Previous research in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) suggests that a main aim of explainability approaches is to satisfy specific interests, goals, expectations, needs, and demands regarding artificial systems (we call these “stakeholders' desiderata”) in a variety of contexts. However, the literature on XAI is vast, spreads out across multiple largely disconnected disciplines, and it often remains unclear how explainability approaches are supposed to achieve the goal of satisfying stakeholders' desiderata. This paper discusses the main classes of stakeholders calling for explainability (...) of artificial systems and reviews their desiderata. We provide a model that explicitly spells out the main concepts and relations necessary to consider and investigate when evaluating, adjusting, choosing, and developing explainability approaches that aim to satisfy stakeholders' desiderata. This model can serve researchers from the variety of different disciplines involved in XAI as a common ground. It emphasizes where there is interdisciplinary potential in the evaluation and the development of explainability approaches. (shrink)

Bioethics has received important criticisms for its perceived privileging of biomedical authority with longstanding calls for greater recognition of the social, political, economic, historical, and...

The study of human cognition and the study of artificial intelligence (AI) have a symbiotic relationship, with advancements in one field often informing or creating new work in the other. Human cognition has many capabilities modern AI systems cannot compete with. One such capability is the detection, identification, and resolution of knowledge gaps (KGs). Using these capabilities as inspiration, we examine how to incorporate detection, identification, and resolution of KGs in artificial agents. We present a paradigm that enables research on (...) the understanding of KGs for visual-linguistic communication. We leverage and enhance and existing KG taxonomy to identify possible KGs that can occur for visual question answer (VQA) tasks and use these findings to develop a classifier to identify questions that could be engineered to contain specific KG types for other VQA datasets. Additionally, we examine the performance of different VQA models through the lens of KGs. (shrink)

The study of human cognition and the study of artificial intelligence (AI) have a symbiotic relationship, with advancements in one field often informing or creating new work in the other. Human cognition has many capabilities modern AI systems cannot compete with. One such capability is the detection, identification, and resolution of knowledge gaps (KGs). Using these capabilities as inspiration, we examine how to incorporate detection, identification, and resolution of KGs in artificial agents. We present a paradigm that enables research on (...) the understanding of KGs for visual-linguistic communication. We leverage and enhance and existing KG taxonomy to identify possible KGs that can occur for visual question answer (VQA) tasks and use these findings to develop a classifier to identify questions that could be engineered to contain specific KG types for other VQA datasets. Additionally, we examine the performance of different VQA models through the lens of KGs. (shrink)

Several vaccines against COVID-19 have now been developed and are already being rolled out around the world. The decision whether or not to get vaccinated has so far been left to the individual citizens. However, there are good reasons, both in theory as well as in practice, to believe that the willingness to get vaccinated might not be sufficiently high to achieve herd immunity. A policy of mandatory vaccination could ensure high levels of vaccination coverage, but its legitimacy is doubtful. (...) We investigate the willingness to get vaccinated and the reasons for an acceptance (or rejection) of a policy of mandatory vaccination against COVID-19 in June and July 2020 in Germany based on a representative real time survey, a random sub-sample (SOEP-CoV) of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Our results show that about 70 percent of adults in Germany would voluntarily get vaccinated against the coronavirus if a vaccine without side effects was available. About half of residents of Germany are in favor, and half against, a policy of mandatory vaccination. The approval rate for mandatory vaccination is significantly higher among those who would get vaccinated voluntarily (around 60 percent) than among those who would not get vaccinated voluntarily (27 percent). The individual willingness to get vaccinated and acceptance of a policy of mandatory vaccination correlates systematically with socio-demographic and psychological characteristics of the respondents. We conclude that as far as people’s declared intentions are concerned, herd immunity could be reached without a policy of mandatory vaccination, but that such a policy might be found acceptable too, were it to become necessary. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a phenomenon of increasing interest. Today, it is practiced in most countries around the globe and studied in various fields of academia. However, the focus still lies on Western developed countries, their understanding, and implementation of CSR. This paper focuses on the comparison of the orientation towards CSR in Germany and Qatar, thereby closing a research gap by providing insights from a Middle Eastern country. Based on a survey among 265 business students in both countries, (...) the research examines their perception of the economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities of a firm. Findings suggest that, next to economic obligations, Qataris appear more willing to support philanthropic activities of a business while Germans highly value ethical standards. Moreover, females in both countries value economic responsibilities less important than males do. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility is a phenomenon of increasing interest. Today, it is practiced in most countries around the globe and studied in various fields of academia. However, the focus still lies on Western developed countries, their understanding, and implementation of CSR. This paper focuses on the comparison of the orientation towards CSR in Germany and Qatar, thereby closing a research gap by providing insights from a Middle Eastern country. Based on a survey among 265 business students in both countries, the (...) research examines their perception of the economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities of a firm. Findings suggest that, next to economic obligations, Qataris appear more willing to support philanthropic activities of a business while Germans highly value ethical standards. Moreover, females in both countries value economic responsibilities less important than males do. (shrink)

