If stem cell-based therapies are developed, we will likely confront a difficult problem of justice: for biological reasons alone, the new therapies might benefit only a limited range of patients. In fact, they might benefit primarily white Americans, thereby exacerbating long-standing differences in health and health care.

We report on the deliberations of an interdisciplinary group of experts in science, law, and philosophy who convened to discuss novel ethical and policy challenges in stem cell research. In this report we discuss the ethical and policy implications of safety concerns in the transition from basic laboratory research to clinical applications of cell-based therapies derived from stem cells. Although many features of this transition from lab to clinic are common to other therapies, three aspects of stem cell biology pose (...) unique challenges. First, tension regarding the use of human embryos may complicate the scientific development of safe and effective cell lines. Second, because human stem cells were not developed in the laboratory until 1998, few safety questions relating to human applications have been addressed in animal research. Third, preclinical and clinical testing of biologic agents, particularly those as inherently complex as mammalian cells, present formidable challenges, such as the need to develop suitable standardized assays and the difficulty of selecting appropriate patient populations for early phase trials. We recommend that scientists, policy makers, and the public discuss these issues responsibly, and further, that a national advisory committee to oversee human trials of cell therapies be established. **NB we did not reccommend a NAC, we think it might be appropriate**. (shrink)

The coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) has caused shortages of life-sustaining medical resources, and future waves of the virus may cause further scarcity. The Yale New Haven Health System developed a triage protocol to allocate scarce medical resources during the COVID-19 pandemic, with the primary goal of saving the most lives possible, and a secondary goal of making triage assessments and decisions consistent, transparent, and fair. We outline the process of developing the protocol, summarize the protocol, and discuss the major ethical challenges (...) encountered, along with our answers to the challenges. These challenges include (1) the role of age and chronic comorbidities; (2) evaluating children and pregnant patients; (3) racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in health; (4) prioritization of healthcare workers; and (5) balancing clinical judgment versus protocolized assessments.We conclude with a review of the limitations of our protocol and the lessons learned. We hope that a robust public discussion of such protocols and the ethical challenges they raise will result in the fairest possible processes, less need for triage, and more lives saved during future waves of the pandemic and similar public health emergencies. (shrink)

In biscuit conditionals (BCs) such as If you’re hungry, there’s pizza in the fridge, the if clause appears to apply to the illocutionary act performed in uttering the main clause, rather than to its propositional content. Accordingly, previous analyses of BCs have focused on illocutionary acts, and, this, I argue, leads them to yield incorrect paraphrases. I propose, instead, that BCs involve existential quantification over potential literal acts such as assertions, questions, commands, and exclamations, the semantic objects associated with declarative, (...) interrogative, imperative, and exclamative sentences, respectively. Such an existential interpretation of BCs requires only that we add potential literal acts to our inventory of individuals, and it produces reasonable paraphrases in which if has its normal meaning: If you’re hungry,[there’s a (relevant/salient) assertion that] there’s pizza in the fridge. These potential literal act variables are introduced into semantic interpretations and then undergo Existential Closure. Hence, we would expect to see similar interpretations in contexts other than BCs, that is, with other if constructions, with connectives other than if, with potential literal acts other than assertion, and in root sentences. This prediction is borne out, along with the parallel prediction that we cannot quantify over purely illocutionary acts like offers, but only over potential literal acts, those conventionally associated with a particular morphosyntactic shape. (shrink)

The facts aboutsuch, then, indicate not just thatsuch is a pro-adjective, but also that binding conditions apply broadly to pro-ADJs and pro-CNs, as well as to a wide range of pro-arguments. If this is true, the CN binding process accomplished by rules (40) and (41) might better be expressed in a system that uses a Cooper (1979) store mechanism. In fact, Stump (p. 144) notes that this could easily be done. Meanings of the type of∨ P n could be stored, (...) just as NP meanings are, until an appropriate binding CN phrase was encountered. Binding conditions would simply require that a∨ P n meaning not come out of storage until the derivation had emerged from its governing category. The behavior of the pro-adjectivesuch suggests that an expression of any category, if it is legitimately translatable as a variable, may be a fullfledged proform; many principles and mechanisms described to account for the widely studied pronouns in fact apply to nonargument categories. (shrink)

