Eleatics

This article examines the interpretation of Parmenides’ prologue (28 B 1, 1-30 DK) in Sextus’ account of the Criterion of Truth (M. vii 49-260). It proceeds by three ap- proaches, each telling part of the story regarding Sextus’ sources. The rst identi es two sets of source-material by means of the ideas and language. Here basic features of the interpre- tation of the prologue emerge. The second discusses why 28 B 1, 1-30 and 28 B 7, 2-B 8, 2 DK (...) are treated as one continuous whole, showing the kind of interpretation involved in a deliberate decision: making 28 B 8, 1-2 DK into a natural conclusion, referring to a path and to ambition (thymos) as 28 B 1, 1-2 DK had done. The third compares the prologue’s tech- nique of interpretation with the rst of two interpretations of Xenophanes, the interpretation of Pythagorean verse, and the rst of two interpretations of Empedocles, showing how these contrast sharply with the interpretation of Parmenides 28 B 7, 2-B 8, 2 DK and material linked with the briefer source. The amalgamation had originally helped assimilate Parmenides to Plato. Hence the amalgamator is seen as a Platonist with strong literary interests and skilled in the use of quotation. It is no accident that the discursive source is linked with the tradition of Timaeus-interpretation. (shrink)

Dieser Band versammelt eine Auswahl von Vorträgen, die auf dem Platonicum XII Symposium über Platons Parmenides gehalten wurden, vom 15. bis 19. Juli 2019 in Paris. Der Band beinhaltet fünfzig Beiträge, die von der Lebendigkeit und Vielfalt der platonischen Studien zu diesem schwierigen Dialog zeugen. Er gliedert sich in sechs Abschnitte, die einen Weg durch den Dialog nach seinen wichtigsten Artikulationen darstellen: I. An der Schwelle zum Parmenides II. Parmenides im Kontext III. Dialog, Dialektik, Übungen IV. Die Theorie der Formen (...) V. Die Hypothesen VI. Parmenides und seine Rezeption. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that the enigmatic fragment 12 of Parmenides, supplemented by the first part of A.tius II 7.1, represents an unlikely cosmos which comprises alternating spherical crowns of fire and night, surrounding the earth. A comparison of the fragment and A.tius’ text shows that the latter adds nothing substantial to the fragment. Thus, fragment 12 can actually represent the structure of the earth, which consists of a core of fire, is surrounded by the layers of the earth’s crust, (...) into which heat is transmitted from within, and on which the goddess of life dwells. (shrink)

In some of the Aristotelian accounts, Parmenides’ thesis is construed in opposition to the philosophy of nature; on the other hand, he is also depicted, in a different context, as a cosmologist, to whom the Stagirite (and a long tradition afterwards, ending with Simplicius) ascribes a theory of becoming and its principles. In this paper, I exhibit and analyse the relevant passages from Physics I 1-3, Metaphysics I 3 and 5 and On generation and corruption I 3, providing an interpretation (...) that aims to solve the apparent paradox, making sense of the information we can gather from Aristotle’s and Simplicius’ testimonies. Eventually, I propose a construal of the Two Ways of fr. 2 with an emphasis on the predicative reading of einai, which could hint at the Parmenidean approach to cosmology that runs in parallel with the argument on Being. (shrink)

Como é possível extrair filosofia de um texto de quatro ou cinco páginas, arbitrariamente montado ao longo de mil anos de citações na Antiguidade, cujo tamanho original se desconhece, e suas partes, precariamente conectadas, juntam-se a partir de critérios e suposições tardias? Normalmente, nem se quer refletimos sobre questões desse tipo quando tratamos de estudar o pensamento de um autor, pois é comum que o estudo de um filósofo não passe pela história da obra em questão, quando e de que (...) forma ocorreu a transmissão do texto ao longo da história. No presente artigo, teceremos algumas considerações importantes que leitor não familiarizado com o Poema de Parmênides tem de ter para que evite cair em armadilhas e reproduza dogmaticamente interpretações convencionalmente estabelecidas. (shrink)

