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Erik Myin
University of Antwerp
  1. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2013 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    In this book, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds -- basic minds -- are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of ...
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  2.  71
    Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    An extended argument that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. -/- Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms (...)
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  3. Representation-Hunger Reconsidered.Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3639-3648.
    According to a standard representationalist view cognitive capacities depend on internal content-carrying states. Recent alternatives to this view have been met with the reaction that they have, at best, limited scope, because a large range of cognitive phenomena—those involving absent and abstract features—require representational explanations. Here we challenge the idea that the consideration of cognition regarding the absent and the abstract can move the debate about representationalism along. Whether or not cognition involving the absent and the abstract requires the positing (...)
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  4. Extensive Enactivism: Why Keep It All In?Daniel D. Hutto, Michael D. Kirchhoff & Erik Myin - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8 (706).
    Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from representationalism toward pure, empirical functionalism fails to provide a substantive “mark of the cognitive” and is bereft of other adequate means for individuating (...)
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  5. The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation in Its Place.Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin, Anco Peeters & Farid Zahnoun - 2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. London: Routledge. pp. 272-282.
    The mainstream view in cognitive science is that computation lies at the basis of and explains cognition. Our analysis reveals that there is no compelling evidence or argument for thinking that brains compute. It makes the case for inverting the explanatory order proposed by the computational basis of cognition thesis. We give reasons to reverse the polarity of standard thinking on this topic, and ask how it is possible that computation, natural and artificial, might be based on cognition and not (...)
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  6. Is Trilled Smell Possible? How the Structure of Olfaction Determines the Phenomenology of Smell.Ed Cooke & Erik Myin - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):59-95.
    Smell 'sensations' are among the most mysterious of conscious experiences, and have been cited in defense of the thesis that the character of perceptual experience is independent of the physical events that seem to give rise to it. Here we review the scientific literature on olfaction, and we argue that olfaction has a distinctive profile in relation to the other modalities, on four counts: in the physical nature of the stimulus, in the sensorimotor interactions that characterize its use, in the (...)
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  7.  37
    Reincarnating the Identity Theory.Erik Myin & Farid Zahnoun - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9 (3):1--9.
  8.  15
    A Twofold Tale of One Mind: Revisiting REC’s Multi-Storey Story.Erik Myin & Jasper C. Van den Herik - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12175-12193.
    The Radical Enactive/embodied view of Cognition, or REC, claims that all cognition is a matter of skilled performance. Yet REC also makes a distinction between basic and content-involving cognition, arguing that the development of basic to content-involving cognition involves a kink. It might seem that this distinction leads to problematic gaps in REC’s story. We address two such alleged gaps in this paper. First, we identify and reply to the concern that REC leads to an “interface problem”, according to which (...)
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  9. Enactive Vision.Erik Myin & Jan Degenaar - 2014 - In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge. pp. 90-98.
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  10.  96
    Color and the Duplication Assumption.Erik Myin - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):61-77.
    Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some ofthe spatial cases. This is due (...)
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  11. Perception With Compensatory Devices: From Sensory Substitution to Sensorimotor Extension.Malika Auvray & Erik Myin - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (6):1036–1058.
    Sensory substitution devices provide through an unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality, e.g., audition) access to features of the world that are normally accessed through another sensory modality (the substituted modality, e.g., vision). In this article, we address the question of which sensory modality the acquired perception belongs to. We have recourse to the four traditional criteria that have been used to define sensory modalities: sensory organ, stimuli, properties, and qualitative experience (Grice, 1962), to which we have added the criteria (...)
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  12.  44
    Perceptual Consciousness, Access to Modality and Skill Theories: A Way to Naturalize Phenomenology?Erik Myin & J. Kevin O'Regan - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1):27-45.
    We address the thesis recently proposed by Andy Clark, that skill-mediated access to modality implies phenomenal feel. We agree that a skill theory of perception does indeed offer the possibility of a satisfactory account of the feel of perception, but we claim that this is not only through explanation of access to modality but also because skill actually provides access to perceptual property in general. We illustrate and substantiate our claims by reference to the recently proposed 'sensorimotor contingency' theory of (...)
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  13.  25
    REC: Just Radical Enough.Erik Myin & Daniel D. Hutto - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):61-71.
    We address some frequently encountered criticisms of Radical Embodied/Enactive Cognition. Contrary to the claims that the position is too radical, or not sufficiently so, we claim REC is just radical enough.
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  14. Sensory Consciousness Explained (Better) in Terms of 'Corporality' and 'Alerting Capacity'.Erik Myin - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.
    How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do (...)
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  15. Neural Representations Not Needed - No More Pleas, Please.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):241-256.
    Colombo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2012) argues that we have compelling reasons to posit neural representations because doing so yields unique explanatory purchase in central cases of social norm compliance. We aim to show that there is no positive substance to Colombo’s plea—nothing that ought to move us to endorse representationalism in this domain, on any level. We point out that exposing the vices of the phenomenological arguments against representationalism does not, on its own, advance the case for representationalism (...)