Wissen, so lautet die unausgesprochene Maxime der Humanisten und Polyhistoren der Frühen Neuzeit, kann man nie genug erwerben. Riesige Bibliotheken und Kunstkammern sowie voluminöse Abhandlungen, Geschichtswerke und Enzyklopädien geben noch heute eindrucksvoll Rechenschaft von dieser Leidenschaft. Doch wächst mit der Größe jeder Sammlung auch die Notwendigkeit ihrer Ordnung. Es ist daher kein Zufall, dass ›Ordnung‹ zum Schlüsselbegriff des humanistischen Enzyklopädismus aufgestiegen und zum Gegenstand hartnäckiger Auseinandersetzungen unter den Gelehrten geworden ist. In Steffen Siegels Untersuchung werden die vielfältigen philosophischen Versuche, die (...) Fülle des Wissens systematisch zu ordnen, nicht allein anhand der Überlieferung von Texten rekonstruiert. Im Zentrum dieser reich illustrierten Studie, die bei mittelalterlichen Wissenspraktiken ihren Ausgang nimmt, sich insbesondere den vielschichtigen Bildkulturen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts widmet und einen Ausblick auf moderne Visualisierungstechniken bietet, steht die faszinierende Vielfalt jener Bilder, die Ordnungen des Wissens als sichtbare Figuren vor Augen rückten. Die Bedeutung von Schautafeln und Bildallegorien, von wissenschaftlichen Illustrationen und Karten wird, mit Blick auf die Frage nach möglichen Ordnungen des Wissens, in diesem Buch zum ersten Mal übergreifend analysiert. Ein Akzent der Untersuchungen liegt auf der bislang nur wenig erforschten Geschichte des Diagramms in der Frühen Neuzeit. In der Mitte zwischen den Darstellungsmöglichkeiten von Bildern und Texten, standen insbesondere diagrammatische Schemata im Dienst der Konstruktion und der Beglaubigung von Ordnungen des Wissens. Anhand der reichen Tradition frühneuzeitlicher Diagramme lassen sich in hervorragender Weise die Potentiale, aber auch die Probleme eines Zusammenspiels von Wissens-, Ideen- und Mediengeschichte in der Zeit um 1600 ablesen und profilieren. Mit den im Jahr 1587 in Paris publizierten Tableaux legte Montaignes Zeitgenosse Christophe de Savigny eines der erstaunlichsten und reichsten Zeugnisse frühneuzeitlicher Kunst im Dienst einer solchen Wissensgeschichte vor. Das Tafelwerk steht daher im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchungen zu den Figuren enzyklopädischer Wissensordnungen. Erstmals seit seiner Publikation vor über fünfhundert Jahren wird dieses sehr selten gewordene, für die Gelehrtenkultur des 16. Jahrhunderts äußerst repräsentative Werk hier vollständig und in einer farbigen Reproduktion wieder zum Druck gebracht. Die komplexen Strategien, mit Hilfe von Bildern, Diagrammen und Texten für eine bestimmte Wissensordnung zu argumentieren, lassen sich auf diese Weise an einer bedeutenden Quelle der vormodernen Gelehrtengeschichte minutiös nachvollziehen. Die Fülle des Wissens und die Möglichkeiten seiner Ordnung werden dabei als Herausforderungen sichtbar, die in gleicher Weise das Interesse der Kunstgeschichte und der Kulturwissenschaft, der Wissenschafts- und Pädagogikgeschichte und der Philosophie berühren. (shrink)

This study empirically examined the views of Certified Internal Auditors (CIAs) concerning the role of Code of Ethics for members of the Institute of Internal Auditors. It is a continuation of an earlier study which examined the usefulness of the Code to CIAs. Among the questions asked were what is the primary reason for the Code of Ethics, how useful is it, have you used it, should more enforcement actions be taken against members who violate the Code, and what are (...) the legal and moral responsibilities of the CIA to report serious ethical violations, e.g., environmental pollution, to outsiders when top management and the board of directors are aware of the matter but are not doing anything to correct it. The results indicate strong support for the Code, its enforcement, and use as an instrument to encourage the internal flow of ethical behavior by embers and others. (shrink)