Background: According to Gelfand et al., COVID-19 infection and case mortality rates are closely connected to the strength of social norms: “Tighter” cultures that abide by strict social norms are more successful in combating the pandemic than “looser” cultures that are more permissive. However, countries with similar levels of cultural tightness exhibit big differences in mortality rates. We are investigating potential explanations for this fact. Using data from Germany and Japan—two “tight” countries with very different infection and mortality rates—we examined (...) how differences in socio-demographic and other determinants explain differences in individual preventive attitudes and behaviors. Methods: We compared preventive attitudes and behaviors in 2020 based on real-time representative survey data and used logit regression models to study how individual attitudes and behaviors are shaped by four sets of covariates: individual socio-demographics, health, personality, and regional-level controls. Employing Blinder-Oaxaca regression techniques, we quantified the extent to which differences in averages of the covariates between Japan and Germany explain the differences in the observed preventive attitudes and behaviors. Results: In Germany and Japan, similar proportions of the population supported mandatory vaccination, avoided travel, and avoided people with symptoms of a cold. In Germany, however, a significantly higher proportion washed their hands frequently and avoided crowds, physical contact, public transport, peak-hour shopping, and contact with the elderly. In Japan, a significantly higher proportion were willing to be vaccinated. We also show that attitudes and behaviors varied significantly more with covariates in Germany than in Japan. Differences in averages of the covariates contribute little to explaining the observed differences in preventive attitudes and behaviors between the two countries. Conclusion: Consistent with tightness-looseness theory, the populations of Japan and Germany responded similarly to the pandemic. The observed differences in infection and fatality rates therefore cannot be explained by differences in behavior The major difference in attitudes is the willingness to be vaccinated, which was much higher in Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese population behaved more uniformly across social groups than the German population. This difference in the degree of homogeneity has important implications for the effectiveness of policy measures during the pandemic. (shrink)

Edited by Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch & Christopher Zurn. This volume collects original, cutting-edge essays on the philosophy of recognition by international scholars eminent in the field. By considering the topic of recognition as addressed by both classical and contemporary authors, the volume explores the connections between historical and contemporary recognition research and makes substantive contributions to the further development of contemporary theories of recognition.