Dans le livre VI de son commentaire sur le Parménide, Proclus rend compte des interprétations des « hypothèses » du Parménide proposées par ses devanciers. Le présent article étudie l’exégèse des hypothèses par le premier commentateur que Proclus examine, à savoir Amélius, le disciple de Plotin. Après une présentation des vestiges de son commentaire sur le Parménide, j’analyse trois aspects particulièrement intéressants de son exégèse : 1) à la différence de la plupart des commentateurs néoplatoniciens, Amélius distinguait non pas neuf, (...) mais huit hypothèses. Je soutiens que, en considérant la dernière section (Prm. 165e2-166c2) comme dépourvue de tout contenu positif, Amélius la fusionnait avec la précédente – lecture du texte qui n’a pas été reprise par les défenseurs modernes d’une division en huit hypothèses. 2) Amélius suppose que chaque hypothèse décrit une réalité, mais le sens précis de certaines identifications est difficile à saisir : quels sont les trois types de matière associés aux hypothèses 5-7? Ces trois matières correspondent probablement à trois entités qu’Amélius trouvait dans le Timée : la chōra/matière première, le niveau des éléments-traces et l’univers ordonné. 3) Sur un point au moins, l’exégèse d’Amélius contrevient à l’ordre hiérarchique descendant des sujets des hypothèses (procédant de la réalité la plus élevée jusqu’à la dernière), qui était un présupposé incontesté de l’interprétation de tous les commentateurs néoplatoniciens. Je soutiens que cela est dû à un autre principe exégétique, selon lequel la qualité négative d’une hypothèse (à l’exception de la première) signifie une sorte de dégradation de l’entité correspondante. Puisque, dans la deuxième partie du Parménide, les hypothèses négatives alternent avec les positives, ce principe supplémentaire entre en conflit avec la disposition linéaire descendante impliquée par le principe hiérarchique. Dans la conclusion de l’article, je montre comment l’analyse de l’exégèse d’Amélius permet de mieux comprendre le développement ultérieur de l’exégèse ancienne du Parménide. (shrink)

MéThéor - Métaphysique et Théorie de la Connaissance - ULiège [BE].

Em Parmênides 132b-c é afirmado que se as Ideias fossem pensamentos, então as coisas que participam nelas também seriam pensamentos. A afirmação soa estranha dentro da dinâmica,apresentada no corpus platonicum, da “participação” dos entes sensíveis nas Ideias; todavia, não parece simples determinar o motivo desta estranheza. A chave do problema pode ser uma identificação dos tipos de qualidades das Ideias ou Formas nteligíveis que estão implicados na “participação”. Vários especialistas trataram da matéria na segunda metade do século XX (OWEN, 1968; (...) KEYT, 1969 e 1971; VLASTOS, 1972), tendo sempre como ponto de partida a distinção de qualidades das Ideias traçada no texto dos Tópicos de Aristóteles (137b3-13). Nesse sentido, o presente artigo: i) apresenta os conceitos utilizados no tratamento desta matéria pelos exegetas: “atributos ideais”, “atributos próprios”, “Distinção-P”, “Predicação Paulina”, “Predicação Ordinária” e “Autopredicação”; ii) explica a incompatibilidade da distinção aristotélica de qualidades das Ideias (“Distinção-P”) com a ontologia apresentada nos próprios diálogos platônicos (VLASTOS, 1972 e 1973; CHERNISS, 1944); iii) sugere uma nova “Distinção-P”, mostrando sua compatibilidade com essa ontologia; iv) aplica-a ao caso daquela afirmação sobre as Ideias de Parmênides 132b-c, demonstrando a utilidade dessa distinção pela elucidação que ela promove da dinâmica da “participação” nessa passagem. (shrink)