We examine when and how police officers may avoid costly errors under stress by leveraging theoretical and empirical work on the biopsychosocial (BPS) model of challenge and threat. According to the BPS model, in motivated performance contexts (e.g., test taking, athletics), the evaluation of situational and task demands in relation to one’s perceived resources available to cope with those demands engenders distinct patterns of peripheral physiological responding. Individuals experience more challenge-like states in which blood circulates more efficiently in the periphery (...) when they evaluate their coping resources as meeting or exceeding the task demands. Conversely, individuals experience more threat-like states in which blood circulates less efficiently in the periphery when they view the situation or task demands as exceeding their coping resources. Patterns of response consistent with challenge and threat states have been shown to predict important performance and decision-making outcomes in stressful contexts, and repeated experiences of threat-like patterns of physiological activity are thought to have detrimental effects on long-term cardiovascular health. To date, however, research has not used the biopsychosocial model to understand police decision-making under stress. Here, we review relevant empirical work from the perspective of the BPS model concerning how minority status and power can shape challenge and threat responding and contribute to decision making under stress. We then detail a research agenda aimed at improving the translational value of research being conducted within the BPS model for understanding complex performance and decision making in the real world, including among law enforcement personnel. (shrink)

R. Emmett Tyrrell, the editor of the neo-conservative monthly The American Spectator, has been justly denounced as a “mean-spirited punk” by fellow writers from The Nation and The New Republic. Tyrrell, a knock-down version of H.L. Mencken, writing without the master's verve or wit, is indeed a pretentious and thoroughly unpleasant fellow whose book The Liberal Crack-Up is given over to a nuke-the-whales humor, i.e., an extended and generally senseless tirade against feminists, peaceniks, environmentalists, etc. It is all the more (...) disturbing, then, to see that in one lucid moment, the chapter on “Whatever Happened to Liberalism,” Tyrrell makes some worthwhile points. (shrink)

A sequence of theoretical models is constructed as an extension to Leszek Nowak's theory of socialist society to explain important characteristics of the violent party purges in Soviet Stalinism. According to these models, purges are a regular and systemic feature of a socialist system during a certain phase of development (modelled as the phase of social enslavement). Contrary to traditional conceptions which interpret the purges essentially as resulting from the actions of an almost omnipotent, and partly irrational, despot, the models (...) presented here provide an explanation which does not need to conceive Stalin as the architect of terror (Robert Conquest), i.e. as the long-term planner of the terror. However, the concepts presented here preserve the vital arguments of the traditional approach, thereby contradicting the revisionist pattern of interpretation. In particular the models seek to provide a theoretical base for an explanation of the moderation of inner-party terror from 1938. This moderation is interpreted as resulting from a modification of the then existing ideology (and corresponding habits of the party's leadership); a modification which in itself had been stimulated by the disastrous effects of the great purge in 1937/38. This modification can be theoretically conceived as a process of ideological learning. The historical fact that the post-war purges (i.e. the Leningrad affair in 1949 and the Mingrelian affair 1951/52) did not reach such an enormous extent as the purges of the late 1930s may thus be attributed to a process of ideological learning. (shrink)

Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences in mainstream epistemology today. An important commitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – responsibilist virtue epistemology (e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Battaly 2006; Baehr 2011) – is that it must provide regulative normative guidance for good thinking. Recently, a number of virtue epistemologists (most notably Baehr, 2013) have held that virtue epistemology not only can provide regulative normative guidance, but moreover that we should reconceive the primary epistemic aim of all education as (...) the inculcation of the intellectual virtues. Baehr’s picture contrasts with another well-known position – that the primary aim of education is the promotion of critical thinking (Scheffler 1989; Siegel 1988; 1997; 2017). In this paper – that we hold makes a contribution to both philosophy of education and epistemology and, a fortiori, epistemology of education – we challenge this picture. We outline three criteria that any putative aim of education must meet and hold that it is the aim of critical thinking, rather than the aim of instilling intellectual virtue, that best meets these criteria. On this basis, we propose a new challenge for intellectual virtue epistemology, next to the well-known empirically-driven ‘situationist challenge’. What we call the ‘pedagogical challenge’ maintains that the intellectual virtues approach does not have available a suitably effective pedagogy to qualify the acquisition of intellectual virtue as the primary aim of education. This is because the pedagogic model of the intellectual virtues approach (borrowed largely from exemplarist thinking) is not properly action-guiding. Instead, we hold that, without much further development in virtue-based theory, logic and critical thinking must still play the primary role in the epistemology of education. (shrink)

