A deontological approach to surgical ethics advocates that patients have the right to receive the best care that can be provided. The ‘learning curve’ in surgical skill is an observable and measurable phenomenon. Surgical training may therefore carry risk to patients. This can occur directly, through inadvertent harm, or indirectly through theatre inefficiency and associated costs. Trainee surgeon operating, however, is necessary from a utilitarian perspective, with potential risk balanced by the greater societal need to train future independent surgeons.New technology (...) means that the surgical learning curve could take place, at least in part, outside of the operating theatre. Simulation-based deliberate practice could be used to obtain a predetermined level of proficiency in a safe environment, followed by simulation-based assessment of operative competence. Such an approach would require an overhaul of the current training paradigm and significant investment in simulator technology. This may increasingly be viewed as necessary in light of well-discussed pressures on surgical trainees and trainers.This article discusses the obligations to trainees, trainers and training bodies raised by simulation technology, and outlines the current arguments both against and in favour of a simulation-based training-to-proficiency model in surgery. The significant changes to the current training paradigm that would be required to implement such a model are also discussed. (shrink)

Nihilism is the logic of nothing as something, which claims that Nothing Is. Its unmaking of things, and its forming of formless things, strain the fundamental terms of existence: what it is to be, to know, to be known. But nihilism, the antithesis of God, is also like theology. Where nihilism creates nothingness, condenses it to substance, God also makes nothingness creative. Negotiating the borders of spirit and substance, theology can ask the questions of nihilism that other disciplines do not (...) ask: Where is it? What is it made of? Why is it so destructive? How can it be made holy, or overcome? Genealogy of Nihilism rereads Western history in the light of nihilistic logic, which pervades two millennia of Western thought and is coming to fruition in our present age in a virulently dangerous manner. From Parmenides to Alain Badiou, via Plotinus, Avicenna, Duns Scotus, Ockham, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, Lacan, Deleuze and Derrida, a genealogy of nothingness can be witnessed in development, with devastating consequences for the way we live. Conor Cunningham's elaborate and sophisticated theology, spanning the disciplines of philosophy, science and popular culture, permits us to see not simply how modernity has formulated its philosophies of nothing, but how these philosophies might be transfigures by the crucial difference theology makes, and so be reconcilable with life and the living - with the very gift which being is. (shrink)

Human desires for survival and things conducive to survival seem to be exactly what one would expect given natural selection. Thus, one might intuitively assume that such desires provide evidence for evolutionary naturalism. The purpose of this paper is to show that they do not: desires for survival, things conducive to survival, and other natural desires found in human beings are not an evidential asset to evolutionary naturalism. Indeed, they are severely problematic due to their intentionality and the fact that (...) they fit just as well, if not better, with theism. (shrink)

This book explores the uses of the term “paradigm” with respect to both logos and myth in Plato, with a focus on Sophist and Statesman. In so doing, Conor Barry argues for a unitary as opposed to a developmental conception of Plato's dialogues.

Theology after Heidegger must take into account history and language as constitutive elements in the pursuit of meaning. Quite often, this prompts a hurried flight from metaphysics to an embrace of an absence at the center of Christian narrativity. In this book, Conor Sweeney explores the "postmodern" critique of presence in the context of sacramental theology, engaging the thought of Louis-Marie Chauvet and Lieven Boeve. Chauvet is an influential postmodern theologian whose critique of the perceived onto-theological constitution of presence (...) in traditional sacramental theology has made big waves, while Boeve is part of a more recent generation of theologians who even more wholeheartedly embrace postmodern consequences for theology. Sweeney considers the extent to which postmodernism a la Heidegger upsets the hermeneutics of sacramentality, asking whether this requires us to renounce the search for a presence that by definition transcends us. Against both the fetishization of presence and absence, Sweeney argues that metaphysics has a properly sacramental basis, and that it is only through this reality that the dialectic of presence and absence can be transcended. The case is made for the full but restless signification of the mother's smile as the paradigm for genuine sacramental presence. (shrink)

