kind. We show that their objection imposes two criteria on theories of content: a truth-evaluable criterion and an intensionality criterion. For the objection to go through, teleosemantics must be subject to both these criteria and must fail to satisfy them. We argue that (...)
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  • I Am Mind, Therefore I Am Map. Mapping as Extended Spatio-Temporal Process.Sonia Malvica & Alessandro Capodici - 2021 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (3):242-253.
    : The multifaceted nature of the map animates a wide range of debates that reveal its interdisciplinary nature. Our goal is to overcome classical cognitivism harmonizing the fields of neuroscience, geography, and enactivism to promote a holistic view not only of the map, but also of human beings and, more specifically, of the dynamic subject-world relationship. We have retraced the spatiality of the body and described the spatial dimension of implicit and explicit bodily skills and properties involved in the exploration (...)
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  • Wittgenstein’s Challenge to Enactivism.Victor Loughlin - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):391-404.
    Many authors have identified a link between later Wittgenstein and enactivism. But few have also recognised how Wittgenstein may in fact challenge enactivist approaches. In this paper, I consider one such challenge. For example, Wittgenstein is well known for his discussion of seeing-as, most famously through his use of Jastrow’s ambiguous duck-rabbit picture. Seen one way, the picture looks like a duck. Seen another way, the picture looks like a rabbit. Drawing on some of Wittgenstein’s remarks about seeing-as, I show (...)
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  • Why Enactivists Should Care About Wittgenstein.Victor Loughlin - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (3):1083-1095.
    There is now an established literature on the link between later Wittgenstein and enactivist approaches in cognitive science. However, is this link not just a matter for card carrying Wittgensteinians? Can enactivists not manage perfectly well without Wittgenstein? In this paper, I show why some enactivists should care about Wittgenstein. Focusing on the enactivist view, “Sensorimotor Identity”. I argue that proponents of this view can use Wittgensteinian considerations to resolve an issue confronting their view and thereby shore up their proposed (...)
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  • A Radical Reassessment of the Body in Social Cognition.Jessica Lindblom - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • Discursive Habits: A Representationalist Re-Reading of Teleosemiotics.Catherine Legg - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):14751-14768.
    Enactivism has influentially argued that the traditional intellectualist ‘act-content’ model of intentionality is insufficient both phenomenologically and naturalistically, and minds are built from world-involving bodily habits – thus, knowledge should be regarded as more of a skilled performance than an informational encoding. Radical enactivists have assumed that this insight must entail non-representationalism concerning at least basic minds. But what if it could be shown that representation is itself a form of skilled performance? I sketch the outline of such an account (...)
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  • In Search of an Ontology for 4E Theories: From New Mechanism to Causal Powers Realism.Charles Lassiter & Joseph Vukov - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9785-9808.
    Embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended theorists do not typically focus on the ontological frameworks in which they develop their theories. One exception is 4E theories that embrace New Mechanism. In this paper, we endorse the New Mechanist’s general turn to ontology, but argue that their ontology is not the best on the market for 4E theories. Instead, we advocate for a different ontology: causal powers realism. Causal powers realism posits that psychological manifestations are the product of mental powers, and that (...)
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  • Secret Charades: Reply to Hutto.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1183-1187.
    In reply to Daniel Hutto’s “Getting Real About Pretense,“ I defend my theory of pretense against his claim that it is subject to counterexamples by clarifying wherein the value of the analysis lies. Then I argue that the central challenge still facing Hutto’s “primacy of practice” approach, as well as other 4E approaches to pretense, is to explain the link between pretense and deception.
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  • Making Too Many Enemies: Hutto and Myin’s Attack on Computationalism.Jesse Kuokkanen & Anna-Mari Rusanen - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):282-294.
    We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem (...)
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  • Preferential Engagement and What Can We Learn from Online Chess?Vadim Kulikov - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (4):617-636.
    An online game of chess against a human opponent appears to be indistinguishable from a game against a machine: both happen on the screen. Yet, people prefer to play chess against other people despite the fact that machines surpass people in skill. When the philosophers of 1970’s and 1980’s argued that computers will never surpass us in chess, perhaps their intuitions were rather saying “Computers will never be favored as opponents”? In this paper we analyse through the introduced concepts of (...)
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  • Scaling-Up Skilled Intentionality to Linguistic Thought.Julian Kiverstein & Erik Rietveld - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):175-194.
    Cognition has traditionally been understood in terms of internal mental representations, and computational operations carried out on internal mental representations. Radical approaches propose to reconceive cognition in terms of agent-environment dynamics. An outstanding challenge for such a philosophical project is how to scale-up from perception and action to cases of what is typically called ‘higher-order’ cognition such as linguistic thought, the case we focus on in this paper. Perception and action are naturally described in terms of agent-environment dynamics, but can (...)