Die Beiträge des Bandes, die aus den Vorträgen der 4. Jahrestagung,,Diskurs - interdisziplinär" 2014 hervorgehen, fokussieren in unterschiedlicher disziplinärer Perspektivierung die diskursanalytische Konstante der Historizität. Das im Titel genannte historische Apriori indiziert gleichermaßen die Diskursivität sprachlichen Handelns als kontextuelles Bedingt-Sein von Aussagen wie auch die Geschichtlichkeit und damit Relativität sprachlicher Artefakte, für die hier Texte als eine weite Kategorie von Kommunikaten stehen. Im ersten Bandabschnitt,,Historische Semantik und Pragmatik" werden sprachliche Phänomene und, auf einer Metaebene, linguistische Kategorien unter dem Vorzeichen diskursiver (...) Varianz in den Blick genommen. Die Beiträge des zweiten Abschnitts,,Literatur und Texte" reflektieren die Historizität und soziale Wirksamkeit literarischer Formen. Im dritten Teil,,Gesellschaft und Politik" werden Wissens- und Normbildungsprozesse in den Diskursen verschiedener sozialer Felder fokussiert. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.2 (2002) 432-442 [Access article in PDF] The Legacy of the Enlightenment James Schmidt What's Left of Enlightenment? A Postmodern Question, edited by Keith Michael Baker and Peter Hanns Reill; ix & 203 pp. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper. Postmodernism and the Enlightenment: New Perspectives in Eighteenth-Century French Intellectual History, edited by Daniel Gordon; vi & 227 pp. New York: (...) Routledge, 2001, $80.00 cloth, $22.95 paper. IF THE ENLIGHTENMENT did not exist, postmodernists would have had to invent it. It performs the same function, Daniel Gordon argues in his introduction to Postmodernism and the Enlightenment, that the Ancien Regime did for the French revolutionaries: as the "other of postmodernism," it represents "the modern that postmodernism revolts against" (P&E, p. 1). Indeed, the image of the Enlightenment that emerges from the postmodern critique does seem, in large part, to be an invention. As Keith Michael Baker and Peter Hanns Reill suggest in the introduction to their collection What's Left of Enlightenment? the various strands of thought commonly grouped under the label postmodernism "have at least one thing in common": "they all depend upon a stereotyped, even caricatural, account of the Enlightenment" which sees the Enlightenment as the point of origin for the "rationalism, instrumentalism, scientism, logocentrism, universalism, abstract rights, eurocentrism, individualism, humanism, masculinism, etc." that [End Page 432] defines the modernity which postmodernity hopes to supersede (WLE? p. 1).One consequence of the inclination to trace the origin of the various failings of modernity to the Enlightenment is that arguments about the "legacy of the Enlightenment" tend to get out of hand. In a particularly sharp-sighted contribution to the Baker and Reill collection David Hollinger notes that it is all too easy for a critic of Enlightenment to argue that "I'm hot stuff because I'm not only refuting you, my puny opponent, but... every great thinker from Descartes to Popper," and, conversely, all too enticing for those who have been criticized to counter, "watch out, you think you are arguing only against me, but the implications of your reasoning are to deny the common sense of every humane and rational mind since the seventeenth century" (WLE? p. 9). Historians of the eighteenth century have been curiously reluctant to join this battle and have, for the most part, left the field to philosophers, literary scholars, and political theorists (WLE? pp. 17-18; P&E, p. 3). The intent of the two collections reviewed here is to remedy this situation by setting a group of historians to work scrutinizing differing aspects of the postmodernist critique of the Enlightenment. More often than not, the results are quite rewarding, though the question of the relationship between postmodernism and the Enlightenment remains, in the end, somewhat ambiguous.The scope of these two volumes is quite impressive. Baker and Reill's collection opens with essays by David Hollinger and Richard Rorty (one of the two nonhistorians invited to the festivities) offering contrasting characterizations of the relationship of postmodernism and the Enlightenment. It continues with a discussion of a few important interpretations of the Enlightenment (including articles by Jonathan Knudsen on German historicism, Hans Sluga on Heidegger, Johnson Kent Wright on Cassirer, and Michael Meranze on Foucault) and concludes with essays by Lorraine Daston ("Enlightenment Fears, Fears of Enlightenment"), Dena Goodman (on gender difference in the Enlightenment), and Lawrence Klein (on the idea of "conversation" in the Enlightenment) that seek, in differing ways, to reveal "the existence within the Enlightenment of elements frequently seen as characteristic of Postmodernity itself" (WLE? p. 3).Gordon's volume offers a counterpoint to the final part of Baker and Reill's collection: each of its nine essays is intended as confrontation between a postmodernist characterization of a particular aspect of the Enlightenment and an account of "how the theme really operates in [End Page 433] Enlightenment thought" (P&E, p. 5). Thus Malick W. Ghachem examines how Montesquieu's account of law was applied to French colonies in the Caribbean, Arthur Goldhammer discusses Diderot's view of language, Daniel Rosenberg... (shrink)

We study model theory of fields with actions of a fixed finite group scheme. We prove the existence and simplicity of a model companion of the theory of such actions, which generalizes our previous results about truncated iterative Hasse–Schmidt derivations [13] and about Galois actions [14]. As an application of our methods, we obtain a new model complete theory of actions of a finite group on fields of finite imperfection degree.