While scholarly research on the relationship between female board representation and strategic decision-making has gained momentum, employee policy outcomes have remained relatively understudied. Integrating theory from the ethics of care perspective with research on the glass ceiling and workplace voice, we seek to understand the circumstances under which female directors influence policy changes for firm employees. We argue that firms with increasing female board representation are more likely to enact human capital development policies benefiting firm employees. However, this positive relationship (...) will ultimately diminish as boards accrue an increasing number of female directors. We further predict that the presence of a female leader at the firm (serving in the role of either the CEO or the board chair) will moderate this diminishing effect. Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find support for our hypotheses. The findings from this study provide evidence that while female board representation is positively related to human capital development policies, this effect is nuanced and impacted by the presence of female leadership at the top of organizations. Our paper extends existing research on the nature of female directors’ influence on ethical decisions, emphasizing the impact of these directors on employees. (shrink)

My argument in this paper is that Charles Taylor’s view of liberty and ethics unites Isaiah Berlin’s liberal pluralism with Elizabeth Anscombe’s virtue ethics. Berlin identifies, in “Two Concepts of Liberty,” a tradition of negative liberty advocated by figures like Locke and Mill. He maintains that this concept of liberty is unique to modernity, and it is the form of liberty best suited to the political sphere. The much older concept of positive liberty, which is found in ancient philosophers like (...) Plato and Aristotle, as well as modern thinkers like Hegel, Berlin regards as ill-suited to the political sphere. Anscombe, in “Modern Moral Philosophy,” specifically identifies and criticizes the Anglo-Saxon tradition of moral philosophy. Utilitarian thinkers like Mill are, for Anscombe, consequentialists. The virtue ethics of Aristotle gives a basis for the intrinsic goodness and badness of actions not in sentiment but reason. Charles Taylor draws upon the views of both thinkers. He advocates a liberal pluralism in a manner comparable to Berlin. However, Taylor strongly emphasizes, with Anscombe, that the most complete conception of ethical and political life must be rooted in virtue ethics and positive liberty. Thus, Taylor’s views constitute a synthesis of the approaches of his two mentors. (shrink)

Using the work of Lacan but with reference to a number of other philosophers, this article argues eight main theses: first of all, that non-Platonic philosophical construction follows after a foundational destruction; second, that philosophy generally has a nothing outside its text, one that allows for the formation of that text—for example, Kant forms the text of phenomena only by way of the noumena; third, that this transcendental nothing renders all identities ideal, however that is conceived—an example being Badiou’s notion (...) of “belonging,” one derived from the work of Georg Cantor and Paul Cohen; fourth, that a consequence of this ideality is mereological nihilism; fifth, due to this mereological nihilism any existent is only ever an aggregate, that is, an aggregate of some base element, or “stuff ”—a position that returns such philosophy to that of the ancients; sixth, this collapses idealism and materialism into each other, a collapse marked by what is referred to throughout as an impossible monism. Moreover, this impossible monism is a result of philosophy’s constant production of a bastard trinity—a dual monism, as it were. Seventh, that there are two models of difference evident in non-Platonic philosophy: the first is that of a block, with difference cut into it—like Swiss cheese, as it were—while the second is a flux which we seek to arrest with local regimes of stability. Eighth, and finally, that theology, in line with Plato, suggests the possibility of another difference, namely, a peaceable one. (shrink)

According to contemporary nonpositivist theories, legal obligations are a subset of our genuine moral obligations. Debates within nonpositivism then turn on how we delimit the legal “domain” of morality. Recently, nonpositivist theories have come under criticism on two grounds. First, that they are underinclusive, because they cannot explain why paradigmatically “legal” obligations are such. Second, that they are overinclusive, because they count as “legal” certain moral obligations that are plainly nonlegal. This paper undertakes both a ground-clearing exercise for and a (...) defense of nonpositivism. It argues, in particular, that Dworkin's claims about the legal domain of morality in his later work are often mischaracterized by critics, because these critics fail to read these claims in light of his earlier theory of “Law as Integrity.” A nonpositivist theory that unifies Dworkin's earlier and later work, I argue, deals with the criticisms leveled at nonpositivist theories better than other nonpositivist competitors. (shrink)