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  • A New, Better BET: Rescuing and Revising Basic Emotion Theory.Michael David Kirchhoff, Daniel D. Hutto & Ian Robertson - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:1-12.
    Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, has dominated the affective sciences for decades (Ekman, 1972, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011). It has been highly influential, driving a number of empirical lines of research (e.g., in the context of facial expression detection, neuroimaging studies and evolutionary psychology). Nevertheless, BET has been criticized by philosophers, leading to calls for it to be jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016). This paper defuses those criticisms. In addition, it shows (...)
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  • The Brittleness of Expertise and Why It Matters.Daniel Kilov - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3431-3455.
    Expertise has become a topic of increased interest to philosophers. Fascinating in its own right, expertise also plays a crucial role in several philosophical debates. My aim in this paper is to draw attention to an important, and hitherto unappreciated feature of expertise: its brittleness. Experts are often unable to transfer their proficiency in one domain to other, even intuitively similar domains. Experts are often unable to flexibly respond to changes within their domains. And, even more surprisingly, experts will occasionally (...)
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  • Phenomenology and Naturalism in Autopoietic and Radical Enactivism: Exploring Sense-Making and Continuity From the Top Down.Hayden Kee - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 9):2323-2343.
    Radical and autopoietic enactivists disagree concerning how to understand the concept of sense-making in enactivist discourse and the extent of its distribution within the organic domain. I situate this debate within a broader conflict of commitments to naturalism on the part of radical enactivists, and to phenomenology on the part of autopoietic enactivists. I argue that autopoietic enactivists are in part responsible for the obscurity of the notion of sense-making by attributing it univocally to sentient and non-sentient beings and following (...)
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  • Re-conceptualizing the role of stimuli: an enactive, ecological explanation of spontaneous-response tasks.Alan Jurgens - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):915-934.
    This paper addresses a challenge proposed against non-mindreading explanations of infant spontaneous-response task data. The challenge is a foundational assumption of mindreading explanations best summed up by Carruthers : 141-172, 2013, Consciousness and Cognition, 36: 498-507, 2015) claim that only by appealing to a theory of mind is it possible to explain infant responses in spontaneous-response false-belief tasks when there are no one-to-one correspondences between observable behavior and mental states. Heyes, 131–143, 2014a, Developmental Science, 17, 647–659. b) responds to this (...)
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  • Selfless Activity and Experience: Radicalizing Minimal Self-Awareness.Daniel D. Hutto & Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):509-520.
    This paper explicates how we might positively understand the distinctive, nonconceptual experience of our own actions and experiences by drawing on insights from a radically enactive take on phenomenal experience. We defend a late-developing relationalism about the emergence of explicit, conceptually based self-awareness, proposing that the latter develops in tandem with the mastery of self-reflective narrative practices. Focusing on the case of human newborns, Sect. 1 reviews and rejects claims that the capacities of actors to keep track of aspects of (...)
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  • Re-Doing the Math: Making Enactivism Add Up.Daniel Hutto - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):827-837.
    Mathematical cognition is widely regarded as the epitome of the kind of cognition that systematically eludes enactivist treatment. It is the parade example of abstract, disembodied cognition if ever there was one. As it is such an important test case, this paper focuses squarely on what Gallagher has to say about mathematical cognition in Enactivist Interventions. Gallagher explores a number of possible theories that he holds could provide useful fodder for developing an adequate enactivist account of mathematical cognition. Yet if (...)
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  • Re-affirming experience, presence, and the world: setting the RECord straight in reply to Noë.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):971-989.
    This paper responds to Alva Noë’s general critique of Radical Enactivism. In particular, it responds to his claim that Radical Enactivism denies experience, presence and the world. We clarify Radical Enactivism’s actual arguments and positive commitments in this regard. Finally, we assess how Radical Enactvism stands up in comparison with Noë’s own version of Sensorimotor Knowledge Enactivism.
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  • Much Ado About Nothing? Why Going Non-Semantic is Not Merely Semantics.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):187-203.
    This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds. How we answer determines which theoretical framework the sciences of mind ought to embrace. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Rowlands’s argument that the RTM-question is a bad question and that attempts to answer it, one (...)
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  • Getting Into Predictive Processing’s Great Guessing Game: Bootstrap Heaven or Hell?Daniel Hutto - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2445-2458.
    Predictive Processing accounts of Cognition, PPC, promise to forge productive alliances that will unite approaches that are otherwise at odds. Can it? This paper argues that it can’t—or at least not so long as it sticks with the cognitivist rendering that Clark and others favor. In making this case the argument of this paper unfolds as follows: Sect. 1 describes the basics of PPC—its attachment to the idea that we perceive the world by guessing the world. It then details the (...)