Parmenides believed that he had found the most reliable way of theorizing about ultimate reality. While natural philosophers conceptualized phenomenal differences to explain cosmic change, Parmenides used the least meaningful but most versatile verb in Ancient Greek to engage in a purely intellectual exploration of reality – one that transcended synchronous and asynchronous differences. In this article I explain how the verb εἰμί was useful to Parmenides in his attempt to overcome natural philosophy. First, I argue that the Eleatic philosopher (...) regarded νοεῖν and εἶναι as equivalent because εἰμί-clauses enabled him to express arguably any conceivable content without providing significant additional meaning. I then show that Parmenides’ concept of being implies the present tense and the imperfective aspect but is grounded in the lexical content of the verb εἰμί, which entails no inherent temporal limits. This explains why ἔστι, ἐόν, and εἶναι could be used to indicate unbounded actuality, regardless of whether these forms represented lexical predicates or auxiliaries for predication. Finally, I maintain that the suitability of εἰμί for talking about all kinds of things without introducing temporal limits allowed Parmenides to avoid what he saw as two mistakes made by natural philosophers: identifying ultimate reality with something that cannot cover the full extent of thought and confusing actuality with present occurrence. (shrink)

According to a fragment of Porphyry (410 F Smith = 80 B 2 DK), containing a dialogue on the theme of plagiarism, Plato made use of the same arguments as Protagoras’ Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος against monistic thinkers, most likely the Eleatics. My paper aims to analyse Porphyry’s testimony to assess some aspects of Protagoras’ reflection on being through a comparison with parallel sources, in particular Plato’s dialogues (Theaetetus, Euthydemus, Sophist, Parmenides). I conclude that it is plausible to suppose that, within (...) the framework of a more general reflection on ὀρθοέπεια, Protagoras viewed the notion of being in Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος from a linguistic perspective. (shrink)

Review of: "Zeno and Einstein".

When, in Plato’s Parmenides 155e4–157b5, Parmenides refers to the instant (ἐξαίφνης), he is alluding to a paradox of Zeno, and not to an argument of Plato. Thus, in the second part of the Parmenides, the speaker is a fair representation of the historical Parmenides, and not a figment of Plato’s imagination.

This note addresses the longstanding question of whether Parmenides B6.9 should be read as an allusion to Heraclitus B51. It offers a response to some recent objections that have been raised against such a reading, and in particular draws attention to the reception context of both texts, a topic that has been largely overlooked in the scholarship on this issue.

논문은 『파르메니데스』편에서 소크라테스와 제논, 파르메니데스 사이의논의들이 역사적으로 있을 수 없는 플라톤의 허구적 구상에 불과하다면, 논의들을전달했다고 하는 퓌토도로스와 안티폰, 그리고 현재 전달하고 있는 케팔로스를 포함하여 대화편의 전체의 구성이 플라톤의 허구적 구상일 수밖에 없다는 인식 하에, 대화편의 도입부에 나타난 극적인 배경설정을 플라톤의 허구적 구상이라는 차원에서 파악하면서 그것의 철학적인 함의를 밝혀내고자 한다. 그에 따르면, 전체의 대화편에서는 그 자신 자기 자신에 따라 있는 형상들에 대해 그것들의 필요조건인어떤 것의 규정이 갖는 관계가 난제로 제시되는데, 도입부에서는 그런 문제 상황이아낙사고라스의 정신을 대변하는 클라조메나이 출신의 케팔로스의 손을 잡고 플라톤의 (...) 두 형제가 환영하고, 케팔로스의 일행이 언젠가 있었다고 하는 소크라테스와제논, 파르메니데스 사이의 논의들을 듣겠다고 아테네에 와 청하고, 제논의 친애자인 퓌토도로스로부터 전해 들었다고 하는 안티폰이 그 논의들을 전달하는 것으로설정되고, 이때 안티폰은 자연에 법을 굴레로 제시한 소피스트 안티폰으로 이해되며, 그의 역할은 그 논의들을 케팔로스 일행에게 전달한다고 하지만, 사실은 전달과 더불어 그 자신이 플라톤의 형제들 등등과 더불어 변증법적인 여행에 참여하는것으로 되어있다는 것이다. 플라톤은 이런 상황을 제논과 파르메니데스가 거기에참여하기 위해 왔다고 하는 대 판아테나이아 축제로 표현하는데, 여기서 대 판아테네이아 축제의 철학적인 의미는, 이러저러한 사멸하는 인간 존재들이 각자가 각자의 방식으로 있는 것들의 진리에 대한 논의에 참여하는 것이다. (shrink)