This study examines the semantics of a root form underlying a wide range of Dene lexical expressions. The root evolved from a simple nominal denoting “club” to expressions lexicalizing the movement of stick-like objects and the rotation of helicopter blades. These semantic extensions arise through source-in-target and target-in-source metonymies. Drawing on Cognitive Linguistics, especially the theory of metonymy, offers a method of describing the range of meanings expressed by this root in a concise manner. Focusing on the results of metonymic (...) meaning extensions also opens the way to addressing questions in the history of Dene languages. This study contributes to increasing the typological scope of Cognitive Linguistic approaches and argues for the usefulness of the theory in addressing problems in Dene linguistics. (shrink)

The British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), like many nineteenth-century institutions, sought to avoid controversy by excluding the discussion of political and religious topics from its proceedings. Nonpartisanship was a veneer it could hide behind. Yet during the Montreal meeting of 1884—the first time the association ventured beyond the comfortable confines of the British Isles—this “middle way” was tested. While local and visiting Anglophones, many of them BAAS members, viewed the proceedings and character of the association as “decidedly (...) friendly” to religion and as promoting the broad interests of Protestants, Montreal’s episcopacy and French- speaking press rallied against the anti-Catholic BAAS, accusing it of harboring a dangerous Masonic clique. In different material and social spaces, the relationship between science, religion, and the association was conceived in distinct ways. In examining this case, this essay seeks to augment the growing body of scholarship within science studies that recognizes the importance of writing both the history and the geography of encounters between science and religion. (shrink)

According to the fitting-attitudes account of value, for X to be good is for it to be fitting to value X. But what is it for an attitude to be fitting? A popular recent view is that it is for there to be sufficient reason for the attitude. In this paper we argue that proponents of the fitting-attitudes account should reject this view and instead take fittingness as basic. In this way they avoid the notorious ‘wrong kind of reason’ problem, (...) and can offer attractive accounts of reasons and good reasoning in terms of fittingness. (shrink)

Biobanking, the large-scale, systematic collection of data and tissue for open-ended research purposes, is on the rise, particularly in clinical research. The infrastructures for the systematic procurement, management and eventual use of human tissue and data are positioned between healthcare and research. However, the positioning of biobanking infrastructures and transfer of tissue and data between research and care is not an innocuous go-between. Instead, it involves changes in both domains and raises issues about how distinctions between research and care are (...) drawn and policed. Based on an analysis of the emergence and development of clinical biobanking in the Netherlands, this article explores how processes of bio-objectification associated with biobanking arise, redefining the ways in which distinctions between research and clinical care are governed. (shrink)

As Catholics, like all people of goodwill, work to confront the ongoing legacy of racism in the United States, they need additional resources to understand and challenge the suprapersonal aspects of racism at the social level. Building on existing Catholic analyses of racism as a form of cultural sin and incorporating recent refinements in the concept of structural sin, this paper argues that Catholic social thought can yield a more comprehensive account of systemic racism as a structural and cultural problem. (...) This combined analysis provides the theological resources to help Catholics recognize a duty to confront racism and promote racial justice as a natural extension of their faith commitments. (shrink)