This article points out an internal tension, or even conflict, in the conceptual foundations of Harvey Siegel’s conception of critical thinking. Siegel justifies critical thinking, or critically rational autonomy, as an educational ideal first and foremost by an appeal to the Kantian principle of respect for persons. It is made explicit that this fundamental moral principle is ultimately grounded in the Kantian conception of autonomous practical reason as normatively and motivationally robust. Yet this Kantian conception openly conflicts with (...) Siegel’s own two-component theory of critical thinking, which on close inspection turns out to be a version of the Humean conception of instrumental practical reason as normatively and motivationally powerless. It is concluded that Siegel cannot have it both ways: he cannot appeal both to means-end and to robust rationality. Siegel’s Kantian justification of the critical thinking educational ideal is, therefore, found wanting in terms of his own Humean premises. (shrink)

This study aims at measuring the level of unacceptability of certain unethical behaviours for educators in accounting/finance as well as marketing/management in their various roles. The research was conducted utilising a quantitative approach based on the Integrated Social Contracts Theory in order to compare norms of ethically acceptable/unacceptable behaviours of A/F and M/M educators in the context of Kuwait. The population for this study consisted of educators from A/F and M/M from different Business Schools in Kuwait. The results of the (...) study indicate there is general agreement on unacceptable behaviours in academia between the two groups; however, in general, A/F faculty tend to rate nearly all unethical behaviors as slightly more unacceptable than do M/M faculty. While this may possibly indicate that A/F faculty are slightly more ethical, more likely it reflects different ways of perceiving the world among quantitatively vs. qualitatively-oriented faculty. We also compare the results to a prior similar survey conducted by Siegel and Jackson. It seems that the perceived ethics of behaviours differs somewhat among educators in different parts of the world. This study is expected to assist the development of an ethical code in Kuwaiti academe. This in turn will help students to learn about codes of ethics which will govern their future conduct as professionals. (shrink)

An ideal of education is to ensure that our children develop into autonomous critical thinkers. The ‘indoctrination objection’, however, calls into question whether education, aimed at cultivating autonomous critical thinkers, is possible. The core of the concern is that since the young child lacks even modest capacities for assessing reasons, the constituent components of critical thinking have to be indoctrinated if there is to be any hope of the child's attaining the ideal. Our primary objective is to defuse this objection. (...) We argue, first, that even if the indoctrination objection can be dealt with at the level of beliefs by an account that distinguishes between beliefs instilled in the child at the non‐rational stage that are indoctrinative and those that are non‐indoctrinative, there can be non‐autonomous ‘proto critical thinkers’ who lack autonomy with respect to the requisite motivational components. We then ask what must be added to the account to ensure that proto critical thinkers develop into autonomous ones. We suggest that motivational elements, even if instilled at a stage at which the child has insufficiently developed cognitive capacities, can be ‘truly the child's own’ only relationally: the autonomous motivational elements are ones with respect to which the future child is self‐governing. (shrink)

Harvey Siegel argues that minimum competency testing (MCT) is incompatible with strong sense critical thinking. His arguments are reviewed and contrasted with positions held by John E. McPeck and Michael Scriven. Siegel's arguments seem directed against the prevailing form of MCT. However, alternative formats which allow for the aggregate and context-sensitive nature of critical thinking are not doomed to the arbitrariness Siegel finds. MCT may be a legitimate and useful means for furthering critical thinking as one of (...) our educational ideals. (shrink)

Con un amplio espectro de problemáticas organizadas en torno de la naturaleza y contenido de la percepción, Peláez y Cervieri han compilado un libro necesario que cuenta al menos con tres virtudes, dos para lectores especializados y una extra para lectores nuevos. La primera virtud es el carácter significativo de la muestra, a la par de artículos de probada influencia en el ámbito de la filosofía de la mente (como el de Schellenberg y el de Siegel), se agregan artículos (...) novedosos de investigadores consolidados y otros de reciente pero sólida y fructífera trayectoria (tal es el caso de Laura Perez y Miguel Sebastián). Por otra parte, hay artículos que sin abordar directamente la naturaleza de la percepción son clave para la temática del volumen, tal es el caso de la formidable discusión en torno de una teoría naturalista del contenido en el artículo de Hutto y Satne o de la original propuesta de Siegel que analiza el estatus de la inferencia y la estimación. Esto refleja una característica de la disciplina relacionada al borramiento de fronteras con otras ramas linderas a la filosofía de la mente tales como epistemología, filosofía de la acción, filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas o filosofía del lenguaje. Estos cruces provocan una ganancia a la hora de poner en una perspectiva apropiada los problemas filosóficos. (shrink)