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  16.  15
    On the Importance of Correctly Locating Content: Why and How REC Can Afford Affordance Perception.Erik Myin - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):25-39.
    REC, or the radical enactive/embodied view of cognition makes a crucial distinction between basic and content-involving cognition. This paper clarifies REC’s views on basic and content-involving cognition, and their relation by replying to a recent criticism claiming that REC is refuted by evidence on affordance perception. It shows how a correct understanding of how basic and contentless cognition relate allows to see how REC can accommodate this evidence, and thus can afford affordance perception.
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  17.  23
    Reasons for pragmatism: affording epistemic contact in a shared environment.Ludger van Dijk & Erik Myin - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):973-997.
    Theorizing about perception is often motivated by a belief that without a way of ensuring that our perceptual experience correctly reflects the external world we cannot be sure that we perceive the world at all. Historically, coming up with a way of securing such epistemic contact has been a foundational issue in psychology. Recent ecological and enactive approaches challenge the requirement for perception to attain epistemic contact. This article aims to explicate this pragmatic starting point and the new direction of (...)
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  18.  35
    The Extent of Memory. From Extended to Extensive Mind.Karim Zahidi & Erik Myin - 2015 - In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 391-408.
  19.  17
    Phenomenal Consciousness Explained (Better) in Terms of Bodiliness and Grabbiness.J. Kevin O’Regan, Erik Myin & Alva NOë - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.
    How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do (...)
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  20.  66
    Skill, Corporality and Alerting Capacity in an Account of Sensory Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë - 2006 - In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
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  21.  43
    Much Ado About Nothing? Why Going Non-Semantic is Not Merely Semantics.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):187-203.
    This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds. How we answer determines which theoretical framework the sciences of mind ought to embrace. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Rowlands’s argument that the RTM-question is a bad question and that attempts to answer it, one (...)
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  22.  5
    Reasons for pragmatism: affording epistemic contact in a shared environment.Ludger van Dijk & Erik Myin - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):973-997.
    Theorizing about perception is often motivated by a belief that without a way of ensuring that our perceptual experience correctly reflects the external world we cannot be sure that we perceive the world at all. Historically, coming up with a way of securing such epistemic contact has been a foundational issue in psychology. Recent ecological and enactive approaches challenge the requirement for perception to attain epistemic contact. This article aims to explicate this pragmatic starting point and the new direction of (...)
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  23.  5
    Reasons for Pragmatism: Affording Epistemic Contact in a Shared Environment.Erik Myin & Ludger Dijk - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):973-997.
    Theorizing about perception is often motivated by a belief that without a way of ensuring that our perceptual experience correctly reflects the external world we cannot be sure that we perceive the world at all. Historically, coming up with a way of securing such epistemic contact has been a foundational issue in psychology. Recent ecological and enactive approaches challenge the requirement for perception to attain epistemic contact. This article aims to explicate this pragmatic starting point and the new direction of (...)
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  24.  31
    An Account of Color Without a Subject?Erik Myin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):42-43.
    While color realism is endorsed, Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) case for it stretches the notion of “physical property” beyond acceptable bounds. It is argued that a satisfactory account of color should do much more to respond to antirealist intuitions that flow from the specificity of color experience, and a pointer to an approach that does so is provided.
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  25.  11
    Two Sciences of Perception and Visual Art: Editorial Introduction to the Brussels Papers.Erik Myin - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):8-9.
    Two kinds of vision science are distinguished: a representational versus a nonrepresentational one. Seeing in the former is conceived of as creating an internal replica of the external world, while in the latter seeing is taken to be a process of active engagement with the environment. The potential of each theory for elucidating artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation is considered, necessarily involving some comments on visual consciousness. This discussion is intended as a background against which various themes of the papers (...)
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  26.  8
    The Is and Oughts of Remembering.Erik Myin & Ludger van Dijk - 2022 - Topoi 41 (2):275-285.
    One can be reproached for not remembering. Remembering and forgetting shows who and what one values. Indeed, memory is constitutively normative. Theoretical approaches to memory should be sensitive to this normative character. We will argue that traditional views that consider memory as the storing and retrieval of mental content, fail to consider the practices we need for telling the truth about our past. We introduce the Radically Enactive view of Cognition, or REC, as well-placed to recognize the central role of (...)
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  27.  14
    Re-affirming experience, presence, and the world: setting the RECord straight in reply to Noë.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):971-989.
    This paper responds to Alva Noë’s general critique of Radical Enactivism. In particular, it responds to his claim that Radical Enactivism denies experience, presence and the world. We clarify Radical Enactivism’s actual arguments and positive commitments in this regard. Finally, we assess how Radical Enactvism stands up in comparison with Noë’s own version of Sensorimotor Knowledge Enactivism.
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  28.  35
    Explaining the Computational Mind, by Marcin Milkowski.Erik Myin & Karim Zahidi - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):951-954.
  29. Enacting is Enough.Erik Myin & Daniel D. Hutto - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1):24-30.
    In the action-space account of color, an emphasis is laid on implicit knowledge when it comes to experience, and explanatory ambitions are expressed. If the knowledge claims are interpreted in a strong way, the action-space account becomes a form of conservative enactivism, which is a kind of cognitivism. Only if the knowledge claims are weakly interpreted, the action space-account can be seen as a distinctive form of enactivism, but then all reductive explanatory ambitions must be abandoned.