Feminine beauty was implicated in colonial ways of seeing Indigenous peoples. The Australian ‘Native Belle’, as the feminine type of the noble savage, caught the European imagination at the time that European women such as Mary Wollstonecraft inaugurated a critique of feminine beauty as enslaving. Representations of the native belle were disseminated through new forms of communication and were implicated in prevailing discourses of Indigenous peoples such as ethnology. The native belle demonstrates a European longing for feminine beauty that was (...) natural and unaffected. This type also demonstrates that ideas of visual identity as manifest in feminine beauty were important descriptors of racial difference. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:William of Tyre, Livy, and the Vocabulary of ClassConor KostickThe most valuable source for the history of the early crusades and the Kingdom of Jerusalem is undoubtedly William of Tyre's A History of Deeds Done Beyond The Sea. A work of great scholarship and careful detail, it is particularly important in that William was Chancellor of the Kingdom of Jerusalem from 1174 and Archbishop of Tyre from 1175 to (...) his death c. 1185 and so was closely placed to the political decision making of the period. William was also a careful and highly educated scholar; although born in Jerusalem, he spent twenty years among the leading intellectuals of France and Italy and, after pursuing an avid interest in the liberal arts, devoted himself to civil law and the teachings of the masters at Bologna.1 In this respect William is far more than a narrator of crusading history, for which he would be highly regarded; he is also an important figure in the intellectual advances of the twelfth century. A close examination of William's vocabulary of social order shows that in his work he advanced the evolution of twelfth-century social concepts and also shed some light on the social structure of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.The History was commissioned by King Amalric of Jerusalem in 1167 and took its final form after redrafting by William in 1184, and it is clear that in his work William reveals a very rich vocabulary to describe social classes (see appendix). William actually uses the term classis to mean a social category of person. Current scholarship in history, sociology, and political theory would consider it anachronistic to talk about class in the twelfth century. Indeed, the use of classis as a term for social category must have been extremely rare as even such eminent scholars of lexicographers as Charles Dufresne Du Cange and Jan Frederik Niermeyer do not note it.Insofar as medieval writers before William discussed society, they referred to ordines, the orders of society. In the early part of the eleventh century even [End Page 353] the most advanced discussion of the subject of class had not progressed beyond the work of Adalbero, Bishop of Laon, and Gerard, Bishop of Cambrai, writing c. 1025, who had articulated the famous tripartite division of society according to function—those who pray, those who fight, and those who labor.2William uses the term ordo to mean order in the theological sense and ordines to indicate social order, but equally often he uses the term classis for the same purpose. For example, in describing the character of Baldwin III, he writes that "[Baldwin] acquired so great favor to himself from the commoners and the greater people that he was more popular with both classes [classis] than his predecessors."3 After the defeat of King Louis VII at Mount Cadmus, 7 January 1148, during the Second Crusade, William describes how the women fearfully cast about during for the return of fathers, lords, husbands, and sons: "and while they did not find what they sought they spent the night kept awake by the burden of their cares... nevertheless there returned in the night some of each of these classes [classis]."4Classis also appears in the phrase secundae classis homines, a phrase used three times to indicate a category of middle-class person. In describing the distant origins of the Hospitallers he says that it was a time when "there also flocked [to Jerusalem] some of the other nations, both nobles and the second class of men."5 At the fall of Balbis (3 November 1168) King Amalric's troops, "scarcely spared the old people and children, and were not any more merciful to the second class of persons."6 For his campaign beginning December 1170 the king's formidable opponent Saladin "increased his army with commoners and the second class of people."7 It is interesting to note that in these last two examples the term is referring to Muslim society, which William must have considered as socially diverse as his own. The existence and activity of a middle class of person as subjects of his history required William to use... (shrink)

The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex is a key node in the human salience network. It has been ascribed motor, pain-processing and affective functions. However, the dynamics of information flow in this complex region and how it responds to inputs remain unclear and are difficult to study using non-invasive electrophysiology. The area is targeted by neurosurgery to treat neuropathic pain. During deep brain stimulation surgery, we recorded local field potentials from this region in humans during a decision-making task requiring motor output. (...) We investigated the spatial and temporal distribution of information flow within the dACC. We demonstrate the existence of a distributed network within the anterior cingulate cortex where discrete nodes demonstrate directed communication following inputs. We show that this network anticipates and responds to the valence of feedback to actions. We further show that these network dynamics adapt following learning. Our results provide evidence for the integration of learning and the response to feedback in a key cognitive region. (shrink)

In a book on Justinian’s wars of conquest, Peter Heather has argued that Rome’s ability to wage war in the sixth century CE was helped, to a large degree, by the military revolution that took place in Late Antiquity, which consisted of two principal parts: an increased deployment of Roman soldiers to the eastern frontier, and a shift towards Hunnic tactics. In this essay, however, I argue that these claims are misguided, and using five criteria set out by Lee Brice (...) in an article on military revolution during the reigns of Philip II and Alexander the Great of Macedon, I show that the changes which Heather argues in favour of had begun long before Late Antiquity. Instead, what we see is the continued gradual evolution of Rome’s military, with the Roman state shifting troops to the east from the beginning of the imperial era, and the first documented implementation of steppe-inspired changes dating to the second century. (shrink)