The interpretation of Parmenides’ Περί Φύσεως is a fascinating topic to which philosophers, historians of philosophy and scientists have dedicated many studies along the history of Western thought. The aim of this paper is to present the reading of Parmenides’s work offered by Federigo Enriques. It is based on several original theses: (1) Parmenides was the discoverer of abstract geometry; (2) his critics was addressed against the Pythagoreans rather than against Heraclitus; (3) Parmenides discovered and applied the contradiction and the (...) third excluded principles in the context of his research on foundation of geometry; (4) Parmenides’s metaphysical and physical conceptions have their bases in his speculation on geometry; (5) Parmenides used the principle of sufficient reason. Enriques’s reading is worth being expounded and discussed within the historical, philosophical and scientific context in which it is inserted. Since Enriques’s ideas are not widely known and discussed, my research has the purpose to fill this gap. The article also aims to provide elements to illustrate the discussion on Parmenides in the first half of the last century. (shrink)

This article argues that the second part of the Parmenides (137-166) consists not only of the well-known logical structure that has been widely studied but also of a great variety of definitions of forms. My aim is to show how these definitions depend on a specific group of closely connected primary forms (i.e., same, different, part, whole). The definitions that Parmenides provides help Socrates overcome his failure in attempting to define forms in the first part of the dialogue.

I walk a well-trodden but still only partially explored path, along which we shall attempt to establish a basis for the study of the Parmenides poem’s unity by way of a comparison with twentieth-century physics. I investigate the hypothesis that Parmenides’ sphere-shaped τὸ ἐόν, as described in B8.42-49, could be understood as a hyperspherical unlimited whole cosmologically bounded by the διάκοσμος described by the complex sphere system in fragment B12.

Karl Popper (1902-1994) est mort avant d’avoir terminé cette collection d’articles. Quelques uns (comme « Back to the Presocratics » (1958), publié dans Conjectures et Réfutations, ou la note de The Open Society (1945) – huit pages – consacrée aux corps premiers du Timée) sont relativement connus. Certains, tel celui consacré à « la lumière que la Lune peut jeter sur les deux voies de Parménide » (1992) le sont moins. D’autres enfin sont inédits, comme la « réhabilitation » de (...) Xénophane (ch.... (shrink)

Ein Buch nicht der Re-Mythisierung, sondern der Mythoskritik, allerdings einer Kritik, die den Mythos ernst nimmt. Daher: »Mein Thema lautet: die Funktion der Genealogie im Mythos. So formuliert, setzt es eine rationale Vorstellung vom Funktionieren des Mythos voraus – es fordert zu einer systematischen Erörtertung auf. Wir brauchen nicht zu befürchten, daß eine systematische Erörterung das Mystische des Mythos verfehlt, weil sie archaische Verhältnisse dem Zwang der Rationalität unterwirft. Eher wird sie die Verbindung deutlich machen, die zwischen Mythos, Rationalität und (...) Zwang besteht.«. (shrink)

Once one draws a distinction between loyal non-existent items, which do not exist in a non-universal sense of the first-order existence predicate, and non-items, which fail to exist in a universal sense of that predicate, one may allow for the former but not for the latter in the overall ontological domain, so as to adopt a form of soft Parmenideanism. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for this distinction.