     
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  30. From a Sensorimotor Account of Perception to an Interactive Approach to Psychopathology.Erik Myin, Kevin O'Regan & Inez Myin-Germeys - 2015 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  31.  25
    Phenomenal Consciousness Lite: No Thanks!J. Kevin O'Regan & Erik Myin - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):520-521.
    The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.
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  32.  51
    The Structure of Color Experience and the Existence of Surface Colors.Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-17.
    Color experience is structured. Some ?unique? colors (red, green, yellow, and blue) appear as ?pure,? or containing no trace of any other color. Others can be considered as a mixture of these colors, or as ?binary colors.? According to a widespread assumption, this unique/binary structure of color experience is to be explained in terms of neurophysiological structuring (e.g., by opponent processes) and has no genuine explanatory basis in the physical stimulus. The argument from structure builds on these assumptions to argue (...)
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  33.  91
    Toward an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of "Bodiliness" and "Grabbiness".Kevin J. O'Regan, Erik Myin & No - 2001 - In A. Carsetti (ed.), Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal con- sciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the _problem _of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes.
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  34. Uitgebreid, complementair, of omvattend? Het waar en het hoe van het mentale.Erik Myin & Karim Zahidi - 2012 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 104 (3).
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  35.  31
    Beyond Intrinsicness and Dazzling Blacks.Erik Myin - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):964-965.
    Palmer's target article is surely one of the most scientifically detailed and knowledgeable treatments of spectrum inversion ever. Unfortunately, it is built on a very shaky philosophical foundation, the notion of the "intrinsic". In the article's ontology, there are two kinds of properties of mental states, intrinsic properties and relational properties. The whole point of the article is that these aspects of experience are mutually exclusive: the intrinsic is nonrelational and the relational is nonintrinsic.
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  36. A Short Review of Consciousness in Action by Susan Hurley.Axel Cleeremans & Erik Myin - 1999 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3:455-458.
    Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which (...)
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  37.  19
    Het bereik van het mentale.Erik| Zahidi Myin & Karim Zahidi - 2012 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74 (1):103.
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  38. Radical Embodied Cognitive Science.Erik Myin - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):295 - 299.
  39. The matter of the mind. Philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience, and reduction. [REVIEW]Erik Myin - 2009 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 101 (2):157-159.
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  40.  35
    Yesterday Life, Tomorrow Consciousness?: The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach, Christof Koch . Englewood, CO: Roberts, 2004, (429 Pp; $45.00 Hbk; ISBN 0974707708).Erik Myin & Johan Veldeman - 2007 - Biological Theory 2 (4):424-427.
  41. Some Problems for Fodor's Theory of Content.Erik Myin - 1992 - Philosophica 50 (2):101-122.
  42. Direct Perception in Mathematics: A Case for Epistemological Priority.Bart Kerkhove & Erik Myin - 2002 - Logique Et Analyse 45.
  43. Holism, Functionalism and Visual Awareness.Erik Myin - 1998 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 31 (1):3-19.
     
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  44. Is bewustzijn louter representatie?Erik Myin - 2005 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 2:157-159.
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  45. Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Quining Kinds of Content: The Primacy of Experience.Erik Myin - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):72-77.
  46. Constrained Inversions of Sensations.Erik Myin - 2001 - Philosophica 68.
    Inverted sensation arguments such as the inverted spectrum thought experiment are often criticized for relying on an unconstrained notion of 'qualia'. In reply to this criticism, 'qualia-free' arguments for inversion have been proposed, in which only physical changes happen: inversions in the world, such as the replacement of surface colors by their complements, and a rewiring of peripheral input cables to more central areas in the nervous system. I show why such constrained inversion arguments won't work. The first problem is (...)
     
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  47. Constrained Inversions of Sensations.Erik Myin - 2001 - Philosophica (Belgium) 68 (2):31-40.
    Inverted sensation arguments such as the inverted spectrum thought experiment are often criticized for relying on an unconstrained notion of 'qualia'. In reply to this criticism, 'qualia-free' arguments for inversion have been proposed, in which only physical changes happen: inversions in the world, such as the replacement of surface colors by their complements, and a rewiring of peripheral input cables to more central areas in the nervous system. I show why such constrained inversion arguments won't work. The first problem is (...)
     
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  48. Feelings and Objects.Erik Myin & Lars De Nul - 2006 - In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
  49.  42
    Towards an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts Of.Erik Myin - unknown
    In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the problem of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes?behavioral, neural, computational?can produce experience. Numerous thinkers have argued that phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained in functional, neural or information-processing terms (e.g. Block 1990, 1994; Chalmers 1996). Different arguments have been put forward. For example, it has been argued that two individuals could be exactly alike in functional/computational/behavioral measures, but differ in the character of their (...)
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  50. Quining Kinds of Content: The Primacy of Experience.Erik Myin - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):72-76.
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