Der Berliner Theologe, Philosoph und auch politische Reformer Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher führte eine umfangreiche Korrespondenz. Der zwölfte Band der 5. Abteilung der historisch-kritischen Gesamtausgabe Schleiermachers enthält Briefe von Januar 1811 bis Juni 1813. Sie umfassen die ersten Jahre der Berliner Reformuniversität, in denen Friedrich Schleiermacher erster Dekan der theologischen Fakultät war und an der Konzeption und Umsetzung der Preußischen Bildungs- und Kirchenreformen mitwirkte. Nach dem von ihm herbeigesehnten Abfall Preußens von Napoleon oblagen ihm die Organisation des Berliner Landsturms (...) und die Redaktion der Tageszeitung "Der preußische Correspondent", während die allmählich anwachsende Familie im scheinbar sicheren Schlesien untergebracht war. (shrink)

Der Berliner Theologe, Philosoph und Reformer Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher führte eine umfangreiche Korrespondenz. Der dreizehnte Band der 5. Abteilung der historisch-kritischen Gesamtausgabe Schleiermachers enthält Briefe von Juli 1813 bis Dezember 1816. Im Augenblick des auch von ihm ersehnten Sieges über Napoleon zeigt sich Schleiermacher zunehmend deprimiert über die politische Entwicklung Preußens und über die Zeit, die über den Tagesereignissen für die eigenen Projekte verloren gegangen ist. Die Magenkrämpfe melden sich wieder und werden - nicht ohne Erfolg - mit (...) magnetischen Kuren behandelt. Die folgenden Jahre sehen Schleiermacher u.a. auf einer Erholungs- und Badereise nach Thüringen und dem Rheinland, auf der er noch einmal Goethe trifft, und als Rektor der Berliner Universität. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band enthält Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermachers (1768–1834) sämtliche erhaltenen und erschlossenen Briefe aus den Jahren 1809–1810. Bereits 1808 hatte sich Schleiermacher endgültig in Berlin niedergelassen und war in Konzeption und Berufungsfragen aktiv an der Berliner Universitätsgründung beteiligt. Im Mai 1809 heiratete Schleiermacher Henriette von Willich, die 20 Jahre jüngere Witwe eines verstorben Freundes. Aus der knapp einjährigen Verlobungszeit 1808–1809 liegen über 100 Briefe des Brautpaares vor. Die bereits im Vorfeld der Universitätsgründung begonnen Vorlesungen setzte Schleiermacher 1810 als (...) ordentlicher Professor fort – 1809 trat er seine Stelle als reformierter Prediger an der Dreifaltigkeitskirche an. Die Korrespondenz Schleiermachers mit Familie, Freundinnen und Freunden sowie zahlreichen Kollegen zeichnet ein eindringliches politisches, geistes- und alltagsgeschichtliches Panorama der Zeit und gewährt einen Einblick in die Entstehung des Schleiermacherschen Werkes. (shrink)

Der Berliner Theologe, Philosoph und Reformer Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–1834) war weitmaschig vernetzt und führte eine umfangreiche Korrespondenz. Band 15 der 5. Abteilung der historisch-kritischen Gesamtausgabe Schleiermachers (KGA) enthält die Briefe von und an Schleiermacher der Jahre 1819 und 1820. Das Ende des zweiten Jahrzehnts ist für Berlin und für Preußen von besonderer politischer Virulenz. Es steht unter dem Vorzeichen zunehmender Repression gegen liberale Kräfte durch den Preußischen Stadt. Verhängnisvoll ist die Ermordung des Schriftstellers Kotzebue durch den Burschenschaftler (...) Sand. Der Trostbrief des Berliner Theologen De Wette an die Mutter des Täters dient der Regierung zum Anlass, Rechte und Freiheiten der Berliner Professorenschaft einzuschränken. Schleiermacher, der selbst immer wieder im Fokus der Demagogenverfolgung stand, setzt sich nachdrücklich und zugleich taktisch klug für die Freiheit der Wissenschaften und der Kirche ein. 1819/20 war Schleiermacher zum vierten und letzten Mal Dekan der Theologischen Fakultät und setzte sich u.a. für die Unterstützung bedürftiger Studenten ein. Privat ist das Jahr 1820 auch von der Geburt seines ersten und einzigen Sohns geprägt. Wissenschaftlich erweitert sich sein System der Wissenschaften um die 1819 erstmals gehaltene Vorlesungen über Ästhetik. Zugleich begann er, seine Dogmatik, der „Glaubenslehre“, in Buchform auszuarbeiten. (shrink)

