Secession

In this article, I (hereafter: the writer) have argued that the right to secede as a right to territory is multilateral, also, heterogeneous nationalism will be suggested to avoidance of secession. Moreover, an argument that the writer has called the Martyr Argument is presented against unilateral or consensual secession, and the writer will extend this argument to related topics and questions. As a result, this argument will defend a comprehensive anti-model of secession. Well, what is wrong with secession?

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

The text of this interview is based on a conversation between Bagryana Popov and Juliane Römhild on 1 September 2021. In this interview, Bagryana discusses two works which unite her research into political trauma and site-specific performance in the context of political repression under the communist regime in Bulgaria. For her choreography He is not here and the performance event Traces Bagryana returned to Sofia, the city of her birth, to explore her own family history and her grandfather’s incarceration as (...) a political prisoner. He is not here is a meditation on the body at the receiving end of political power developed in collaboration with dancer Simon Ellis. Traces takes the audience first to the courthouse in Sofia, where Bagryana’s grandfather was trialled, and then to her family’s flat where Bagryana’s daughter reads from the diaries of her grandmother. Both works were a part of Bagryana’s PhD project at Melbourne University. (shrink)

ABSTRACT For several decades now, a steady flow of scholarly contributions from both intellectual history and political theory has been reasserting Benjamin Constant as a theorist of liberal democracy. Constant’s visionary understanding of liberal democracy is usually conflated with his understanding of limited popular sovereignty. In this article, I reconstruct Constant’s positive conception of popular sovereignty, i.e. his conception of what popular sovereignty means within its limits and take it as the starting point of an analysis of Constant’s understanding of (...) democracy. I argue that Constant’s understanding of popular sovereignty as ‘the assent of all’ leads to a distinction between ‘governmental authority’ and ‘sovereign power’. The latter is exercised by the individual members of the political community and has features that align with contemporary aggregative and contestatory approaches to democracy. Even though according to this analysis, Constant’s conception of democracy allows for both pluralism and dynamism, those are operative against the background of a more fundamental conservatism: Constant’s understanding of sovereign power is predicated on an institutional status quo. (shrink)

Calls to recognize a right of return are a recurring feature of refugee crises. Particularly when such crises become long-term, advocates of displaced people insist that they be allowed to return to their country of origin. I argue that this right is best understood as the right of refugees to return, not to a prior territory, but to a prior political status. This status is one that sees not just any state, but a refugee's state of origin, take responsibility for (...) safeguarding their welfare. This entitlement I characterize as an institutional right: a right that presupposes, and is a necessary feature of, a particular institution. The institution of which the right of return is an indispensable part is the international political system that sees authority exercised by sovereign states. The institutional argument for a right of refugee return presupposes two basic factual claims about states: they play a central role in safeguarding rights and they pursue exclusionary policies of border control. Importantly, the institutional view presupposes only that states do perform both functions, not that they are justified in doing so. On a purely normative level, the institutional account assumes little more than the moral equality of human beings. (shrink)

We defend the moral and legal right to secede in accordance with plebiscitary theory. Our paper has three main goals. First, by offering a schematic characterization of plebiscitary theory, the main arguments in its favour (and the main objections to them), we contribute to clarify the structure of this complex debate. Second, we stress the point that, if the moral right to secede is established, the resistance for its inclusion into positive law is unjustified. Finally, by addressing old and new (...) objections to plebiscitary theory, we hope to make a compelling case for a wider recognition of secessionist rights. (shrink)

Supporters of open borders sometimes argue that the state has no pro tanto right to restrict immigration, because such a right would also entail a right to exclude existing citizens for whatever reasons justify excluding immigrants. These arguments can be defeated by suggesting that people have a right to stay put. I present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this “right to stay put” reply. I do this by describing a kind of exclusion that (...) has not been discussed in depth, which I call “territorial exclusion.” Territorial exclusion is the process according to which the group that wishes to exclude current citizens secedes from the territory in which those citizens reside. I argue that the wrongness of territorial exclusion explains why there is no pro tanto right for a state to exclude immigrants, because otherwise there would be a pro tanto right for the state to kick people out by seceding from the territory they inhabit. Because kicking people out like this is typically wrong, borders cannot be closed. (shrink)