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  • Explaining Embodied Emotions – with and Without Representations.Rebekka Hufendiek - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):319-331.
    Embodied accounts have offered a theoretical framework in which emotions are understood to be patterned embodied responses that are about core relational themes. Some authors argue that this intentionality should be understood in terms of some kind of non-conceptual representation format, while others suggest a radical enactivist framework that takes emotions to be intentional but not representational. In this paper I will argue that the abstract nature of the core relational themes emotions are about and the interrelatedness of emotions with (...)
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  • Cognition Without Neural Representation: Dynamics of a Complex System.Inês Hipólito - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    This paper proposes an account of neurocognitive activity without leveraging the notion of neural representation. Neural representation is a concept that results from assuming that the properties of the models used in computational cognitive neuroscience must literally exist the system being modelled. Computational models are important tools to test a theory about how the collected data has been generated. While the usefulness of computational models is unquestionable, it does not follow that neurocognitive activity should literally entail the properties construed in (...)
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  • Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference.Inês Hipólito & Thomas van Es - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    This aim of this paper is two-fold: it critically analyses and rejects accounts blending active inference as theory of mind and enactivism; and it advances an enactivist-dynamic understanding of social cognition that is compatible with active inference. While some social cognition theories seemingly take an enactive perspective on social cognition, they explain it as the attribution of mental states to other people, by assuming representational structures, in line with the classic Theory of Mind. Holding both enactivism and ToM, we argue, (...)
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  • Can we trust the phenomenological interview? Metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological objections.Simon Høffding, Kristian Martiny & Andreas Roepstorff - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):33-51.
    The paper defends the position that phenomenological interviews can provide a rich source of knowledge and that they are in no principled way less reliable or less valid than quantitative or experimental methods in general. It responds to several skeptic objections such as those raised against introspection, those targeting the unreliability of episodic memory, and those claiming that interviews cannot address the psychological, cognitive and biological correlates of experience. It argues that the skeptic must either heed the methodological and epistemological (...)
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  • Do Brain Decoders Have an Ontological Mind of Their Own? Response to Nikolas Rose.Claus Halberg - 2019 - Body and Society 25 (4):103-120.
    In a recent article published in Body & Society, Nikolas Rose considers what he takes to be possible historical–ontological implications of recent developments in brain-decoding technologies. He argues that such technologies embody the premise that the brain is the real locus of mental states and processes, hence that a new materialist ontology of thought may be in the process of emerging through technological demonstration rather than through philosophical resolution. In this reply, I offer some reasons for being sceptical about such (...)
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  • Dual Process Theories in Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics: a Critical Review.James D. Grayot - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):105-136.
    Despite their popularity, dual process accounts of human reasoning and decision-making have come under intense scrutiny in recent years. Cognitive scientists and philosophers alike have come to question the theoretical foundations of the ‘standard view’ of dual process theory and have challenged the validity and relevance of evidence in support of it. Moreover, attempts to modify and refine dual process theory in light of these challenges have generated additional concerns about its applicability and refutability as a scientific theory. With these (...)
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  • Corpo Funzionale E Corpo Senziente. La Tesi Forte Del Carattere Incarnato Della Mente in Fenomenologia.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2022 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (1):41-56.
    In questo lavoro distinguo tra due versioni della tesi del carattere incarnato della mente: “debole” e “forte”. Secondo la versione debole, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo che si muove ed agisce nell’ambiente, ossia un corpo funzionale. Secondo la versione forte, invece, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo non solo funzionale ma anche senziente, ossia: il corpo come sede della sensibilità o coscienza fenomenica. Sostengo che alcuni approcci all’interno della “scienza cognitiva incarnata” (...)
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  • Replies to Barrett, Corris and Chemero, and Hutto.Shaun Gallagher - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):839-851.
    In this essay, I respond to the critical remarks of Louise Barrett, Amanda Corris and Anthony Chemero, and Daniel Hutto on my book Enactivist Interventions. In doing so, I consider whether behaviorism can make a contribution to enactivist theory, whether synergies are the same as dynamical gestalts, and whether the brain can add anything to mathematical reasoning.
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  • Prospecting Performance: Rehearsal and the Nature of Imagination.Shaun Gallagher & Zuzanna Rucińska - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4523-4541.
    In this paper we explore the notion of rehearsal as a way to develop an embodied and enactive account of imagining. After reviewing the neuroscience of motor imagery, we argue, in the context of performance studies, that rehearsal includes forms of imagining that involve motor processes. We draw on Sartre’s phenomenology of imagining which also suggests that imagining involves motor processes. This research in neuroscience and phenomenology, supports the idea of an embodied and enactive account of imagination.