The main scope of this short article is to provide a modification of the axioms given by Messmer and Wood for the theory of separably closed fields of positive characteristic and finite imperfectness degree. As their original axioms failed to meet natural expectations, a new axiomatization was given (i.e., Ziegler’s one), but the new axioms do not follow Messmer and Wood’s initial idea. Therefore, we aim to give a correct axiomatization that is more similar to the original one and that, (...) as with the original axioms, involves only one Hasse–Schmidt derivation, this time based on the iterativity conditions corresponding to the Witt group. (shrink)

This paper responds to discussion and criticism contained in a mini-symposium on Just health: meeting health needs fairly. The replies clarify existing positions and modify or develop others, specifically in response to the following: Thomas Schramme criticises the claim that health is of special importance because of its impact on opportunity, and James Wilson argues that healthcare is not of special importance if social determinants of health have a major causal impact on population health. Annette Rid is concerned that the (...) relevance condition in accountability for reasonableness is unclear and does little work. Harald Schmidt aims to flesh out where an account of responsibility for health should go since one is under-developed in Just health. Michael Schefczyk and Susanne Brauer challenge aspects of the prudential lifespan account. Samia Hurst asks what impact a population view should have on clinician obligations. (shrink)

The objective of this thesis – Reflective Equilibrium as a Form of Life – is to contribute to the deepening of understanding of the method of reflective equilibrium – a method of internal epistemic justification. In the first part of the study, four paradigmatic conceptions of the method will be analyzed in order to carve out a conceptual core: The ones by John Rawls – who coined the name of the method – Norman Daniels, Michael DePaul and Catherine Elgin. I (...) will argue that the conceptual core of the method contains four elementary rules: 1) A minimalistic fallibilism, 2) a moderate holism, 3) a minimalistic rationality, and 4) a weak foundationalism. Compliance with these rules is necessary and jointly sufficient for any epistemic procedure of justification to be in accordance with the method of reflective equilibrium. The second part of the study is intended to answer some of the open questions concerning this definition of the conceptual core of the method. It will be argued that the a minimalistic fallibilism, as a very central element of the method, is justified since there is no belief whose truth is transparent to an epistemic agent. Even if it were the case that such beliefs exist, there would be attractive options of retreat which provide a quasi-universal justification of minimalistic fallibilism. It will also be argued that all alternative methods of justification are either compatible with the method of reflective equilibrium or are not justified. While a metajustification of the method – understood as a justification of the method employing the method itself – is on the one hand not completely satisfactory, as it presupposes the acceptance of the method before it is justified, it is epistemically acceptable on the other hand, since it allows for a critical inquiry and is open-ended. It will be pointed out that a moderate foundationalism can be justified by the method for some specific area of inquiry insofar as basic beliefs can be identified. Yet, the default-position of the method is only a weak foundationalism (often also termed “coherentism”). With regard to the possibility of a formal interpretation of the method with which one could specify key terms used in the definition of the conceptual core, I will sketch general ways such a formalization might take. However, I will argue that the informal interpretation of the method has priority over any formal interpretation. In the third and concluding part of the study, I will present the claim that one should interpret the method of reflective equilibrium as a form of life. This means that the method is at least implicitly accepted by some epistemic agents: they have developed a disposition and ability to act according to the method. This interpretation of the method can be related to the notion of critical thinking, which, as a civic virtue and educational ideal, is subject of empirical research and practical application. A possible misunderstanding with respect to the method of reflective equilibrium as a form of life should be avoided: To interpret the method as a form of life does not indicate that it must be a comprehensive form of life. Acknowledging it in private life is optional. According to the proposed understanding of the method it is primarily a public and political form of life. (shrink)