This volume purports to explore the legal and political issues triggered by the new wave of secessionism. More specifically, those issues concern the interplay between notions of democracy and law. Against this background, the editors use amorality in order to escape the terrain of the justification of secession by making a distinction between the democratic theory of secession and the theory of democratic secession. In the first section, the theoretical nexus democracy-secession has been approached both from a legal and political (...) theory perspective. The second section of the book examines the instruments that the theory of democratic secession invokes in order to justify secession and presents both legal and political science contributions. The third section focuses on social movements and political actors. The fourth section focuses on two case studies due to the awareness of the importance of the difference between secession in a democratic occidental context and separations in a non-democratic context. (shrink)

‘Rights and Territories: A Reply to Nine, Miller, and Stilz’ defends the Lockean theory of states’ territorial rights against the critiques of Nine, Miller, and Stilz. In response to Nine’s concern that such a Lockean theory cannot justify the right of legitimate states to exclude aliens, it is argued that a consent-based theory like the Lockean one is flexible enough to justify a wide range of possible incidents of territorial rights – importantly including, though not necessarily including, the sort of (...) right to exclude aliens that is familiar from actual political practice. Miller’s criticisms are more wide-ranging. In response, the article argues that Lockean labor-based property rights are both stronger and more enduring than Miller suggests and that nationalism’s resources for dealing with concerns about rights-supersession and trapped minorities are importantly overstated by Miller. Against Stilz’s Kantian, ‘presentist’ account of states’ authority over persons and territories, it is argued that the rectification of past wrongs remains morally crucial even in the context of otherwise-just societies and that Stilz’s Kantian/rawlsian position unconvincingly privileges the rights to autonomy of territorially concentrated groups over those of dissenting individuals or wrongfully dispersed groups. (shrink)

There are various ways of reducing conflicts and of stabilizing the political situation in states where society is made up of many different ethnic groups and religious communities, and where relations between these segments – or between them and the central government – are tense. A particularly important way is the establishment in those states of a political system based on power-sharing (PS), which allows members of various ethnic and religious segments to take part in the exercise of power. The (...) literature on the subject usually discusses two models of PS: consociationalism and centripetalism. A third model is encountered in practice, however, that of hybrid power-sharing (HPS), which combines the institutions of the first two. The main objective of this article is to explain the nature and origins of HPS. (shrink)

The philosophical debate on secession has hitherto revolved primarily around the question of self-determination rather than that of distributive justice. Normative theorists of secession have approached the question of secession mostly in terms of the right that the secessionist group has to secede. Much less attention has been paid to the extent and the nature of obligations or duties that the seceding group might have toward the group it is leaving behind. At best, secession theorists have introduced clauses to the (...) effect that secession should not undermine the remainder state’s viability nor violate prior arrangements of reciprocal cooperation. While these clauses certainly reflect a certain concern for distributive justice, I argue that they are insufficient in two respects: they are problematically minimal in what they require, and the justification given for these clauses accounts only for part of the normative picture. In this paper, I address these two shortcomings by arguing that the seceding group might have significant duties of distributive justice toward the remainder group, and that these duties are associative in nature and stem from a concern to secure non-domination within the pre-secession polity. What is gained from my non-domination account, then, is that it is analytically more comprehensive and normatively more accurate. In arguing for claims and, the paper contributes both to the debate on secession as well as to the conceptualization of associative duties and of non-domination. (shrink)

Survey of the literature, issues, and debates about territorial rights.

According to the popular-choice theory of secession, the inhabitants of any territory, as a group, should have an internationally recognized right to secede from a sovereign state if their majority chooses by referendum to do so, and if they are capable of sustaining legitimate state institutions. Prior efforts to defend this group right on individualistic grounds—such as the individual right to associate freely or to participate as an equal in democratic decision-making—have failed. As a result, some recent defenders of the (...) choice theory have suggested that the group right the theory implies is “irreducibly collective.” I argue, to the contrary, that this group right can be grounded fully in the fundamental right of each individual to be treated as an equal by the political institutions to which he is subject. The territorial implications of the choice theory are, moreover, consistent with a plausible account of the territorial rights of states. (shrink)

The Author presents the theoretical framework of this «Governare lapaura»’ issue on the Fear of Secession. Starting from the recent cases of the Brexit and the Catalonian referendum, the main goal of this issue is reflecting on the relationship between the political crisis of unitary State and the revival of secession.

