Philosophy of Mind > Perception > The Contents of Perception > The Experience of High-Level Properties
The Experience of High-Level Properties
Edited by Susanna Siegel (Harvard University)
About this topic
Summary | Which properties are we presented with in perception? In vision, do we consciously see just color, shape, illumination, and motion, or can we visually experience more complex properties such as kinds, causation, and personal identity? The main issue concerns how rich or impoverished perceptual contents are. This issue bears on the role of contents of perception in providing rational support for beliefs. If perceptual experiences suggest a range of propositions that are candidates for being justified by those experiences, then the propositions in this range will be influenced by the contents perception can have. Some skeptical challenges may rely on the relative impoverishment of contents. If contents can be more complex, then we can ask how perceptual experience come to have such contents, and whether other mental states besides input systems traditionally categorized as part of perception can influence perceptual contents. The issue also bears on the role perceptual experience in guiding action. Which actions an experience is poised to guide will depend on which properties that experience presents. It also raises the possibility that experiences could have imperative contents, rather than just indicative contents - a possibility explored in the philosophical literature on the pain. |
Key works | Peacocke 1992 introduced in passing some examples of complex contents. Siegel 2005 invigorated contemporary discussion issue by defending the view that contents of visual experience can be complex enough to include kind properties.Siegel 2010 makes the case that visual experiences can represent kinds, causal properties, certain perceptual relations, and personal identity, defends a method for deciding the question, and presents a framework for addressing the issue in terms of accuracy conditions. Prinz 2002 and Prinz 2013 each make a case against the thesis that experiences can present high-level contents. Butterfill 2009 discusses the cases of visually experiencing causation.Church 2010 and McDowell 1985 discuss perception of moral properties.Bayne 2009 relates the issue to the experience of agency and to cognitive phenomenology. Logue 2013 questions whether the issue can be decided either way. |
Introductions | Siegel 2005; Millar 2000; Bayne 2009. |
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Related categories
Siblings:
- Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content (434)
- Color Experience (175)
- Spatial Experience (331)
- The Experience of Objects (155)
- The Contents of Perception, Misc (436)
- Consciousness of Action (252)
- Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability (269)
- Construction and Inference in Perception (92)
- Gestalt Theory (284)
- Representation in Neuroscience (250)
- Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content (434)
- Color Experience (175)
- Spatial Experience (331)
- The Experience of Objects (155)
- The Contents of Perception, Misc (436)
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Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario) David Chalmers (ANU, NYU) Area Editors: David Bourget Gwen Bradford Berit Brogaard Margaret Cameron David Chalmers James Chase Rafael De Clercq Ezio Di Nucci Esa Diaz-Leon Barry Hallen Hans Halvorson Jonathan Ichikawa Michelle Kosch Øystein Linnebo JeeLoo Liu Paul Livingston Brandon Look Manolo Martínez Matthew McGrath Michiru Nagatsu Susana Nuccetelli Giuseppe Primiero Jack Alan Reynolds Darrell P. Rowbottom Aleksandra Samonek Constantine Sandis Howard Sankey Jonathan Schaffer Thomas Senor Robin Smith Daniel Star Jussi Suikkanen Aness Kim Webster Other editors Contact us Learn more about PhilPapers |