Although the responsibility for health debate has intensified in several ways between Norman Daniels’ 1985 Just healthcare and Just health: meeting health needs fairly of 2008, comparatively little space is dedicated to the issue in Just health, and Daniels notes repeatedly that his account “says nothing about personal responsibility for health”. Daniels considers health responsibility mainly in a particular luck-egalitarian version which he rejects because of its potentially unfeasible, penalising and inhumane character. But I show that he nonetheless acknowledges and (...) endorses explicitly other dimensions of health responsibility. I develop a wider, more nuanced and less punitive concept of health responsibility, which expands Daniels’ brief consideration and is compatible with the overall approach set out in Just health. In its application to preventative medicine and health promotion in particular, the concept is suited to support and complement the notion that “health is special”, which is central in Just health. The concept of health responsibility as co-responsibility specifies the subjects and objects of health responsibilities. It permits the attribution of responsibility without blame and disconnects the question of assigning responsibility from decisions about entitlement to treatment or different status in prioritisation decisions. This approach secures conceptual plausibility and clarity of the concept of health responsibility, is of use in policy making, and can help reduce political tensions. (shrink)

Danielle Celermajer advocates for reconceptualizing responsibility in light of the climate crisis. I argue instead that we must understand current concepts of responsibility which are implicit in actual responsibility practices. I illustrate this by appeal to the practice of holding each other responsible for our beliefs-a practice in which we are constantly involved, but which is often obscured. It extends our responsibility to involuntary aspects of our own mind and involves socially distributed cognitive duties. Cognitive responsibility is part and parcel (...) of shared human conceptual frameworks that we should work to uncover and fully understand rather than revise. (shrink)

Der Beitrag stellt die exemplarische Untersuchung eines Psychotherapiegesprächs mit Hilfe der »szenisch-narrativen Mikroanalyse« (SNMA) vor. »Jetzt-Momente« (»Now Moments«) und »Begegnungsmomente« (»Moments of Meeting«) im Sinne von Daniel Stern und der Boston Change Process Study Group wurden von unabhängigen geschulten Ratern identifiziert und in einer systematischen, psychoanalytisch interpretierenden Konsentierung evaluiert. Ziel des Verfahrens ist es, durch die Nutzung von Parallelprozessen die Übertragungs-Gegenübertragungs-Bewegung im Therapiedialog zu verdeutlichen und dadurch ein wesentliches Agens in (nicht nur) psychoanalytischen Psychotherapien nachzuweisen.

One of six commentaries on “Obesity: Chasing an Elusive Epidemic,” by Daniel Callahan, from the January‐February 2013 issue.

Religionskritik wird gerade in der jungeren Vergangenheit bevorzugt als Kritik an der vermeintlichen Irrationalitat religiosen Glaubens artikuliert. Die Autoren der im vorliegenden Konferenzband versammelten Beitrage fragen zunachst anhand exemplarischer Studien zu Hamann, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche und Rudolf Otto nach der Bedeutung und Funktion des Irrationalen in rezeptionsgeschichtlich massgeblichen religionsphilosophischen Entwurfen der (Nach-)Aufklarung. Erganzt und zugespitzt wird der historische Abschnitt des Bandes durch Analysen zu Werk und Wirkung Soren Kierkegaards, dem neuzeitlichen Irrationalitatstheoretiker par excellence. Daruber hinaus wird aus systematischer Perspektive nach (...) der kritischen und/oder konstruktiven Funktion des Irrationalitatsthemas fur Religionsphilosophie und Theologie gefragt, wobei nicht nur semantische, sondern auch fundamentaltheologische und ethische Aspekte Berucksichtigung finden. Mit Beitragen von: Daniel Conway, Istvan Czako, Dario Gonzalez, Todd Gooch, Zoltan Gyenge, Gesche Linde, William McDonald, Peter Sajda, Jochen Schmidt, Heiko Schulz, Harald Steffes, Jon Stewart, Curtis Thompson, Knut Wenzel, Oliver Wiertz. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Bande enthält Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermachers sämtliche erhaltenen und erschlossenen Briefe aus dem Jahr 1808. 1808 ließ sich Schleiermacher endgültig in Berlin nieder und war in Konzeption und Berufungsfragen aktiv an der Berliner Universitätsgründung beteiligt. Im Herbst 1808 unternahm er eine konspirative Reise nach Ostpreußen und pflegte enge Kontakte zu den preußischen Reformern. Im Juli 1808 verlobte sich Schleiermacher mit Henriette von Willich, der 20 Jahre jüngeren Witwe eines verstorben Freundes - aus der knapp einjährigen Verlobungszeit liegen (...) über 100 Briefe des Brautpaares vor. Die Korrespondenz Schleiermachers mit Familie, Freundinnen und Freunden sowie zahlreichen Kollegen zeichnet ein eindringliches politisches, geistes- und alltagsgeschichtliches Panorama der Zeit und gewährt einen Einblick in die Entstehung des Schleiermacherschen Werkes. (shrink)