Susanna Siegel argues that visual contents are rich: visual experiences represent a variety of properties, over and above mere colors and shapes, including, notably, kind properties, e.g., the property of being a pine tree. To argue her case, she makes use of the method of phenomenal contrasts, which involves choosing among different explanatory hypotheses to account for phenomenal contrasts between relevant experiences. I will argue that there is reason to question whether the method of phenomenal contrasts is suitable for (...) establishing that kind properties are represented in visual experiences, insofar as the method draws upon first-person intuitions eclectically. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, David Botting defended pragma-dialectics against epistemological criticisms by exponents of the epistemological approach to argumentation, i.e. Harvey Siegel, John Biro and me. In particular, Botting tries to justify with new arguments a Functional Claim, that the function of argumentation is to resolve disputes, and a Normative Claim, that standpoints that have the unqualified consensus of all participants in a dispute will generally be epistemically sound. In this reply it is shown that Botting’s (...) arguments are fallacious, that the two Claims are false and that the epistemological approach to argumentation, of course, outclasses pragma-dialectics epistemically and is at least as good as it in other respects. (shrink)

If knowing requires believing on the basis of evidence that entails what’s believed, we have hardly any knowledge at all. Hence the near-universal acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology: if it's true that "we are all fallibilists now" (Siegel 1997: 164), that's because denying that one can know on the basis of non-entailing evidence1is, it seems, not an option if we're to preserve the very strong appearance that we do know many things (Cohen 1988: 91). Hence the significance of concessive (...) knowledge attributions (CKAs) (Rysiew 2001)—i.e., sentences of the form 'S knows that p, but it's possible that q' (where q entails not-p). To many, utterances of such sentences sound very odd indeed. According to David Lewis (1996: 550), however, such sentences are merely "overt, explicit" statements of fallibilism; if so, their seeming incoherence suggests that, contrary to our everyday epistemic pretensions, "knowledge must be by definition infallible" after all (ibid.: 549). -/- Recently Jason Stanley (2005) has defended fallibilism against the Lewisian worry that overtly fallibilistic speech is incoherent. According yo Stanley, CKAs are not just odd-sounding: in most cases, they are simply false. But this doesn't impugn fallibilism. Insofar as the odd-sounding utterances Lewis cites state the fallibilist idea, the latter portion thereof ('S cannot eliminate a certain possibility in which not-p', e.g.) expresses the idea that the subject's evidence doesn't entail what's (allegedly) known (hence, the negation of any contrary propositions). According to Stanley, however, this is not the best reading of the possibility clauses CKAs contain. On the correct account of the latter, while the sentences Lewis cites are almost always self-contradictory, they don't capture the fallibilist idea after all. Here, we argue that the sentences in question do express precisely the fallibilist idea, but argue that Lewis has nonetheless failed to raise a problem for the latter. In addition, we respond to worries that the resulting view of the semantics of epistemic possibility statements has certain unacceptable consequences. (shrink)

Since the 80s, educators have supported instruction in critical thinking as “an Educational Ideal.” This should not be a surprise given some of the more common conceptions, e.g., Ennis’s “reasonable reflective thinking on what to believe or do,” or Siegel’s “being appropriately moved by reasons,” as opposed to bias, emotion or wishful thinking. Who would want a doctor, lawyer, or mechanic who could not skillfully evaluate arguments, causes, and cures? So, educators endorsed the dream that, through proper CT instruction, (...) students’ critical skills and “rational passions” could be greatly improved. In spite of the dream’s appeal, the reality is, after 30+ years, there is little reason to think the dream resembles reality. After describing what I take to be an adequate definition of CT, such a depressing conclusion will be supported by CT assessment scores from across academe, the continued widespread disagreement among experts in nearly all fields, including CT, and the abundant psychological research on rationality and decision making. And finally, while the ideal extols the value of objectivity, I shall argue that bias may be unavoidable because personal values play a vital role in the evaluation of many arguments. (shrink)