This essay explores the fear of secession in two different context: the exit of a member State from EU and the secession of a territorially concentrated group from a member State of the EU. The case of the recent Brexit and the crisis in Catalonia are taken as case studies to comprehend theoretically which secession could «constitute» EU as a Federation. In the second part, I exemplify how from the international perspective secession can be considered as an «ultimate right» and (...) that if one can talk of such a thing as legality when referring to secession that can be done only in the sense of a liminal legality: a legality that reside in the border area between the internal and the international legal order. In the last part of the essay, I shall try to use Catalonia as test to evaluate both the opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo and the famous Reference of the Canadian Supreme Court on Québec. In the conclusion of the essay, I will also verify if Catalonia can be read through the lens of the Just-Cause Theories of Secession. (shrink)

Latin American religious political thought includes colonial Spanish and Portuguese ideologies that preceded independence but have survived into the post-independence era, authoritarian ideologies supportive of military governments in the twentieth century, and progressive liberation theologies. In this article, I present a distinct tradition: a version of classical liberal thought. This tradition is skeptical of big government, opposed to caste systems, supportive of a high degree of federalism, uneasy with militarism, and supportive of democratic institutions while affirming religious social norms. This (...) ideology was developed in northeastern Brazil in the early nineteenth century by a Carmelite activist named Frei Caneca (Brother Mug), who published a newspaper titled the Typhis Pernambucano (Tiphys of the State of Pernambuco). (shrink)

Many of the major self-determination movements of the 20th and early 21st Centuries did not go smoothly, but resulted in forced or semi-forced transfers of groups of people from one country to another. Forced population transfers are not, of course, supported by major theorists of self-determination and secession. However, the problems that make population transfers extremely common in actual cases of self-determination and secession, are not squarely faced in many theories of self-determination. And, I shall argue, certain leading theories of (...) self-determination and secession would make population transfers almost inevitable in practice, even if not called for or sanctioned in theory. This is a major stumbling block for any attempt to move from an abstract account of self-determination towards a working theory. In this paper I take a first step towards addressing this problem. I shall show how any approach to dealing with secession, including “primary rights” accounts, “remedial rights only” accounts, and even “consensual” accounts, must be able to deal with the inevitable problem of population transfers, if it is to be a complete and plausible theory. I shall also show how population transfers, to the extent that we can always expect them to take place, can be made as just as possible, in light of any approach to the problem of secession. I will not here attempt to adjudicate between different approaches to secession and self-determination. To that extent, my argument may be seen as a friendly addition to all of the above approaches, showing how they may try to meet an objection which they have not yet faced. (shrink)

The recent crisis involving the territory of Crimea has been characterized both as a case of wrongful annexation and as one of rightful secession. Territory and competing territorial claims lie at the heart of the normative questions of secession and annexation. Any normative theory of secession or of annexation must therefore address their territorial aspect: It must explain why one agent rather than another has a valid claim to the disputed territory. One of the most interesting, yet controversial, normative accounts (...) of secession has been offered by choice theorists of secession. Choice theorists adopt a rather permissive stance, based on the normative significance of political self-determination. Choice theories, however, have been widely criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of what legitimates the seceding group’s territorial claim. This article argues that it is possible to remedy choice theories’ failure to address the question of territorial justification adequately. To do so, this article offers a two-tier account of territory that is grounded in the normative significance of self-determination. It defends this account of territory by showing that it is implied by our normative condemnation of annexation. It argues that the same reasons that warrant opposition to annexation provide support for secession. In closing, this article revisits the case of Crimea in light of its two-tier account of territory, and considers what role international law and institutions might play in addressing this type of situation. (shrink)

Based on evidence collected and analyzed about repetitive armed conflicts in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in Africa, Dr. Kibiswa establishes in this book that Bany2 armed group leaders, involved in insurgencies, fit into the two Van Evera’s criteria of ethnonationalist groups. Indeed, they display more loyalty to their ethnic group than to the DRC nation and are moved by their desire to achieve statehood. As such, this underlying motivation of their never-ending fights is hard for the DRC (...) nation to accommodate, while their geographic proximity to their fatherland as well as the availability of natural resources provide them with favorable conditions and easy means to believe in the success of their secessionist project. So, they keep trying and wagging war repeatedly. (shrink)