In the original publication of the article, the last sentence in footnote 16 was incorrectly published as “Thanks to—for raising this issue.” The corrected sentence should read as “Thanks to Daniel Star for raising this issue.”.

In the present enterprise we take a look at the meaning of Autonomy, how the word has been employed and some of the consequences of its use in the sciences of the artificial. Could and should robots really be autonomous entities? Over and beyond this, we use concepts from the philosophy of mind to spur on enquiry into the very essence of human autonomy. We believe our initiative, as does Dennett's life-long research, sheds light upon the problems of robot design (...) with respect to their relation with humans. (shrink)

Our ability to locate moral responsibility is often thought to be a necessary condition for conducting morally permissible medical practice, engaging in a just war, and other high-stakes endeavors. Yet, with increasing reliance upon artificially intelligent systems, we may be facing a wideningresponsibility gap, which, some argue, cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility. How then, if at all, can we make use of crucial emerging technologies? According to Colin Allen and Wendell Wallach, the advent of so-called ‘artificial moral (...) agents’ (AMAs) is inevitable. Still, this notion may seem to push back the problem, leaving those who have an interest in developing autonomous technology with a dilemma. We may need to scale-back our efforts at deploying AMAs (or at least maintain human oversight); otherwise, we must rapidly and drastically update our moral and legal norms in a way that ensures responsibility for potentially avoidable harms. This paper invokes contemporary accounts of responsibility in order to show how artificially intelligent systems might be held responsible. Although many theorists are concerned enough to develop artificial conceptions ofagencyor to exploit our present inability to regulate valuable innovations, the proposal here highlights the importance of—and outlines a plausible foundation for—a workable notion ofartificial moral responsibility. (shrink)

In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the relation of consciousness, the will, and our intentional and voluntary actions. Wegner claims that our experience and common sense view according to which we can influence our behavior roughly the way we experience that we do it is an illusion.

This paper argues that praise is governed by a norm of standing, namely the evaluative commitment condition. Even when the target of praise is praiseworthy and known to be so by the praiser, praise can be inappropriate owing to the praiser’s lacking the relevant evaluative commitment. I propose that uncommitted praisers lack the standing to praise in that, owing to their lack of commitment to the relevant value, they have not earned the right to host the co-valuing that is the (...) communicative aim of praise. (shrink)

We often think about the alternatives to a decision that has been made. Thinking in this way is known as counterfactual thinking, that is, thinking about what could have been had an alternative dec...

Supporters of open borders sometimes argue that the state has no pro tanto right to restrict immigration, because such a right would also entail a right to exclude existing citizens for whatever reasons justify excluding immigrants. These arguments can be defeated by suggesting that people have a right to stay put. I present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this “right to stay put” reply. I do this by describing a kind of exclusion that (...) has not been discussed in depth, which I call “territorial exclusion.” Territorial exclusion is the process according to which the group that wishes to exclude current citizens secedes from the territory in which those citizens reside. I argue that the wrongness of territorial exclusion explains why there is no pro tanto right for a state to exclude immigrants, because otherwise there would be a pro tanto right for the state to kick people out by seceding from the territory they inhabit. Because kicking people out like this is typically wrong, borders cannot be closed. (shrink)

I defend the cosmopolitan instrumentalist theory of secession, according to which a group has a right to secede only if this would promote cosmopolitan justice. I argue that the theory is preferable to other theories of secession because it is an entailment of cosmopolitanism, which is independently attractive, and because, unlike other theories of secession, it allows us to give the answers we want to give in cases like secession of the rich or secession that would make things worse for (...) minorities. I defend the view against the objections that it allows for colonialism and annexation, that it is not a distinct theory, and that it is impractical. (shrink)