Reasoning is a certain kind of attitude-revision. What kind? The aim of this paper is to introduce and defend a new answer to this question, based on the idea that reasoning is a goodness-fixing kind. Our central claim is that reasoning is a functional kind: it has a constitutive point or aim that fixes the standards for good reasoning. We claim, further, that this aim is to get fitting attitudes. We start by considering recent accounts of reasoning due to Ralph (...) Wedgwood and John Broome, and argue that, while these accounts contain important insights, they are not satisfactory: Wedgwood’s rules out too much, and Broome’s too little. We then introduce and defend our alternative account, discuss some of its implications and attractions, and, finally, consider objections. (shrink)

What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning—both theoretical and practical—according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds that the standards of (...) good reasoning derive from rational requirements. The second holds that these standards derive from reasons. We argue that these accounts face serious difficulties in correctly distinguishing good from bad reasoning, and in explaining what's worthwhile about good reasoning. We then propose our alternative account and argue that it performs better on these counts. In the final section, we develop certain elements of the account in response to some possible objections. (shrink)

Limited scholarly attention has been committed to the analysis of Nietzsche’s 1873 Time-Atom Theory, a fragment whose contentions strike both the seasoned and unseasoned reader of the Nachlass as especially speculative and grandiose. The principal objective of this essay is to critically review and extend the recent aspects of this limited commentary, focusing on the work of Gregory Whitlock, Robin Small and Keith Ansell-Pearson. I argue that an important and overlooked ambiguity is latent in Nietzsche’s framing of his argument, which (...) impinges upon the scope and purpose of the fragment. I consider the question posed by Small as to the status of the time-points in the fragment which, I contend, Nietzsche does not hold to be empirical. Thirdly, I discuss a central point of debate between Whitlock, Small and Ansell-Pearson: the extent of the analogy between Roger Boscovich and Nietzsche. I submit in conclusion that the connections between the two have been over-emphasised in the context of the 1873 fragment, and that this relationship cannot yield a complete account of Nietzsche’s approach. (shrink)

This paper compares the treatment of private sensations in the works of Wittgenstein and Klossowski. Its aim is to show that, despite the differences between their traditions and methods, they align in at least one important respect: rejecting relations of reference between signs and private sensations. The paper briefly contextualises their lines of attack on these relations, situating the two thinkers’ commonalities amidst what are undeniably divergent wider purposes. It proceeds to argue for two more specific conclusions. Firstly, Klossowski’s own (...) rejoinder directed at reference to private sensations is rooted in his comparison of linguistic meaning to economic valuation in Living Currency. Secondly, Klossowski goes beyond Wittgenstein in arguing that, regardless of the status of reference of this sort, no complete account of sensation can view it only as private. (shrink)

According to Paul Boghossian and others, inference is subject to the taking condition: it necessarily involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion, and drawing the conclusion because of that fact. Boghossian argues that this condition vindicates the idea that inference is an expression of agency, and that it has several other important implications too. However, we argue in this paper that the taking condition should be rejected. The condition gives rise to several serious prima facie problems and (...) the reasons which have been offered in favour of it fail to convince. (shrink)

This is a survey of recent debates concerning the normativity of belief. We explain what the thesis that belief is normative involves, consider arguments for and against that thesis, and explore its bearing on debates in metaethics.

In Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, Bernard Stiegler develops an account of the pedagogical responsibilities which follow from rhythmic intergenerational flows, involving the creation of milieus which care for and pay attention to the future, toward the creation of nootechnical milieus. Such milieus are defined by their objects of attention: intellectual life, spiritual life, and political life; taken together: noetic life. Such is the claim Alfred North Whitehead makes when arguing that the sole object of education is life (...) and the creation of an art of life which is itself a rhythmic adventure.The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, to clarify the importance of Stiegler’s reading of Aristotle’s notion of the noetic soul in our thinking about the role, purpose, and function of educational institutions in relation to intellective, spiritual, and political life. In this paper, I will fuse this discussion with a Whiteheadian approach to rhythm, developing what I call a ‘rhythmic nootechnics’ in the service of ‘nootechnical evolution’ as, I argue, Whitehead’s approach to rhythm allows to clarify and enrich Stiegler’s reading of Aristotle. Second, and as indicated, to explore the relationship between Whitehead and Stiegler, insofar as the former has become an increasing reference point for the latter, but this relationship remains unexplored in the literature. Third, to apply this concept of ‘rhythmic nootechnics’ to think about what transformations at the level of pedagogy and politics are necessary to reinvent the university from this Stieglerian and Whiteheadian perspective. (shrink)