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  • RECkoning with the Stakes in Overcoming Representation-Hungry Problem Domains.Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):517-532.
    The paper reviews the current state of play around anti-representationalist attempts at countering Clark and Toribio’s representation-hunger thesis. It introduces a distinction between different approaches to Chemero’s Radical embodied cognition thesis in the form of, on the one hand, those pushing a hard line and, on the other, those who are more relaxed about their anti-representationalist commitments. In terms of overcoming Clark and Toribio’s thesis, hardliners seek to avoid any mentioning of mental content in the activity they purport to explain. (...)
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  • Autonomous Technologies in Human Ecologies: Enlanguaged Cognition, Practices and Technology.Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen & Stephen J. Cowley - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (2):687-699.
    Advanced technologies such as drones, intelligent algorithms and androids have grave implications for human existence. With the purpose of exploring their basis for doing so, the paper proposes a framework for investigating the complex relationship between such devices and human practices and language-mediated cognition. Specifically, it centers on the importance of the typically neglected intermediate layer of culture which not only drives both technophobia and philia but also, more fundamentally, connects pre-reflective experience and socio-material practices by placing advanced technologies in (...)
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  • Book Review: Ecology of the Brain: The Phenomenology and Biology of the Embodied Mind. [REVIEW]Tom Froese - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Shannon + Friston = Content: Intentionality in Predictive Signaling Systems.Carrie Figdor - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2793-2816.
    What is the content of a mental state? This question poses the problem of intentionality: to explain how mental states can be about other things, where being about them is understood as representing them. A framework that integrates predictive coding and signaling systems theories of cognitive processing offers a new perspective on intentionality. On this view, at least some mental states are evaluations, which differ in function, operation, and normativity from representations. A complete naturalistic theory of intentionality must account for (...)
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  • In Defense of Pluralist Theory.Anika Fiebich - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6815-6834.
    In this article I defend pluralist theory against various objections. First, I argue that although traditional theories may also account for multiple ways to achieve social understanding, they still put some emphasis on one particular epistemic strategy. Pluralist theory, in contrast, rejects the so-called ‘default assumption’ that there is any primary or default method in social understanding. Second, I illustrate that pluralist theory needs to be distinguished from integration theory. On one hand, integration theory faces the difficulty of trying to (...)
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  • Between Vision and Action: Introduction to the Special Issue.Gabriele Ferretti & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):3899-3911.
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  • Is Radically Enactive Imagination Really Contentless?Marco Facchin - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1089-1105.
    Radical enactivists claim that cognition is split in two distinct kinds, which can be differentiated by how they relate to mental content. In their view, basic cognitive activities involve no mental content whatsoever, whereas linguistically scaffolded, non-basic, cognitive activities constitutively involve the manipulation of mental contents. Here, I evaluate how this dichotomy applies to imagination, arguing that the sensory images involved in basic acts of imaginations qualify as vehicles of content, contrary to what radical enactivists claim. To argue so, I (...)
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  • Against Radical Enactivism’s Narrowmindedness About Phenomenality.Juan Camilo Espejo-Serna - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):213-228.
    Radical Enactivism rejects representationalism but nonetheless allows the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as supervening on brain bound elements. In this paper, I argue that Radical Enactivism should reject the possibility of wholly brain-bound phenomenal experience. I propose a way of individuating perceptual experiences that does not depend on representationalism and raises a problem to the view defended by Hutto and Myin according to which, with respect to phenomenality, it is possible to adopt a view that partly construes experience in (...)
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  • Intellectualizing Know How.Benjamin Elzinga - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-20.
    Following Gilbert Ryle’s arguments, many philosophers took it for granted that someone knows how to do something just in case they have the ability to do it. Within the last couple decades, new intellectualists have challenged this longstanding anti-intellectualist assumption. Their central contention is that mere abilities aren’t on the same rational, epistemic level as know how. My goal is to intellectualize know how without over-intellectualizing it. Intelligent behavior is characteristically flexible or responsive to novelty, and the distinctive feature of (...)
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  • Pretense: The Context of Possibilities.Monika Dunin-Kozicka & Arkadiusz Gut - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1107-1130.
    In this paper, we deal with the issue of how it is possible for pretending children to engage in exploratory performances and entertain alternative states of affairs. We question the approach according to which pretenders must be capable of counterfactual reasoning. Instead, we follow an alternative action-based framework on cognition and thus pretense, which argues for a much more profound role of the context of play than the questioned Counterfactual Thinking Approach to Pretense (CTAP). First, we motivate this shift in (...)
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