Attitudinal control

Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Beliefs are held to norms in a way that seems to require control over what we believe. Yet we don’t control our beliefs at will, in the way we control our actions. I argue that this problem can be solved by recognising a different form of control, which we exercise when we revise our beliefs directly for reasons. We enjoy this form of attitudinal control not only over our beliefs, but also over other attitudes, including intentions—that is, over the will itself. Closely tied to our capacity for reasoning, attitudinal control is in important respects more fundamental than the voluntary control that we exercise over our actions. In the course of developing this account I respond to two objections recently raised against an earlier version of it by Booth

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 83,944

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
Doxastic voluntarism.Rico Vitz - 2008 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
An Essay on Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
Compatibilism and doxastic control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.
Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Taking control of belief.Miriam McCormick - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169-183.
Deontology and doxastic control.Nicholas Tebben - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2835-2847.
Virtue and voluntarism.James Montmarquet - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):393 - 402.
Belief control and intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.
Doxastic Voluntarism and Self-Deception.Anthony R. Booth - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (22):115 - 130.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-15

Downloads
300 (#48,720)

6 months
11 (#101,586)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Conor McHugh
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.Cameron Boult - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):518-534.
All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).

View all 40 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

View all 41 references / Add more references