Dieser Titel aus dem De Gruyter-Verlagsarchiv ist digitalisiert worden, um ihn der wissenschaftlichen Forschung zugänglich zu machen. Da der Titel erstmals im Nationalsozialismus publiziert wurde, ist er in besonderem Maße in seinem historischen Kontext zu betrachten. Mehr erfahren Sie.

In der 1970 gegr ndeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien ver ffentlicht. Gr ndungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), G nther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von J rgen Mittelstra mitherausgegeben.

Das Werk des vorsokratischen Philosophen Parmenides, das nur fragmentarisch erhalten ist, kann als Lehrgedicht beschrieben werden. In diesem Buch werden zum ersten Mal die pädagogischen Aspekte des Gedichtes aufgrund einer detaillierten Diskussion von ausgewählten Fragmenten systematisch untersucht. Es werden u. a. folgende Fragen behandelt: Wie kommt der Suchende oder Lernende zur philosophischen Erkenntnis? Welche 'Wege' oder Methoden führen dorthin? Was für Lernstufen gibt es? Wie verhält sich der Lernende (der Kuros) zur Belehrenden (der Göttin)? Welcher geistige Zustand soll den Erkennenden (...) kennzeichnen? Parmenides' Ontologie wird hier als Beschreibung des Erkennenden in Betracht gezogen, insofern das erkennende Subjekt seinem Objekt entsprechen soll. Parmenides' philosophische Pädagogik wird im Rahmen der Erziehungstheorie und Praxis der antiken Philosophie dargestellt und mit dem Thema der Philosophie als Lebenskunst verglichen. (shrink)

In the process that followed the evolution of ancient Greek thought from mythology to a systematic philosophy, Parmenides, the founder of the Elea school, built up his thoughts with theses that were the exact opposite of his time and perhaps common sense in general. His famous poem On Nature, in the light of the logical principles, inferences, and analyses it contains, has profoundly influenced both epistemologies in terms of structure and possibility, and ontologies within the framework of time, space, and (...) movement. In the mentioned period, the logical internal consistency of Parmenides and his followers, and the rational level in their arguments shaped the ancient period. The role he played especially in natural philosophy and metaphysics is undeniable. However, the ambiguities in the context of the theses and their interpretations of his poem, the only work that has been quoted, have not been resolved until today. The dimensions of this mystery are not only related to classical thought. Ontologies related to physics approaches, theoretical and institutional beliefs about them, and various cosmogony and language understandings can be related to Parmenides in some way. It is also possible to find in Parmenides's early forms some of the contents that form the basis of the philosophy of logic and has metaphysical roots constructed by Aristotle in the ancient period and for which he gained a well-deserved reputation. In addition to the deductive approach, especially the law of contradiction, the principle of identity, the law of excluded third, and the principles of sufficient reason are the most important concepts among those mentioned. These principles, which are not directly formulated, have been used in the context of Parmenides’ arguments about knowledge, existence, and related concepts. In our study, by touching on the significant points of the poem written by Parmenides, we will try to examine the conceptual uses and logical structures of the principles we have expressed and follow the traces of the process in question, and examine its effects. The main reason for this effort is that the content presented by Parmenides continues to be discussed today, maintained its influence in many areas mentioned above, and is an important cornerstone in the development of philosophy. (shrink)

Plato's view on time, a key aspect of his doctrine of forms, is influenced by his reception of Parmenides, but the way in which Plato takes up and modifies Parmenides' view is a matter of ongoing scholarly debate. In this article, the author analyzes Plato's revision of Parmenidean time by exploring four temporalities: the eternal present, timeless eternity, the enduring present, and the instant between time and eternity. Through this examination, she uncovers the common origin of both the eternal present (...) of Parmenides' fragment B8 and the flowing present of the phenomenal realm in the instant (ἐξαίφνης) in Plato's Parmenides. This perspective on time offers a promising solution to Plato's problem of participation, bridging the gap between the eternal being of the form and the being in time of the particulars. (shrink)