Allen Buchanan proposes a methodological framework with which theorists may evaluate different theories of secession, including the National Self-Determination theory. An important claim he makes is, because the right to secede is inherently institutional, any adequate theory of secession must include, as an integral part, an analysis of institutional morality. Because the National Self-Determination theory blatantly lacks such an analysis, Buchanan concludes that this theory is inherently flawed. In this paper, I consider Buchanan’s framework and the responses from supporters of (...) national self-determination theory. I try to clarify the confusion shared by both parties. I conclude that, although Buchanan’s theory of institutional morality is sound, his critiques of the national self-determination theory fails. (shrink)

The secession of prosperous regions may negatively affect the redistributive scheme of an established state. As a consequence, the capacity of its welfare system to support the inhabitants of poorer regions may be significantly reduced. Some authors assert that affluent groups who opt for full political independence violate duties of solidarity. This objection to the secession of prosperous regions can be based on different views of distributive justice. Here, following a distinction that has been introduced by Allen Buchanan, ‘subject centred’ (...) and ‘justice as reciprocity’ theories are explored. It is argued that both theories fail to support the case against the secession of wealthy groups. ‘Subject centred’ theories cannot explain special duties toward compatriots, whereas ‘justice as reciprocity’ theories cannot justify restrictions on exit rights. However, this does not mean that separatists have no moral duties vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. They are obliged to dissolve the political union in a fair way, e.g., by accepting responsibility for some share of the public debts. (shrink)

The principle of national self-determination holds that a national community, simply by virtue of being a national community, has a prima facie right to create its own sovereign state. While many support this principle, not as many agree that it should be formally recognized by political institutions. One of the main concerns is that implementing this principle may lead to certain types of inequalities—between nations with and without their own states, members inside and outside the border, and members and nonmembers (...) inside the same nation state. While these inequalities may arise, I shall argue that they are not unjust. These worries are partly the results of confusing two types of interests that a national group may have—in cultural affairs and in political affairs. While a national community should enjoy rights over their cultural affairs, this does not grant them authority over other non-cultural, political affairs. Once the distinction is drawn, we can see that there are constraints on the implementation of this principle. Consequently, these inequalities justify setting limits to a group’s right of self-government, although they do not conclusively refute the right itself. (shrink)

Because secession centrally involves taking away a territory, a successful normative theory of secession must give a credible account of when a seceding group has a valid territorial claim. One of the most prominent types of normative theory of secession is remedial theories of secession. I argue that while remedial theories address the question of territorial justification, they fail to do so adequately, because their account is both arbitrary and internally inconsistent. I argue that addressing the question of territorial justification (...) non-arbitrarily and consistently requires adopting a broader and morally more plausible conception of justice than that on which remedial theories explicitly rely; and I show that this broader conception of justice is implicit in remedial theories’ account of territorial justification. Recognizing this, however, has significant implications for remedial theories, as it considerably broadens the scope of valid territorial claims, and hence of valid secessionist claims. (shrink)

Voluntarist accounts of secession are those that attempt to ground a moral right to secede in autonomy. This paper argues that no such account is likely to succeed. After describing the serious problems that plague the most straightforward Voluntarist approach, I examine two recent accounts that employ novel approaches designed to avoid those difficulties. I argue that both accounts fail, shedding considerable doubt on the possibility of a plausible autonomy-based account of the moral right to secede. I go on to (...) discuss what this pessimistic conclusion implies for the theory and practice of secession. (shrink)

Daniel Kofman | : La littérature philosophique récente concernant les droits juridictionnels suppose qu’on puisse les justifier par une « théorie des droits territoriaux », sans faire appel à une théorie de l’autodétermination. Or les principes d’autodétermination des peuples devraient déterminer les principes des frontières juridictionnelles, et non le contraire. Les « droits territoriaux » sont essentiellement des droits de gouvernance, lesquels découlent eux-mêmes des principes d’autodétermination. Pour défendre ces thèses, je critique les arguments de Brilmayer, Simmons, et Stilz. | (...) : Recent philosophical literature on jurisdictional rights assumes they can be justified by a “theory of territorial rights” without a theory of self-determination. However, principles of self-determination of peoples should determine principles of jurisdictional boundaries, not the contrary. “Territorial rights” are essentially rights of governance, which derive from principles of self-determination. I support these theses by criticising arguments of Brilmayer, Simmons and Stilz. (shrink)

