Material to categorize
- Reductive views of knowledge and the small difference principle.Simon Wimmer - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.details
- John Cook Wilson on the indefinability of knowledge.Guy Longworth & Simon Wimmer - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1547–1564.details
- Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking.Simon Wimmer & Guy Longworth - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-22.details
- Safety and Necessity.Niall J. Paterson - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1081-1097.details
- Knowing Falsely: the Non-factive Project.Adam Michael Bricker - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):263-282.details
- Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase: A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge.Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1123-1152.details
- Lying: Knowledge or belief?Neri Marsili - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460.details
- Wissen, Wissenschaft, Wissenschaftslehre.Jens Lemanski - 2021 - In Nora Schleich (ed.), Philosophie als Wissenschaft. Hildesheim, Deutschland: Olms. pp. 113-133.details
- Das Gettier-Problem und der Wert des Wissens.Martin Grajner - 2009 - In Wissen und Werte. Paderborn, Deutschland: pp. 177-202.details
- The Epistemology of Thomas Reid.Derek R. Brookes - 1996 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (VI):119-168.details
- The 'Unified' Background.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.details
- Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
- Can Knowledge Really be Non-factive?Michael J. Shaffer - 2021 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 12 (2):215-226.details
- Studying marginalised physical sciences.Sean F. Johnston - 2007 - ‘Writing the History’ of the Physical Sciences After 1945: State of the Art, Questions, and Perspectives, Strasbourg, 8-9 June 2007.details
- Chunglin Kwa, Styles of Knowing: A New History of Science from Ancient Times to the Present. [REVIEW]Sean F. Johnston - 2012 - Ambix 59:294-295.details
- Definition and the Foundations of Knowledge in Illuminationist Philosophy: Section on Expository Propositions (al-Aqwāl al-Shāriḥa),.Hossein Ziai - 1993 - In Borhan Ibneh Yousef (ed.), Papers in Honor of ‘Ostād’ Javad Mosleh. Los Angeles: Research & Education Center. pp. 108-130.details
- Skepticism and the acquisition of “knowledge”.Shaun Nichols & N. Ángel Pinillos - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):397-414.details
- Knowledge and tracking revisited.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):396-405.details
- Normal Knowledge: Toward an Explanation-Based Theory of Knowledge.Andrew Peet & Eli Pitcovski - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (3):141-157.details
- The Ambiguity Theory of “Knows”.Mark Satta - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):69-83.details
- Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
- E=K and The Gettier Problem: A Reply to Comesaña and Kantin.Rodrigo Borges - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):1031-1041.details
- Tell Me Something I Don't Know: Dialogues in Epistemology.Michael L. Veber - 2018 - Peterborough, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press.details
- Gettier Across Cultures.Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Amita Chatterjee, Kaori Karasawa, Noel Struchiner, Smita Sirker, Naoki Usui & Takaaki Hashimoto - 2015 - Noûs:645-664.details
- Knowledge as de re true belief?Paul Egré - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1517-1529.details
- Justification and Indefinite Propositions: Disarming Gettier's Counterexamples.Paul K. Moser - 1984 - Critica 16 (46):3-14.details
- The Origin of the ‘Gettier’ Problem: Socrates and The Theaetetus.Michael Jenkins - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):51-66.details
- The Gettier Non-Problem.Stephen Hetherington - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (1):85-107.details
- Internalism, the Gettier problem, and metaepistemological skepticism.Mylan Engel - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1):99-117.details
- There’s nothing to beat a backward clock: A rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke.John N. Williams - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):363-378.details
- Beat the (Backward) Clock.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):353-361.details
- Rejoinder to Haze.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):227-230.details
- Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.Rodrigo Borges Claudio de Almeida & Peter Klein (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.details
- Reply to Adams and Clarke.Tristan Haze - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):221-225.details
- Knowing as the most general factive mental state.Francois-Igor Pris - 2017 - Философская Мысль 6:29-35.details
- Knowledge and the Gettier Problem.Stephen Cade Hetherington - 2016 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
- Testimony and Gettier: A Reply to Vance.Adrian Heathcote - 2016 - Ratio 29 (2):228-233.details
- Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):1-14.details
- Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper.M. Clark - 1963 - Analysis 24 (2):46-48.details
- Two Notions of Warrant and Plantinga's Solution to the Gettier Problem.R. Greene & N. A. Balmert - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):132-139.details
- A Gettier drama.O. Hanfling - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):262-263.details
- The two faces of compatibility with justified beliefs.Tero Tulenheimo - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):15-30.details
- In Defense of Sensitivity.Tim Black & Peter Murphy - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):53-71.details
- Knowledge’s Boundary Problem.Stephen Hetherington - 2006 - Synthese 150 (1):41-56.details
- Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Analysis.Lars Gundersen - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (3):353-364.details
- Safety, Closure, and the Flow of Information.Jens Kipper - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):1109-1126.details
- The epistemology of neo-Gettier epistemology.Bob Lockie - unknowndetails
- Standard Gettier Cases: A Problem for Greco?Shane Ryan - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):201-212.details
- Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge.Katalin Farkas - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.details
- Chapter 2. Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 6-8.details
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