This chapter introduces readers to the view that praise is a form of address, or is communicative in the sense of seeking uptake from its target. The proposal that praise is communicative will seem counterintuitive if we take blame to be our paradigm of what it is for a responsibility-response to be communicative. This is because blame is communicative in a manner that intuitively presupposes some normative failure; it involves calling its target to account (or answer) for some wrongdoing. But, (...) the ‘rightdoer’ already properly regarded the relevant reasons in acting praiseworthily. So, there is nothing for which the praiseworthy agent must similarly account or answer for. How then could praise be communicative in sense of seeking uptake from its target? This chapter develops the view that praise is communicative in that it invites the praiseworthy agent to accept credit by co-valuing their action in the evaluative terms supplied by the praiser. This proposal is defended against three objections, namely that it is descriptively inadequate regarding our actual practices, that it is morally mistaken about when we owe others a response, and that it implies redundant communication. (shrink)

Wittgenstein famously remarks that ‘the meaning of a word is its use’ (PI §43). Whether or not one views this as gesturing at a ‘theory’ of meaning, or instead as aiming primarily at dissuading us from certain misconceptions of language that are a source of puzzlement, it is clear that Wittgenstein held that for certain purposes the meaning of an expression could profitably be characterised as its use. Throughout his later writings, however, Wittgenstein’s appeal to the notion of use pulls (...) in two directions. In several places, Wittgenstein seems to connect the notion of an expression’s meaning with that of use in the sense of usage or practice. More specifically, he suggests that for an expression to possess meaning is for there to be a practice of employing it according to certain rules. ‘That’, he tells us, ‘is why there exists a correspondence between the concepts “rule” and “meaning”’ (OC §62; cf. PG 68; PO 51; RFM VI §28; VW 103). Indeed, Wittgenstein goes so far as to say, ‘The rule-governed nature of our languages permeates our life’ (RC §303). Call the view that the meaning of an expression is determined by a general principle governing its use, rulism. (shrink)

Majority rule is often regarded as an important democratic principle. But modern democracies divide voters into districts. So if the majority should rule, which majority should rule? Should it be the popular majority, or an electoral majority (i.e., either the majority of voters in the majority of districts, or the majority of voters in districts that contain the majority of the population)? I argue that majority rule requires rule by the popular majority. This view is not novel and may seem (...) obvious. But it is rarely defended, and often rejected. I defend it by arguing that this view about which majority should rule is best supported by the arguments for why the majority should rule, and best avoids the arbitrary and perverse verdicts of rule by electoral majorities. I close by considering the significant practical implications of the view. The Electoral College is often criticized on the basis that the winner of the popular vote doesn’t always win the election. But all district-based democracies have this feature, so all district-based democracies must be reformed if they are to satisfy the principle of majority rule. (shrink)

As a strategy for exploring the relationship between understanding and knowledge, we consider whether epistemic luck – which is typically thought to undermine knowledge – undermines understanding. Questions about the etiology of understanding have also been at the heart of recent theoretical debates within epistemology. Kvanvig (2003) put forward the argument that there could be lucky understanding and produced an example that he deemed persuasive. Grimm (2006) responded with a case that, he argued, demonstrated that there could not be lucky (...) understanding. In this paper, we empirically examine how participants' patterns of understanding attributions line up with the predictions of Kvanvig and Grimm. We argue that the data challenge Kvanvig's position. People do not differentiate between knowing-why and understanding-why on the basis of proper etiology: attributions of knowledge and understanding involve comparable (and minimal) roles for epistemic luck. We thus posit that folk knowledge and understanding are etiologically symmetrical. (shrink)

According to an influential recent view, S is propositionally justified in believing p iff S is in no position to know that S is in no position to know p. I argue that this view faces compelling counterexamples.

I argue that there is a tension between two of the most distinctive theses of Sven Rosenkranz’s Justification as Ignorance: the central thesis concerning justification, according to which an agent has propositional justification to believe p iff they are in no position to know that they are in no position to know p and the desire to avoid logical omniscience by imposing only “realistic” idealizations on epistemic agents.