A number of philosophers argue that the moral value of national identity is sufficient to justify at least a prima facie right of a national community to create its own independent, sovereign state. In the literature, this argument is commonly referred to as the identity argument. In this paper, I consider whether the identity argument successfully proves that a national group is entitled to a state of its own. To do so, I first explain three important steps in the argument (...) and then consider whether they lead to the desired conclusion. My examination reveals that the identity argument relies on the Optimal Protection Principle; however, this principle does not apply to the case of a national community. As a result, the identity argument fails to justify even a prima facie right of a national community to establish its own state. (shrink)

L’interprétation d’un acte de violence de masse est toujours délicate puisqu’elle confère un certain statut au groupe visé. Ce statut peut devenir un facteur important dans la décision de la communauté internationale de reconnaître ou non l’indépendance d’un groupe et de son territoire. Cet article examine le cas de la reconnaissance du Kosovo par la communauté internationale, en février 2008, et soutient que cette reconnaissance a été rendue possible par l’utilisation d’arguments basés sur le statut collectif de victime de nettoyage (...) ethnique détenu par la population albanaise du Kosovo. L’article comble le fossé entre, d’un côté, la théorie de la sécession comme réparation, et de l’autre, les travaux sur la violence de masse contre les groupes ethnonationaux. L’analyse montre que la pratique de la reconnaissance étatique a été réorientée vers un critère restrictif lié au type de violence subie par le groupe réclamant l’indépendance. Dans cette optique, le territoire devient une forme tangible de compensation pour les injustices subies, ce qui tranche par rapport à la pratique antérieure de la reconnaissance étatique dans l’ex-Yougoslavie et ailleurs.The interpretation of an act of mass violence is always a contentious issue since it confers a certain status to the targeted group. This status may become an important factor in the international community’s decision to recognize or not the independence of a group and its territory. This article examines the case of Kosovo’s February 2008 recognition by the international community and argues that this recognition was made possible by the summoning of arguments based on Kosovo Albanians’ collective status as victims of ethnic cleansing. The article bridges the gap between on the one hand the Remedial Right theory of secession, and on the other hand, works on mass violence against ethnonational groups. The article shows that the practice of state recognition was reoriented towards a restrictive criterion linked to the type of violence sustained by the group claiming independence. Under this interpretation, territory becomes a tangible form of compensation for suffered injustices, which contrasts with earlier practice of state recognition in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. (shrink)

Symposium: Territory, Belonging: secession, self-determination and territorial rights in the age of identity politics With a discussion of Neera Chandhoke’s Contested Secessions. Rights, Self-determination, Democracy and Kashmir (OUP 2012) Guest Editor: Valentina Gentile Submission Deadline Long(1,000 words max): November 15, 2012 Full paper (10,000 words max, upon acceptance): March 15, 2013 Invited Contributors Allen Buchanan (DukeUniversity), Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University), Margaret Moore (Queen’s University) and Neera Chandhoke (University of Delhi).

In this chapter I will survey the philosophical discussion on the justification of territorial rights which has developed during the last two decades. By a territorial right I will understand a moral entitlement to exert jurisdictional power, i.e. to enact and to enforce laws, within a certain area. The theories of territorial rights which are currently debated in political philosophy can be broadly classified into four groups. In the following I will examine various forms of property theories, justice-based arguments, national (...) accounts and choice theories. Ultimately, I will defend a plebiscitary version of choice theory which considers the will of the residents to be decisive for the assessment of territorial claims. (shrink)

Although national identity is valuable in a variety of ways, I argue that its value is not sufficient to justify a group’s right to govern itself, either in the form of an independent, sovereign state or an autonomous, sub-state government. My thesis is somewhat unusual—most philosophers who affirm the value of national identity also endorse the right of a national community to some form of self-government, and most philosophers who deny that a national community has the right to any form (...) of self-government also deny the value of national identity. (shrink)