For some of Plato’s commentators some passages of the Republic and the Parmenides provide a clear guideline regarding the extension of the noetic “world”, namely, a criterion that allows us to know what kind of Platonic forms there are, and which there are not. There are forms only for a pair of opposite properties such as “big” and “small”; indeed, smallness itself is not what appears to the senses, since each sensible instance of smallness appears “mixed” with its opposite, bigness. (...) On the contrary, things that are perceived by the senses such as fingers, do not have an eidos. However, a more careful reading of the relevant passages, taking into account what Socrates says in 476a about the unity and multiplicity of the forms, will show us the incorrectness of this interpretation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to offer a general view of the philosophical affinities between Plato and Hegel through the analysis of the Hegelian interpretation of the Parmenides. We will show how the Hegelian approach to Plato, and his understanding of idealism and dialectics, is determined by Hegel’s debate with the philosophy of Kant. A brief exposé of the differences between Kantian transcendental idealism and Hegelian absolute idealism will be needed. Then, we will show some traits of the Hegelian (...) hermeneutics of Plato in order to understand how the first part of the Parmenides admits parallelisms with certain excerpts of Hegel’s work, both regarding its philosophical purpose as well as stylistically. Finally, the Author expounds the Hegelian evaluation of the dialectical exercise from the second part of the Parmenides. There, Platonic Dialectic fails and does not accomplish its philosophical purpose, and becomes a valuable skepticism consubstantial to philosophical thought. (shrink)

Originally presented as the authors thesis (doctoral--Universiteat Freiburg i. Br., 1988) under the title: Der Widerspruch und das Urteilsproblem im platonischen Dialog "Parmenides.".

Excerpt from The Fragments of Parmenides Two dollars per volume; single number, fiftyfienfgs; three volumes (or three copies of either volume), five dollars; first four volumes (015 feur copies of either volume), six dol lars; ten copies of Vol. III. Or IV. For ten dollars. Vols. I. And II. Bound in one volume, in [muslin, $4 50; Vol. III. In muslin, $2 50. Back numbers may be had at fifty cents apiece. All subscriptions should be addressed to the Editor. About (...) the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In 1940, Wolfgang Metzger began a profound reflection on the meaning of the phenomenological approach to Gestalt psychology, which had its starting point in the rejection of what he called the “Eleatic” or “Eleatic–Rationalistic Postulate,” that is, the notion that, in his opinion, had dominated Western scientific and philosophical thought of the past centuries, according to which any assertion about the state of things that could lead to self-contradictory conclusions had to be considered unfounded. On the basis of this rejection (...) and with exclusive reference to access to experiential data, Metzger proposed to distinguish five meanings of reality: (1) the physical or experiential world; (2) the intuitive or experienced world; (3) the experienced world (met, Angetroffen) in contrast to the represented world; (4) the something or fullness in contrast to emptiness or nothingness; (5) the real in contrast to the apparent. For Metzger (1950), this concept, although primarily related to perception, has far-reaching implications for our conception of others and of society. We question here the validity of Metzger’s concept, its explanatory significance, and its relation to other phenomenological concepts, such as that of Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

This paper aims to expose and analyze the Aristotelian interpretation of Parmenides’ philosophy. In the first place, the refutation of Parmenides’ monism in Phys. I 2-3 is analyzed. Then a series of relevant passages from the corpus are commented in which Aristotle refers both to the ontology and cosmology of Parmenides and to his methodology of philosophical investigation. It is proposed a compatibilist interpretation of the Aristotelian reading of Parmenides, according to which the latter would have affirmed the unity and (...) immobility of reality according to concept and its changing plurality according to sensory perception. While the Platonic influence on certain aspects of the Aristotelian interpretation is evident, this is not a mere reception and repetition of Plato‘s reading. Indeed, Aristotle seems to have understood Parmenides’s thought from a methodological distinction operating in Phys. I 5. (shrink)