I argue that, if belief is subject to a norm of truth, then that norm is evaluative rather than prescriptive in character. No prescriptive norm of truth is both plausible as a norm that we are subject to, and also capable of explaining what the truth norm of belief is supposed to explain. Candidate prescriptive norms also have implausible consequences for the normative status of withholding belief. An evaluative norm fares better in all of these respects. I propose an evaluative (...) account according to which the goodness of true belief is, in Geach's sense, attributive rather than predicative. (shrink)

Beliefs are held to norms in a way that seems to require control over what we believe. Yet we don’t control our beliefs at will, in the way we control our actions. I argue that this problem can be solved by recognising a different form of control, which we exercise when we revise our beliefs directly for reasons. We enjoy this form of attitudinal control not only over our beliefs, but also over other attitudes, including intentions—that is, over the will (...) itself. Closely tied to our capacity for reasoning, attitudinal control is in important respects more fundamental than the voluntary control that we exercise over our actions. In the course of developing this account I respond to two objections recently raised against an earlier version of it by Booth. (shrink)

As rational agents, we are governed by reasons. The fact that there’s beer at the pub might be a reason to go there and a reason to believe you’ll enjoy it. As this example illustrates, there are reasons for both action and for belief. There are also many other responses for which there seem to be reasons – for example, desire, regret, admiration, and blame. This diversity raises questions about how reasons for different responses relate to each other. Might certain (...) such reasons be more fundamental than others? Should certain reasons and not others be treated as paradigmatic? At least implicitly, many philosophers treat reasons for action as the fundamental or paradigmatic case. In contrast, this paper articulates and defends an alternative approach, on which reasons for attitudes are fundamental, and reasons for action are both derivative and, in certain ways, idiosyncratic. After outlining this approach, we focus on defending its most contentious thesis, that reasons for action are fundamentally reasons for intention. We offer two arguments for this thesis, which turn on central roles of reasons: that reasons can be responded to, and that reasons can feature as premises of good reasoning. We then examine objections to the thesis and argue that none succeed. We conclude by sketching some ways in which our approach is significant for theorising about reasons. (shrink)

Beliefs can be correct or incorrect, and this standard of correctness is widely thought to be fundamental to epistemic normativity. But how should this standard be understood, and in what way is it so fundamental? I argue that we should resist understanding correctness for belief as either a prescriptive or an evaluative norm. Rather, we should understand it as an instance of the distinct normative category of fittingness for attitudes. This yields an attractive account of epistemic reasons.

This paper defends the possibility of doxastic freedom, arguing that doxastic freedom should be modelled not on freedom of action but on freedom of intention. Freedom of action is exercised by agents like us, I argue, through voluntary control. This involves two conditions, intentions-reactivity and reasons-reactivity, that are not met in the case of doxastic states. Freedom of intention is central to our agency and to our moral responsibility, but is not exercised through voluntary control. I develop and defend an (...) account of freedom of intention, arguing that constitutive features of intention ensure that freedom of intention cannot require voluntary control. Then I show that an analogous argument can be applied to doxastic states. I argue that if we had voluntary control of intentions or of doxastic states, this would actually undermine our freedom. (shrink)

Large language models (LLMs) are not detailed models of human linguistic processing. They are, however, extremely successful at their primary task: Providing a model for language. For this reason LLMs are important in psycholinguistics: They are useful as a practical tool, as an illustrative comparative, and philosophically, as a basis for recasting the relationship between language and thought.

This paper explores the interface between users and producers of translational science through three case studies. It argues that effective TS requires a breakdown between user and producer roles: users become producers and producers become users. In making this claim, we challenge conventional understandings of TS as well as linear models of innovation. Policy-makers and funders increasingly expect TS and its associated socioeconomic benefits to occur when funding scientific research. We argue that a better understanding of the hybridity between users (...) and producers in TS is essential to encouraging effective TS activities. In arguing for broader understandings of the hybrid roles of user/producers in TS we rely on empirical observations made during our four-year study of three translational pathways here labeled clinical, commercial, and civic. These pathways were identified in a large-scale network of scientists investigating the pathogenomics of innate immunity (i.e. “the PI.2 network”.. (shrink)