On 17 February 2008, the province of Kosovo formally declared its independence from Serbia. The most important normative theories of secession*choice theories and just cause theories* appear to justify the creation of a second Albanian state on the Balkans. Kosovo’s independence reflects the will of the vast majority of its inhabitants and can be seen as a remedy for grave human rights violations in the era of Slobodan Milos?evic´. Two problems, however, need to be thoroughly discussed. Firstly, the secession of (...) Kosovo may establish a precedent for other separatist conflicts and contribute to the destabilization of south-east Europe and other world regions. Secondly, the new political authorities in Pristina may not be capable to protect the Serb minority against discrimination and repression. It is argued that both problems give no conclusive reasons to reject Kosovo’s claim for independence. However, some aspects of the secession, for instance the maintenance of the provincial borders, are considered to be illegitimate. Keywords: drawing of borders; independence; majority decision; minority protection; primary right theories; remedial right theories; self-determination; sovereignty; territorial integrity Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2010, pp. 123-142. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v3i2.1983. (shrink)

In this article, I present and critically analyze the main ideas of the Nigerian thinker, Ifeanyi A. Menkiti, on the future of the multi-ethnic state in Africa. Menkiti appears to consider that the basic condition for the successful coexistence of the various groups occupying the states of Africa is for relations between them to rest on just principles. Justice should involve the fair and equitable division amongst peoples of the burdens and benefits of living in a common state. To realize (...) this ideal, he proposes the creation in Africa of morally neutral, managerial states. He bases his plan in part on the ideas of John Rawls. Close analysis of Menkiti’s views shows that his vision of the minimalist state is only a temporary solution, which is to lead to the peaceful dismemberment of the current post-colonial model of multi-ethnic states functioning within the old colonial borders. The basic value of Menkiti’s thought rests in his reversal of the usual perspective on African states, as he considers that maintaining territorial integrity or achieving unity should no longer be considered a paramount necessity. Published in "Hemispheres", 2010, No. 25. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the political development of the Belarusian society in the years 1986–2006 in order to answer the following questions: (i) what was the impact of support the nomenclature of the Belarusian Communist Party gave to the Belarusian independence after August 1991 on the process of decrease in power regulation (or in other words – democratization), (ii) why initial period of decrease in power regulation was replaced by its growth and (iii) why this growth (...) of power regulation did not encounter efficient civil reaction like in the neighbouring republics (ex. Ukraine). Finally, I would like to consider further political development in Belarus, especially the perspective of civil revolutions. Presented analysis will not be a chronicler’s presentation of facts from the current history of this country but will be based on a social theory – non–Marxian historical materialism, which will serve as a basis for answering these questions and considering posed problems. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the beginnings and growth of civil movements in the Baltic republics in years 1985-1991, which led to their state independence. Proces of liberation of Baltic societies will be analyzed according to the following criteria: size and range of the civil movement and forms of its institutionalization (i), political concession made by republican authorities (ii) and level of control over the republican structure of power exercised by the civil movements (iii). Finally, I will (...) try to consider why evolution of the Baltic societies resulted in building of the stable democracies, whereas these same efforts are still unsuccesful in Belarus and were unsuccesful in Ukraine. This analysis will not be a chronicle's presentation of events from current history of the Baltic states but will be based on a coherent theoretical framework achieved by employing models and conceptual apparatus of non-Marxian historical materialism. (shrink)

The paper conceptualizes five basic developmental paths the post-Soviet republics followed. The conceptual framework of this paper is expanded theory of real socialism in non-Marxian historical materialism, namely proposed the model of secession from socialist empire. The first developmental path was followed by societies in which an independent civil revolution took place. This path of development bifurcates into two furhter sub-variants. Namely civil revolutions in the Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) resulted in the independence and stable democracies. Civil revolution in (...) Caucasus republics (Armenia, Gergia) were partially succesfull because civil movement in these societies were unable to build stable democracies. Countries such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine followed next developmental path. Its characteristic feauture is active participation of republican communist nomenclatures in seceding from the Soviet Union and gaining state independence. In this variant of development, democratization - characteristic for the first period of independence was counterbalanced by the growing autocratization of political system. This path of development was divided into two developmental variants: in one group of countries (Ukraine) the growth of autocratization caused civil resistance (Ukraine), in the rest societies of this group (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova) - not. Finally the countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) followed the fith developmental path. In these societies, independence permitted to preserve dictatorship of local communist nomenclatures. (shrink)